Jeffrey Sachs 中国治国之道与新世界秩序

Jeffrey Sachs 中国治国之道与新世界秩序

杰弗里·萨克斯：中国治国之道与新世界秩序

格伦·迪森 2025年5月2日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTLAX8hF7I

杰弗里·萨克斯教授是世界知名的经济学教授、畅销书作家、创新型教育家，也是可持续发展领域的全球领导者。萨克斯教授探讨了当前中美经济战的更广泛的历史意义，这场战事标志着以西方为中心的世界几个世纪的终结。他还探讨了西方地缘政治思维与中国地缘政治思维有何不同，以及为何如此不同。

关注 Glenn Diesen 教授：

Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/

X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_DiesenPatreon

Glenn Diesen

大家好，欢迎讨论美国和中国之间的经济战。我们邀请了 Jeffrey Sachs 教授，他是一位著名的经济学家，他花费大量时间为世界各国政府提供咨询。所以，欢迎回来参加我们的节目，很高兴能一直和你在一起，Glenn。我们可以探讨一下科技竞争，或者说，货币竞争，以及将供应链转移回国的努力。但是，如果我们退一步来看，您认为更广泛的发展是什么？我们如何理解这个历史时刻？因为这不是我们日常的贸易战。这似乎……是的，几个世纪以来，我们一直处于以西方为中心的世界秩序之下，而我们现在看到这种秩序受到了挑战，或者至少不一定是……嗯，是的，中国现在正在超越西方，也就是说，世界正在变得不再以西方为中心，这种情况我们已经很久没有见过了，或者说根本没有。

Jeffrey Sachs

嗯，问这个问题的正确方式是……
要从长远角度看待正在发生的事情……世界上大多数人口生活在亚洲……大约60%……在历史的大部分时间里，这意味着大约60%的世界经济产出是在亚洲生产的。历史学家回顾过去，试图重建近几个世纪的经济估计，人们可以得出这样的结论：随着欧洲和北大西洋的崛起，情况发生了决定性的变化，因为在19世纪和20世纪，美国崛起成为世界最大的经济体，而亚洲则黯然失色……当然，不仅仅是黯然失色……它被欧洲帝国主义……列强所主导，

如果你回顾1820年左右……亚洲仍然……占世界经济的一半以上，但到…… 

1950年，在经历了150年以欧美为主导的工业时代之后，整个亚洲经济占世界产出的比重从之前的约60%下降到20%左右，这意味着中国完全被超越，事实上，中国当然遭到了西方的攻击，并输掉了许多战争。首先是第一次和第二次鸦片战争中被西方打败，其次是19世纪中叶所谓的太平天国运动造成的混乱，最后是19世纪末欧洲列强在中国的治外法权或权利，以及日本的入侵，首先是1894-1895年的甲午战争，然后是20世纪的几次日本入侵，以及20世纪30年代的大规模入侵，以及40年代的中国内战，这意味着，到人民共和国成立的时候1949年中华民国成立时，中国经历了大约110年的惨痛失败，也就是中国所谓的百年屈辱。

据估计，截至20世纪50年代，中国在世界经济中的份额大约为世界产出的2%，世界人口的20%。换句话说，从公元500年到公元500年，中国在世界上的悠久历史地位至少有一千年的时间被完全掩盖。在欧洲开始崛起之前，中国在许多技术领域，包括火药、蒸汽机、纸币、指南针、大规模航海等等，都占据了主导地位。

事实上，格伦，我们今天看到的这个故事，从非常非常长的历史视角来看，就是中国重返世界强国的前列，在经济、生产力和技术方面。从某种意义上说，中国已经回归了其在世界上更传统的角色，这一点在过去2000年的大部分时间里都可以看到。事实上，从这个意义上讲，中国的崛起应该被理解为对绝对不平衡的重新平衡，而这个平衡就是欧洲主导的世界。当然，欧洲人和美国人很难理解，欧洲主导世界的想法已经成为一种绝对理所当然的备用方案，而且这种说法已经持续了几百年。而随着欧洲的崛起，欧洲帝国主宰了世界其他地区，完整的意识形态、信仰体系被改写，历史，甚至可以说是种族主义的重写，即使是世界历史的领军思想家，西方也开始说，欧洲的主导地位是自然而然的，欧洲的文化优势，也许是种族优势，但无论争论是什么，欧洲的优势都是自然

