胡宗南在大陆最后的日子

胡宗南在大陆最后的日子 　　　胡宗南，字寿山，毕业于黄埔一期，是蒋介石最为器重的黄埔学生，可谓嫡系中的嫡系。在国民党军队中，胡宗南有好几个第一：黄埔毕业生中第一个军长，第一个兵团总指挥，第一个战区司令长官，第一个，也是唯一一个在国民党军队离开大陆前获三星上将的军人。除了在军队中的显赫地位，胡宗南和国民党军统的情治系统关系也非同一般。胡宗南和戴笠是生死之交，胡的妻子是戴笠一手培养并介绍。最近，旅居英国的张戎出了一本关于毛泽东的书。该书声称，胡宗南是潜伏在国民党军队中的中共间谍，内战期间，胡一直偷偷在为共产党服务。国民党兵败大陆的最后日子，胡宗南是被迫被拥上了飞往台湾的飞机。这本书产生了很大的反响，也引起了胡宗南后人对这此说法的不满。笔者在这里简单介绍一下胡宗南最后离开大陆日子的情形，看看胡宗南倒底真的是不是中共的间谍。 　　　1949年4月24日，中共克太原后，共军的华北18，19兵团并入彭德怀的第一野战军，一野总兵力已达34万多人，兵锋直指西安，咸阳。此时国共的三大战役已结束，共军已渡过长江，占领南京。国民党在军事上大势已去。胡宗南权衡再三，只好放弃西安，咸阳，向秦岭方向撤退。但蒋介石却错误地审时度势，命西北的二马和胡宗南共同出击，力图收复西安，咸阳。此一决策错误不仅没有达到目的，反而使彭德怀乘机发起扶眉战役，重创胡宗南部。胡损失精锐4万3千多人，被迫退守秦岭南麓。 　　　8月24日，蒋介石飞抵重庆，部署西南半壁江山的军事大局。此时的胡宗南通过和时任川湘鄂绥靖公署主任宋希濂的商讨，认为四川难以防守，国民党应把军队集中在滇缅一带，背托国外，也许还能坚持。但胡宗南的两次进谏均遭到蒋介石的严斥。最后蒋介石亲自布局，决定拒共军于川境之外，以陇南和陕南为决战战场，欲使四川再次成为复兴全国的基地。为此，蒋介石严令胡宗南坚守川陕边境一线以防共军入川。 　　　事实的发展证明，蒋介石的战略布局完全是脱离现实，一厢情愿。共军入川根本出于蒋介石的防御战略预料之外。刘邓佯装由西北进攻，秦岭一线仅由贺龙的十八兵团吸住胡宗南，刘邓的二野主力却暗中由湘入黔，再由黔入川。此时蒋介石才醒悟过来，急令胡宗南率兵南下，但为时已晚，后面贺龙的十八兵团则紧跟胡宗南，也由陕入川。蒋介石在四川处于南北夹击的状态。11月底，共军兵临重庆城下，此时，蒋介石只好给他最信任的胡宗南打电话，叫胡速调第一军第一师来重庆机场保驾。11月30日，蒋介石由重庆飞往成都。这一次，胡宗南虽然奉命忠心保驾，但对蒋的决策仍有看法。据胡宗南的参谋长罗列回忆，胡当时说，我军的失败，就在于老是被动。重庆都守不住了，成都谁能保得牢？话虽如此，胡宗南对蒋介石的命令还是忠心执行。 　　蒋介石抵达成都的当天，１９４９年１１月３０日，立即召集军政要员讨论川西决战的问题。此时蒋介石对刘文辉，邓锡侯，潘文华等四川军阀已根本不放心。而事实上这三人早已和中共地下党有所联络，和云南的卢汉也有约定，一旦时机成熟，即共同宣布起义。