风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
华盛顿必须扭转乌克兰僵局
https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/02/09/washington-must-pivot-to-break-the-deadlock-in-ukraine/
作者：克里斯托弗·莫特 2024 年 2 月 9 日
结论
随着环城公路关于乌克兰战争要么是一场伟大的文明冲突，要么是一场民主圣战的叙事的崩溃，任何关于美国及其盟友等外部势力是否应该继续支持在乌克兰的动态行动的判断都必须基于冲突如何进行。 将影响全球力量平衡。
由于假设乌克兰在这一计算中发挥着关键作用，许多分析人士无意中应用了一种过时且误导性的新麦金德参考框架，该框架的重点是欧亚“心脏地带”对全球海上强国美国的重要性。 因此，他们忽视了全球力量平衡的变化，并完全误解了对美国真正至关重要的世界地区。
虽然乌克兰的命运可能对东欧内部和周边的几个地区参与者至关重要，但它在这些邻近地区之外缺乏太大的全球影响。 此外，许多此类国家（即波兰或德国）都足够强大，可以在不需要美国额外军事介入的情况下抗衡俄罗斯在该地区的设计，从而使华盛顿能够将重点转向其他优先事项。
考虑到美国在乌克兰战争中付出的高昂代价及其战略短视，华盛顿必须转向外交，努力与俄罗斯通过谈判找到解决方案。 毕竟，世界上大多数常规冲突最终都是通过外交解决，而不是压倒性胜利。27
然而，考虑到当前战场的僵局以及人力和后勤方面的预期轨迹，谈判的任何进一步拖延只会削弱基辅未来的谈判手气。
乌克兰国家通过其战斗决心，已经从俄罗斯手中榨取了高昂的代价，并从莫斯科手中获得了战略自主权。 然而，考虑到目前战场的僵局以及人力和后勤方面的预期轨迹，谈判的任何进一步拖延只会削弱基辅未来的谈判手气。
<<<<<<>>>>>>
2023年本来应该是大攻势之年。 这证明，一支由北约武装、训练有素的乌克兰军队可以在 2022 年英雄般的失败表现的基础上继续发扬光大，并将俄罗斯人赶回 2014 年的接触线。 与之前乌克兰的攻势不同，例如非常成功的哈尔科夫行动，这次袭击的目标和地点被告知全世界，并在俄罗斯常规物质优势（尤其是火炮方面）面前陷入困境。
随着这次行动的失败，有关俄罗斯-乌克兰战争的主流叙事再次发生了显着变化。 战争开始时，人们对俄罗斯不可避免地会以征服整个乌克兰国家的形式取得胜利的悲观预测，然后鉴于俄罗斯在战争开始时多次令人尴尬的失败，迅速转向对乌克兰全面胜利的乐观预测。 一种极端让位于另一种极端。 不可否认，俄罗斯在2022年的表现——尤其是在后勤方面——极其糟糕。然而，一旦俄罗斯的军事决心明显不会立即瓦解，这一事实并没有改变两国之间的基本力量平衡。
只有少数国家支持俄罗斯进攻乌克兰。 尽管如此，世界上大多数人仍将其视为一场欧洲局部战争。 为了反驳这一论点，并通过以军火和制裁的形式提供前所未有的援助来支持西方对乌克兰的支持，大西洋主义建制派试图将这场战争描述为一场针对俄罗斯帝国的基于价值观和生存的斗争—— 暗指中国和伊朗——一心想通过“独裁轴心”统治世界。1 到 2024 年，这种说法几乎已经站不住脚了。2
重要的是，西方关于乌克兰战争作为我们这个时代关键道德斗争的全球重要性的言论已经被放弃，北大西洋开始探索外交解决方案的可行性，这表明，甚至许多西方政策制定者也认为， 乌克兰战争是大国竞争的一个实例，而不是民主国家与独裁国家之间价值观的重大文明冲突。 3
乌克兰后，第三方国家的行为集中于其国家利益，这表明世界已经不再采用华盛顿的优先事项——这意味着那些往往“全球化”的优先事项与许多国家面临的地缘政治现实不同步。 世界各地。
此外，乌克兰事件后，第三方国家专注于其国家利益的行为表明，世界已经不再接受华盛顿的优先考虑。暗示那些经常“全球化”的优先事项与世界许多国家面临的地缘政治现实不同步。
长期以来，印度一直被华盛顿视为反华一极，但它几乎没有采取任何行动来破坏与俄罗斯的关系，甚至自 2022 年以来还扩大了与莫斯科的商业关系。4 与此同时，许多非洲国家感受到了利用冲突重新平衡关系的机会 对俄罗斯有利，寻求比以前从“西方”伙伴关系中获得的更公平的安全安排。 对于世界上许多国家来说，更加多极化的世界意味着大国之间相互竞争的机会更大，以便为自己争取最好的结果。 5
许多北约联盟国家押注乌克兰可能成为一场全球性的十字军东征，以激发国际支持，但这一赌注已经失败。 由于大量资源被花费在一场没有直接威胁北约联盟任何成员的冲突上，在多年来“Blob”忽视冲突的基本现实之后，一些现实主义终于开始渗透到讨论中。
然而，为了取得成功，外交支持者必须明白，两年来关于这是我们这个时代最重要的斗争的言论不会在一夜之间消失。 目前说服主流反对派相信外交必要性的关键在于强调乌克兰及其最终与俄罗斯边界的确切性质（基辅是否承认）最终与全球力量平衡无关。
全球均势与中心地带理论
乌克兰的命运很可能对其周边国家至关重要，但任何关于其与具有全球利益的遥远大国的相关性的论点都更加值得怀疑。 美国仍然是最重要的全球大国，这就是为什么它与战后现状挂钩并反对对世界秩序的修正主义设计。
