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欧洲对中国的虚张声势

(2024-02-09 08:03:05) 下一个

欧洲对中国的虚张声势

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-justification-for-european-trade-sanctions-on-china-by-yanis-varoufakis-2023-12

2023 年 12 月 19 日 雅尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯

在中美新冷战的背景下,欧盟高层似乎加大了对中国的压力,针对四项不满发出了可信的威胁。 唉,中国当局可能更多的是感到好笑,而不是感到震惊。

雅典—12月7日,欧洲理事会主席米歇尔和欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩分别出席第二十四次欧盟中国领导人会晤,向中国国家主席习近平转达严正信息。 在欧美舆论看来,在中美新冷战背景下,欧盟高层针对四项不满发出可信威胁,似乎是在加大对华施压。 唉,中国当局对他们所听到的消息可能更多的是感到好笑而不是震惊。

通胀之旅的下一阶段 迈克尔·斯宾塞 (MICHAEL SPENCE) 认为,美联储将在 2024 年之后继续降息的预测存在缺陷。

欧盟的第一个不满涉及“贸易不平衡”。 冯德莱恩生动地宣称,“每三个集装箱从中国运往欧洲,就有两个集装箱空空返回”。

当然,毫无疑问,持续的贸易失衡很可能反映了追求永久顺差的重商主义战略。 但欧盟指责中国重商主义的说法有点过分了。 过去十年,中国经常项目顺差平均为1.65%,而欧元区平均为2.24%。 同期,欧洲经济的主要引擎德国则录得令人瞠目结舌的7.44%顺差。

欧盟的第二个不满是,中国的国家援助相当于将中国出口产品倾销到欧洲市场。 毫无疑问,这种不满在 20 世纪 90 年代末和 2000 年代初具有相当大的意义,当时欧盟 — — 和美国 — — 不但没有抱怨中国的倾销行为,反而对中国融入西方的贸易和资本循环大加赞扬。 但既然重商主义的指控已经失去了现实基础,为什么还要提出这种不满呢?

毕竟,中国的电池或电动汽车(EV)在欧洲具有竞争力不是因为补贴,而是因为中国对其开发进行了大量投资。 如今,无论有没有国家援助,中国太阳能电池板的质量都是欧洲无法比拟的。

大众汽车是中国最大的国内汽车制造商之一,过去常常进口德国零部件和工业机器人。 如今,大众汽车从中国采购在中国生产汽车所需的所有零部件和资本货物,这加剧了欧洲的贸易困境。
扭转的不仅仅是贸易顺差。 在几十年来一直依赖德国工程师设计汽车后,大众汽车正在为计划在中国和欧洲销售的下一代全电动汽车招聘多达 3,000 名中国工程师。 更广泛地说,自2008年以来,虽然欧盟在整个欧洲实施严厉的紧缩政策,并在此过程中抑制了对其工业的投资,但中国却将其投资提高到了创世界纪录的占国民收入的近50%。

指责中国重商主义只会引起人们的不满,尤其是德国实业家,他们在过去 50 年里一直认为,德国对世界其他国家持续的贸易顺差反映了全球对高质量德国产品的需求。 无论冯德莱恩对中国领导人说什么,这些实业家都知道,生产太阳能电池板、电池和电动汽车的中国同行有权提出类似的主张。

米歇尔和冯德莱恩的第三个不满是欧洲公司发现很难获得中国政府合同。 加上前两次不满,这些都是欧盟官员对中国出口商采取惩罚措施的理由——特别是对电动汽车(以及更广泛的绿色科技)征收高关税。 但是,尽管官员们引用了布鲁塞尔已经开始对中国电动汽车进行的正式调查,但这一切似乎都缺乏说服力。

我私下交谈过的欧洲工业领导人承认,他们认为这些威胁证明了欧盟领导人意识到欧洲在关键领域失去了竞争力而感到恐慌。 其中一位反问道:“冯德莱恩真的相信对比亚迪电动汽车征收关税的威胁会促进(欧洲)对中国的出口吗?”

可以肯定的是,欧洲公司抱怨中国的竞争环境不公平,尤其是在政府采购方面。 但他们看不到,如果由于美国的巨大压力,欧盟各国政府越来越多地禁止中国公司参与自己的采购,情况将如何改变。 其中一位向我透露:“更不用说,自疫情爆发以来,欧盟各国政府已经我们自己接受了国家援助,就好像没有明天一样。”

米歇尔和冯德莱恩向习近平提出的第四个不满是,中国没有充分支持欧盟对俄罗斯的制裁,以此作为结束俄罗斯军队在乌克兰暴行的共同战线的一部分。 抛开制裁的有效性问题不谈,这一指控仅仅暴露了虚伪:猛烈抨击普京轰炸医院并针对乌克兰的水、电和食品供应(我们都应该这么做),同时保持沉默,就像以色列所做的那样,而且可以说是更多 更糟糕的是,在加沙。

当然,导致欧洲资本流失并失去经常项目盈余的并不是虚伪。 十年前,欧盟对不可避免的欧元危机的愚蠢处理导致了这一点。 创纪录的紧缩水平,加上大规模印钞以及长期未能建立银行业和资本市场联盟,确保了未来13年欧洲金融循环中的资金数量将达到前所未有的水平,而投资却将达到前所未有的低水平 在未来的技术中。 这就是欧洲落后于美国和中国的原因。 以对美国的屈服和针对中国的空洞威胁来回应既可悲又徒劳。

Europe's Bad China Bluff

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-justification-for-european-trade-sanctions-on-china-by-yanis-varoufakis-2023-12

 

Against the backdrop of the new cold war between the United States and China, the European Union’s top brass seems to be adding to the pressure on China by issuing credible threats in response to four grievances. Alas, the Chinese authorities are probably more amused than alarmed.