当然，现在我们正处于那个历史阶段的末期，我们应该明白，这不仅是中国的回归，也是印度的快速发展，还有东南亚，也就是所谓的东盟国家的快速发展，还有西亚部分地区，比如海湾国家的快速发展。所有这些都从根本上终结了以欧洲为中心的世界观，或者说，终结了19世纪末到21世纪初以北大西洋公约为中心的世界观，以及20世纪末以美国为中心的世界观。正如我所说，当出现这些暂时的经济和权力失衡时，你也会在他们头上施加压力，或者我的意思是，你倾向于在意识形态、宗教或其他哲学意义上施加压力，认为这种失衡在美国是自然而然的。美国例外论的观念根深蒂固，认为美国当然统治着世界。是信仰体系的深层组成部分，而非肤浅之物，因此，人们对中国的崛起感到警惕，呃，人们不屑一顾，人们感到恐惧，人们并不以平和的态度看待中国。我不知道有哪位美国领导人会说：“当然，中国是一个拥有悠久文明历史的大国，所以中国发展良好是理所当然的。”呃，你听到的是“中国是世界的巨大威胁，中国的崛起必须被阻止，我们必须遏制中国，我们必须为战争做准备。中国通过欺骗和偷窃实现了经济复苏，否则就会倒闭，中国将会崩溃。换句话说，许多错误的、肤浅的、有偏见的、有时甚至是公然的种族主义观点，都掩盖了美国两个多世纪以来积累的优越感。所以我感谢你从长远角度看待问题，因为这通常正是我们理解当今世界相对经济和技术表现的巨大变化所缺失的。对于那些在过去两个世纪里由于各种令人着迷且复杂的原因而远远落后的人来说，这是一个自然的追赶过程。但这种有利于北大西洋相对于世界其他地区的不平衡已经减弱，并且基本上正在走向终结。