最终，美国的利益归结为防止竞争对手实现全球霸权。 这可以通过近海平衡战略来实现，即海军强国利用其距离和海上力量来增强其他国家阻碍修正主义对手的能力。 6 然而，由于全球反恐战争时代继承的政策 华盛顿发现自己已经过度扩张，在世界各地部署了太多的绊线军事设施和脆弱的后勤供应链。
其中许多战略纠葛都与美国的核心利益无关，阻碍了美国成为有效的离岸平衡者。
其中许多战略纠葛都与美国的核心利益无关，阻碍了美国成为有效的离岸平衡者。 他们甚至可能将美国军队减少为冲突地区的弱势旁观者，而不是阻止其他大国在地区外越权行为的决定性行动者。
在一个对兵力投射进行严格限制的多中心世界中，美国及其盟国必须确定地区优先事项并减少随意干预。 乌克兰根本没有被列入地缘战略优先事项清单，特别是考虑到中国的崛起。7
尽管如此，美国仍然存在一个至上主义派系，他们依靠听起来现实主义的主张和基于利益的语言来支持美国继续参与乌克兰及其他地区的事务。 多夫·扎克海姆 (Dov Zakheim)8 和安德鲁·米奇塔 (Andrew Michta)9 等美国战略家利用“欧亚同时性”等地缘政治理论，认为乌克兰对美国的全球战略态势至关重要。 因此，我们必须根据这些主张本身的条件来调查其优点和起源。
1904年，英国地理学家、学者哈尔福德·麦金德在《地理杂志》上发表了一篇题为《历史的地理枢轴》的文章。 这篇文章最终在英国和美国的地缘政治圈中产生了相当大的影响，它认为海上强国对世界事务毫无疑问的主导地位的时代即将结束。 技术变革，特别是铁路和电报形式的技术变革，将为大型欧亚大陆帝国（尤其是俄罗斯）带来巨大收益。
麦金德假设俄罗斯（或者，崛起的德国以牺牲俄罗斯甚至俄德联盟为代价在东欧获得领土）将控制内陆资源，并保持足够的保护距离，使英国皇家无法触及 海军，从而创建了一个无懈可击的欧亚帝国。 麦金德认为，由于世界上大多数人口居住在欧亚大陆，任何能够主宰超级大陆的力量都将很快主宰世界。 这就是“中心地带”，世界上更多的沿海地区被称为“边缘地带”。 因此，根据麦金德的说法，保持心脏地带的分裂以防止这种假设的全球统治的发生符合英国的利益。该理论在文章发表后的第二年就失去了一些吸引力，日本成功遏制了俄罗斯在太平洋的野心，莫斯科和伦敦开始了反德协约。 与此同时，第一次世界大战导致俄罗斯和德国（暂时）失去了世界事务中决定性力量的地位。
然而，第二次世界大战结束后，苏联崛起，成为仅有的两个仍然屹立不倒的超级大国之一。 在这样的环境下，许多人重新审视了麦金德的观点，修改和更新了它们以适应战后世界。 从当代政策角度来看，最著名的是卡特政府的国家安全顾问兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基。 从该职位退休后，布热津斯基重申了麦金德的论点，但从美国的角度来看，他在 1997 年颇具影响力的著作《大棋盘》中指出：单一大国对欧亚大陆的统治现在是美国的首要安全关切，它需要积极的 美国参与世界许多地区的预防工作11
麦金德-布热津斯基关于潜伏在欧亚“心脏地带”的全球威胁的旧观点实际上被用来为继续支持战略上不健全的政策提供名义上的、现实主义的信任。
虽然这一新麦金德理论第一部分背后的逻辑总体上是合理的，但欧亚大陆由一个国家霸权的假设不仅在历史上不可信，而且极其可疑。 也就是说，对美国竞争对手主宰欧亚大陆的理性恐惧，与俄罗斯自然希望在其周边国家建立势力范围的愿望混为一谈。 12 美国干预东欧的鼓吹者暗示，通过北约和诸如此类的联合堡垒进行强有力的军事反应。 乌克兰将击退莫斯科的领土扩张主义，并削弱俄罗斯相对于美国的地位。 13 然而，俄罗斯（甚至与其盟友一起）不仅缺乏通过帝国征服统一欧亚大陆的能力，而且几乎没有迹象表明 他们有任何这样做的愿望。 因此，麦金德-布热津斯基关于潜伏在欧亚“心脏地带”的全球威胁的旧观点实际上被用来为继续支持战略上不健全的政策提供名义上的、现实主义的信任。
随后发生的事件，包括美国在中东无休止的战争，表明该理论的第二个指令，即呼吁美国在欧亚大陆及其周边地区进行更积极的干预，更加值得怀疑。 麦金德关于陆地基础设施将迅速超过使用货船的海上贸易量的预测要么是错误的，要么尚未实现。 布热津斯基的推论，即中亚对于美国保持欧亚大国分裂的利益至关重要，也未能令人信服，因为那里的国家缺乏地区团结，被地区大国所掩盖，因此无法形成一个可行的平衡集团或 甚至成为中国或俄罗斯全球力量投射的关键。
欧亚大陆的陆路距离以及居住在其中的国家和文化的高度差异，再加上它们的历史竞争，自然阻止了中国或俄罗斯等美国主要竞争对手在欧亚大陆建立任何有意义的有凝聚力的霸权秩序。 与此同时，美国力量越深入欧亚大陆内部并远离其海上力量中心，其后果就越严重，正如伊拉克和阿富汗战争所表明的那样。 结果，华盛顿对欧亚大陆以外地区的主导地位的追求浪费了其资源，并驱使不同的行为体结盟反对它——如果美国不介入，这些行为体将是天然的竞争对手。 14
从短期到中期来看，边缘地区仍然是大国之间争夺优势以打破世界力量平衡的中心地带。 中国的崛起以及力量在东北亚和北美的集中，使太平洋变得更加中心，从而进一步挑战了麦金德关于欧亚内陆中心地带的战略重要性的观点。 在此背景下，现在是时候从美国的角度重新审视乌克兰与全球权力博弈无关的问题了。
乌克兰在北大西洋战略中的边缘地位
