Peter Walker 强大不同平等 克服中美之间的误解和差异

强大、不同、平等：克服中美之间的误解和差异

强大、不同、平等：克服中美之间的误解和差异

https://www.amazon.ca/Powerful-Different-Equal-Misconceptions-Differences/dp/1912555336
作者：Peter B Walker (作者) 2019 年 7 月 12 日
Peter B. Walker 是全球领先的管理咨询公司麦肯锡公司的高级合伙人。 在公司工作的 46 年间，他与世界各地的众多金融机构合作，重点关注中国。 彼得住在美国纽约。

从美国对华的咄咄逼人言辞，到不断升级的针锋相对的贸易战，再到中国提出威胁美国先进技术全球领导地位的2025倡议，中美两国（当今世界两大主导力量）之间的紧张关系从未如此紧张。 更高。

本书对中美关系进行了及时的分析。 每种模式都深深植根于各自的历史和文化，两种模式都非常成功地实现了其主要目标，并且随着时间的推移具有高度的弹性。 它探讨了对治理、经济、社会和军事问题的核心误解，以及这些误解的根源。 作者认为，如果中美两国能够通过了解这些差异及其影响来缩小差距，那么它们就可以共同努力克服全球问题，造福所有人。 更新后的平装本包含了有关中美关系近期事件的新介绍。

彼得·B·沃克的观点
美国需要转变心态，以便与中国合作应对冠状病毒大流行和其他全球问题
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3081963/shift-mindset-needed-so-us-can-work-china-tackle-coronavirus?
美国和中国需要建设性地接触，接受棘手的分歧，并在从气候、饥饿到核扩散等全球问题上共同发挥领导作用，而不是遏制和冲突。

彼得·B·沃克 彼得·B·沃克 2020 年 4 月 30 日
我们与中国的关系已经达到了一个关键的转折点，由于 Covid-19，这一关系变得更加紧迫。 这种病毒和由此引发的大流行是一个正在展开的故事，但也出现了一些教训。

首先，大多数国家 — — 包括美国 — — 根本没有做好准备，即使病毒威胁已众所周知。

我们还知道，对这一流行病反应相对较好的国家有很多值得学习的地方：韩国、台湾、新加坡，当然还有中国。 由于广泛的检测、监测、社交距离和隔离的结合，到目前为止，他们所经历的健康和经济影响相对较小。
想象一下，如果美国和中国宣布通过一个资金充足、人员充足的世界卫生组织进行协调和持续的领导，世界将如何庆祝。 然后，世界卫生组织可以传播其对病毒的构成和传播、最脆弱的情况、最有效的缓解技术、医疗用品、医院设施和所需人员以及快速开发和分发疫苗所需的工作的研究。
库存可以迅速建立并通过全球供应链获取。 如果 Covid-19 来袭时采用这种模式，那么人员和经济损失可能只是实际损失的一小部分。

我们没有与中国合作，而是发现自己在做相反的事情，就像许多美国人一样，将疫情直接归咎于中国。 我们是如何到达这个历史低点的？
1979年美中关系正常化后的几十年里，美国认为，随着中国人民要求更大的自由和选择领导人的权利，更加富裕的中国将转向自由民主。

过去十年，美国逐渐认识到自己的假设是错误的，中国威胁到了其作为无可争议的全球经济领导者的地位。 相反，中国开始被视为战略威胁。

这导致了美国新的遏制战略。 经济上，我们大力加强知识产权保护、减少对华贸易逆差、制造业就业回流等举措。 我们还发起了贸易战。
每周六

我们切断了中国获得某些先进技术的机会，并在南海提出了挑战。 我们指责来访的中国学生和科学家从事间谍活动，并收紧了他们的签证。

我们攻击“一带一路”倡议是一个债务陷阱，旨在将中国的意志和治理模式强加于发展中国家。 我们敦促其他国家禁止使用 5G 领导者华为，理由是北京会获取传输信息进行间谍活动。
然而，遏制措施除了加剧紧张局势外，几乎没有取得什么成效（除了早就该实施的知识产权保护之外）。 在许多情况下，它们产生了相反的效果。

中国经济虽然因贸易战而放缓，但在城市化、快速增长的中产阶级和崛起的服务业的推动下，其增长速度继续明显快于美国。

“一带一路”倡议正在产生巨大的商誉和经济机会，中国与非洲的贸易额目前几乎是美国的四倍。 鉴于中国在可再生能源、高铁、5G、先进计算和人工智能方面取得的进步，中国有望取得成功。

每年，它增加的毕业生科学家、技术专家、工程师和数学家数量是美国同类毕业生人数的几倍。 几乎在所有方面，遏制都失败了。

我们需要的是回归建设性参与，从而形成全球集体领导力。 为此，美国需要再次根本性的思维转变。 双方——尤其是美国——都需要接受每个国家的模式都植根于其独特的历史和文化。

美国模式源于欧洲早期定居者的经验。 国父们摆脱了君主制、阶级驱动的经济体系和有限的自由，设计了一个拥有最大自由的极简主义民主政府。 这个想法是让美国由自由企业经济而不是政府来塑造和驱动。

中国的模式是由儒家价值观塑造的，重点关注家庭和社会。 其历史上不断受到北方入侵、洪水、饥荒和其他灾难的威胁，也几乎不可避免地导致了一个全能的中央政府。 模型中隐含的是，就像王朝一样

只要有人民的支持，政府就会持续下去。

与美国不同，美国公民在通过选举选择领导人时期望有一定的控制感，而中国则通过功绩、持续的绩效评估和考试来选择领导人。 皮尤基金会的研究显示，中国没有地方政府以上级别的普选，但民众对政府的支持率是全球最高的。

几千年来，中国一直专注于国内 — — 与实行干涉主义的美国传播民主和保护人权形成鲜明对比。 在参与对外战争方面，中国仍然是所有大国中最和平的记录之一。

为了人民的最终利益，它在全球范围内积极改善经济。 尽管对华鹰派断言，中国已经证明它没有兴趣输出其治理模式。

Powerful, Different, Equal: Overcoming the Misconceptions and Differences Between China and the US 

https://www.amazon.ca/Powerful-Different-Equal-Misconceptions-Differences/dp/1912555336

by Peter B Walker (Author) July 12 2019
Peter B. Walker is a Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, the world's leading management consultancy firm. During his 46 years at the firm, he worked with a wide range of financial institutions around the world, with a focus on China. Peter lives in New York, USA.

