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美学者提6大原因 吁美军方放弃"拒止性吓阻"战略
2023-9-19 03:33| 来源：世界新闻网
在讨论台湾防卫手段时，「拒止性吓阻」（deterrence by denial）常被视为最佳战略之一。然而，美国军事新闻网站「防务一号」（Defense One）17日刊出学者专文，提出6大原因呼吁五角大厦放弃此一战略，指这个在美苏冷战后受到青睐、至今仍受到国防官员、智库研究和政府战略大力支持的想法，实际上并未发挥作用，俄国并未因此在入侵乌克兰行动上却步，中国仍继续透过「灰色地带」行动重塑南海和东海的安全环境，而五角大厦自身兵棋推演也显示，要完全吓阻中国入侵台湾是行不通的。
华府智库「哈德逊研究所」的两名资深研究员克拉克（Bryan Clark）及派特（Dan Patt）共同撰文指出，随着美国即将开始新一轮总统大选，以及中国、俄罗斯和伊朗局势恶化，现在是时候重新思考某些支撑美国国防政策的传统智慧了，其中瑕疵最多、最未被充分检视的正是「拒止性吓阻」战略。据报导，该战略意指防守方发挥对抗武力，藉由「拒止行动」阻绝敌军，让入侵者意识到自己可能在攻击行动中遭遇奋力抵抗，进而挫败、付出代价，因而不敢轻易发动攻势。两位学者举出「拒止性吓阻」无法继续支撑美国战略架构的6个原因。
一、「拒止性吓阻」概念模煳。
「拒止」表面上看似美国和盟军将阻止或扭转侵略者的行动，但要是人口多达14亿，且拥有世界上最大规模海军、海岸警卫队、船队和火箭军的中国准备入侵台湾，该战略或许就不可行。认为可行的人经常主张，「拒止」意味替侵略者製造不确定性，但这与此一战略应传达的确定性正好相反。如果要製造「不确定性」，提高美军的创造力和灵活性反而更有机会做到。
二、「拒止性吓阻」针对的目标有误。
若战略本身实际上是想动摇潜在侵略者的信心，并重塑其风险衡量，那么美国国防部就应该依据美国情报界对敌方的隐忧，来追求自身能力、战术和姿态，从而最大限度地创造「不确定性」。然而，五角大厦的预算安排，都是为了说服美国国防官员和国会相信美国和盟军有能力拒绝侵略，因为这样更容易对外解释。
三、「拒止性吓阻」扭曲美国的部队规划。
运用战略进行作战分析，探讨部队如何阻止侵略是很好，也有助于证明防御计画的合理性。然而，即使是一支有能力在72小时内击沉350艘船舰的部队，像中国这样的对手可能早就拟好对抗计画，由此提高不了多少「不确定性」。此外，建立能够满足「拒止」的能力，可能也会排挤应对其他侵略手段的能力，例如长期封锁、网路和资讯战或准武装部队扩大攻势等。
四、「拒止性吓阻」在对抗新形式侵略上或许行不通。
拒止战略取决于要拒止的对象，随着「灰色地带」行动、网路和资讯战的效率不断提高，我方将需要採取不同的方法，来吓阻刻意放缓或採取迂迴行动以达成目标的敌方。以中国为例，美军可能得参与「灰色地带」的对抗，并採取行动影响北京领导层，避免局势升级。
五、「拒止性吓阻」损害美国信誉。
此一战略会造成快速、大规模的损失，导致在面对拥有核武的对手时，局势出现灾难性升级。鑑于美国在乌俄战争以来，一直避免对乌方提供更强有力的支持，不能排除美国领袖迴避採取「拒止性吓阻」战略的可能性。
六、「拒止性吓阻」为美军带来不成比例的成本。
要在海外维持一定的军力，以便临时对数百艘军舰或数千辆战车做出打击，对于已处在崩溃边缘的军队来说既昂贵又深具挑战性。更糟的是，像中国那样只需对目标进行有效打击的对手，所负担的成本要比美军低得多。
文中指出，当美国佔据主导地位时，「拒止性吓阻」很有效，但现在反倒让美国的国防计画和投资走向更大的「可预测性」，不再是替对手带来「不确定性」，该是放弃的时候了。
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美国对华威慑不起作用
U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working
Foreign Policy
由于美国在亚洲的军事优势不再是既定的，国防规划者需要采取不同的战略。
2023 年 9 月 5 日《外交政策》，作者：哈德逊研究所国防概念与技术中心主任布莱恩·克拉克 (Bryan Clark) 和哈德逊研究所高级研究员丹·帕特 (Dan Patt)。
三十多年来，美国军事的全球领先地位一直是美国战略和安全政策的基石。 但技术扩散、日益严峻的全球挑战以及过时的部队设计已经削弱了美国对中国的军事优势，而中国可以利用其地理位置的邻近性和先进的能力来赢得针对台湾的地区战争。 如果华盛顿没有确定持续的军事主导地位（迄今为止，华盛顿有能力简单地否认和镇压东亚的侵略），寻求常规威慑的美国领导人将需要制定不同的战略。
尽管华盛顿部分地区发表了言论，但与中国的战争并未迫在眉睫，入侵台湾给中国共产党带来许多风险，因为它面临着日益严峻的经济、人口和外交挑战。 为了让入侵对北京失去吸引力，美国军方可能只需要让中国认为任何冲突都会旷日持久且代价高昂。 因此，华盛顿不应优化美国军队以应对可能永远不会到来的入侵，而应开展一场长期行动，削弱北京对通过一系列暴力途径实现其在台湾和该地区野心的信心。 这场运动应该包括军事和非军事手段，力图引导中国走上更负责任、更和平的道路，实现其外交政策目标。