乌克兰是欧洲的一个重要国家，这可能在一定程度上解释了它作为全球安全关键的新声誉。 但从一个拥有全球利益的世界大国的角度来看，这种声誉就更难维持了。 虽然基辅在战前拥有 4300 万人口和令人印象深刻的农业部门，15 但现在几乎完全依赖外国军事硬件——无论是缴获的俄罗斯设备还是工业和军事进口——并且正在经历严重的人口下降压力，这损害了其长期发展。 军事和战略价值。16 乌克兰的支持者对战争至关重要与地面主要战斗人员相比，他们维持升级主导地位的能力也在动摇。 17
然而，从遥远的全球大国的角度判断一个国家的重要性的真正决定因素不是绝对排名，而是相对排名和情境排名。 与摩尔多瓦或奥地利相比，乌克兰似乎是当地重要的地区大国，但其最大的陆地边界是与强大得多的俄罗斯接壤。 它还与另一个自信的中等强国土耳其共享黑海地区。 稍微远一点的是德国，其次是法国、意大利和英国。 鉴于中等强国的最佳定义是其地区实力和在特定邻国的行动自由，乌克兰根本不符合资格。18 基辅仍然是其历史上一直以来的样子：一个位于不同地区和地区边界的断层国家。 文化安全综合体。
这揭示了一个奇怪但不可避免的事实：没有一个北约国家与乌克兰建立正式联盟。 即使在今天，乌克兰未来是否会加入联盟——即使在物质和言辞上都表现出团结一致——充其量也是不确定的。 由于北约本身没有受到攻击，并且拥有核威慑和常规威慑，因此有关乌克兰的损失会给整个北约国家带来更大风险的说法充其量是毫无根据的。 从美国的角度来看，保护欧洲相对于俄罗斯的力量平衡的关键不在乌克兰，而在德国和土耳其等已经在安全安排上与美国正式挂钩的国家。 最后但并非最不重要的一点是，欧洲本身可能不再像冷战期间那样成为维持全球力量平衡的核心。
乌克兰是俄罗斯永久的眼中钉？
就目前情况而言，美国和俄罗斯是无可否认的地缘政治竞争对手。 因此，必须根据乌克兰自身的情况来考虑乌克兰作为莫斯科周边国家潜在毒丸的地位。 对俄罗斯造成最大损害，或者利用乌克兰作为代理人让俄罗斯“流血”19，其好处是否超过了这种政策的巨大成本？
尽管“战争迷雾”笼罩着对任何正在进行的冲突的评估，但仍然可以收集到某些观察结果。 从北大西洋势力的角度来看，支持乌克兰的论点在于其威慑潜力，可以抑制俄罗斯未来针对其周边国家的军事冒险主义。 虽然顿巴斯的命运与任何与乌克兰没有直接边界的国家无关，但为俄罗斯夺取新地产的高昂成本最终可能会导致莫斯科未来更加克制。 这种观点认为，俄罗斯伤亡人数高于预期也可能导致俄罗斯人民更加不愿采取未来的冒险主义。
这与北大西洋国家似乎从战争中获得的另一个好处相结合：提高了与俄罗斯接壤的国家的怀疑和不安全程度，特别是那些拥有大量俄罗斯少数民族人口的国家。 哈萨克斯坦也许是继乌克兰之后受俄罗斯民族统一主义威胁最大的国家，自乌克兰战争爆发以来，哈萨克斯坦制定了更加独立的外交政策方针，尽管它仍然与俄罗斯保持着友好关系。20对莫斯科的负面情绪也激发了芬兰和瑞典的情绪，这两个国家此前（ 正式）不结盟国家，申请加入北约联盟。 也许最引人注目的是，俄罗斯可能已经赢得了绝大多数乌克兰人的长期敌意，无论边界的未来到底在哪里，这种敌意都将在其边界上酝酿。
西方乌克兰政策的全球影响
因此，美国对乌克兰的干涉主义政策表面上的好处也伴随着巨大的负面影响。 欧洲每一次团结在华盛顿的大西洋主义周围，世界其他地方就会出现更多背离西方政策的行为。 21
如前所述，印度证明了一个中等规模的大国能够并且将会如何绕过北大西洋的制裁制度。 土耳其是北约的正式盟友，但比大多数国家拥有更多的自主权，它巧妙地利用其控制马尔马拉海峡的战略位置与俄罗斯和乌克兰接触，希望成为两国之间的外交媒介，同时也乐意为基辅提供物资 武器和莫斯科在制裁方面存在漏洞。22伊朗和朝鲜都通过间接协助俄罗斯的战争努力来提高其全球影响力。
此外，俄罗斯围绕许多关键国防相关产业的军事再工业化、国内经济的重振以及随后将商业转向中国，表明北约主导的经济制裁几乎没有达到预期的效果。 实际上，它们可能不仅降低了西方的外交影响力23 目前，俄罗斯经济处于战时基础，其弹药和装备的生产正在增加。 除非军事士气出现某种看似合理但不太可能崩溃的情况，否则随着冲突持续的时间越长，莫斯科将加强其在乌克兰问题上的地位。
北大西洋对乌克兰投资的增加削弱了这种实力，并加剧了美国对世界非关键地区太多承诺的后勤担忧。
当欧洲是美国的主要关注焦点时，支持乌克兰的代理人战争可能是一个明智的策略，但考虑到多极世界中大国竞争的更高成本，这一策略尤其不谨慎。 作为北大西洋联盟的关键成员，美国在不切实际地寻求东欧优势的过程中，其外交影响力和军事剩余库存已被耗尽。东欧几个世纪以来一直是俄罗斯实力的支柱，并认为该地区是俄罗斯的天然优势。 势力范围。 但即使在冷战期间，莫斯科在从乌拉尔山脉到喀尔巴阡山脉的东欧平原的天然优势也没有削弱华盛顿的全球实力。 如果说有什么影响的话，那就是北大西洋对乌克兰投资的增加削弱了这种实力，并加剧了美国对世界非关键地区太多承诺的后勤担忧。 25
这一切，最近中东发生的事件进一步证实了这一点。 尽管美国在西亚的永久存在与它在东欧的积极参与一样令人怀疑，但华盛顿的政策制定者（如果不是布鲁塞尔或伦敦的政策制定者）如此迅速地将注意力从乌克兰转向以色列/巴勒斯坦表明， 即使在 Blob 的干预主义派系中，当乌克兰必须与其他优先拥护者竞争时，它也不是一个次要的优先事项。 26
Washington Must Pivot to Break the Deadlock in Ukraine
