风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
The doctrines made US ruining world
- American imperialism
- Monroe Doctrine
- Truman Doctrine
- Carter Doctrine
- Clinton Doctrine
- Jus ad bellum
- Military intervention
- Obama Doctrine
- Powell Doctrine
- Reagan Doctrine
- Foreign policy of the Donald Trump administration
- The One Percent Doctrine
- United States Presidential doctrines
- War on Terrorism
- Weinberger Doctrine
- Wolfowitz Doctrine
布什主义 Bush Doctrine
布什主义指的是美国第 43 任总统乔治·W·布什的多项相互关联的外交政策原则。 这些原则包括单边主义、先发制人的战争和政权更迭。
查尔斯·克劳萨默 (Charles Krauthammer) 于 2001 年 6 月首次使用该短语来描述布什政府“单方面退出反导条约并拒绝京都议定书”。[1] 9/11 袭击后，该短语描述了美国有权采取的政策 以确保自己免受窝藏或向恐怖组织提供援助的国家的侵害，这被用来为 2001 年入侵阿富汗辩护。[1][2] 布什主义与布什政府2003年入侵伊拉克的决定密切相关。[3][4][5]
不同的专家对布什主义赋予了不同的含义。 它被用来描述具体的政策要素，包括“先发制人”的战略，以防御当前或感知到的未来对美国安全的威胁。 这一政策原则特别适用于中东，以打击国际恐怖组织并为入侵伊拉克辩护。[需要引用]
一般来说，布什主义被用来表示愿意单方面追求美国的经济利益。[6][7][8] 其中一些政策已编入国家安全委员会 2002 年 9 月 20 日发布的题为《美国国家安全战略》的文本中。 [9]
布什政府成员很少使用“布什主义”一词。 不过，副总统迪克·切尼在 2003 年 6 月的一次演讲中至少使用过一次这个表达方式，他在演讲中说道：“如果当今世界上有人怀疑布什主义的严肃性，我会敦促那个人 考虑一下阿富汗塔利班和伊拉克萨达姆·侯赛因政权的命运。”[10]
美国国家安全战略[编辑]
布什主义的主要内容在2002年9月17日发布的《美国国家安全战略》文件中进行了阐述。 [11] 该文件经常被引用为该学说的明确声明。[12][13][14] 2006 年更新后，它指出：[15][16]
美国今天面临的安全环境与以往截然不同。 然而，美国政府的首要职责仍然是一如既往：保护美国人民和美国利益。 美国的一项持久原则是，这项义务要求政府有义务在威胁造成严重损害之前利用国家力量的所有要素来预测和应对威胁。 威胁越大，不采取行动的风险就越大 — — 即使敌人攻击的时间和地点仍然存在不确定性，采取预期行动来保卫自己的理由也就越充分。 没有什么比大规模杀伤性武器的恐怖袭击更大的威胁了。 为了制止或防止我们的对手采取这种敌对行动，美国将在必要时先发制人地行使我们固有的自卫权。 美国不会在所有情况下诉诸武力来先发制人地应对新出现的威胁。 我们倾向于非军事行动取得成功。 任何国家都不应以先发制人为借口进行侵略。
组件[编辑]
布什主义被定义为“战略原则、实际政策决定以及指导美国外交政策的一套基本原理和想法的集合。”[17] 其中一些是从 1992 年的沃尔福威茨主义草案中重新出现的，该草案曾被 布什第一届政府泄露并否认； 沃尔福威茨作为国防部副部长，是新布什政府战略规划的核心。 [18] 该学说确定了两个主要支柱：1.）对潜在敌人进行先发制人的打击，2.）促进民主政权更迭。[17][19]
乔治·W·布什政府声称美国陷入了全球战争； 一场意识形态战争，其敌人因共同的意识形态和对民主的共同仇恨而团结在一起。[17][20][21][22][23][24]
在国家安全战略中，强调了四个要点作为布什主义的核心：1.）先发制人，2.）军事主导，3.）新多边主义，以及4.）民主的传播。 [25] 该文件强调先发制人，指出“美国现在受到的征服国家的威胁比失败国家的威胁要小。我们受到的威胁不是舰队和军队，而是少数人手中的灾难性技术”，并要求“保卫美国” 各州、美国人民以及我们在国内外的利益，在威胁到达我们的边境之前识别并摧毁它。”[26]
