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进攻性现实主义 Offensive realism
https://www.britannica.com/topic/offensive-realism
约翰·J·米尔斯海默（John J. Mearsheimer）的观点被他称为“进攻性现实主义”，他认为对安全的需要以及最终对生存的需要使国家成为侵略性权力最大化者。 除了临时联盟之外，各国不会合作，而是不断寻求削弱竞争对手的力量并增强自己的力量。
In John J. Mearsheimer View, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
约翰·米尔斯海默和他的进攻性现实主义
John Mearsheimer & his offensive realism
2024 年 2 月 27 日
出生：1947年12月14日，美国纽约州纽约（76岁）
研究科目： 国际关系
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
约翰·米尔斯海默深受新现实主义国际关系学派创始人肯尼思·瓦尔兹的影响。 汉斯·摩根索等古典现实主义者将国际冲突归因于政治领导人寻求增加权力的自然倾向，而瓦尔兹等新现实主义者（或结构现实主义者）则将战争的原因归咎于国际关系结构。 在沃尔兹的模型中，缺乏高于国家的权威（无政府状态）迫使它们结成联盟，以遏制竞争对手构成的威胁。 换句话说，国际秩序是由国家之间的力量平衡决定的。 出于安全的需要，各国倾向于维持现状并对竞争对手采取防御立场。
米尔斯海默的相反观点被他称为“进攻性现实主义”，他认为对安全的需要以及最终对生存的需要使国家成为侵略性权力最大化者。 除了临时联盟之外，各国不会合作，而是不断寻求削弱竞争对手的力量并增强自己的力量。
米尔斯海默的理论基于五个核心假设：（1）国际体系是无政府主义的（不存在高于国家的权威来仲裁其冲突），（2）所有国家都拥有一定的军事能力（无论多么有限），（3） 国家永远无法完全确定其他国家的意图，（4）国家将生存看得高于一切，（5）国家是寻求促进自身利益的理性行为者。
米尔斯海默认为，这些条件“为各国相互采取侵略性行为创造了强大的动力。” 他的结论是，由于各国无法确切地了解其他国家当前或未来的意图，因此当其核心安全利益受到威胁时，它们尝试通过增强军事实力并采取强硬立场来预防可能的侵略行为是合理的。
尽管米尔斯海默承认战争是一种合法的治国手段，但他并不认为战争总是正当的。 事实上，他对伊拉克战争（2003-11）以及他认为美国试图监管世界的行为持高度批评态度。 在美国外交政策上，他主张“全球平衡”战略，而不是“全球霸权”战略。 他认为，像美国这样的超级大国不应试图将其统治强加于所有大陆，而应仅在另一个大国威胁统治具有战略重要性的地区时进行干预。
米尔斯海默因此判断美国参与第二次世界大战是完全适当的，因为纳粹德国和日本帝国都试图统治各自的地区。 然而，他批评冷战后美国的外交政策高估了该国的军事实力及其随意投射军事力量的能力。 米尔斯海默特别主张从欧洲撤出所有美军，认为美军在欧洲的存在是不合理的，因为目前没有国家威胁要主宰欧洲大陆。
2007 年，米尔斯海默与斯蒂芬·沃尔特 (Stephen M. Walt) 合着了一本畅销书，但备受争议，《以色列游说与美国外交政策》(2007)。 它认为，强大的游说团体通过确保对以色列的无条件支持，扭曲了美国的外交政策，损害了美国的国家利益。 一些人谴责这部作品是阴谋论或事实薄弱，而另一些人则称赞其作者有勇气提出重要的政策问题。
米尔斯海默的其他著作包括《传统威慑》（1983）、《利德尔·哈特与历史的重量》（1988）、《领导人为何撒谎：国际政治中谎言的真相》（2011）、《伟大的错觉：自由梦想与国际现实》（2018）以及 在学术期刊上发表文章数十篇。 他还经常向《纽约时报》和其他全国性报纸发表评论文章，参与公开辩论。 2003年，他当选为美国艺术与科学学院院士。
John Mearsheimer & his offensive realism
Feb 27, 2024
Born: December 14, 1947, New York, New York, U.S. (age 76)
Subjects Of Study: international relations
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
John Mearsheimer was deeply influenced by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the school of international relations known as neorealism. Whereas classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau had traced international conflicts to the natural propensity of political leaders to seek to increase their power, neorealists (or structural realists) such as Waltz located the cause of war in the structure of international relations. In Waltz’s model the absence of an authority above states (the condition of anarchy) forces them to make alliances in order to contain the threats posed by rival powers. The international order, in other words, is determined by the balance of power between states; the need for security leads states to favour the status quo and to adopt a defensive position toward their competitors.