支持通过否认进行威慑战略不变的人认为，威慑北京的最佳方式是通过在该地区集结足够的打击能力来使入侵台湾变得不可行，从而让中国国家主席习近平相信攻击会失败。 由于中国现在拥有世界上最大的海军、陆军、火箭军、民用舰队和工业基地（其建造新舰艇和导弹的速度是美国的两倍以上），从长远来看，这一计划根本不切实际。 此外，某些情况——例如中国的封锁、隔离或针对台湾较小岛屿的行动——可能无法完全否认。
那么，在这些新条件下，否认的真正含义是让中国领导人产生不确定性，怀疑他们的计划能否按照北京可接受的条件取得成功。 像俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争那样陷入困境并耗尽资源的入侵或使中国摇摇欲坠的经济陷入困境的入侵可能很快就会失去支持，任何胜利都将付出惨重的代价。 然而，美国的国防规划和决策仍然关注东亚战场上的行动是否成功或系统是否有效，而不是结果是否足以让习近平和其他中国领导人在考虑发动侵略时三思而后行。
为了获得这种理解并恢复战略在国防规划中的作用，美国国防部应该首先遵循自己的指示。 2022年国防战略的主要组成部分之一是战役概念，在军事学说中，它描述了旨在实现特定目标的一系列精心策划的军事和非军事行动。 但在五角大楼的实践中，美国战略的竞选元素只不过是与军事战备相关的各种预算项目的一个桶，这些项目不容易落入国防战略的其他标题之下。
国防部不应将竞选活动作为杂七杂八的训练计划、维护、部署和演习的预算理由，而应认真对待自己对竞选活动的定义，并制定一项战略来揭示并最终塑造中国领导人的看法。
中国已经开始了自己的行动，例如对台湾领空和水域的持续空中和海上入侵，以及微信上的入侵演习。 涉及的部队、船只、飞机、导弹和车辆的数量远远低于征服一个拥有 2300 万人口的岛屿所需的数量，但这些行动的目的并不是为了考验中国人民解放军 (PLA) 或台湾军队。 军队。 相反，这些活动是塑造国内外观念运动的一部分。
这并不是说国防部在影响中国决策的更广泛努力上无所事事。 近两年来，澳大利亚-英国-美国（AUKUS）安全条约的建立，与菲律宾和日本扩大军事合作，以及对乌克兰的持续支持，无疑削弱了中国领导人的信心。
正如我们最近在哈德逊研究所的报告中概述的那样，适当的竞选策略将建立在这些举措的基础上。 像 AUKUS 这样的大动作不能随意重复，也不能在时机上达到最佳效果，这降低了它们作为信号的效用。 但小型军事行动，例如新的部队组成、能力、战术、态势和盟军行动，可以从中国的反应方式中引发多样化和频繁的信号； 测试有关中国关注或信任领域的假设； 并提供改变北京信念的机会。
冷战期间，美国国家安全领导人也采取了类似的做法来揭露和利用苏联在国土导弹防御和潜艇脆弱性等问题上的神经痛。 如今，从开源卫星图像到算法分析的新信息技术可以增强并加速这一过程。 它将用于制定和编排战役计划，而不是传统地使用技术来服务于作战计划。
美国的行动需要出其不意，才能获得有关解放军和其他中国安全部队的有用信息。 航行自由行动等可预测的行动将引起正式的反应，而这些反应完全无法反映出中国领导人的真正担忧或信心程度。 然而，一场意想不到的多国演习或在东亚出现的一种新的、先前实验性的军事能力可能会通过中国安全机构的言行产生洞察力。
美国军方已经可以在战场上以及五角大楼实验室、战争中心和机构的架子上获得一本令人惊讶的深度杂志。 现有和新兴的美国及盟国单位或系统的新组合，以及相应的作战概念，为引发中国意想不到的新信号和反应提供了几乎无穷无尽的选择。 五角大楼的联合全域指挥与控制计划旨在实现这种可互换性，但努力还不够。 美国国会最近为帮助美国军事指挥官自下而上地将传感器、操作员和武器结合起来所做的努力带来了更多希望。
为了最大限度地影响中国领导人的信念，竞选意外应该有两种主要形式：一是破坏解放军攻击美国通信和后勤薄弱环节的战略，二是通过展示美国及其盟国的力量来破坏中国快速或廉价取得胜利的希望。 为持久冲突做好准备。 通过击败解放军的战略并表明中国的对手已经做好了长期的准备，美国的行动可以增加北京的认知，即对台湾或美国盟友的攻击可能会变得像俄罗斯在乌克兰的不幸遭遇一样混乱、代价高昂和纠缠不清。
华盛顿当前的军事战略旨在向习近平证明，入侵将在战斗中被击败——这一概念的前提是美国在该地区继续保持军事主导地位。 相反，竞选活动首先会集中于降低他对侵略的偏好，使其他道路更具吸引力。 这种劝阻策略将要求美国领导人接受这样的事实：中国不会消失，习近平不会放弃他的目标，美国的军事优势不再得到保证。 但在一个不再由美国主导的世界里，集中精力开展劝阻运动可能是实现和平共处的唯一途径。
U.S. Deterrence Against China Is Not Working
With U.S. military superiority in Asia no longer a given, defense planners need a different strategy.
Foreign Policy， By Bryan Clark, the director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute, and Dan Patt, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