国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德 (Donald Rumsfeld) 在 2006 年发表的一份反映其观点的声明中如此说道
该主义的功效：“如果我进行评级，我会说我们作为一个国家可能应该得到 D 或 D+，因为我们在正在发生的思想之战中做得很好。我并不认为这很容易 ，但我们还没有找到作为一个国家的公式。”[23]
布什总统在 2010 年的回忆录《决策点》中阐述了他对布什主义的离散概念。 他表示，他的学说由四个“方面”组成，其中三个是实践性的，一个是理想主义的。 他们是：（用他的话来说）
“不要区分恐怖分子和窝藏恐怖分子的国家，并追究两者的责任。”
“在海外敌人再次攻击我们国内之前，先与他们战斗。”
“在威胁完全实现之前应对它们。”
“推进自由和希望，以替代敌人的镇压和恐惧意识形态。”
单边主义[编辑]
在布什担任总统初期，单边因素就很明显。 创造“布什主义”一词的保守派查尔斯·克劳萨默在2001年2月使用“单边主义”来指代布什在外交政策上日益增强的单边主义，特别是关于他退出反导条约的决定。 [27][28]
有证据表明，布什愿意让美国采取单方面行动的意愿更早。 《国际和平研究杂志》2003 年文章“布什政府的欧洲形象：从矛盾到僵化”指出：[29]
共和党在2000年总统选举中的纲领为政府在这个问题上定下了基调。 它呼吁北约不仅在东欧（包括波罗的海国家、罗马尼亚、保加利亚和阿尔巴尼亚）大幅扩张，而且最重要的是在中东、高加索和中亚扩张。 目的是在北约内部发展更密切的合作，应对从中东到欧亚大陆的地缘政治问题。 因此，该计划对欧洲采取了广泛而相当模糊的看法。
在现阶段说布什政府在与俄罗斯打交道时已经彻底改变了心意并放弃了根深蒂固的反应还为时过早。
在谈到欧洲的未来时，美国人和欧洲人在关键问题上存在分歧。 这些差异似乎指向支撑布什政府欧洲形象的三个基本价值观。 第一个是单边主义，导弹防御系统就是一个特别明显的例子。 美国的立场与欧洲基于反导会谈和多边主义的做法背道而驰。 欧洲主要国家和美国之间的对立正在形成，欧洲主要国家希望通过司法手段处理此事，而美国则希望推动此事并造成既成事实。
攻击藏匿恐怖分子的国家[编辑]
时长：34分18秒。34:18
在国会联席会议上，布什总统承诺捍卫美国的自由，抵御恐怖主义的恐惧。 2001 年 9 月 20 日（仅音频）
作为 9 月 11 日袭击事件后行政部门的回应，这一原则得到了更全面的发展。 这些袭击对外交政策提出了挑战，因为发动袭击的不是阿富汗，而且没有证据表明他们对这些袭击有任何预知。 [30] 在 9 月 11 日晚向全国发表的讲话中，布什宣布解决这一问题，他宣称：“我们不会区分实施这些行为的恐怖分子和窝藏这些行为的恐怖分子。”[31] 他在 2001 年 9 月 20 日向国会联席会议发表的讲话中更加积极地重申了这一原则：[32]
我们将追捕向恐怖主义提供援助或庇护所的国家。 每个国家、每个地区现在都需要做出决定。 要么你和我们站在一起，要么你和恐怖分子站在一起。 从今天起，任何继续窝藏或支持恐怖主义的国家都将被美国视为敌对政权。
白宫新闻秘书阿里·弗莱舍尔后来在该演讲的自传中写道：“在一次受到媒体和民主党赞扬的演讲中，[总统]宣布了后来被称为‘布什主义’的内容”。 [33] 9/11 袭击后首次公开提及反恐原则，出现在 9 月 30 日政治学家尼尔·科茨 (Neal Coates) 的一篇专栏文章中。 [34]
这项政策被用来为 2001 年 10 月入侵阿富汗辩护，[2] 此后一直应用于美国针对巴基斯坦西北部基地组织营地的军事行动。[需要引用]
先发制人的打击[编辑]
布什于2002年6月1日在美国军事学院（西点军校）向学员发表讲话，明确了先发制人的战争将在美国外交政策和国防的未来中发挥的作用：[35]
我们不能通过抱有最好的希望来保卫美国和我们的朋友。 我们不能相信暴君的话，他们庄严地签署了不扩散条约，然后又系统地破坏它们。 如果我们等待威胁完全实现
e，我们已经等得太久了——我们的安全需要改变你将领导的军队——一支必须随时准备对世界任何黑暗角落发动袭击的军队。 我们的安全将要求所有美国人具有前瞻性和坚定性，做好在必要时采取先发制人行动的准备，以捍卫我们的自由和生命。
布什政府的立场是，在全世界范围内传播民主的严厉措施是不可避免和有效的，例如，解放伊拉克将在该地区种植民主，并使其在中东其他地区蓬勃发展。 [36]