Mearsheimer’s contrasting view, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
Mearsheimer based his theory on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic (there is no authority that exists above the states to arbitrate their conflicts), (2) all states have some military capability (however limited), (3) states can never fully ascertain the intentions of other states, (4) states value survival above all else, and (5) states are rational actors that seek to promote their own interests.
Those conditions, according to Mearsheimer, “create strong incentives for states to behave aggressively toward each other.” Because states cannot know with certainty the present or future intentions of other states, he concluded, it is rational for them to attempt to preempt possible acts of aggression by increasing their military might and adopting an assertive position whenever their core security interests are at stake.
Although Mearsheimer recognized war as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, he did not believe that it was always justified. In fact, he was highly critical of the Iraq War (2003–11) and what he saw as an attempt by the United States to police the world. With regard to U.S. foreign policy, he advocated a strategy of “global balancing” rather than “global hegemony.” A superpower such as the United States, he argued, should not try to impose its rule on all continents but should intervene only when another major power threatens to rule a region of strategic importance.
Mearsheimer thus judged U.S. participation in World War II to have been entirely appropriate, since Nazi Germany and imperial Japan sought to dominate their respective regions. However, he criticized post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy for overestimating the country’s military power and its capacity to project that power at will. Mearsheimer notably advocated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe, arguing that their presence there was irrational, as no state currently threatened to dominate the continent.
In 2007 Mearsheimer coauthored with Stephen M. Walt a best-selling but highly controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). It contended that a powerful lobby skews U.S. foreign policy against the country's national interests by securing unconditional nal Politics (2011), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), and scores of articles published in academic journals. He also frequently participated in public debates by contributing op-ed articles to the The New York Times and other national newspapers. In 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
进攻性现实主义 Offensive realism
进攻性现实主义是国际关系中的一种结构理论，是政治学者约翰·米尔斯海默针对防御性现实主义提出的。
进攻性现实主义认为，国际体系的无政府性质是促进国际政治中侵略性国家行为的原因。 该理论与防御性现实主义有着根本的区别，它将大国描述为权力最大化的修正主义者，推崇推卸责任和自我推销，而不是制衡战略，其一贯目标是主导国际体系。 该理论为国际关系的研究和理解带来了重要的替代贡献，但仍然受到批评。
Offensive realism is a structural theory in international relations and was put forward by the political scholar John Mearsheimer in response to defensive realism.
Offensive realism holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-maximizing revisionists privileging buck-passing and self-promotion over balancing strategies in their consistent aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.
约翰·约瑟夫·米尔斯海默和他的思想
2024 年 2 月 27 日
出生：1947年12月14日，美国纽约州纽约（76岁）
研究科目： 国际关系
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
与同时代的大多数国际关系学者一样，米尔斯海默深受新现实主义国际关系学派创始人肯尼思·沃尔兹的影响。 汉斯·摩根索等古典现实主义者将国际冲突归因于政治领导人寻求增加权力的自然倾向，而瓦尔兹等新现实主义者（或结构现实主义者）则将战争的原因归咎于国际关系结构。 在沃尔兹的模型中，缺乏高于国家的权威（无政府状态）迫使它们结成联盟，以遏制竞争对手构成的威胁。 换句话说，国际秩序是由国家之间的力量平衡决定的。 沃尔兹认为，安全的需要导致各国倾向于维持现状并对竞争对手采取防御立场。
米尔斯海默的相反观点被他称为“进攻性现实主义”，他认为对安全的需要以及最终对生存的需要使国家成为侵略性权力最大化者。 除了临时联盟之外，各国不会合作，而是不断寻求削弱竞争对手的力量并增强自己的力量。
米尔斯海默的理论基于五个核心假设：（1）国际体系是无政府主义的（不存在高于国家的权威来仲裁其冲突），（2）所有国家都拥有一定的军事能力（无论多么有限），（3） 国家永远无法完全确定其他国家的意图，（4）国家将生存看得高于一切，（5）国家是寻求促进自身利益的理性行为者。
米尔斯海默认为，这些条件“为各国相互采取侵略性行为创造了强大的动力。” 他的结论是，由于各国无法确切地了解其他国家当前或未来的意图，因此当其核心安全利益受到威胁时，它们尝试通过增强军事实力并采取强硬立场来预防可能的侵略行为是合理的。