ATHENS – On the December 7, the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen, respectively, attended the 24th European Union-China Summit to convey a stern message to Chinese President Xi Jinping. In the eyes of European and American public opinion, and against the backdrop of the new cold war between the United States and China, the EU’s top brass seemed to be adding to the pressure on China by issuing credible threats in response to four grievances. Alas, the Chinese authorities were probably more amused than alarmed by what they heard.

The Next Phase of Our Inflation Journey MICHAEL SPENCE sees flaws in projections that the US Federal Reserve will continue to cut interest rates beyond 2024.

The EU’s first grievance concerns “unbalanced trade.” Von der Leyen put it colorfully claiming that “for every three containers that go from China to Europe, two containers return empty.”

There is, of course, no doubt that sustained trade imbalances may well reflect a mercantilist strategy for permanent surpluses. But the EU accusing China of mercantilism is a bit rich. Over the past decade, China’s current-account surplus averaged 1.65%, while that of the eurozone averaged 2.24%. In the same period, the main engine of Europe’s economy, Germany, recorded an eye-watering 7.44% surplus.

The EU’s second grievance is that China’s state aid amounts to dumping Chinese exports into Europe’s markets. Undoubtedly, such a grievance made considerable sense in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when, far from complaining about Chinese dumping, the EU – along with the US – were waxing lyrical about China’s induction into the West’s circuits of trade and capital. But why raise this grievance now that the charge of mercantilism has lost its basis in reality?

After all, Chinese batteries or electric vehicles (EVs) are competitive in Europe not because of subsidies but because of massive Chinese investment in their development. Today, Chinese solar panels have achieved a quality that Europe simply cannot match – with or without state aid.

Volkswagen, one of China’s largest domestic automakers, used to import German parts as well as industrial robots. Today, Volkswagen sources all the parts and capital goods it needs to produce cars in China from China, adding to Europe’s trade woes.

And it is not just the trade surplus that has been reversed. After relying for decades on German engineers to design its cars, Volkswagen is in the process of hiring up to 3,000 Chinese engineers for the next generation of all-electric cars that it plans to sell in China and in Europe. More broadly, since 2008, while the EU was imposing severe austerity across Europe, crushing investment in its industries in the process, China was boosting its investments to a world record ratio of almost 50% of its national income.

Blaming Chinese mercantilism only raises eyebrows, especially among German industrialists who spent the past 50 years arguing that Germany’ persistent trade surplus with the rest of the world reflected global demand for high-quality German products. Whatever von der Leyen says to China’s leaders, these same industrialists know that their Chinese counterparts making solar panels, batteries, and EVs have earned the right to make a similar claim.

Michel and von der Leyen’s third grievance is that European firms find it hard to secure Chinese government contracts. Together with the previous two grievances, these are the grounds on which EU officials have built their case for punitive measures against China’s exporters – in particular, high tariffs on EVs (and green tech more generally). But, while officials cite the formal investigation of Chinese EVs that is already underway in Brussels, it all seems unconvincing.

European industrial leaders to whom I have spoken privately admit that they view these threats as evidence of EU leaders’ panic at the realization that Europe has lost competitiveness in crucial fields. One rhetorically asked: “Does von der Leyen truly believe that the threat of tariffs on BYD’s EVs will boost [European] exports to China?”

To be sure, European firms complain about a skewed playing field in China, especially when it comes to government procurement. But they cannot see how this will change if, as a result of enormous US pressure, EU governments increasingly bar Chinese companies from their own procurement. “Not to mention,” one of them confided to me, “the fact that, ever since the pandemic, EU governments have themselves embraced state aid as if there is no tomorrow.”

The fourth grievance that Michel and von der Leyen laid at Xi’s door is that China was insufficiently supportive of the EU’s sanctions on Russia as part of a common front to end the Russian army’s brutality in Ukraine. Setting aside the question of the efficacy of sanctions, this charge merely exposes hypocrisy: Lambasting Putin’s bombardment of hospitals and targeting of Ukraine’s water, electricity, and food supply (as we all should) while staying silent as Israel does the same, and arguably much worse, in Gaza.

Of course, it is not hypocrisy that is causing Europe to hemorrhage capital and lose its current-account surplus. The EU’s inane handling of the inevitable euro crisis a decade ago saw to that. Record-breaking levels of austerity, coupled with massive money printing and a chronic failure to establish a banking and capital-markets union, ensured that for the next 13 years, Europe would have an unprecedented amount of money in its financial circuits and unprecedentedly low investment in the technologies of the future. This is why Europe is falling behind both the US and China. Responding with subordination to America and empty threats aimed at China is both sad and futile. 

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