https://peacediplomacy.org/2024/02/09/washington-must-pivot-to-break-the-deadlock-in-ukraine/
BY: Christopher Mott Feb 9, 2024
Conclusion
With the crumbling of Beltway narratives about the Ukraine War as either a grand civilizational clash or a jihad for democracy, any judgment about whether external powers such as the United States and its allies should still support kinetic operations in Ukraine must be based on how the conflict will impact the global balance of power.
By assuming that Ukraine plays a critical role in that calculation, many analysts inadvertently apply an outdated and misguided neo-Mackinderian frame of reference focused on the supposed import of the Eurasian “heartland” to a global maritime power that is the United States. They thus lose sight of the shifting global balance of power and categorically misunderstand the world regions that truly are of vital importance to the United States.
While the fate of Ukraine may be crucial to several regional players within and around Eastern Europe, it lacks much of a global repercussion beyond those immediate regions. Furthermore, many such countries (i.e. Poland or Germany) are strong enough to counterbalance Russian designs in the region without any additional U.S. military involvement, allowing Washington to pivot to other priorities.
Considering the high costs of the Ukraine war for the United States and its strategic shortsightedness, Washington must pivot to diplomacy and try to find a negotiated solution with Russia. After all, the majority of conventional conflicts around the world are ultimately resolved through diplomacy, not overwhelming victory.27
Through its resolve to fight, the Ukrainian state has already extracted a high price from Russia and secured its strategic autonomy from Moscow. Considering the current stalemate on the battlefield and the expected trajectories in manpower and logistics, however, any further delay in talks will only weaken Kyiv’s negotiating hand down the road.
<<<<<<>>>>>>
2023 was supposed to be the year of the Great Offensive. The proof that a NATO-armed and trained Ukrainian army could continue to build upon the successes of its heroic, underdog performance of 2022 and drive the Russians back to the 2014 lines of contact. Unlike previous Ukrainian offensives, such as the highly successful Kharkiv operation, the objectives and location of this attack were telegraphed to the world and floundered in the face of conventional Russian material superiority, especially in artillery.