尽管米尔斯海默承认战争是一种合法的治国手段，但他并不认为战争总是正当的。 事实上，他对伊拉克战争（2003-11）以及他认为美国试图监管世界的行为持高度批评态度。 在美国外交政策上，他主张“全球平衡”战略，而不是“全球霸权”战略。 他认为，像美国这样的超级大国不应试图将其统治强加于所有大陆，而应仅在另一个大国威胁统治具有战略重要性的地区时进行干预。 米尔斯海默因此判断美国参与第二次世界大战是完全适当的，因为纳粹德国和日本帝国都试图统治各自的地区。 然而，他批评冷战后美国的外交政策高估了该国的军事实力及其随意投射军事力量的能力。 米尔斯海默特别主张从欧洲撤出所有美军，认为美军在欧洲的存在是不合理的，因为目前没有国家威胁要主宰欧洲大陆。
2007 年，米尔斯海默与斯蒂芬·沃尔特 (Stephen M. Walt) 合着了一本畅销书，但备受争议，《以色列游说与美国外交政策》(2007)。 它认为，强大的游说团体通过确保对以色列的无条件支持，扭曲了美国的外交政策，损害了美国的国家利益。 一些人谴责这部作品是阴谋论或事实薄弱，而另一些人则称赞其作者有勇气提出重要的政策问题。
米尔斯海默的其他著作包括《传统威慑》（1983）、《利德尔·哈特与历史的重量》（1988）、《领导人为何撒谎：国际政治中谎言的真相》（2011）、《伟大的错觉：自由梦想与国际现实》（2018）以及 在学术期刊上发表文章数十篇。 他还经常向《纽约时报》和其他全国性报纸发表评论文章，参与公开辩论。 2003年，他当选为美国艺术与科学学院院士。
John Joseph Mearsheimer & his thoughts
Feb 27, 2024
Born: December 14, 1947, New York, New York, U.S. (age 76)
Subjects Of Study: international relations
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
Like most international relations scholars of his generation, Mearsheimer was deeply influenced by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the school of international relations known as neorealism. Whereas classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau had traced international conflicts to the natural propensity of political leaders to seek to increase their power, neorealists (or structural realists) such as Waltz located the cause of war in the structure of international relations. In Waltz’s model the absence of an authority above states (the condition of anarchy) forces them to make alliances in order to contain the threats posed by rival powers. The international order, in other words, is determined by the balance of power between states. According to Waltz, the need for security leads states to favour the status quo and to adopt a defensive position toward their competitors.
Mearsheimer’s contrasting view, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
Mearsheimer based his theory on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic (there is no authority that exists above the states to arbitrate their conflicts), (2) all states have some military capability (however limited), (3) states can never fully ascertain the intentions of other states, (4) states value survival above all else, and (5) states are rational actors that seek to promote their own interests.
Those conditions, according to Mearsheimer, “create strong incentives for states to behave aggressively toward each other.” Because states cannot know with certainty the present or future intentions of other states, he concluded, it is rational for them to attempt to preempt possible acts of aggression by increasing their military might and adopting an assertive position whenever their core security interests are at stake.
Although Mearsheimer recognized war as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, he did not believe that it was always justified. In fact, he was highly critical of the Iraq War (2003–11) and what he saw as an attempt by the United States to police the world. With regard to U.S. foreign policy, he advocated a strategy of “global balancing” rather than “global hegemony.” A superpower such as the United States, he argued, should not try to impose its rule on all continents but should intervene only when another major power threatens to rule a region of strategic importance. Mearsheimer thus judged U.S. participation in World War II to have been entirely appropriate, since Nazi Germany and imperial Japan sought to dominate their respective regions. However, he criticized post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy for overestimating the country’s military power and its capacity to project that power at will. Mearsheimer notably advocated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe, arguing that their presence there was irrational, as no state currently threatened to dominate the continent.
In 2007 Mearsheimer coauthored with Stephen M. Walt a best-selling but highly controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). It contended that a powerful lobby skews U.S. foreign policy against the country's national interests by securing unconditional support for Israel. Some decried the work as conspiratorial or factually weak, whereas others applauded its authors for having the courage to raise an important policy issue.