关于如何处理伊拉克、伊朗和朝鲜等国家（所谓的“邪恶轴心”[37]国家），布什政府中出现了两种截然不同的思想流派。 国务卿科林·鲍威尔和国家安全顾问康多莉扎·赖斯以及美国国务院专家主张美国现行外交政策本质上应该继续下去。 这些政策是冷战后制定的，旨在建立多边行动共识（可能采取对问题国家日益严厉的制裁的形式，概括为遏制政策）。 副总统迪克·切尼、国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德以及保罗·沃尔福威茨和理查德·珀尔等一些有影响力的国防部政策制定者提出了相反的观点，他们认为直接和单边行动既是可能的也是合理的，美国应该接受 作为唯一剩余的超级大国的地位提供了民主和安全的机会。
民主政权更迭[编辑]
布什在2001年底至2002年的多次演讲中阐述了他对美国外交政策和全球干预的看法，宣称美国应积极支持世界各地的民主政府，特别是中东的民主政府，以此作为应对威胁的战略。 恐怖主义，国家必须为了自身的安全利益而单方面采取行动，而无需得到联合国等国际机构的批准。[6][7][8] 这代表着对杜鲁门主义和鲍威尔主义、克林顿主义等冷战后哲学的威慑和遏制政策的背离。
布什在 2003 年国情咨文中宣称：[38]
美国人是一个自由的民族，他们知道自由是每个人的权利，也是每个国家的未来。 我们珍视的自由不是美国送给世界的礼物，而是上帝送给人类的礼物。
布什第二次就职后，2006年1月在国防大学发表演讲时表示：“捍卫自由需要推进自由。”
新保守派和布什主义认为，对西方和美国的仇恨之所以特别存在，并不是因为美国的行为，而是因为恐怖分子产生的国家社会混乱，没有享受到与生俱来的自由。 民主的一部分。[17][23] 布什主义认为，美国的敌人利用恐怖主义作为针对国家的意识形态战争。 美国的责任是保护自己，在恐怖分子所在地推行民主，破坏恐怖活动的基础。 [17][23] 埃及、黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦的选举是这一倡议的结果，从某种意义上说，兄弟会、真主党和哈马斯都被允许参与其中。
对布什主义的影响[编辑]
新保守派[编辑]
该学说的发展受到新保守主义意识形态的影响，[39][40]，被认为是距里根主义政治现实主义的一步。[39][41] 直到冷战结束、比尔·克林顿就任美国总统之前，里根主义一直被认为是美国外交政策的关键。 里根主义被认为是反共产主义的，反对苏联的全球影响力，但后来谈到冷战结束时的和平红利以及国防开支减少带来的经济利益。 里根主义受到新保守派的强烈批评[41][42][43]，他们也对海湾战争的结果[39][40]和比尔·克林顿领导下的美国外交政策感到不满，[40][44 ] 激发他们通过支持积极干预和民主和平理论来呼吁变革，以实现全球稳定[40][45]。 [44] 乔治·W·布什政府顾问中的几位核心人物认为自己是新保守主义者或强烈支持他们的外交政策理念。 [40][46][47][48][49][50]
众所周知，新保守派长期以来一直支持伊拉克推翻萨达姆·侯赛因，1998 年 1 月 26 日，新美国世纪计划 (PNAC) 向时任总统比尔·克林顿发出公开信，指出：
因此，在不久的将来，我们将成为您
无法以任何合理的置信度确定伊拉克是否拥有此类武器。 这种不确定性本身就会对整个中东产生严重的不稳定影响。 几乎不需要补充的是，如果萨达姆确实获得了运载大规模杀伤性武器的能力（如果我们继续沿着目前的道路前进，他几乎肯定会这样做），那么该地区的美国军队以及我们的朋友和盟友的安全 以色列和温和的阿拉伯国家以及世界石油供应的很大一部分都将面临危险。 主席先生，正如你正确地宣称的那样，21世纪上半叶世界的安全将在很大程度上取决于我们如何应对这一威胁。
PNAC原始校长声明的签署人包括乔治·H·W·布什的副总统丹·奎尔、乔治·W·布什的国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德、副国防部长保罗·沃尔福威茨、副总统迪克·切尼和他的兄弟杰布·布什。 [40]
PNAC成员、国防政策委员会咨询委员会（DPBAC）主席、新保守派理查德·珀尔后来对入侵伊拉克表示遗憾，并最终将入侵归咎于乔治·W·布什总统。 [51]
其他被认为采用新保守主义外交政策思维的布什内阁成员包括副总统迪克·切尼和国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯。 [52]