A U.S. Navy sailor walks past an F/A-18F fighter jet on the flight deck of the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier in the port of Busan, South Korea, on March 28.
For more than three decades, the U.S. military's global preeminence has been the rock on which U.S. strategy and security policy are built. But technology diffusion, growing global challenges, and antiquated force design have eroded the United States’ military edge against China, which could exploit its geographical proximity and advancing capabilities to win a regional war against Taiwan. Without the certainty of continued military dominance that, until now, gave Washington the ability to simply deny and suppress aggression in East Asia, U.S. leaders seeking conventional deterrence will need to devise a different strategy.
Despite the rhetoric in parts of Washington, war with China is not imminent, and an invasion of Taiwan carries many risks for the Chinese Communist Party as it faces mounting economic, demographic, and diplomatic challenges. To make an invasion unattractive for Beijing, the U.S. military may merely need to raise China’s perception that any conflict would be drawn out and exceedingly costly. Instead of optimizing the U.S. military for an invasion that may never come, Washington should therefore mount a long-term campaign that undermines Beijing’s confidence in a range of violent paths to realizing its ambitions in Taiwan and the region. This campaign should involve military and nonmilitary means that seek to steer China toward more responsible and peaceful paths to its foreign-policy goals.
Proponents of an unchanged strategy of deterrence through denial argue the best way to deter Beijing is to make an invasion of Taiwan infeasible by massing sufficient strike capability in the region to convince Chinese President Xi Jinping that an attack would fail. With China now operating the world’s largest navy, army, rocket force, civilian fleet, and industrial base (which builds new ships and missiles at more than twice the U.S. pace), this plan has become simply unrealistic over the long term. Furthermore, some scenarios—such as a Chinese blockade, quarantine, or operation against Taiwan’s smaller islands—may prove impossible to completely deny.