Glenn Diesen

这真是太有趣了，极端的经济不平衡是如何催生意识形态的，我想这可以解释权力集中地的优越性。

Jeffrey Sachs

我想，如果要我说，格伦，有一件事对我来说很有趣，也很令人惊讶，如果你去读欧洲最伟大的思想家的著作，比如哲学家伊曼纽尔·康德，他无疑是西方文明的伟大天才之一，他的著作中散布着许多观点，但这并不是他的主要关注点，而是一种非常基于种族的欧洲优越性观点。读到这些观点，你会感到有些震惊，因为他是一位伟大的普世主义者，他确实是一位绝对命令的伟大描述者，这种命令为行为设定了普遍的标准。但欧洲
天生就是优越文明的观念深深植根于
各种意识形态之中，从文艺复兴到启蒙运动，当然，也包括
19世纪的浪漫民族主义时期，以及纳粹主义和20世纪的其他意识形态，这些意识形态都基于种族或宗教的优越性，或者其他赋予统治权的欧洲文化属性，而这正是欧洲优越性所在。呃，很多事情都出错了。呃，在我们的思维中，这些信念根深蒂固，呃，也许并不明确，也许在某个时候甚至会被否定，但它们根植于我们政府、我们国家处理国际问题的方式中。去年在哈林堡庆祝了伊曼纽尔·K·哈林堡300周年诞辰，这确实让我印象深刻，它背后的一些普世主义，以及某种优越感。但塞缪尔·亨廷的观点很有意思，他指出，西方国家我们倾向于认为，我们几个世纪以来一直统治着世界，是因为我们的优越思想、价值观和意识形态。但他指出，真正原因是掌握了更高效的武器，控制了海上航线，并在工业革命中取得了领先，是的，世界其他国家不会忽视这一点。呃，不会忽视这一点。这是我们有组织的暴力，但是，呃，但这引出了一个问题：这会导致什么？中国制定了不同的规则，因为如果以欧洲为中心的世界，是所有这些帝国都聚集在一个小小的大陆上，嗯，这如何形成了我们看待世界的方式？因为我们的政治理论家倾向于认为存在着不可避免的地缘政治竞争，这几乎是自然规律。你认为中国的地缘政治心态会有什么不同？会与例如欧洲人的行为方式有所不同，因为我们一直
认为这一切都是普遍的。我想说，这也是一个绝对引人入胜且备受争议的问题，但我有自己的看法。我要分享的是，西方政治文化中最具决定性的事件，如果我可以这样说的话，就是公元476年，也就是西罗马帝国的覆灭，罗马被日耳曼征服者
征服。当时，这是一个漫长的过程，但随着西罗马帝国的覆灭，欧洲分裂成多个政治实体，实际上是一个由城邦、王国、藩属国以及所有可以想象的政治组织形式组成的复杂万花筒，从中国层面开始，这些帝国都未能真正达到查理曼大帝所开创的神圣罗马帝国的规模。但正如人们所言，它从来都不是真正神圣的，也不是罗马的，也从来都不是一个帝国，就其建立的方式而言。但关键是，尽管拿破仑有抱负，尽管查理曼有抱负，尽管希特勒曾努力尝试，欧洲过去、现在和现在都从未成为一个统一的政治实体。今天的欧盟是一种不同类型的、仍然非常薄弱的??欧洲范围的政治组织。欧洲四分五裂，基本上陷入了长达1500年的欧洲战争之中，战争成为了常态。关于治国之道的思考，实际上是在思考欧洲的冲突。因此，治国之道是无政府主义的，国际关系理论中著名的现实主义假设，是对大约公元500年到至少1950年欧洲现实的一个很好的初步预测。因此，各国之间会发生冲突、竞争、斗争、征服、击败、屈服等等，这些都是欧洲治国之道的思考方式。

中国的历史与欧洲截然不同。中国在公元前221年统一于秦朝，这是第一次统一。中国的地理格局像一个盒子，盒子的北部是旱地，也就是所谓的阶梯状地区，西边是热带地区。南面是东南亚的森林，东面是东海，太平洋，它是一个盒子，在2000多年前成为一个统一的行政国家。中国有时分裂，秦朝让位于汉朝，汉朝分裂，后来在唐朝、宋朝、元朝、明朝和清朝重新统一。

但可以说，在过去的2200年里，中国大部分时间都是一个中央集权的行政国家，中国的哲学是一种混乱的哲学，强调和谐在保持这个统一国家运转方面的重要性。现在人们争论这是否会导致中国出现一种不同的治国方略，我的答案是肯定的，实际上中国并不以西方无政府主义的国际治国方略来思考问题，中国以一个庞大的中国国家来思考问题，在这个国家里，内部秩序是决定性的，2000年来，对外帝国主义从未成为统治。

中国幅员辽阔，从未寻求海外领土。总的来说，是的，人们可以指出一些特定的地方和事件，但总的来说，中国与邻国保持着和平关系。我举个例子，从1368年明朝初年到1839年英国入侵中国，也就是第一次鸦片战争。大概有500年的时间，中国几乎没有与东亚邻国发生过战争，比如日本、朝鲜和越南。

据我所知，15世纪，越南与朝鲜发生了大约17年的战争。中国从未入侵过朝鲜，但中国是当时的主导力量，按照西方国家的统治方式，你会说，中国会入侵并占领，从未尝试过。在此期间，中国从未入侵过日本，一次也没有。我相信，1592年，日本入侵过一次。或者至少，日本幕府将军，一位军事指挥官，试图……入侵中国当然失败了，但无论如何，东亚基本上享有长达五百年的和平，有时也被称为儒家和平。

现在，当我与我们的朋友约翰·米尔希默（John Mirshimer）讨论这个问题时，他是一位亲爱的朋友，也是一位伟大的政治学家。在我看来，他说：“不，不，不，中国的行为方式将与任何其他大国一样。” 他不同意中国拥有不同治国方略的观点。我不敢苟同。我热爱并钦佩约翰，但我不同意他的观点。我认为中国对治国方略的看法不同，它是由两千年不同的历史塑造的。