布什主义与长期以来的新保守主义思想相一致，认为美国卷入了一场全球思想战争，一方面是西方的自由价值观，另一方面是试图摧毁这些价值观的极端主义； 美国必须承担安全责任并在世界上发挥领导作用，积极寻找敌人并改变那些支持敌人的国家。 [17][23][24][53]
布什主义和新保守主义推理认为，里根现实政治下对敌人的遏制是行不通的，美国的敌人必须在攻击前先发制人地消灭——使用美国所有可用的手段， 这样做的资源和影响力。[17][23][24]
美国军事学院西点军校反恐中心詹姆斯·福里斯特博士在《赢得反恐战争》一书中评论道：“虽然西方在与好战的伊斯兰黑暗军队的斗争中面临着不确定性，但我们确实没有 尽管我们确切地知道它将如何结束，但已经非常清楚的是，由于西方灵活、民主的制度及其无所不包的自由意识形态，世界将成功击败好战的伊斯兰教。”[24]
纳坦·夏兰斯基[编辑]
更多信息：民主和平理论
布什主义的另一部分知识基础是 2004 年由以色列政治家兼作家纳坦·夏兰斯基 (Natan Sharansky) 和以色列驻美国经济事务部长罗恩·德默 (Ron Dermer) 合着的书《民主案例》，布什称这本书对他的思想产生了影响。 [54] 该书认为，用民主政府取代独裁政权不仅在道义上是合理的，因为它可以为这些国家的公民带来更大的自由，而且在战略上也是明智的，因为民主国家比独裁国家更和平，也更少滋生恐怖主义。
扩大美国影响力[编辑]
普林斯顿大学研究员乔纳森·蒙特恩博士在其2005年《国际安全》期刊文章《布什主义的根源：美国战略中的权力、民族主义和民主促进》[55]中将布什政府积极推进民主的推动归因于两个主要因素 ：物质能力的扩张，以及民族主义国内意识形态的存在。 他声称布什政府认为布什主义在国外促进民主对于美国“反恐战争”的成功至关重要。 这也是政府扩大美国国际政治和经济影响力的宏伟战略的一个关键目标。 他研究了长期促进民主的两种相互竞争的方法：“榜样主义”，即以身作则的领导，以及“平反主义”，即直接运用美国的力量，包括使用强制力。 尽管范例主义在 20 世纪盛行，但平反主义一直是布什政府的首选做法。
批评与分析[编辑]
布什主义引起了批评和争议。[29][56] 作为国家安全委员会的工作人员，负责布什国家安全战略的彼得·D·费弗(Peter D. Feaver)表示，他统计过多达七种不同的布什主义。 美国国家安全战略（通常被错误地称为“布什主义”）的起草者之一反对赋予该声明太多分量。 “其实我从来没有想过
“如果有布什主义的话，”后来担任国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯领导下的国务院顾问的菲利普·D·泽利科 (Philip D. Zelikow) 说道。 吉米·卡特的国家安全顾问兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基表示，他认为没有“一张纸”可以代表布什主义。 [57]
地缘政治战略专家指出，哈尔福德·麦金德在《历史的地理支点》中关于“心脏地带”和世界资源控制的理论在今天仍然有效。[58][59][60]
罗伯特·G·考夫曼 (Robert G. Kaufman) 在 2007 年出版的《捍卫布什主义》一书中，[17] 写道：“没有人比哈尔福德·麦金德更好地理解这一转变的逻辑或含义。他的先见之明的理论首先在《历史的地理支点》中提出， 麦金德于 1904 年出版的《美国战略》正确地塑造了美国自二战以来的大战略，他警告说，任何一个主宰欧亚大陆（他称之为“世界岛”）的国家都有可能主宰世界，包括美国。 [61] 考夫曼是一位政治学家、公共政策教授和影子金融监管委员会成员。 他在接受关于这本书的采访时说：“我写这本书是因为我坚信布什主义具有比人们意识到的更令人信服的逻辑和历史血统。”[20]
布什主义在国内和国际上都出现了两极分化。 [62] 2008年，民意调查显示，反美情绪比布什政府形成布什主义之前更加强烈； 这一增长可能（至少部分是）布什主义和保守外交政策实施的结果。[63][64]
外国干涉主义[编辑]
主条目：乔治·W·布什政府的外交政策
布什主义的外交政策在美国和国际上都引起争议。[29][55]
约翰·米尔斯海默 (John J. Mearsheimer) 在他的著作《大错觉：自由主义梦想与国际现实》中指出，像布什主义这样的自由主义霸权政策无法有效实现其既定的最终目标，并且注定会导致更多的战争、反美主义和 全球民主倒退。
这些政策的一些批评者对美国越来越愿意单方面使用军事力量表示怀疑。 [65][66]