What denial really means under these new conditions, then, is to create uncertainty in the minds of Chinese leaders that their plans could succeed on terms acceptable to Beijing. An invasion that bogs down and drains resources like Russia’s war in Ukraine or sinks China’s faltering economy could quickly lose support, and any victory would be pyrrhic. However, U.S. defense planning and decision-making still focus on whether an operation succeeds or a system works on an East Asian battlefield—not whether the result is sufficient to make Xi and other Chinese leaders think twice about aggression as they consider launching it.
To gain that understanding and restore the role of strategy in defense planning, the U.S. Defense Department should begin by following its own directives. One of the 2022 National Defense Strategy’s main components is the notion of campaigning, which in military doctrine describes an orchestrated series of military and nonmilitary actions designed to achieve specific objectives. But in Pentagon practice, the campaigning element of U.S. strategy has become little more than a bucket for various budget items related to military readiness that don’t easily fall under the defense strategy’s other headings.
Rather than using campaigning as a budget justification for a motley collection of training programs, maintenance, deployments, and exercises, the Defense Department should take its own definition of campaigning seriously—and build a strategy to reveal and eventually shape the perceptions of Chinese leaders.
China is already engaged in its own campaign, exemplified by sustained air and maritime intrusions into Taiwan’s airspace and waters, as well as invasion rehearsals featured on WeChat. The numbers of troops, ships, aircraft, missiles, and vehicles involved fall far short of what would be needed to subdue an island of 23 million people, but the operations are not intended to test either the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or Taiwanese forces. Instead, these events are part of a campaign to shape perceptions at home and abroad.
This is not to say the Defense Department has been idle in its broader effort to shape Chinese decision-making. In the last two years, the establishment of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact, expanded military cooperation with the Philippines and Japan, and continued support for Ukraine have all undoubtedly eroded Chinese leaders’ confidence.
As we recently outlined in a Hudson Institute report, a proper strategy of campaigning would build on these initiatives. Big moves like AUKUS cannot be repeated at will or be timed to best effect, which reduces their utility as a signal. But small military actions, such as new force compositions, capabilities, tactics, postures, and allied operations, can elicit diverse and frequent signals from the way China responds; test hypotheses regarding areas of Chinese concern or confidence; and provide opportunities to shift Beijing’s beliefs.
During the Cold War, U.S. national security leaders practiced a similar approach to expose and exploit Soviet neuralgia regarding issues such as homeland missile defense and submarine vulnerability. Today, new information technologies, from open-source satellite imagery to algorithmic analysis, can empower and accelerate the process. Instead of the traditional use of technology to serve an operational plan, it would be used to build and orchestrate the campaign plan.
U.S. campaigns will need surprise to elicit useful revelations about the PLA and other Chinese security forces. Predictable actions such as freedom of navigation operations will draw formalized responses that show nothing about Chinese leaders’ real concerns or levels of confidence. However, an unexpected multinational exercise or a new, previously experimental military capability showing up in East Asia could yield insights via the words and actions of China’s security establishment.
A deep magazine of surprise is already available to the U.S. military, both in the field and on the shelves of the Pentagon’s laboratories, warfare centers, and agencies. New combinations of existing and emerging U.S. and allied units or systems, as well as the accompanying operational concepts, offer almost endless options for eliciting unanticipated new signals and reactions from China. The Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control initiative was intended to enable this kind of interchangeability, but the effort has fallen short. Recent efforts by the U.S. Congress to help U.S. military commanders combine sensors, operators, and weapons from the bottom up hold more promise.
To maximize their impact on Chinese leaders’ beliefs, campaign surprises should come in two main flavors: those that undermine the PLA’s strategy of attacking perceived U.S. communications and logistics vulnerabilities and those that undermine Chinese hopes for a quick or cheap victory by demonstrating U.S. and allied readiness for a protracted conflict. By defeating the PLA’s strategy and showing that China’s opponents are prepared for the long haul, U.S. campaigns can increase the perception in Beijing that an attack on Taiwan or a U.S. ally could become as messy, costly, and entangling as Russia’s misadventure in Ukraine.
Washington’s current military strategy aims to prove to Xi that an invasion would be defeated in battle—a notion that presupposes continued U.S. military dominance in the region. Instead, campaigning would focus on lowering his preference for aggression in the first place, making other paths more attractive. This strategy of dissuasion would require U.S. leaders to accept that China will not fade away, Xi will not give up on his goals, and U.S. military preeminence is no longer guaranteed. But focusing on a campaign of dissuasion may the only path to peaceful coexistence in a world no longer dominated by the United States.
