风萧萧_Frank
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普京和习近平揭露了资本主义的巨大幻想
除非美国及其盟国动员起来拯救它，否则全球化的第二个伟大时代即将灾难性地结束。
作者：John Micklethwait 和 Adrian Wooldridge 2022 年 3 月 24 日
再见全球化？
1919 年出版的一本关于《和平的经济后果》的书并不是理解当前乌克兰战争的经济后果的明显起点。但值得花一点时间阅读约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes) 对1913年伦敦上层中产阶级悠闲生活的著名描述——就在第一次世界大战改变一切之前：
凯恩斯随后描述了这位伦敦人如何在市场上进行投机，并在没有护照的情况下前往任何他想去的地方，也无需更换货币（金本位意味着他的钱在任何地方都可以使用）。然后，这位著名经济学家通过深入伦敦特权人士的头脑发出了致命一击:
非常好的读物。"除非美国及其盟国动员起来拯救它，否则全球化的第二个伟大时代即将灾难性地结束。”
“1919 年出版的一本关于《和平的经济后果》的书并不是理解当前乌克兰战争的经济后果的明显起点。但值得花一点时间阅读约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 对乌克兰当前战争的著名描述。 1913 年，伦敦上层中产阶级的悠闲生活——就在第一次世界大战改变一切之前：
伦敦居民(1913年), 可以在床上喝着早茶，通过电话订购全世界的各种产品，数量按他认为合适的数量，并合理地期望这些产品早日送到他家门口；他可以同时以同样的方式在世界任何地方的自然资源和新企业中冒险他的财富，并且不费力气甚至不费力地分享它们的预期成果和优势。
凯恩斯随后描述了这位伦敦人如何在市场上进行投机，并在没有护照的情况下前往任何他想去的地方，也无需更换货币（金本位意味着他的钱在任何地方都可以使用）。然后，这位著名经济学家通过深入伦敦特权人士的头脑发出了致命一击：
[伦敦人]认为这种状况是正常的、确定的和永久的，除非有进一步改进的方向，任何偏离这种状况的行为都是异常的、可耻的和可以避免的。军国主义和帝国主义、种族和文化竞争、垄断、限制和排斥的计划和政治，这些计划和政治对这个天堂起到了蛇的作用，只不过是他日报的娱乐而已，而且似乎几乎没有产生任何影响。社会和经济生活的正常进程根本没有发生过变化，其国际化实际上已接近完成。
凯恩斯笔下的大都会英国人完全没有意识到全球化的第一个伟大时代即将在索姆河被打成碎片，他就像罗伯特·奥尔特曼的电影《戈斯福德公园》中嬉闹的贵族一样，这部电影讲述了在一座宏伟的乡村别墅里度过周末的故事。 战争爆发之前。 我们中的一个人拥有一张1913年牛津最豪华的餐饮俱乐部布林登的照片：世界未来的统治者以冰冷的傲慢目光注视着我们。一年之内，他们中的大多数人都在战壕里。
浮夸的贵族并不是唯一沾沾自喜的人。知识分子也同意了。诺曼·安吉尔 (Norman Angell) 于 1909 年出版的爱德华时代畅销书《大幻觉》认为，鉴于世界的相互联系，战争是不可能发生的。欧洲和美国的伟大企业都是基于同样的假设运作的。”
乌克兰正在改变世界秩序，但这并非普京所希望的
https://www.universal-defence.com/blog/ukraine-is-changing-the-world-order-just-not-how-putin-hoped
彭博社 2022 年 4 月 4 日
弗拉基米尔·普京总统派遣武装部队进入乌克兰两天后，俄罗斯国家通讯社俄新社发表了一篇文章，认为胜利即将到来。 它庆祝了“一个新时代”，其标志是西方统治的结束、美国与欧洲大陆之间联系的切断以及俄罗斯在世界上回归其应有的“空间和地位”。
随着战争的激烈进行，预示着一个俄罗斯世界的到来，将乌克兰、白俄罗斯和俄罗斯联合起来，看起来还为时过早。 俄新社很快就撤下了这篇文章。 但作者在一件事上是对的：普京的入侵决定似乎确实正在改变国际秩序，只是不一定按照他计划的方式改变。
从柏林到伦敦，再到塔林等波罗的海国家的首都，保卫欧洲的标准已经被撕毁。 大规模战争不再是不可想象的，各国正在重新考虑他们花什么、买什么以及他们需要如何作战。
北约的欧洲成员国并没有与美国分裂，而是与美国保持一致。 该联盟并没有像普京在入侵之前所要求的那样缩小到 20 世纪 90 年代扩张前的规模，而是在其边境部署了更多人员。 北约已向其东翼增派约3000名士兵，以及直升机、坦克和战斗机，以阻止克里姆林宫扩大战场的任何潜在决定。
“无论这场战争结果如何——尽管现在听起来很愤世嫉俗——历史学家都会说，普京对乌克兰的攻击给了欧洲恢复所需的时间，这样欧洲就可以对抗俄罗斯，并进一步对抗中国，”将军说。 理查德·巴伦斯（Richard Barrons），英国联合部队司令部前司令。 “乌克兰正在付出高昂的代价来为我们争取时间。”
对欧洲来说，最大的问题是它将如何度过这段时间。 德国承诺额外支出1000亿欧元（1100亿美元）只是加强军事行动的最明显例子，这对欧洲内部以及与俄罗斯的力量平衡都有影响。
其他国家也在增加国防预算，其中包括三个波罗的海小国，它们长期以来一直对普京敲响警钟。 他们还要求北约提供永久基地以及远程防空系统，尽管目前还不清楚他们是否会得到这些。
