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Yanis Varoufakis 为什么欧洲不能自由地与中国交往

(2024-02-09 07:57:07) 下一个

Yanis Varoufakis 为什么欧洲不能自由地与中国交往 

2023 年 12 月 14 日

Yanis Varoufakis – Why Europe is not free to relate to China

https://braveneweurope.com/yanis-varoufakis-why-europe-is-not-free-to-relate-to-china?
欧盟陷入经济困境,特别是在美国扩大霸权要求的情况下。 欧盟因此无法与中国发展必要的关系。

亚尼斯·瓦鲁法基斯 (Yanis Varoufakis) 是 MeRA25 领导人、希腊前财政部长、雅典大学经济学教授
本文最初发表于《中国日报》智库《中国观察》


第24次中欧领导人会晤于周四落下帷幕,人们很自然地想要审视这些宣言和官方演讲的背后,以找出影响欧盟与中国关系及其对华政策的更深层次的力量。 但要理解这些力量的本质,至关重要的是要回到最初,即1971年8月,当时美国结束了自己设计的布雷顿森林国际金融体系。 我们之所以需要追溯到那么久远的时间,是因为欧盟的商业模式是为了应对从固定汇率制度到金融化资本主义时代的动荡过渡而形成的。 同样,中国的重大崛起及其与欧洲不断发展的联系也需要以同样的眼光来审视。

在布雷顿森林体系下,只要美国与欧洲国家和日本保持贸易顺差,欧洲货币与美元之间的固定汇率(即欧洲的美元化)就会发挥作用——从某种意义上说,流入欧洲的美元会迁移 回到美国本土——得益于美国对欧洲的净出口。 然而,一旦美国成为赤字国家,在 20 世纪 60 年代末的某个时候,布雷顿森林体系就不再可持续,并迅速被华盛顿秘密向欧洲和日本提出的我所说的黑暗协议所取代。

黑暗交易相当简单:“我们将利用我们的贸易逆差来保持对你们产品的高需求。 作为回报,您将自愿将您的利润投资于我们的 FIRE——金融、保险和房地产领域。” 于是,美元就成了美化的借据。 美国可以用它或多或少地购买欧洲和日本工厂可以生产的所有东西,用美元支付,欧洲和日本资本家别无选择,只能投资美国的火。为什么称这为黑暗交易? 因为,在美国和欧洲资本家获得巨额财富的同时,它还导致德国等净出口国的工资受到永久性抑制,欧洲其他国家陷入缓慢的衰退,以及美国中心地带的工业大规模衰退。

中国在 20 世纪 90 年代的巨大崛起让美国和欧盟处于这种奇怪的关系中。 中国经济受益于华盛顿的黑暗协议,该协议现已扩大到将整个工厂生产线从美国出口到中国,然后将其产品出口到美国,美国公民用美元支付,然后他们的中国接受者将投资于华尔街 ,例如,在美国国库券中。 华尔街会用这些节省下来做什么? 他们将把欧洲、日本和中国的大部分利润投资到世界各地的新资本设备上。 简而言之,美国回收了别人的钱,并保留了由此产生的利润和租金的很大一部分。

这个以美国为中心的全球回收机制在2008年彻底崩溃。 所发生的事情是,在每天有数十亿美元的欧洲和亚洲利润涌入华尔街的背景下,美国和英国的金融家掀起了一场不可持续的赌注(也称为结构性衍生品)的海啸,这些赌注不可避免地崩溃了, 首先是雷曼兄弟倒闭,然后是恶性多米诺骨牌效应,导致整个北大西洋和欧洲银行体系崩溃。

那时,西方国家对大多数人实行普遍紧缩政策,并代表金融及其大企业客户大量印钞。 其结果是金融市场出现极好的复苏,但生产性资本投资崩溃(因为企业可以看到大多数人买不起昂贵的新商品),西方工人阶级陷入萧条,不平等程度令人心碎,以及 欧洲和美国的种族主义极右。