Mearsheimer’s other works included Conventional Deterrence (1983), Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988), Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), and scores of articles published in academic journals. He also frequently participated in public debates by contributing op-ed articles to the The New York Times and other national newspapers. In 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
进攻性现实主义
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offective_realism
进攻性现实主义是一种国际关系结构理论，属于新现实主义学派，是政治学者约翰·米尔斯海默[1]针对防御性现实主义提出的。 进攻性现实主义认为，国际体系的无政府性质是促进国际政治中侵略性国家行为的原因。 该理论与防御性现实主义有着根本的区别，它将大国描述为权力最大化的修正主义者，推崇推卸责任和自我推销，而不是制衡战略，其一贯目标是主导国际体系。 该理论为国际关系的研究和理解带来了重要的替代贡献，但仍然受到批评。
理论渊源
进攻性现实主义是现实主义学派中突出而重要的国际关系理论，其中包括以罗伯特·吉尔平、兰德尔·施韦勒、埃里克·拉布斯、法里德·扎卡里亚等代表学者的不同观点为特征的各种次趋势。 2][3][4] 然而，迄今为止，继肯尼斯·沃尔兹（Kenneth Waltz）的防御性新现实主义之后发展起来的进攻性新现实主义最重要的变体是约翰·J·米尔斯海默（John J. Mearsheimer）的变体，在他 2001 年的著作《大国政治的悲剧》中得到了充分发展。 [5]
虽然米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义理论确实重申并建立在古典现实主义者阐述的某些假设的基础上，但它完全背离了这一分支，因为它使用实证主义作为科学哲学，并在国际政治中的国家行为研究中添加了一种以系统为中心的方法。 国际体系的结构。[6][7][8] 因此，他的进攻性新现实主义与防御性现实主义等其他结构理论一起属于新现实主义的分支。 [9]
主要原则
该理论基于五个中心假设，类似于肯尼思·沃尔兹的防御性新现实主义的核心假设。 它们是：[10][11]
大国是世界政治的主要参与者，国际体系是无政府主义的
所有国家都拥有一定的进攻性军事能力
国家永远无法确定其他国家的意图
各国以生存为首要目标
国家是理性的行为者，有能力制定合理的战略，最大限度地提高其生存前景
与防御性新现实主义一样，进攻性现实主义提出了一个无政府主义的国际体系，在这个体系中，理性大国在不确定其他国家意图并有能力进行军事进攻的情况下努力生存。 [12][13] 尽管米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义最初是从与防御性新现实主义类似的主张发展而来，但它对国际政治中的大国行为提出了截然不同的预测。
主要是，它与防御性新现实主义的不同之处在于国家需要积累权力以确保其安全，以及国家为达到令人满意的安全水平而制定的战略。 最终，米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义描绘了一幅更为悲观的国际政治图景，其特点是危险的国家间安全竞争可能导致冲突和战争。 [16][17]
现状与权力最大化国家
约翰·米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义旨在纠正肯尼思·沃尔兹的防御性新现实主义的“现状偏见”。 [18][19] 虽然两种新现实主义派别都认为国家主要关心的是最大化其安全，但他们对这一过程所需的权力大小存在分歧。 与防御性新现实主义相反，防御性新现实主义认为国家是维持现状的国家，只寻求通过维持现有的权力平衡来维持各自在国际体系中的地位，[20][21]进攻性新现实主义声称国家实际上是权力最大化 修正主义者怀有侵略意图。 事实上，在进攻性新现实主义中，国际体系为大国提供了采取进攻性行动的强烈动机，以增强其安全并确保其生存。 [21][22]
以无政府状态（缺乏能够执行规则和惩罚侵略者的中央权威）为特征的国际体系以及国家意图和可用进攻性军事能力的不确定性，导致各国不断相互恐惧，并诉诸自助机制来满足自己的需要。 生存。[23] 为了减轻彼此对侵略的恐惧，各国总是寻求最大化自己的相对实力（以物质能力来定义）。 正如米尔斯海默所说：“他们寻找机会通过以牺牲潜在竞争对手为代价获得额外的权力增量来改变权力平衡”，[24]因为“一个国家相对于其他国家的军事优势越大，该国的军事优势就越强”。