罗伯特·W·塔克和大卫·C·亨德里克森认为，这反映了对国际法的背弃，标志着美国在外交事务中合法性的终结。 [67]
其他人则表示，这可能导致其他国家诉诸大规模杀伤性武器的生产或恐怖活动。 [68] 这一学说被认为与正义战争理论相悖，将构成侵略战争。 [69][70] 帕特里克·J·布坎南 (Patrick J. Buchanan) 写道，2003 年入侵伊拉克与 1996 年新保守主义政策文件《彻底决裂：保卫王国的新战略》有显着相似之处。 [71]
政治学家凯伦·科维亚特科斯基 (Karen Kwiatkowski) 2007 年在她的文章《理解布什主义》中写道：
你看，我们出于自卫和为了世界的利益而杀害恐怖分子。 我们正在接管外国，让我们最喜欢的傀儡“负责”他们，控制他们的经济、他们的行动、他们的着装规范、他们的防御项目和他们的梦想，仅仅是因为我们爱他们，而且显然无法生存 没有他们。[72]
彻底背离[编辑]
布坎南等人认为，布什主义与美国以前的外交政策截然不同，是新保守主义意识形态根源的延续。 [39][73][74][75][76][77]
最初，对美国的支持率很高，[77]但到布什政府结束时，经过七年的战争，反美情绪高涨，对布什主义的批评也很普遍；[77][78]尽管如此， 该学说仍然得到一些美国政治领导人的支持。 [78]
著名新保守主义者的代表及其对布什主义的影响在美国公众中一直备受争议。 [41][52][78][79]
批评者，如《正确的国家》一书中的约翰·米克尔思韦特，声称布什是被新保守派欺骗才采取他们的政策的。 [52][80][81]
极化[编辑]
反战批评者声称，布什主义在国内造成了强烈的两极分化，疏远了美国的盟友，[72]并且违背了布什所宣称的成为“团结者，而不是分裂者”的愿望。 [62]
慈悲信仰和宗教影响[编辑]
布什经常谈到他对富有同情心的保守主义的信仰[82][83]，并将自由视为“上帝的礼物”。 [38] 查尔斯·R·凯斯勒 (Charles R. Kesler) 在克莱蒙特研究所的文章《民主与布什主义》中，[76] 写道：“在开始第二个任期时，总统及其顾问必须重新认真审视布什主义。在许多方面，它 是出口版本
富有同情心的保守主义。”
社会心理学策略和影响[编辑]
还有人批评布什主义的做法与其社会心理影响有关，称它们创造了一种恐惧文化。 [84][85][86][87]
内奥米·克莱因在她的《休克主义》一书中提到了一个反复出现的休克隐喻，她在接受采访时声称，布什政府继续利用“在休克状态下打开的机会之窗”，随后给出了一个令人欣慰的理由： 公众，作为社会控制的一种形式。[88]
民主化[编辑]
一些评论家认为，布什主义的目的不是支持由当地人民推动的真正的民主政权，而是由代表美国的外交官建立的对美国友好的政权，其目的只是为了让美国选民看起来是民主的。 [89] 例如，就阿富汗而言，有人认为议会民主被美国淡化，权力集中在美国盟友阿富汗总统哈米德·卡尔扎伊手中。 [90] 卡尔扎伊的当选被描述为美国政府和美国决策者哈利勒扎德操纵的结果。 与此同时，这些评论员提请人们注意一些不受欢迎（但对美国友好）的军阀在美国选举监督下取得“合法”地位。 一些评论员将选民投票率数据解读为“大规模舞弊”的证据。 [91] 索纳利·科尔哈特卡和詹姆斯·英格尔斯写道：“美国决策者是否会允许任何接近民主的事情在阿富汗爆发并干扰他们的计划，还有待观察。”[92]
对于阿富汗的选举，阿富汗前妇女事务部长西玛·萨马尔表示：“这不是民主，而是橡皮图章。一切都已经由有权势的人决定了。”[93]
大多数关于美国干预的研究都对美国输出民主的历史持悲观态度。 John A. Tures 使用自由之家的数据检查了 1973 年至 2005 年美国干预的 228 个案例。 [94] 虽然在 63 个案例中，一个国家确实变得更加民主，但在 69 个案例中，该国变得不那么民主 - 并且多元化的干预措施 96 并未导致该国的民主发生任何变化。 [94]
Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine refers to multiple interrelated foreign policy principles of the 43rd President of the United States, George W. Bush. These principles include unilateralism, preemptive war, and regime change.