有两件事拯救了西方资本主义:西方央行的印钞已经提到了,还有……中国。 雷曼兄弟倒闭后,中国政府立即明智地增加投资,用国内投资来弥补预期的外国需求损失。 至此,中国免疫了西方金融危机病毒。 在此过程中,中国的投资热潮对稳定美国和问题重重的欧元区发挥了重要作用。

这是理解当前中欧关系的历史背景:欧盟对中国的需要远远超过中国对欧盟的需要,但在对华关系上却受到美国的牵制。 要了解这一点,请注意 2008 年危机爆发之前

源于华尔街的欧洲,欧盟的基础是有缺陷的,因为与美国不同,美国拥有联邦财政部、完全统一的银行体系和联邦总投资计划(当然,其中包括其庞大的预算) 强大的军工联合体),而欧洲却没有这些。 结果,2008年之后,希腊成为煤矿里的金丝雀,欧洲民众陷入严厉的紧缩政策,大多数欧洲政府陷入无法偿还的债务,导致投资水平低于本已很低的欧洲国家。 美国远低于中国。

十五年后,我们就能看到结果。 2008年,欧洲人的总收入比美国公民高出10%。 到 2022 年,美国公民的收入比欧洲人高 26%。 此外,欧洲人不仅在集体上而且在私人方面都在变得更加贫穷。 更糟糕的是,自2009年以来的十五年里,与中国或美国不同,欧洲未能对未来技术进行投资:电池、太阳能、微芯片和人工智能。 最重要的是,虽然美国和中国对新的基于云的资本进行了大量投资,赋予其所有者对大型科技和数字金融交易的新兴联系的巨大权力,但欧洲却没有。

上述解释了为什么欧洲尽管拥有财富和财富,但却是一个衰落的经济集团,陷入了华盛顿针对中国发动的日益激烈的新冷战,以阻止中国大型科技和数字支付系统的集聚增长,这对中国构成了威胁。 以美元为基础的全球支付体系面临危险。 乌克兰危机在欧洲现有的南北分歧上又增加了东西方分歧,并过度提高了能源成本,进一步削弱了欧洲独立于欧洲意愿选择对华政策的自主权。 我们。

总之,当欧洲和中国官员在第24次中欧领导人会晤时,欧洲代表选择谈判立场的自由度将比以前少得多。 欧洲已经不再是以前的欧洲了。 这对欧洲和中国人民都没有好处。

Yanis Varoufakis – Why Europe is not free to relate to China

https://braveneweurope.com/yanis-varoufakis-why-europe-is-not-free-to-relate-to-china?

December 14, 2023

The EU is in economic trouble, especially as the US expands its hegemonic demands. The EU is for this reason unable to develop its relations with China as is necessary.

Yanis Varoufakis is leader of MeRA25, former Greek finance minister and professor of economics at the University of Athens

This article originally appeared in China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily

As the 24th EU-China Summit concluded on Thursday, it is natural to want to look behind the declarations and official speeches to identify the deeper forces shaping the European Union’s relationship with China and its policies toward China. But to understand the nature of these forces, it is crucial to go back to the very beginning, August 1971, when the United States ended the Bretton Woods international financial system designed by itself. The reason we need to go that far back in time is that the EU’s business model was shaped in response to that tumultuous transition from a fixed exchange rate system to the era of financialized capitalism. Similarly, China’s momentous rise, and its evolving links to Europe, need to be examined under the same light.

Under the Bretton Woods system, fixed exchange rates between European currencies and the dollar (i.e., Europe’s dollarization) worked well as long as the US maintained a trade surplus with the European countries and Japan — in the sense that the dollars pumped into Europe would migrate back to US soil — courtesy of US net exports to Europe. However, once the US became a deficit country, sometime in the late 1960s, Bretton Woods was no longer sustainable and was speedily replaced by what I call a Dark Deal that Washington surreptitiously offered Europe and Japan.