[25] 国家寻求增强军事实力，损害体系内其他国家的利益，以霸权——成为国家体系中唯一的大国——为最终目标。 [26]
约翰·米尔斯海默将这一观点总结如下：“大国认识到，确保自身安全的最佳途径就是现在就实现霸权，从而消除任何其他大国挑战的可能性。只有被误导的国家才会放弃获得霸权的机会。” [27]”相应地，米尔斯海默等进攻性新现实主义者认为，一个国家增加其相对实力以达到霸权的最佳战略是依靠进攻性战术 。 如果它们的侵略行为是理性的，大国很可能会奉行扩张主义政策，这将使它们更接近霸权。 [28][29]
由于受到跨洋力量投射和报复力量的限制，全球霸权几乎不可能实现，因此国家所能希望达到的最佳最终状态是成为一个地区霸主，统治自己的地理区域。 [28][29] 这种对权力的不懈追求本质上产生了一种“持续的安全竞争，战争的可能性总是在幕后”的状态。 [30] 只有实现地区霸权，大国才会成为维持现状的国家。
平衡与推卸责任[编辑]
进攻性新现实主义强调霸权作为国家的最终目标，这与防御性新现实主义的信念形成鲜明对比，后者认为国家的生存可以在远非霸权的某个时刻得到保证。 在防御性新现实主义思维中，权力积累带来的安全增量最终会经历边际收益递减，成本最终超过收益。 [31] 防御性新现实主义认为，在无政府状态下，国家有强烈的平衡倾向——国家负有维持现有权力平衡的直接责任——以对抗威胁性的权力寻求国家，这反过来可能成功地“危及”国家的利益。 最大化状态的生存”。[32] 这一论点也适用于针对国际体系中最强大国家的国家行为，因为防御性新现实主义者指出，权力过度集中会弄巧成拙，引发平衡性的反击。 [33][34][35]
米尔斯海默对这些主张提出了质疑，他提出这样的论点：在没有霸权的情况下，很难估计国家何时达到令人满意的权力量，而且由于集体行动问题，广泛依赖制衡作为有效的权力检查方法的成本高昂。 [36] [37] 他认为，当一个大国发现自己处于防御姿态，试图阻止对手以牺牲自己为代价获得权力时，它可以选择平衡或通过推卸责任的方式进行干预——将采取行动的责任转移给其他国家，同时保留自己的权力。 在场边。
为了确定大国按照其中一种或另一种行为的环境，米尔斯海默在华尔兹的防御性新现实主义的基础上，在权力分配的同时纳入了第二个变量——地理。 一方面，平衡与推卸之间的选择取决于无政府国际体系是两极、平衡还是不平衡的多极架构。 另一方面，国家在边界共享和制水能力方面的地理位置也影响着大国的战略偏好。 结合起来，这两个变量使他能够确定，与防御性新现实主义的预测相反，大国倾向于在所有多极化实例中推卸平衡责任，但那些包含潜在霸主的实例除外。 [38][39][ 40]
针对防御性新现实主义者对国际体系中最强大国家的国家行为立场，米尔斯海默认为，受到威胁的国家将不情愿地参与制衡潜在霸权的活动，但不太可能形成制衡联盟来对抗已实现地区霸权的大国。 [41] 这种缺乏平衡的最好解释是区域霸主新获得的现状立场，这是由于其力量投送能力受到地理限制而产生的。 [42][43] 地区霸主发现自己处于防御地位，而不是依靠进攻行动，试图通过阻止其他地区任何同等竞争对手的崛起来避免对其霸权地位的威胁。 因此，它将充当离岸平衡者，将责任转嫁给潜在霸主的当地邻国，并仅将平衡作为最后的手段。 [29]
贡献与批评[编辑]
米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义代表了对国际关系理论的重要贡献，但也引起了重要的批评。 虽然下面的输入和批评提供了该理论的一个很好的例子
考虑到其贡献和反对它的论点，该清单在任何情况下都不应被视为详尽无遗。
理论输入[编辑]
首先，一些学者认为米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义为华尔兹的防御性新现实主义提供了另一种补充。 该理论补充了防御性新现实主义者的论点，即国际体系的结构限制了国家行为。 进攻性新现实主义认为，无政府状态也可以激励国家最大化其权力份额，从而纠正与防御性新现实主义有关的现状偏见，进攻性新现实主义解决了华尔兹理论未能解释的一些异常现象。 该理论主要能够对国际体系中国家之间发生的冲突数量提供解释。 正如斯奈德所说，米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义“通过为修正主义国家的行为提供理论依据，扩大了新现实主义理论的范围”。 [44]
此外，这种互补性可能意味着交替解释国家行为的两种理论之间的理论相互关系，从而允许“更完整的结构现实主义理论，可以更准确地解释防御性和进攻性国家行为”。 [45] 其次，这些学者坚持认为米尔斯海默的进攻性新现实主义对外交政策理论和联盟理论做出了重大贡献。 更具体地说，米尔斯海默的理论比结构防御现实主义更进一步，成功地理论化了国际政治和外交政策。
与沃尔兹拒绝防御性新现实主义作为一种能够解释国际政治之上的外交政策的理论相反，[46][47]进攻性新现实主义包括对与分析的系统层面和个体国家行为有关的国际结果的解释。 [48] [49] 此外，在权力分配的同时纳入地理等新变量，增强了进攻性新现实主义对国家追求侵略行动并诉诸制衡和推卸责任做出具体假设的潜力。 [50]