With the collapse of this operation, the mainstream narrative about the Russia-Ukraine war has once again shifted remarkably. The war opened with gloomy predictions of inevitable Russian victory in the form of conquering the entire Ukrainian country, then rapidly pivoted towards euphoric forecasts of total Ukrainian victory in light of the multiple embarrassing Russian failures at the beginning of the war. One extreme gave way to another. It is undeniable that Russian performance—especially in regards to logistics—was extremely poor in 2022. Yet, this fact did not change the fundamental balance of power between the two countries once it became apparent that Russian military resolve would not immediately crack.
Only a handful of countries supported Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Still, most of the world viewed it as a local European war. To counter this argument, as well as to bolster support for the West’s backing of Ukraine with unprecedented assistance in the form of munitions and sanctions, the Atlanticist establishment sought to frame the war as a values-based and existential struggle against an imperial Russia—and by implication China and Iran— bent on world domination through an “authoritarian axis”.1 By 2024, this narrative has all but faltered.2
Importantly, the speed at which the Western rhetoric about the global import of the Ukraine War as the pivotal moral struggle of our time has been abandoned and the North Atlantic is beginning to explore the viability of a diplomatic solution shows that even many Western policymakers view the Ukraine war as an instantiation of great-power competition rather than as a grand civilizational clash of values between democracies and autocracies.3
Moreover, the post-Ukraine behavior of third-party states, focused on their national interests, demonstrates how the world has already moved on from adopting Washington’s priorities—implying that those often “globalized’ priorities are out of sync with the geopolitical realities faced by many nations around the world.