这时蒋介石唯一可以相信和依靠的就只有胡宗南了。如要说胡宗南是共产党间谍，此乃活捉蒋介石的一个大好机会。而此时，中共的地下党确有一个捉蒋行动。中共地下党员，时任国民党反情报队队长徐震球策反了95军副军长杨晒轩，在成都组织了近二百人的捉蒋敢死队。准备从北校场的黄埔楼下手。后来又传出蒋介石是住在商业街的励志社。敢死队又在励志社附近重新部署。但12月7日胡宗南任命亲信盛文为成都卫戍区总司令，接管成都的城防大权，刘文辉。邓锡侯等连夜逃离成都到彭县，并于12月9日通电宣布起义。12月9日成都各大报刊都报道，“蒋总裁昨已离蓉飞台”。中共地下党的捉蒋敢死队只好停止计划。其实，时隔一天，12月10日晚11点多钟，蒋介石才在胡宗南的护送下从成都凤凰山机场乘“美龄号”专机飞往台湾。如果说胡宗南是共产党间谍，对11月30日到12月10日这段历史是无法解释的。这时的胡宗南要扣留蒋介石去北京邀功是易如反掌。刘文辉，邓锡侯，潘文华的反蒋之心，已是路人皆知。胡要反蒋，岂不一拍即合？ 　　　对于胡宗南来说，死守西川是一个不可能的任务。此时他对共产党的抵抗已经丧失决心。12月19日，宋希濂在峨眉附近被俘。蒋介石从台湾下令，叫胡宗南撤退到西昌死守。胡宗南对蒋的这一布署非常抵触。成，渝两地皆失，西昌焉能守住？12月23 日胡宗南从成都起飞，并没有去西昌，而是飞到了海南。准备由海南飞台湾。蒋介石知道后对胡宗南严加痛斥，并派顾祝同专程飞到海南督促胡宗南再赴西昌。对于飞海南一事，胡宗南后来在台湾遭到弹劾时辨解说，从成都起飞后，因西昌天气太差，所以改飞海南。如果说胡宗南真是共产党间谍，一定不会飞海南而是改飞南京或上海。这是说胡宗南是共党间谍难以解释的第二个问题。 　　　西昌是胡宗南的伤心之地。胡宗南返回西昌后，把所有残部加以整编，总共只有一万多人，但这时面临着共军13个团的三面包围。双方对峙了28天。这段时间，胡宗南的心情极为沮丧。他知道凭他这一万多人要和气势如虹的共产党军队抗衡根本不可能。他把自己关在邛海新村的房间里，点上红烛，在氤氲昏红的光线中，时而绕室徘徊，时而抱头痛哭。胡宗南实在想不通的是，他四十万人马，在几个月间，没打一场像样的仗，就只剩下这万把人的部队。但出于对国民党的信念和对蒋介石的忠心，胡宗南准备战至最后，以杀身成仁。 胡宗南最后离开西昌去台湾的情况，胡宗南的秘书长，军统高级特务赵龙文后来在台湾有所回忆： 　　［三十九年（即1950年）三月二十五日晚上一时，参谋长罗列打电话给我。“睡了没有？” “睡了，有事吗？” “有事，请过来谈一谈。”…….. 我到参谋长室，冷梅（罗列字冷梅）正在写遗书，看到我，把一张电报递给我，说：“刚到的。” “ 总裁的电报。要我们转进到海口，把部队交给兵团一级的将领＂。我把电报念了出来，问罗列：“把部队交给谁呢？” ＂问题就在这儿。率６９军的兵团司令胡长青要在三天以后才可以到。别的人不能交。但部队不能交，胡先生（胡宗南）就不能脱离这个险境。为了解这个结，只有我来但任这个任务。