Charles Krauthammer first used the phrase in June 2001 to describe the Bush administration's "unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol."[1] After the 9/11 attack, the phrase described the policy that the United States had the right to secure itself against countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.[1][2] The Bush Doctrine became strongly associated with the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003.[3][4][5]
Different pundits have attributed different meanings to the Bush Doctrine. It was used to describe specific policy elements, including a strategy of "preemptive strikes" as a defense against an immediate or perceived future threat to the security of the United States. This policy principle was applied particularly in the Middle East to counter international terrorist organizations and to justify the invasion of Iraq.[citation needed]
Generally, the Bush Doctrine was used to indicate a willingness to unilaterally pursue U.S. economic interests.[6][7][8] Some of these policies were codified in a National Security Council text entitled the National Security Strategy of the United States published on September 20, 2002.[9]
The phrase "Bush Doctrine" was rarely used by members of the Bush administration. The expression was used at least once, though, by Vice President Dick Cheney, in a June 2003 speech in which he said, "If there is anyone in the world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush Doctrine, I would urge that person to consider the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq."[10]
National Security Strategy of the United States[edit]
The main elements of the Bush Doctrine were delineated in a document, the National Security Strategy of the United States, published on September 17, 2002.[11] This document is often cited as the definitive statement of the doctrine.[12][13][14] As updated in 2006, it states:[15][16]
Components[edit]
The Bush Doctrine is defined as "a collection of strategy principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales and ideas for guiding United States foreign policy."[17] Some of these had reemerged from the 1992 draft Wolfowitz Doctrine, which had been leaked and disavowed by the first Bush administration; Wolfowitz, as deputy secretary of defense, was at the center of the new Bush administration's strategic planning.[18] Two main pillars are identified for the doctrine: 1.) preemptive strikes against potential enemies and 2.) promoting democratic regime change.[17][19]
The George W. Bush administration claimed that the US was locked in a global war; a war of ideology, in which its enemies are bound together by a common ideology and a common hatred of democracy.[17][20][21][22][23][24]
Out of the National Security Strategy, four main points are highlighted as the core to the Bush Doctrine: 1.) Preemption, 2.) Military Primacy, 3.) New Multilateralism, and 4.) the Spread of Democracy.[25] The document emphasized preemption, stating, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few", and required "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders."[26]
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked thus in 2006, in a statement taken to reflect his view of the Doctrine's efficacy: "If I were rating, I would say we probably deserve a D or D+ as a country as how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place. I'm not going to suggest that it's easy, but we have not found the formula as a country."[23]
In his 2010 memoir Decision Points, President Bush articulates his discrete concept of the Bush Doctrine. He stated that his doctrine consisted of four "prongs", three of them practical, and one idealistic. They are the following: (In his words)
- "Make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them — and hold both to account."
- "Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at home."
- "Confront threats before they fully materialize."
- "Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy's ideology of repression and fear."
Unilateralism[edit]
Unilateral elements were evident early in Bush's presidency. Conservative Charles Krauthammer, who coined the term "Bush Doctrine", deployed "unilateralism", in February 2001 to refer to Bush's increased unilateralism in foreign policy, specifically regarding his decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty.[27][28]
There is some evidence that Bush's willingness for the US to act unilaterally came even earlier. The International Journal of Peace Studies 2003 article "The Bush administration's image of Europe: From ambivalence to rigidity" states:[29]
Attacking countries that harbor terrorists[edit]
The doctrine was developed more fully as an executive branch response following the September 11 attacks. The attacks presented a foreign policy challenge, since it was not Afghanistan that had initiated the attacks, and there was no evidence that they had any foreknowledge of them.[30] In an address to the nation on the evening of September 11, Bush stated his resolution of the issue by declaring that, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."[31] The President made an even more aggressive restatement of this principle in his September 20, 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress:[32]
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer later wrote in an autobiographical account of that address, "In a speech hailed by the press and by Democrats, [the President] announced what became known as the 'Bush Doctrine'".[33] The first published reference after the 9/11 attacks to the terror-fighting doctrine appeared September 30 in an op-ed by political scientist Neal Coates.[34]
This policy was used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001,[2] and has since been applied to American military action against Al Qaeda camps in North-West Pakistan.[citation needed]
Pre-emptive strikes[edit]
Bush addressed the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) on June 1, 2002, and made clear the role pre-emptive war would play in the future of American foreign policy and national defense:[35]
The stance of the Bush administration was that the harsh measures to spread the democracy worldwide are inevitable and efficacious, in which for instance, liberating Iraq will plant democracy in the area and enable it to flourish in the rest of the Middle East.[36]
Two distinct schools of thought arose in the Bush administration regarding how to handle countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (the so-called "Axis of Evil"[37] states). Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, as well as U.S. Department of State specialists, argued for what was essentially the continuation of existing U.S. foreign policy. These policies, developed after the Cold War, sought to establish a multilateral consensus for action (which would likely take the form of increasingly harsh sanctions against the problem states, summarized as the policy of containment). The opposing view, argued by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and a number of influential Department of Defense policy makers like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, held that direct and unilateral action was both possible and justified and that America should embrace the opportunities for democracy and security offered by its position as sole remaining superpower.
Democratic regime change[edit]
In several speeches between late 2001 and 2002, Bush expanded on his view of the US foreign policy and global intervention, declaring that the US should actively support democratic governments around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating the threat of terrorism, and that the nation had to act unilaterally in its own security interests, without approval of international bodies like the United Nations.[6][7][8] This represented a departure from the Cold War policies of deterrence and containment under the Truman Doctrine and post–Cold War philosophies such as the Powell Doctrine and the Clinton Doctrine.
In his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush declared:[38]
After his second inauguration, in a January 2006 speech at National Defense University, Bush said: "The defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom."
Neoconservatives and the Bush Doctrine held that the hatred for the West and the United States particularly exists not because of actions perpetrated by the US, but rather because the countries from which terrorists emerge are in social disarray and do not experience the freedom that is an intrinsic part of democracy.[17][23] The Bush Doctrine holds that enemies of the US use terrorism as a war of ideology against the nation. The responsibility of the US is to protect itself by promoting democracy where the terrorists are located so as to undermine the basis for terrorist activities.[17][23] The Elections in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine happened as a result of this initiative in the sense that Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas were allowed to participate in it.