Long courted as a counter-China pole by Washington, India has done little to undermine its relations with Russia, even expanding its commercial ties with Moscow since 2022.4 Many countries in Africa, meanwhile, sensed an opportunity to capitalize on the conflict and rebalance their relations in Russia’s favor, seeking more equitable security arrangements than those they formerly got from “Western” partnerships. To many countries around the world, a more multipolar world translates into greater opportunity for bidding the great powers against each other in order to get the best outcome for themselves.5
The bet many NATO-aligned countries made that Ukraine could become a global crusade around which to galvanize international support has failed. With massive amounts of resources being spent on a conflict that has not directly threatened any member of the NATO alliance, some realism has at last begun to penetrate the discussion after years of the Blob overlooking the fundamental realities of the conflict.
To achieve success, however, supporters of diplomacy must understand that two years of rhetoric about this being the most important struggle of our era will not disappear overnight. The key to persuading mainstream opposition about the necessity of diplomacy at this moment lies in emphasizing that neither Ukraine nor the exact nature of its eventual borders with Russia (recognized by Kyiv or not) is ultimately relevant to the global balance of power.
The Global Balance of Power and Heartland Theory
Ukraine’s fate may well be of critical import to the countries bordering it, but any argument for its relevance to more distant powers with global interests is far more suspect. The United States remains the most significant global power, which is why it is tied to the Postwar status quo and opposes revisionist designs on the world order.
In the end, U.S. interest boils down to preventing global hegemony by a rival power. This can be done via the strategy of offshore balancing, where a naval power uses its distance and seapower to enhance the ability of other states that stand in the way of revisionist rivals.6 However, due to policies inherited from the Global War on Terror era, Washington finds itself overextended, with too many tripwire military deployments and vulnerable logistical supply chains across the world.
Many of these strategic entanglements are peripheral to America’s core interests and prevent it from being an effective off-shore balancer. They may even reduce U.S. forces to vulnerable spectators in a conflict zone rather than decisive actors deterring extra-regional overreach by other great powers.
In a polycentric world of hard limits on force projection, the U.S. and its allies must establish regional priorities and reduce haphazard interventions. Ukraine simply does not make the list of geostrategic priorities, especially given the rise of China.7
Nevertheless, there exists a primacist faction in America that relies on realist-sounding claims and an interest-based language to champion continued U.S. involvement in Ukraine and beyond. Using geopolitical rationales such as “Eurasian Simultaneity”, U.S. strategists like Dov Zakheim8 and Andrew Michta,9 among others, posit that Ukraine is critical to America’s global strategic posture. We must therefore investigate the merit and origins of such claims on their own terms.
In 1904, the British geographer and scholar Halford Mackinder released an article in The Geographic Journal titled “The Geographic Pivot of History”. This piece, which would eventually become quite influential in both British and American geopolitical circles, postulated that the age of the maritime power’s unquestioned dominance over world affairs was coming to a close. Technological changes, particularly in the form of railroads and telegraphs, were going to produce massive gains for large, land-based Eurasian empires, particularly Russia.