萨克斯教授。与您交谈总是令人着迷，所以，嗯，是的，非常感谢。我认为这将成为未来几年的一个重点。中国的治国方略在多大程度上与西方截然不同。我希望看到您和米尔希默就此进行辩论。再次感谢您抽出时间，我们将继续讨论。很高兴与您交谈。非常感谢。

Jeffrey Sachs: Chinese Statecraft & a New World Order

 Glenn Diesen  2025年5月2日

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcTLAX8hF7I

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs is a world-renowned economics professor, a bestselling author, an innovative educator, and a global leader in sustainable development. Prof. Sachs discusses the wider historical meaning of the current economic war between the US and China, which represents the end of centuries of a Western-centric world. Prof. Sachs also discusses how and why the Western geopolitical mindset is distinctively different from that of China.

Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen:

Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/

X/Twitter: https://x.com/Glenn_DiesenPatreon

Hi everyone and welcome to discuss the
economic war between the United States
and China we are joined by professor
Jeffrey Sachs uh a renowned economist who
spends a lot of his time advising
governments uh across the world so
welcome back to the program well great
to be with you always Glenn so uh we can
look at this uh tech rivalry or yeah the
currency competition uh the efforts to
repatriate supply chains uh however if
we take I guess a step back what what do
you see as the wider developments here
how can we understand this uh point in
history because uh this is not your
everyday trade war this is um it seems
as if uh yeah we've had a western
centric world order now for centuries
and we now see this being contested or
at least not not necessarily the order
but um yeah China is now outpacing the
west that is the world is becoming much
less western centric we haven't really
seen this in a while or at all 

Jeffrey Sachs

well this is the right way to ask uh the question
of what's happening is to take the long
view uh most of of the world population
lives in Asia uh about 60% % uh for most
of history that means that roughly 60%
of the world economy world output was
produced in Asia as best one can tell
when historians look back and try to
recreate economic estimates in recent centuries that changed
decisively with the rise of Europe and
of the North Atlantic because in the
19th and 20th centuries of course the
United States rose to become the largest
economy in the world asia was eclipsed
in this and not only eclipsed of course
it was dominated by European imperial
powers if you look around 1820 or so
Asia was still uh more than half of the
world economy but by 1950 after 150
years of the industrial age dominated by Europe and the United
States uh the whole Asian economy had
declined to around 20% of world output
from what had been roughly 60% this
meant China completely being eclipsed and in
fact of course attacked uh and losing
many wars first to the west in the first
and second opium wars uh to chaos during
the so-called Taiping rebellion in the
middle of the 19th century uh to the
extr territorial privileges or rights or
dominance of European powers in China at
the end of the 19th century and then to
Japanese invasion uh in several episodes
starting with the SinoJapanese war in se
in 189495 and then several Japanese
invasions in fact in the 20th century
and the massive invasions of the
1930s civil war in China in the 1940s
and this meant that By the time
of the uh the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in
1949 China had gone through about 110
years of devastating defeats what China
calls the century of humiliation
china's share of the world economy uh
was estimated is estimated to be maybe
2% of world output and roughly 20% of
world population uh as of uh the 1950s
in other words China was completely
eclipsed from its long historical role
in the world uh for at least a millennium by the way from 500 to,500 AD
uh before the beginning of the European
ascendancy china clearly dominated the
world across many technologies gunpowder the steam engine
paper currency the compass uh largecale
ocean navigation and one could go on and
on in fact so the story Glenn that we
see today taken from a very very
long-term perspective in history is the
return of China to the front ranks of
power in the world and economic
productivity and technology uh in a
sense China has returned to its more
traditional role in the world which one
could see for much of the last 2,000
years in fact the rise of China in this
sense should be understood as a rebalancing of what was absolutely
unbalanced and that is a European
dominated world of course it's very hard
for Europeans and Americans to
understand that the idea of European
dominance in the world has become an
absolute natural standby and that's been
true for several hundred years actually
where as Europe rose in power as
European empires uh dominated the other
parts of the world uh full ideologies
belief belief systems uh rewriting of
history uh a lot of racism one can add
even by the leading thinkers of uh world
history in the west came to say well
Europe's dominance is natural European
cultural superiority maybe racial
superiority uh but whatever the argument
was European superiority is natural of
course now we're at the end of that
phase of history and one should
understand it's not only the return of
China it's also the rapid development of
India it's the rapid development of
Southeast Asia the so-called ASEAN
countries uh it's the rapid development
of parts of West Asia uh in the the Gulf
countries for example all of this is rather
fundamentally ending the eurosentric
view of the world or what in the late
19th century to the early 21st century
became the North Atlantic NATO centered
vision of the world and by the end of
the 20th century became the American
centered vision of the world and when
you have these temporary imbalances of
economy and power as I said you
also put a bull work under them or I say
you I mean the tendency is that a bull
work is put under them in
ideological or religious or uh some
other philosophical sense to say that
imbalance is natural in the United
States the idea of American
exceptionalism is very deep the idea
that yes of course America rules the
world is a deep part of the belief
system not a superficial item so the rise of China is
viewed with alarm uh it's viewed with
disdain it's viewed with fear it's not
viewed with equinimity i don't know any
American leaders that say "Well of
course China's a big power that has had
a long history of civilizational
greatness so it's natural that China's
doing well." Uh what you hear is "China
is the great threat to the world china's
rise must be stopped we must contain
China we must prepare for war china
cheated uh and stole its way to
economic recovery or return it's
artificial china will collapse in other
words many erroneous superficial biased sometimes blatantly
racist views to undergur this sense of superiority in
the US that built up over two centuries
so I thank you for taking the long view
because that's typically what is
precisely missing uh in understanding uh
the big changes of relative economic and
technological uh performance in our world today it's a
natural catching up of those who fell
far behind in the last two centuries for
a variety of fascinating and complex
reasons but that imbalance that
developed favoring the North Atlantic
relative to the rest of the world has
diminished and basically is coming to an
end at this point 