From the aggressive US rhetoric against China, to the escalating trade war with tit for tat responses, and China's 2025 initiative that threatens the US global leadership in advanced technologies, tensions between the US and China (the two dominant forces of today's world) have never been higher.

This book provides a timely analysis of the US-China relationship. Each model is deeply rooted in their respective histories and cultures, with both models highly successful in achieving their main goals and highly resilient over time. It explores the core misconceptions on governance, economic, social and military issues, and the root causes of these misconceptions. If China and US could close the gap by each understanding those differences and their implications, the author argues, they could work together to overcome global issues to the benefit of all. This updated paperback edition includes a new introduction covering recent events in US-China relations.

Opinion  by Peter B. Walker

Shift in mindset needed so US can work with China to tackle coronavirus pandemic and other global issues

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3081963/shift-mindset-needed-so-us-can-work-china-tackle-coronavirus?

Instead of containment and conflict, the US and China need to engage constructively, accept intractable differences, and move towards co-leadership on global issues from climate and hunger to nuclear proliferation

 

 Peter B. Walker  30 Apr 2020

We have reached a critical inflection point in our relationship with China, made all the more urgent due to Covid-19. The virus and resulting pandemic are an unfolding story, yet several lessons have emerged.

The first is that most countries – including the United States – were simply unprepared, even as the viral threat became well known.

 

We also know there is much to learn from countries that have responded relatively well to the pandemic: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and, yes, China. They have experienced relatively modest health and economic effects so far, thanks to some combination of extensive testing, monitoring, social distancing and quarantining.

Imagine how the world would celebrate if the US and China were to announce a coordinated and continuing leadership through a fully funded and staffed World Health Organisation. The WHO could then disseminate its research on the make-up and spread of the virus, profile of the most vulnerable, most effective mitigation techniques, medical supplies, hospital facilities and staff required, and work necessary to rapidly develop and distribute a vaccine.

Stockpiles could quickly be built up and accessed via global supply chains. If that model were in place when Covid-19 hit, the human and economic losses are likely to have been a fraction of what they will be.

Instead of working with China, we find ourselves doing the opposite, like many in the US, blaming the pandemic squarely on the Chinese. How did we arrive at this historic low point?

For decades after the US and China normalised relations in 1979, the US assumed a wealthier China would shift towards liberal democracy as Chinese people demanded greater freedoms and the right to select their leaders.

Over the past decade, the US has come to understand that its assumption was wrong and that China threatened its role as the undisputed global leader, economically. China began to be perceived as a strategic threat instead.

 

This led to a new US strategy of containment. Economically, we took initiatives to substantially increase intellectual property protection, reduce the trade deficit with China and repatriate manufacturing jobs. We also launched a trade war.

EVERY SATURDAY

 

 

e cut China’s access to some advanced technologies and challenged it in the South China Sea. We accused visiting Chinese students and scientists of spying, and tightened up on their visas.

 

We attacked the Belt and Road Initiative as a debt trap designed to force China’s will and governance model on developing countries. We urged other countries to ban the use of 5G leader Huawei, on the theory that Beijing would access transmissions to spy.

Yet containment has accomplished little other than to increase tensions (with the exception of the long overdue intellectual property protection). In many cases, they had the opposite effect.

China’s economy, though slowed by the trade war, continues to grow significantly faster than America’s, fuelled by urbanisation, a rapidly growing middle class and a rising services industry.

The Belt and Road Initiative is generating substantial goodwill and economic opportunities, with China’s trade with Africa now nearly four times larger than the US’. China is positioned to succeed, given its advances in renewable energy, high-speed rail, 5G, advanced computing and artificial intelligence.

Every year, it adds a population of graduating scientists, technology specialists, engineers and mathematicians several times larger than the comparable US graduate pool. In nearly every way, containment has failed.

What we need is a return to constructive engagement that would lead to collective global leadership. For this, the US needs another fundamental mindset shift. There needs to be acceptance on both sides – particularly the US – that each country’s model is rooted in its unique history and culture.

The US model emerged from early settlers’ experience in Europe. Having escaped monarchies, a class-driven economic system and limited freedoms, the founding fathers designed a minimalist democratic government with maximum freedoms. The idea was to have America shaped and driven by its free enterprise economy, not the government.

China’s model was shaped by Confucian values with a focus on family and society. Its history of constant threats of invasions from the north, floods, famines and other disasters also led, almost inevitably, to an all-powerful central government. Implicit in the model is that, like dynasties, governments would endure as long as they had people’s support.

Unlike the US, where citizens expect some sense of control while selecting leaders through elections, China selects its leaders through merit, ongoing performance reviews and examinations. China has no popular election above local-government level but popular support for the government is among the highest globally, according to Pew Foundation research.

For thousands of years, China focused inward – in contrast to an interventionist US spreading democracy and protecting human rights. China still has among the most peaceful records of any major country in terms of involvement in foreign wars.

 

It is active globally to improve its economy for the ultimate benefit of its people. Despite assertions by China hawks, China has proven it has no interest in exporting its governance model.