理论缺陷[编辑]
一些学者指出了米尔斯海默进攻性新现实主义的逻辑问题。 斯奈德驳斥了米尔斯海默关于安全困境的观点，称其为“进攻性现实主义的概括性陈述”。 [51][52] 他认为，进攻性新现实主义将所有国家视为修正主义者，消除了整个安全困境概念所依据的中心命题——其他国家意图的不确定性。 侵略性大国为最大化其安全而采取的措施威胁其他国家，这导致国家之间真正合理的安全竞争，而不是基于假设威胁的不必要的竞争。 [53]
彼得·托夫特认为进攻性新现实主义的分析水平存在缺陷。 他认为，纳入非结构性地理变量来解释大国行为，将该理论的分析焦点从系统范围的动态转移到了区域动态。 考虑到该理论的地区安全分析，他进一步认为，进攻性新现实主义未能明确定义什么是一个“理所当然的欧洲或东北亚等实体”的地区，为学术界的反对留下了空间。 [54]
Christopher Layne 进一步强调了与地理变量相关的问题。 他批评了米尔斯海默的推理，即“水的阻止力”阻止了大国实现全球霸权，因为这种限制似乎不适用于新兴对手在其邻国之外施加影响力的情况。 正如莱恩所说，“显然，水阻止了美国将其权力强加于遥远地区的其他国家，但它并不能阻止他们威胁美国在西半球的主导地位”。 [55] 此外，他发现进攻性现实主义将地区霸主归类为维持现状的国家，这与该理论强调大国是无情的权力最大化者的说法很难调和。 从这个意义上说，莱恩质疑水资源限制是否有能力将权力最大化的国家转变为维持现状的国家，并与米尔斯海默相矛盾，他认为地区霸权仍然受到安全追求的影响，从而努力实现全球霸权。 [56] ]
第二组批评涉及进攻性新现实主义的限制性焦点问题。 米尔斯海默的理论因未能考虑国内政治而受到批评。 新兴大国的内部政治运作、经济或社会不受关注，而这些在国家决策过程中发挥着作用，进而影响其在国际政治中的行为。 [57][58] 此外，斯奈德认为，没有考虑恐怖主义等跨国威胁，米尔斯海默对安全的强调使他忽视了国家的非
-意识形态、国家统一和人权等安全利益与权力竞争一起成为国际政治的重要方面。 [59]
此外，托夫特指出，米尔斯海默对军事能力和国家征服领土能力的关注“意味着他的分析可能会忽略许多其他获得和行使影响力的方式”。 [60] 同样，主要关注国际冲突讨价还价模型的政治学家指出，进攻性新现实主义忽视了战争代价高昂的事实。 [61]
由于这些成本反过来又使战争效率低下，国家（即使是那些没有霸权的国家）也有动力通过讨价还价达成和解。 例如，在一个 70% 到 30% 的电力崩溃的两极世界中，各国宁愿选择类似比例的资源崩溃，也不愿在战斗过程中摧毁其中一些资源。 由于这种低效率——战争的低效率之谜——米尔斯海默提出的持续战斗实际上会使国家变得更不安全，因为反复的战斗成本最终会耗尽该国家的所有权力。
最重要的是，该理论的经验有效性和预测能力一直受到质疑，这反过来又会对进攻性新现实主义对国际政治中国家行为的规定的有效性产生负面影响。 除了提到该理论未能解释日本20世纪的领土获取、北约的延续或德国在冷战后时代未能实现地区霸权之外，[58][62]批评者还对进攻性新现实主义观点表示严重怀疑 关于中国崛起和美国地区霸权的问题。 他们认为，没有理由相信中国作为一个想要确保自身生存的理性大国会寻求霸权而不是依赖合作机制。 [63][64] 他们同样反驳了米尔斯海默关于美国的论点。 首先，美国地区霸权地位的独特性是由反对力量弱或制衡效率低下而非地理限制来解释的。[65][66]
托夫特和莱恩更进一步断言，米尔斯海默错误地将美国视为从事离岸平衡的地区霸主。 这些学者认为，实证数据表明，美国谋求并实现全球霸权，而不是成为一个以称霸西半球、同时阻止欧洲和东北亚同行竞争对手崛起为战略目标的地区霸主。 反过来，米尔斯海默对美国未来战略行为的预测存在偏差，主要是在海外军事介入方面。[67][68]
另见
两害相权取其轻原则
进攻性崇拜
Offensive realism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism
Offensive realism is a structural theory in international relations that belongs to the neorealist school of thought and was put forward by the political scholar John Mearsheimer[1] in response to defensive realism. Offensive realism holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-maximizing revisionists privileging buck-passing and self-promotion over balancing strategies in their consistent aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.