问
this is uh yeah fascinating how the extreme economic imbalances give rise to
ideologies I guess to explain the superiority of the where the power is concentrated 

Jeffrey Sachs

I think and and if I could say Glenn one thing that's interesting for me and very surprising if you go to the writings of of the greatest thinkers in Europe uh for example the philosopher Emanuel Kant who is no doubt one of the great geniuses of of Western
civilization he has scattered through his writings it wasn't his main preoccupation but a very race-based view of European superiority and one reads
that with some shock because he was the
great universalist he was the great
describer of indeed the categorical
imperative which set universal standards
for behavior but the idea that Europe is
inherently the superior civilization is deeply embedded of
course in a wide range of ideologies
stretching back from the Renaissance to
the Enlightenment of course to the
period of Romantic Nationalism in the
19th century and onto Nazism and other
ideologies of the 20th century that were
based on superiority of race or religion
uh or some other attribute of European
culture that gave the right to dominate
and this is where uh so much goes wrong
uh in our uh thinking uh these beliefs
become deeply embedded uh maybe not explicit maybe
they're even denied uh after a certain
point but they're embedded uh in the way
that our governments our states approach
international issues was it Emanuel's K's 300y year
birthday last year in Khalinrad and it
did strike me some of the universalism
behind it there was some sense of
superiority but what's interesting with
Samuel Hunting he made this point that
uh um that the western countries we we
tend to believe that we've been ruling
the world for these centuries because of
our superior ideas and values and
ideology but he made a point that it's
really the mastered more efficient
weaponry controlled the sea lanes and
got a head start in the industrial
revolution and yeah the rest of the
world do not uh do do not ignore this
that it was our organized violence but
uh but how but it begs the question how
will this lead to a different rule by
China because if if the euroentric world
was you all these empires on a small
continent um how this kind of formed our way of
looking at the world because our
political theorists tend to assume that
you have this unavoidable geopolitical
rivalry that is almost a law of nature
how do you think China would be
different its geopolitical mentality
would be different than for example the way the
Europeans have behaved because we always
assumed it's all universal
this is also an absolutely fascinating
and much debated question I would say
but I have my own views which I'll share
and that is that the decisive event in western
political culture if I may put it that
way is 476 AD uh which is the collapse
of the western Roman Empire when Rome is
conquered by German Germanic
conquerors and at that point it was a
long process but with the fall of the
western Roman Empire Europe uh
fragmented into multiple political
entities in fact a complete complex uh remarkable
kaleidoscope of political entities of
citystates and and kingdoms and dupdoms
and uh every conceivable form of uh
political organization from the Chinese
level up through would be Europeanwide
empires that never quite reached their
billing like the Holy Roman Empire that
Charlemagne in in effect began but it as
uh was famously said it was never quite
holy never Roman and never an empire uh
in in the way that it built itself but
the point is Europe was and is and
remained despite Napoleonic aspirations despite
Charlemagne's aspirations despite what
Hitler uh tried never uh became a
unified political entity and today's
European Union is a is is a different
kind and still very weak construction of
uh some kind of uh Europeanwide