＂ “冷梅兄！” 我站起来紧紧握住他的手，“这是忠义凛然之举，我深深地感佩！。。。。。。 我们坐吉普车到邛海，已是清晨2时。胡先生寓所灯光明亮。我们进了会客室，只见胡先生左手夹了一包文件，右手拿了两个玻璃杯，先冲着对我笑了笑，让传令兵倒了两杯酒，对我说：“龙文兄，你是不应该留在此地的，早上就要走，这是我十年来的日记，请你带到台湾，有空整理一下。＂ ．．．．． 大家坐下，茶几上摆着五只杯子。我作了几句开场白：“服从命令是今天大义所在，此其一，共匪分路进兵，要活捉胡宗南，我们不能上当，此其二；反共不是一天可以完成，真正的斗争，要从今天开始，此其三。＂ 接着大家发言，这一场谈话，一直发展到清晨４时，罗列参谋长最后发言，他用低沉的语气，一句一句扣人心弦地说道： “当年汉高祖荣阳被困，假若没有纪信代死，以后的历史可能全变了。我们牺牲了多少人，对于历史，没有丝毫影响，胡先生牺牲了，将来７万多的学生，３万多的干部，谁能号召起来，领导起来，再跟共匪作殊死的战斗？所以，我思量再三，决定我来作一个纪信。＂ 这几句话，感动了我们大家，一致站起来，请求胡先生采纳罗参谋长的意见。这可歌可泣的历史，完成了“终于道义＂的信条。］ 赵龙文的这篇回忆有着那个时代的烙印，但毕竟反映出胡宗南最后离开大陆前的真实情形。在参谋长罗列提出要做纪信的第二天，１９５０年３月２６日，共产党军队逼近西昌机场，胡宗南被迫乘飞机飞往台湾。 胡宗南到台湾后，面临着国民党内一片追究战争失败的责难。台湾监察院李梦彪等４６人联名提出弹劾章，指责胡宗南保卫西南不力，又临阵脱逃。为此，国民党政府组成军事法庭，要求依法审判胡宗南。最后还是蒋介石念其愚忠，插手其案，此案才不了了之。但从此后，胡宗南在台湾再也没有风光过，成天节衣简食，郁郁寡欢地呆在家中。１９６２年，胡宗南在病痛和忧郁中去世。其妻叶霞翟博士在胡去世后写了一本《天地悠悠》的回忆录，详细描写了胡宗南晚年清苦寂寞的生活，文章颇为感人。其中有一段回忆令人印象深刻。胡爱喝一点小酒。每次小酌两杯后，他总是两眼泪汪汪，拍着椅子扶手说：“如果海上可以骑马，我宁愿带一支骑兵，冲上大陆，去与共产党决一死战，不成功，则成仁。＂当然，海上不能骑马，这始终只是胡宗南将军的一个梦。 张戎的书指胡宗南为中共间谍的根据，主要是胡在进兵延安后一系列不可思议的军事失败。但由军事上的失败来指称一位驰骋沙场几十年的军人为敌方间谍是令人难以信服的。如果说胡的失败不可思议，蒋介石的失败就更不可思议。从１９４８年秋到１９４９年底，短短一年多一点的时间，国民党的几百万装备精良的大军竟然灰飞烟灭，如此推理，蒋介石才是共产党埋藏在国民党中最大的间谍。 一个人著书立说一定要有根有据，踏实严谨。胡宗南间谍一说，涉及到胡宗南死后的盖棺定论，涉及到要推翻从蒋介石到罗列，赵龙文，从戴笠到毛人凤，再到胡的妻子叶霞翟等一系列重要当事人对胡宗南的判断和评价，结论一定要谨慎。否则，无论是对死去的胡宗南及其同僚，还是对活着的胡的后人，都是不道德的。