Theoretical origins[edit]
Offensive realism is a prominent and important theory of international relations belonging to the realist school of thought, which includes various sub-trends characterised by the different perspectives of representative scholars such as Robert Gilpin, Randall Schweller, Eric J. Labs and Fareed Zakaria.[2][3][4] Yet, to date, the most important variant of offensive neorealism, developed after Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism, is that of John J. Mearsheimer as fully developed in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[5]
While Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism theory does reiterate and build on certain assumptions elaborated by classical realists, it departs completely from this branch by using positivism as a philosophy of science and by adding a system-centric approach to the study of state behaviour in international politics based on the structure of the international system.[6][7][8] Accordingly, his offensive neorealism pertains to the sub-branch of neorealism alongside other structural theories such as defensive realism.[9]
Main tenets[edit]
The theory is grounded on five central assumptions similar to the ones that lie at the core of Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism. These are:[10][11]
- Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is anarchical
- All states possess some offensive military capability
- States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
- States have survival as their primary goal
- States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival
Like defensive neorealism, offensive realism posits an anarchic international system in which rational great powers uncertain of other states' intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive.[12][13] Although initially developed from similar propositions to those of defensive neorealism, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism advances drastically different predictions regarding great power behaviour in international politics.[14][15]
Mainly, it diverges from defensive neorealism in regards to the accumulation of power a state needs to possess to ensure its security and the issuing of strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism draws a much more pessimistic picture of international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security competition likely leading to conflict and war.[16][17]
Status quo v. power-maximizing states[edit]
John Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism intends to fix the "status quo bias" of Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism.[18][19] While both neorealist variants argue that states are primarily concerned with maximising their security, they disagree over the amount of power required in the process. To the contrary of defensive neorealism according to which states are status quo powers seeking only to preserve their respective positions in the international system by maintaining the prevailing balance of power,[20][21] offensive neorealism claims that states are in fact power-maximising revisionists harbouring aggressive intentions. Indeed, in offensive neorealism, the international system provides great powers with strong incentives to resort to offensive action in order to increase their security and assure their survival.[21][22]
The international system characterised by anarchy (the absence of a central authority capable of enforcing rules and punishing aggressors) and uncertainty as to state intentions and available offensive military capabilities leads states to constantly fear each other and resort to self-help mechanisms to provide for their survival.[23] In order to alleviate this fear of aggression each holds of the other, states always seek to maximise their own relative power, defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals",[24] since "the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is".[25] States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with hegemony—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate goal.[26]
John Mearsheimer summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.[27]" Accordingly, offensive neorealists such as Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to hegemony.[28][29]
Since global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best end game status states can hope to reach is that of a regional hegemon dominating its own geographical area.[28][29] This relentless quest for power inherently generates a state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background".[30] Only once regional hegemony is attained do great powers become status quo states.
Balancing v. buck-passing[edit]
The emphasis offensive neorealism puts on hegemony as states' end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive neorealism's belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive neorealist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits.[31] Defensive neorealism posits that under anarchy there is a strong propensity for states to engage in balancing—states shouldering direct responsibility to maintain the existing balance of power—against threatening power-seeking states, which may in turn succeed in "jeopardiz[ing] the very survival of the maximizing state".[32] This argument also applies to state behavior towards the most powerful state in the international system, as defensive neorealists note that an excessive concentration of power is self-defeating, triggering balancing countermoves.[33][34][35]
Mearsheimer challenges these claims by making the argument that it is rather difficult to estimate when states have reached a satisfactory amount of power short of hegemony and costly to rely extensively on balancing as an efficient power-checking method due to collective action issues.[36][37] According to him, when a great power finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring buck-passing—transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines.
In order to determine the circumstances in which great powers behave according to one or the other, Mearsheimer builds on Waltz's defensive neorealism by including a second variable—geography—alongside the distribution of power. On one hand, the choice between balancing and buck-passing depends on whether the anarchic international system is of a bipolar, balanced, or unbalanced multipolar architecture. On another hand, state geographic location in terms of border sharing and stopping power of water also influences great powers' strategy preference. Combined, these two variables allow him to establish that great powers tend to favor—to the contrary of defensive neorealism predictions—buck-passing over balancing in all instances of multipolarity except for those that include a potential hegemon.[38][39][40]
Responding to defensive neorealists' posture on state behaviour towards the most powerful state in the international system, Mearsheimer believes that threatened states will reluctantly engage in balancing against potential hegemons but that balancing coalitions are unlikely to form against a great power that has achieved regional hegemony.[41] This lack of balancing is best explained by the regional hegemon's newly acquired status quo stance, which follows from the geographical constraints on its power projection capability.[42][43] Instead of relying on offensive actions, a regional hegemon finds itself in a defensive position seeking to avert threats to its hegemonic status by preventing the rise of any peer competitors in other areas. As such it will behave as an offshore balancer, passing the buck to local neighbours of the potential hegemon and engaging in balancing only as a last resort.[29]
Contributions and criticism[edit]
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism represents an important contribution to international relations theory yet also generated important criticism. While the inputs and critics below provide a good sample of the theory's contributions and the kind of arguments that have been addressed against it, the listing should in no case be considered as exhaustive.
Theoretical inputs[edit]
Firstly, some scholars believe that Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism provides an alternative complement to Waltz's defensive neorealism. The theory adds to defensive neorealists' argument that the structure of the international system constrains state behaviour. Setting to rectify the status quo bias pertaining to defensive neorealism by arguing that anarchy can also generate incentives for states to maximize their share of power, offensive neorealism solves some anomalies that Waltz's theory fails to explain. Mainly, the theory is able to provide an explanation for the amount of conflict occurring among states in the international system. As Snyder states, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism "enlarges the scope of neorealist theory by providing a theoretical rationale for the behaviour of revisionist states".[44]
Moreover, this complementarity could signify theoretical interrelation with the two theories working in alternation to explain state behaviour, thereby allowing for a "more complete structural realist theory that can more accurately account for both defensive and offensive state behaviour".[45] Secondly, these scholars uphold the argument that Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism significantly contributes to foreign policy theory and alliance theory. More specifically, Mearsheimer's theory goes a step further than structural defensive realism by successfully theorising both international politics and foreign policy.