political organization europe
fragmented and basically engaged in eur
within European war for uh 1500 years
and war became the standard and thinking
about statecraftraft is thinking about
conflict in Europe uh and so the idea
that statecraft is anarchctic the famous
assumption of realism in international
relations theory is a uh a good first
projection of European reality roughly
from around 500 AD to at least let's say
to 1950 and the idea that states
therefore collide with each other
compete with each other fight with each
other conquer each other defeat each
other succumb and so forth is European
state craft thinking china is very very
different in its history china unified
in 221 BCE uh in theQin dynasty the
first unification and China's uh
geographically kind of a box uh the box
has a dryland uh step region so-called
to the north the Himalayas to the west
the tropical forests of Southeast Asia
to the south and the East China Sea uh
the Pacific Ocean to the east it's a box
that became a state a unified
administrative state more than 2,000
years ago china fragmented at times uh
theQin dynasty gave way to the Han uh
era the Han era broke apart then became
later reunited in the Tang and the Song
and the Yuan and the Ming and theQing
dynasties but one could say that for
most of the last 2,200 years China's
been a centralized administrative state
and the philosophy underpinning China is
a confusion philosophy that emphasizes
the importance of harmony in keeping
this integrated state functioning now
it's debated does this lead to a
different kind of state craft of China
my answer uh is yes uh it does actually
china does not think in terms of western
anarchctic international statecraftraft
china thinks in terms of a large Chinese
state where internal order is decisive
and where external imperialism was never
the rule for 2,000 years china's vast
and did not look for overseas
territories by and large yes one can uh
point to particular places and episodes
but by and large China had peaceful
relations with its neighbors i'll just
give one example from 1368 which is the beginning of the Ming
dynasty to 1839 which is Britain's
invasion of China in the first opium war
so roughly uh for uh what is that uh uh
500 years China did not engage in almost almost
any fighting with its East Asian
neighbors with Japan with Korea and with
Vietnam uh with Vietnam there was about
a 17-year period of war in the 15th
century with Korea as far as I know
China never invaded Korea even once but
China was the dominant power and in
western state craft you'd say well China
would uh would invade and take over
never tried china never during this
period invaded Japan not even once uh it
was invaded by Japan once in
uh 1592 I believe it is or at least an
attempt by a uh Japanese shogun a
military commander to invade China it
failed of course but in any event you
had essentially a half a millennium of
peace in East Asia sometimes called the
Confucian peace now when I discussed
this with our our friend John Mirshimer
a dear friend and a great political
scientist as far as I'm concerned he
says "No no no no china will behave just
the same way as any other great power."
And he doesn't agree with this idea that
China has a different kind of state
craft i beg to differ i love and admire John but I disagree
with him i think China's view of
statecraft is different and it has been
shaped by a different 2,000 years of
history professor Sax it's always
fascinating to speak with you so uh yeah
thank you so much and I yeah I think
this will be a key focus in the years to
come to what extent China is uh its
statecraft is distinctively different
from that of the western so is I would
like to see you and Merchimer in a
debate about this thank you again for
your time we'll continue the discussion
great great to be with you thanks so much。