[Drpaulpyrh]

Hu Tsung Nan was not a Spy in Chiang Camp

[新闻评论] I am a retired engineer/scientist and university professor who specializes in research, development and design of advanced military systems for over 30 years . In the research and development stage I had to read, evaluate and analyze various battle field maneuvers, strategic planning and combat tactics. The reading materials covered past and current war tactics from guerilla warfare to modern high tech weapon systems. I have a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Toronto in 1951, Master and Doctorate degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. I believe that I am highly qualified to judge what historical fact in war and peace was and what was not.

Upon my retirement I have been reading a number of unclassified books published by various publishers. Recently I came upon a book written by Mrs. Halliday (Ms. Jung Chang) and Mr. Halliday, entitled “Mao, The Unknown Story”. While looking at the photographs in that book, I noticed pictures embedded in Chapter 29 and reasons why Chiang Kai Shek lost the civil war to Mao Tse Tung. It stated that the main reason was due to “four top sleepers” planted in Chiang’s government. General Hu Tsung Nan was mentioned among the four sleepers. So I reviewed the entire section of Chapter 29 and discovered that there was nothing to base your allegation that Hu Tsung Nan was a communist spy in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp.

In my experience, there is nothing that could verify that allegation in classified or unclassified documents, telegrams, and staff reports in General George Marshall’s Missions to China (to mediate a peace agreement between Chiang’s and Mao’s camps). Needless to say I cannot use classified, because I’m not certain that General Marshall’s reports, telegrams, and notes written in that era have all been declassified or not. There were a lot of other reports about Chinese participation in World War II and Civil War written by various US and UK generals and reporters also. Not a single indication to that effect.

The writer’s allegation that Hu was a mole planted by Mao in Chiang’s camp was based on hearsay and rumors and should not be treated as historical facts


Here is my analysis to counter the writer’s conviction that General Hu Tsung Nan was a mole in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp planted by Mao. To begin with there was not a single person mentioned in Chapter 29 who suspected General Hu was a mole planted by Mao. As a historian Mr. Jon Halliday should not use his own hunch based on some comments made by unnamed Mao’s radio man to convict an honorable national hero of Nationalist China as a traitor to his country and his leader. The oath of ethics of Historians Association to report true historical facts without imposing his or her own opinions let alone to convict someone with intentions. To put untrue stories as fact in a chapter and highlight the false accusation must be utterly beyond your and/or any true dedicated historian’s apprehensions.

Among the persons mentioned in the section relating to General Hu in Chapter 29, the only believable statement can be attributed to Major General David Goodwin Barr. General Barr, the Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in China observed that Hu “prevailed on” Chiang to reinforce his Xian garrison to an extent which was later to prove disastrous to the Nationalists in East Central China; key losses there were “a direct result of a shift of forces to the west,” where, Barr noted, they were either useless or destroyed. General Barr never said anything that General Hu could be a mole planted by Mao. To move troops from one theater to another theater happens all the time during a war . General Barr was a talented staff officer but not a strong combat troop commander. Less than two years later while he was in Korea as Commander of U.S. 7th Infantry Division under Major General Edward M. “Ned” Almond, Commander of X Corps, directly under General Douglas MacArthur. He himself was a “yes” man to his superiors. It was his troop who spearheaded to the Manchurian border town, Hyesanjin-on-the-Yalu on November 20, 1950. When his soldiers reached the Yalu River, General MacArthur told General Almond, “Heartiest congratulations, Ned, please tell David Barr that the 7th Division hit the jackpot.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff has given MacArthur specific orders to stay far away from Yalu River, but MacArthur ignores the orders. A couple days later, on November 24, the X Corp under General Almond including the 7th Infantry Division were encircled by the Chinese Communist Army. Thousands and thousands of U.S. soldiers were either killed or captured by the Chinese Communists. Exactly the same fate encountered by General Hu Tsung Nan’s army in 1948. General Hu occupied the Red Capital at Yenan for a whole year before they were forced to abandon the city. The U.S. Army only reached the Yalu River for four days and was forced to retreat all the way back to South Korea and even the capital of South Korea, Seoul, was reoccupied by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Nobody would say that General Douglas McArthur was a traitor who deliberately sacrificed his soldiers and officers.