Contrary to Waltz's rejection of defensive neorealism as a theory capable of explaining foreign policy on top of international politics,[46][47] offensive neorealism includes explanations of both international outcomes pertaining to the systemic level of analysis and individual state behaviour.[48][49] Additionally, the inclusion of new variables such as geography alongside the distribution of power enhances offensive neorealism's potential to make specific assumptions about states' pursuit of aggressive actions and resort to balancing and buck-passing.[50]
Theoretical flaws[edit]
Some scholars have pointed out logical issues with Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism. Snyder rejects Mearsheimer's view of the security dilemma as "a synoptic statement of offensive realism".[51][52] He argues that offensive neorealism's positing of all states as revisionists removes the central proposition—uncertainty about other states' intentions—on which the whole concept of security dilemma is grounded. Aggressive great powers' measures to maximize their security threaten others which leads to an actual justified security competition between states rather than an unnecessary one based on hypothetical threats.[53]
Peter Toft argues that there are flaws in offensive neorealism's level of analysis. According to him, the inclusion of the non-structural geography variable to explain great power behaviour shifts the theory's focal point of analysis from system-wide dynamics to regional ones. Considering the theory's regional security analyses, he further argues that offensive neorealism fails to clearly define what constitutes a region with "entities like Europe or North-East Asia (taken) for granted", leaving room for scholarly disapproval.[54]
Christopher Layne further highlights problems associated with the geographic variable. He criticizes Mearsheimer's reasoning according to which the "stopping power of water" prevents a great power from achieving global hegemony as this constraint does not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival's capacity to exercise influence beyond its own neighbourhood. As Layne states, "apparently water stops the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it does not stop them from threatening American primacy in the Western Hemisphere".[55] Moreover, he finds offensive realism's classification of regional hegemons as status quo powers difficult to reconcile with the theory's emphasis on great powers as relentless power-maximizers. In this sense, Layne questions the ability of the water constraint to transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo power and contradicts Mearsheimer by arguing that a regional hegemon remains subjected to the quest for security, thereby striving to attain global hegemony.[56]
A second group of criticisms addresses the issue of offensive neorealism's restrictive focuses. Mearsheimer's theory has been criticised for failing to take into account domestic politics. No attention is paid to a rising power's internal political functioning, its economy or society, which play a role in a state's decision-making process, in turn influencing its behaviour in international politics.[57][58] Moreover, Snyder argues that no consideration is given to transnational threats such as terrorism, and that Mearsheimer's emphasis on security makes him ignore states' non-security interests such as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect of international politics alongside power competition.[59]
Additionally, Toft points out that Mearsheimer's concentration on military capabilities and issuing state capacity for territorial conquest "implies a risk that his analyses miss a host of other ways of gaining and exercising influence".[60] Similarly, political scientists whose primary focus is bargaining models of international conflict note that offensive neorealism ignores the fact that war is costly.[61]
Since those costs in turn make war inefficient, states (even those who do not have hegemony) have incentive to construct bargained settlements. For instance, in a bipolar world with a 70%-to-30% power breakdown, states would prefer an analogously proportioned breakdown in resources rather than having some of those resources destroyed over the course of fighting. Due to this inefficiency—war's inefficiency puzzle—the constant fighting Mearsheimer proposes would actually make states less secure because the repeated costs of fighting eventually deplete all of that state's power.
Most importantly, there have been questions about the theory's empirical validity and prediction ability, which in turn can negatively affect the validity of offensive neorealism's prescriptions for state behaviour in international politics. In addition to mentioning the theory's failure to account for Japan's 20th century territorial acquisitions, NATO's continuation or Germany's non-achievement of regional hegemony in the post-Cold war era,[58][62] critics have also expressed serious doubts regarding offensive neorealist views on China's rising power and U.S. regional hegemony. According to them, there is no reason to believe that China as a rational power which wants to ensure its survival will seek hegemony rather than rely on cooperative mechanisms.[63][64] They similarly contradict Mearsheimer's arguments regarding the United States. Firstly, weak opposition or balancing inefficiencies rather than geographical constraints are taken as explanations for the uniqueness of the United States' regional hegemonic position.[65][66]
Toft and Layne go a step further by asserting that Mearsheimer misjudges the United States as a regional hegemon engaged in offshore balancing. Instead of being a regional hegemon with the strategic aim of dominating the Western hemisphere while preventing the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Northeast Asia, these scholars believe that empirical data points to the fact that the United States has sought and achieved global hegemony, which in turn biases Mearsheimer's predictions regarding future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its military involvement overseas.[67][68]