Mackinder hypothesized that Russia (or, alternatively, an ascendant Germany making territorial gains in Eastern Europe at the expense of Russia or even a Russo-German alliance) would control resources inland with enough protective distance that they would be out of reach for the British Royal Navy, thus creating an unassailable Eurasian empire. Since the majority of the world’s population lived in Eurasia, Mackinder argued, any power that could dominate the supercontinent would soon dominate the world. This was “The Heartland”, with the more coastal parts of the world referred to as “The Rimland”. It therefore served the interests of the British, according to Mackinder, to keep the Heartland divided to prevent this hypothetical global domination from occurring.10
The theory lost some traction early on as the year after the article’s release saw Japan successfully check Russian ambitions in the Pacific, and Moscow and London began an anti-German entente. Meanwhile, The First World War resulted in Russia and Germany being (temporarily) knocked out as decisive powers in world affairs.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, however, the Soviet Union rose as one of only two superpowers to remain standing. In such an environment, many revisited Mackinder’s views, revising and updating them to fit the Postwar world. The most notable from a contemporary policy perspective was Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of the Carter Administration. After retiring from that office, Brzezinski reiterated Mackinder’s arguments but from an American perspective in his influential 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard: The domination of the Eurasian landmass by a single power was now the primary security concern of the United States, and it required active U.S. involvement in many parts of the world to prevent.11
While the logic behind the first part of this neo-Mackinderian theory is generally sound, the very presumption of Eurasian hegemony by one state is not only historically implausible but also extremely dubious. Namely, the rational fear of a U.S. rival dominating Eurasia is confounded with Russia’s natural desire for a sphere of influence in its near abroad.12 It is implied by advocates of U.S. interventionism in Eastern Europe that a robust military response through NATO and aligned bulwarks like Ukraine will repel Moscow’s territorial expansionism and weaken Russia’s position vis-a-vis the United States.13 However, not only does Russia (even together with its allies) lack the ability to unite Eurasia through imperial conquest, but there is also little indication that they have any desire to do so. As such, the old Mackinder-Brzezinski view of a global threat lurking in the Eurasian “heartland” is actually being used to give nominal, realist credence to continued support for a strategically unsound policy.
Subsequent events, including America’s endless wars in the Middle East, have shown that the theory’s second directive, which calls for more active U.S. intervention in and around Eurasia, is even more suspect. Mackinder’s prediction that land infrastructure would rapidly come to surpass the volume of maritime trade using cargo vessels is either incorrect or has not yet materialized. Brzezinski’s corollary that Central Asia would be vital for U.S. interests in keeping the Eurasian powers divided has also failed to convince, as the states there lack regional unity, are overshadowed by the regional powers, and are thus unable to form either a viable balancing bloc or even to serve as the lynchpin for global power projection for either China or Russia.
The overland distances within Eurasia and the high degree of variance of the states and cultures inhabiting it, combined with their historical rivalries, naturally prevent major U.S. rivals like China or Russia from establishing any kind of meaningful cohesive hegemonic order across Eurasia. Meanwhile, the further U.S. power moves into inner Eurasia and away from its maritime center of strength, the more calamitous the results can be, as shown by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, Washington’s pursuit of primacy over areas beyond the Eurasian Rimland has squandered its resources and driven disparate actors to align against it—actors who, absent U.S. involvement there, would be natural rivals.14
Over the short to medium term, the Rimland remains the central zone of contestation between great powers jockeying for advantage to tip the balance of power in the world. The rise of China and the concentration of power in Northeast Asia and North America has made the Pacific even more central, thus further challenging Mackinder’s notions about the strategic import of an inland Eurasian heartland. In this context, it is high time to revisit Ukraine’s irrelevance to the global balance of power game from a U.S.-based perspective.
Ukraine’s Peripheral Position in North Atlantic Strategy
Ukraine is a significant country in Europe, which may partly explain its newfound reputation as a lynchpin for global security. From the perspective of a world power with global interests, however, this reputation is harder to uphold. While home to 43 million people and an impressive agricultural sector before the war,15 Kyiv is now almost entirely dependent on foreign military hardware—whether captured Russian equipment or industrial and military imports—and is experiencing severe downward demographic pressures that undermine its long-term military and strategic value.16 The supporters of Ukraine, who are so critical to the war effort, are also wavering in their ability to maintain any sense of escalation dominance compared to the primary combatants on the ground.17
The true determining factors in judging a country’s importance from the perspective of distant global powers, however, are to be found not in absolute rankings but in relative and situational ones. Ukraine may seem a locally consequential regional power when compared to Moldova or Austria, but its largest land border is with the far stronger Russia. It also shares the Black Sea region with yet another assertive middle power, Turkey. A bit further afield lies Germany, followed by France, Italy, and Britain. Given that a middle power is best defined by its regional strength and freedom of action in a specific neighborhood, Ukraine simply does not qualify.18 Kyiv remains what it has been throughout its history: a fault-line state in the borderlands of different regional and cultural security complexes.
This sheds some light on the strange but unavoidable fact that not a single NATO country has a formal alliance with Ukraine. Even today, the future inclusion of Ukraine into the alliance—even after all this material and rhetorical solidarity—is uncertain at best. Since NATO itself is not under attack, and has both nuclear and conventional deterrence, claims that a loss for Ukraine poses a greater risk for NATO countries in general are unfounded at best. From an American perspective, the key to protecting the balance of power vis-a-vis Russia in Europe is not to be found in Ukraine, but in countries like Germany and Turkey that are already formally tied to the U.S. in security arrangements. Last but not least, Europe itself may no longer be central to maintaining the global balance of power as it once was during the Cold War.