Chang and Holliday mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan struck up a friendship with Chiang’s intelligence chief, Tai Li. The fact is General Hu did not strike up a friendship with Tai Li when Tai was Chiang’s Intelligence Chief. They were friends when General Hu was still a school teacher in his home town Shao Fong way before he went to Wampoa Military Academy in 1924. Tai Li went to the Wampoa Military Academy in 1926. By 1927 General Hu was already a National hero in China. During that time, Mao was not even a leader or prominent member of the Communist Party. During the Second Northern Expedition the National Army took over Shanghai on March 21, 1927. On the afternoon of March 22, Hu Tsung Nan assembled regiment and battalion officers and armed soldiers rode captured vehicles for a tour of the city, intruded onto British and French Extra- territories and drove by the Racing Course and through Nanking Road. The British and French were daunted by the National Army’s valor and Shanghai citizens fervor dared not stop the parade in spite of the fact during the battle for Shanghai they had 23,000 soldiers in Shanghai and dispatched over ninety warships toward Nanking. It just to show who was more famous between Hu and Mao during that time.

During the so-called Long March of the Chinese Communists, General Hu’s army was one of the groups of the Nationalists Forces to pursue the Communists. The Communists were driven out of their so-called Soviet Territory. They had about 100,000 men but by the time they reached Yenan, there were only about 10,000 men left. 40,000 to 50,000 of Communists army were either killed or captured by Hu Tsung Nan’s Army. When they were facing extinction by the Nationalists, Mao managed to persuade General Chang Hsueh Liang to detain Chiang Kai Shek in Xian during their military meeting and demanded that Chiang Kai Shek to stop fighting the Communists and form a united front to resist the Japanese aggression. The Communists army was officially designated as the 8th National Corp during the Sino-Japanese War. During that period both Chinese Communists and the Nationalists armies were under the same Commander, Chiang Kai Shek.

The writers mentioned that “a man named Hu Kung Mien was appointed by Hu Tsung Nan as his representative to Mao. That man, Hu K’ung Mien, was commonly assumed to be a communist during that time. “Because of this relationship between General Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien,” you declared that General Hu Tsung Nan must be a mole planted by Mao. This statement is utterly without merit. When General Hu was at Wampoa Military Academy, a number of instructors and cadets had dual Nationalist and Communist party memberships. That was because Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of Whampoa Academy, allowed them to have dual party memberships in order to appease the Soviet Union as it was funded by the Soviet Union. Chou En-Lai was political director and Hu K’ung Mien was head of the security guide of the academy. A lot of students knew both of them and had contacts with them. That was the only relationship between Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien which we could say so for sure. We could not say that they have a close friendship as suggested by you.

The authors stated that Mao was able to move around Yanan freely when Yenan was occupied by General Hu’s army without being captured by Hu therefore General Hu must be Mao’s mole. This assumption was utterly without foundation. The territories around Yenan were like today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan’s border full of caves and rocks. The whole area was still under Communists control. Besides, any knowledgeable military analyst would know that deception during the war is simply part of military technique and the leader such as Mao must show his subordinates that he is strong and confident when they are facing military setbacks. When his cook said that Mao was doing business as usual, it was only his observation. Neither the cook nor the radio man ever mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan was a mole there. You said that Hu did not capture Mao when Mao was only 150 Km away from Yenan was because he was a “Sleeper” of Mao is totally wrong. Four years after we occupied Afghanistan we still have not captured Osama Bin Laden, or his assistant Ayman al-Zawahiri. We could not even capture Abu Musab al-Zarquawi in Iraq. No one ever allege that our Military Commander of Middle East, General John P. Abizaid, must be a “Sleeper” planted by Osama Bin Laden.

Based on the above analysis, I proposed to the Random House Publisher, Mr. Dan Franklin, to remove the statement on Hu Tsung Nan, since the section related to General Hu Tsung Nan being a mole or sleeper, in Chapter 29, is definitely untrue it should be deleted from Chapter 29.