Influences on the Bush Doctrine[edit]
Neoconservatives[edit]
The development of the doctrine was influenced by neoconservative ideology,[39][40] and it was considered to be a step from the political realism of the Reagan Doctrine.[39][41] The Reagan Doctrine was considered key to American foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, just before Bill Clinton became president of the United States. The Reagan Doctrine was considered anti-Communist and in opposition to Soviet Union global influence, but later spoke of a peace dividend towards the end of the Cold War with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending. The Reagan Doctrine was strongly criticized[41][42][43] by the neoconservatives, who also became disgruntled with the outcome of the Gulf War[39][40] and United States foreign policy under Bill Clinton,[40][44] sparking them to call for change towards global stability[40][45] through their support for active intervention and the democratic peace theory.[44] Several central persons in the counsel to the George W. Bush administration considered themselves to be neoconservatives or strongly support their foreign policy ideas.[40][46][47][48][49][50]
Neoconservatives are widely known to long have supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and on January 26, 1998, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) sent a public letter to then-President Bill Clinton stating:
Among the signatories to PNAC's original statement of Principals is George H. W. Bush's Vice President Dan Quayle, George W. Bush's defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, his Vice President Dick Cheney, and his brother Jeb Bush.[40]
PNAC member and the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (DPBAC), Neoconservative Richard Perle, later expressed regret over the Iraq invasion and ultimately put the blame for the invasion on President George W. Bush.[51]
Other Bush cabinet members who are thought to have adopted neoconservative foreign policy thinking include Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.[52]
The Bush Doctrine, in line with long-standing neoconservative ideas, held that the United States is entangled in a global war of ideas between the western values of freedom on the one hand, and extremism seeking to destroy them on the other; a war of ideology where the United States must take responsibility for security and show leadership in the world by actively seeking out the enemies and also change those countries who are supporting enemies.[17][23][24][53]
The Bush Doctrine, and neoconservative reasoning, held that containment of the enemy as under the realpolitik of Reagan did not work, and that the enemy of United States must be destroyed pre-emptively before they attack—using all the United States' available means, resources and influences to do so.[17][23][24]
On the book Winning the War on Terror Dr. James Forest, U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, comments: "While the West faces uncertainties in the struggle against militant Islam's armies of darkness, and while it is true that we do not yet know precisely how it will end, what has become abundantly clear is that the world will succeed in defeating militant Islam because of the West's flexible, democratic institutions and its all-encompassing ideology of freedom."[24]
Natan Sharansky[edit]
Another part of the intellectual underpinning of the Bush Doctrine was the 2004 book The Case for Democracy, written by Israeli politician and author Natan Sharansky and Israeli Minister of Economic Affairs in the United States Ron Dermer, which Bush has cited as influential in his thinking.[54] The book argues that replacing dictatorships with democratic governments is both morally justified since it leads to greater freedom for the citizens of such countries, and strategically wise, since democratic countries are more peaceful, and breed less terrorism than dictatorial ones.
Expanding United States influence[edit]
Princeton University research fellow Dr. Jonathan Monten, in his 2005 International Security journal article "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy",[55] attributed the Bush administration's activist democracy promotion to two main factors: the expansion of material capabilities, and the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology. He claims that the Bush Doctrine's promotion of democracy abroad was held as vital by the Bush administration to the success of the United States in the "war on terror". It was also a key objective of the administration's grand strategy of expanding the political and economic influence of the United States internationally. He examines two contending approaches to the long-term promotion of democracy: "exemplarism", or leadership by example, and "vindicationism", or the direct application of United States power, including the use of coercive force. Whereas exemplarism largely prevailed in the 20th century, vindicationism has been the preferred approach of the Bush administration.