Ukraine as a Permanent Thorn in Russia’s Side?
As things stand, the United States and Russia are undeniable geopolitical rivals. So Ukraine’s position as a potential poison pill in Moscow’s near abroad has to be considered on its own terms. Do the benefits of inflicting maximum damage on Russia, or giving it a “bloody nose”19 by using Ukraine as a proxy, outweigh the extraordinary costs of such a policy?
Despite the “fog of war” that clouds the assessment of any ongoing conflict, certain observations can still be gleaned. From the perspective of the North Atlantic establishment, the argument for supporting Ukraine rests on its deterrence potential for inhibiting Russia from future military adventurism targeting its near abroad. While the fate of the Donbass is irrelevant to any country that lacks immediate borders with Ukraine, the high costs of seizing new real estate for Russia might, in the end, contribute to more restraint by Moscow in the future. Higher than expected Russian casualties might also induce greater reluctance for future adventurism by the Russian people, so the argument goes.
This couples another benefit North Atlantic states seem to have reaped from the war: raising the levels of suspicion and insecurity in countries that border Russia, particularly those with large Russian-minority populations. Perhaps the country most threatened by Russian irredentism after Ukraine, Kazakhstan has charted a more independent foreign policy course since the Ukraine War broke out, although it still maintains friendly relations with Russia.20 Negative emotions towards Moscow also inspired Finland and Sweden, two previously (formally) unaligned nations, to apply to join the NATO alliance. Perhaps most strikingly, Russia has likely gained the long-term enmity of the vast majority of Ukrainians, something that will simmer right on their border no matter where exactly the future of that border lies.
The Global Impact of the West’s Ukraine Policy
The ostensible gains of an interventionist U.S. policy in Ukraine thus come with substantial downsides. For every instance of solidarity in Europe unifying around Washington’s Atlanticism, there have been many more acts of divergence from Western policy elsewhere in the world.21
As mentioned before, India is a testament to how a suitably large middle power can and will get around North Atlantic sanctions regimes. Turkey, an official NATO ally but one with far more autonomy than most, deftly uses its strategic location controlling the Straits of Marmara to engage both with Russia and Ukraine, hoping to serve as a diplomatic vector between the countries even as it happily supplies Kiyv with weapons and Moscow with loopholes around sanctions.22 Iran and North Korea have both managed to increase their global prominence by indirectly assisting the Russian war effort.
Furthermore, Russia’s military reindustrialization around many key defense-related industries, the reinvigoration of its domestic economy, and subsequent redirection of commerce towards China shows that NATO-led economic sanctions have had little of their intended impact. In practice, they might have not only decreased Western diplomatic leverage but also bolstered the targeted regime.23 Currently, the Russian economy is on a wartime footing and its production of munitions and equipment is on the rise. Barring some kind of hypothetically plausible but unlikely collapse in military morale, Moscow is on course to strengthen its position over Ukraine the longer the conflict lasts.24
Backing a proxy war in Ukraine might have been a sound strategy back when Europe was the primary focus of the United States, but given the higher costs of great power competition in a multipolar world, it is especially imprudent. As the pivotal member of the North Atlantic alliance, the U.S. has seen its diplomatic leverage and military surplus stocks depleted in a quixotic quest for advantage in Eastern Europe—a region that has been the backbone of Russia’s power for centuries and that it considers its natural sphere of influence. But even during the Cold War, Moscow’s natural advantages in the East European Plain from the Urals to the Carpathians did nothing to undermine Washington’s global power. If anything, the increase in North Atlantic investment in Ukraine has undermined that power and exacerbated logistical concerns for the United States, which has far too many commitments to non-critical regions of the world.25
All this has been further confirmed by recent events in the Middle East. While permanent U.S. presence in West Asia is every bit as suspect as its active involvement in Eastern Europe, that policymakers in Washington (if not those in Brussels or London) are so quick to pivot their attention away from Ukraine and onto Israel/Palestine reveals that even in the interventionist wings of the Blob, Ukraine is a lesser priority when it has to compete with the other fixations of primacy-advocates.26