The Dark Deal was rather simple: “We shall keep demand for your products high, using our trade deficit. In return, you will voluntarily invest your profits in our FIRE — finance, insurance and real estate sectors.” Thus, the US dollar became a glorified IOU. The US could use it to buy more or less everything that Europe’s and Japan’s factories could produce, paying in dollars that European and Japanese capitalists had no alternative but to invest in the US’ FIRE.Why call this Dark Deal? Because, along with fabulous riches for US and European capitalists, it yielded permanent wage repression in net exporting countries, such as Germany, a slow burning recession in the rest of Europe, and a massive industrial decline in the heartlands of the US.

China’s momentous rise in the 1990s found the US and the EU in this strange relationship. China’s economy benefited from Washington’s Dark Deal which was now extended to export entire factory lines from the US to China, whose output would then be exported to the US, with US citizens paying for it in dollars that their Chinese recipients would then invest in Wall Street, for example, in US treasury bills. And what would Wall Street do with these savings? They would invest much of European, Japanese and Chinese profits into new capital equipment around the world. In short, the US recycled other people’s moneys and kept a significant portion of the resulting profits and rents.

This US-centered global recycling mechanism broke down in 2008 once and for all. What had happened was that, on the back of the billions of dollars of European and Asian profits rushing into Wall Street on a daily basis, the US and UK financiers built tsunamis of unsustainable bets (also called structured derivatives) which, inevitably, crashed and burned, first when Lehman Brothers collapsed and then in a vicious domino effect that brought down the entire North Atlantic and European banking system.

At that point, the West practiced universal austerity for the majority and huge money printing on behalf of finance and its Big Business clients. The result was a superb recovery for financial markets, but a collapse of productive capital investments (as business could see that the majority could not afford pricey new goods), depression for the West’s working class, soulcrushing levels of inequality, and the rise of the racist ultraright both in Europe and the US.

Two things saved Western capitalism: the Western central banks’ money printing already mentioned and … China. Immediately after Lehman’s collapse, the Chinese government wisely boosted investment to replace the anticipated loss of foreign demand with domestic investment. Thus, China was immunized from the Western financial crisis virus. In the process, China’s investment spree played a major role in stabilizing both the US and the problematic eurozone.

This is the historical background against which to understand the current relationship between China and the EU: The EU needs China much more than China needs the EU, but it is restrained by the US in its relationship with China. To see this, note that before the 2008 crisis hit Europe, emanating from Wall Street, the very foundations of the EU were faulty, for unlike the US, which has a Federal Treasury, a fully unified banking system and a federal aggregate investment program (which, of course, includes the large budget of its mighty military-industrial complex), Europe has none of that. As a result, after 2008, with Greece being the canary in the coal mine, as European populations were being immersed in harsh austerity, most European governments were allowed to sink into unpayable debt, leading to investment levels lower than the already low levels of the US and far lower than those of China.

Fifteen years later, we can see the results. In 2008, Europeans earned, in aggregate, 10 percent more than the US citizens. By 2022, the US citizens were earning 26 percent more than Europeans. Moreover, Europeans are becoming poorer not just collectively but also privately. What is worse is that for fifteen years, since 2009, Europe has failed to invest, unlike China or the US, into the technologies of the future: batteries, solar power, microchips and artificial intelligence. Most importantly, while the US and China have invested massively in the new cloud-based capital that grants its owners great power over the emerging nexus of Big Tech and digital financial transactions, Europe has not.

The above explains why Europe, despite its wealth and riches, is a fading economic bloc caught up in the mounting new Cold War that Washington has unleashed against China in order to stem the growth of China’s agglomeration of Big Tech and digital payment systems which pose a danger to the global dollar-based payments system. By adding an East-West divide to Europe’s existing North-South divide, and by boosting inordinately its energy costs, the crisis in Ukraine has diminished even further Europe’s autonomy to choose its own policies vis-a-vis China independently of the will of the US.

In conclusion, when the European and Chinese officials meet at the 24th EU-China Summit, Europe’s representatives will have far fewer degrees of freedom to choose their negotiating position than they once had. Europe is not what it used to be. And that is good for the peoples of neither Europe nor China.

 

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