Criticism and analysis[edit]
The Bush Doctrine resulted in criticism and controversy.[29][56] Peter D. Feaver, who worked on the Bush national security strategy as a staff member on the National Security Council, said he has counted as many as seven distinct Bush doctrines. One of the drafters of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which is commonly mistakenly referred to as the "Bush Doctrine", demurred at investing the statement with too much weight. "I actually never thought there was a Bush doctrine", said Philip D. Zelikow, who later served as State Department counselor under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "Indeed, I believe the assertion that there is such a doctrine lends greater coherence to the administration's policies than they deserve." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, said he thought there was no "single piece of paper" that represents the Bush Doctrine.[57]
Experts on geopolitical strategy note that Halford Mackinder's theories in "The Geographical Pivot of History" about the "Heartland" and world resource control are still as valid today as when they were formulated.[58][59][60]
In his 2007 book In the Defense of the Bush Doctrine,[17] Robert G. Kaufman wrote: "No one grasped the logics or implications of this transformation better than Halford Mackinder. His prescient theories, first set forth in Geographical Pivot of History, published in 1904, have rightly shaped American grand strategy since World War II. Mackinder warned that any single power dominating Eurasia, "the World Island", as he called it, would have the potential to dominate the world, including the United States."[61] Kaufman is a political scientist, public policy professor and member of The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. He said in an interview about the book: "I wrote this book because of my conviction that the Bush Doctrine has a more compelling logic and historical pedigree than people realize."[20]
The Bush Doctrine was polarizing both domestically and internationally.[62] In 2008, polls showed there was more anti-Americanism than before the Bush administration formed the Bush Doctrine; this increase was probably, at least partially, a result of implementing the Bush Doctrine and conservative foreign policy.[63][64]
Foreign interventionism[edit]
The foreign policy of the Bush Doctrine was subject to controversy both in the United States and internationally.[29][55]
John J. Mearsheimer argues in his book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities that a liberal hegemonic policy like the Bush Doctrine is ineffective at achieving its stated end goals and is doomed to lead to more war, anti-Americanism, and a global retreat in democracy.
Some critics of the policies were suspicious of the increasing willingness of the United States to use military force unilaterally.[65][66]
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson argued that it reflects a turn away from international law, and marks the end of American legitimacy in foreign affairs.[67]
Others have stated that it could lead to other states resorting to the production of WMDs or terrorist activities.[68] This doctrine is argued to be contrary to the just war theory and would constitute a war of aggression.[69][70] Patrick J. Buchanan wrote that the 2003 invasion of Iraq had significant similarities to the 1996 neoconservative policy paper A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.[71]
Political scientist Karen Kwiatkowski in 2007 wrote in her article "Making Sense of the Bush Doctrine":
Radical departure[edit]
According to Buchanan and others, the Bush Doctrine was a radical departure from former United States foreign policies, and a continuation of the ideological roots of neoconservatism.[39][73][74][75][76][77]
Initially, support for the United States was high,[77] but by the end of the Bush administration, after seven years of war, anti-Americanism was high and criticism of the Bush Doctrine was widespread;[77][78] nonetheless the doctrine still had support among some United States political leaders.[78]
The representation of prominent neoconservatives and their influences on the Bush Doctrine had been highly controversial among the American public.[41][52][78][79]
Critics, like John Micklethwait in the book The Right Nation, claim that Bush was deceived by neoconservatives into adopting their policies.[52][80][81]
Polarization[edit]
Anti-war critics have claimed that the Bush Doctrine was strongly polarizing domestically, had estranged allies of the United States,[72] and belied Bush's stated desire to be a "uniter, not a divider".[62]
Compassionate belief and religious influence[edit]
Bush often talked about his belief in compassionate conservatism[82][83] and liberty as "God's gift".[38] In his Claremont Institute article Democracy and the Bush Doctrine,[76] Charles R. Kesler wrote, "As he begins his second term, the president and his advisors must take a hard, second look at the Bush Doctrine. In many respects, it is the export version of compassionate conservatism."
Sociopsychological strategy and effects[edit]
There is also criticism on Bush Doctrine practices related to their sociopsychological effects saying they create a culture of fear.[84][85][86][87]
Naomi Klein wrote in her book The Shock Doctrine about a recurrent metaphor of shock, and she claimed in an interview that the Bush administration continued to exploit a "window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock", followed by a comforting rationale for the public, as a form of social control.[88]
Democratization[edit]
Some commentators argue that the Bush Doctrine has not aimed to support genuine democratic regimes driven by local peoples, but rather US-friendly regimes installed by diplomats acting on behalf of the United States and intended only to seem democratic to U.S. voters.[89] For example, in the case of Afghanistan, it is argued that parliamentary democracy was downplayed by the US and power concentrated in the hands of the Afghan president Hamid Karzai, a US ally.[90] The election of Karzai has been described as the result of manipulation on the parts of the US government and US policy maker Zalmay Khalilzad. At the same time, these commentators draw attention to the number of unpopular (but US-friendly) warlords achieving "legitimating" positions under US supervision of the elections. Some commentators interpreted voter turnout figures as evidence of "large-scale fraud".[91] Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls have written, "It remains to be seen if U.S. policymakers will ever allow anything approaching democracy to break out in Afghanistan and interfere with their plans."[92]
Of the elections in Afghanistan, Sima Samar, former Afghan Minister for Women's Affairs, stated, "This is not a democracy, it is a rubber stamp. Everything has already been decided by the powerful ones."[93]
Most studies of American intervention have been pessimistic about the history of the United States exporting democracy. John A. Tures examined 228 cases of American intervention from 1973 to 2005, using Freedom House data.[94] While in 63 cases a country did become more democratic, in 69 instances the country became less democratic - and the plurality of interventions, 96, caused no change in the country's democracy.[94]