所有这些都并不意味着欧洲恢复了稳定，而是承认了欧洲的失落。 美国国家安全委员会前欧洲和俄罗斯事务高级主任菲奥娜·希尔上周在丹佛大都会州立大学表示，普京入侵乌克兰“是一次后帝国、后殖民时代的土地掠夺”。 “如果我们让这种情况发生，我们就为未来树立了先例。”
这些额外的数十亿美元可以有效地使用，也可以不有效地使用。 随着战争最初的冲击和乌克兰抵抗运动的鼓舞人心的影响不可避免地消退，北约的团结和决心也可能会消失。
观点：普京和习近平揭露了资本主义的巨大幻想
普京或许仍能实现他的一些目标，而且种种迹象表明，他可能会选择孤立俄罗斯——以及乌克兰和欧洲的永久不稳定——而不是承认自己的错误。 失败可能会使他的政治生存受到质疑。
“这仍然是一场竞赛，”美国智库兰德公司高级国防研究员戴维·施拉帕克说。 “这是一场他们激励我们开始跑步的比赛，但这仍然是一场双方都没有注定输赢的比赛。 北约方面仍然需要打很多牌来解决这个问题。”
什拉帕克负责 2014 年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后进行的兰德兵棋推演，以预测如果俄罗斯入侵三个波罗的海国家会发生什么。 结果成为新闻头条，因为它们发人深省：俄罗斯军队将在 60 小时内到达爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛首都。
在“既成事实”中，他们还将在其他较大的北约盟国做出反应之前关闭所谓的苏瓦乌基缺口（Suwalki Gap）——一条从白俄罗斯边境延伸到俄罗斯飞地加里宁格勒的陆地走廊。
施拉帕克表示，在过去三周乌克兰发生的事件之后，人们自然会对这种闪电袭击表示怀疑，但根据兰德兵棋推演中的假设来判断这场战争将会发生什么变化还为时过早。 俄罗斯领导人和指挥官肯定会以截然不同的方式攻击北约。
尽管如此，俄罗斯军队仍受到重创，其精确制导导弹库存也已耗尽。 美国参谋长联席会议主席前特别助理迈克尔·马扎尔 (Michael Mazarr) 表示，除非当前冲突发生灾难性升级，否则俄罗斯未来与北约发生选择战争的可能性将低于 2 月 24 日之前 。
他说，可以肯定的是，在三五年内，普京的将军们将吸取教训，重新集结和重新武装，但他们将因限制获得技术和资金的制裁而受到阻碍。 周二，美国国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文告诉记者，盟友将在本周晚些时候举行会议时寻求收紧和扩大对俄罗斯的制裁。
马扎尔表示，这就是欧洲安全秩序更令人担忧的变化所在。他表示，大国之间的稳定取决于达成某种维持现状的共同协议。 即使是 20 世纪 60 年代后的苏联也实现了这一目标，但普京领导下的俄罗斯却从未实现过这一目标。 而且，无论北约在冷战后的扩张有多么明智，这样的协议现在可能是不可能的。
马扎尔表示，在乌克兰事件之后，“克里姆林宫的政权不会被视为地缘政治伙伴”。 “我们现在陷入了与一个日益受到羞辱、极端民族主义和危险的衰落大国的无限期对抗。”
华盛顿的担忧主要集中在中国是否决定帮助俄罗斯逃避制裁和重新装备，此举将招致美国进一步制裁，并加速世界经济和地缘政治集团的重新划分。 中国否认莫斯科曾向中国寻求帮助，而且到目前为止，几乎没有具体迹象表明它会这样做。
在北约前线国家，国防官员不太关注俄罗斯在乌克兰的军事混乱，而更多地关注普京可以根据错误假设采取行动的证据。
“俄罗斯希望在世界这一地区恢复这种苏联式的国家集团，”爱沙尼亚国防联盟指挥官里霍·乌特吉准将说，该联盟是一个由 19,000 名成年人和 6,000 名学员组成的志愿预备队。 “也许我们不是下一个——有摩尔多瓦，还有格鲁吉亚，阿塞拜疆和亚美尼亚之间存在冻结的冲突，还有哈萨克斯坦——俄罗斯必须在很多地方采取行动。 但我们必须做好准备。”
乌特吉表示，自入侵乌克兰以来，他已收到约 1000 份加入部队的申请，其中一半是女性。 他还计划购买更多乌克兰人为此部署的反坦克武器和肩扛式防空导弹。
不过，最重要的是，乌特吉坚信，事实证明兰德关于这场战争实际上将如何在波罗的海地区展开的假设是错误的。 毫无疑问，俄罗斯军队将迅速进驻首都，但战争将像乌克兰一样在俄罗斯后方和城市进行。 这不会是板上钉钉的事情。 “如果北约部队需要一段时间才能到达，他们就不会来到被占领土，”乌特吉说。 “他们将来到战区。”
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Unless the U.S. and its allies mobilize to save it, the second great age of globalization is coming to a catastrophic close.
A book published in 1919 on “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” isn’t the obvious starting place for understanding the economic consequences of the current war in Ukraine. But it’s worth taking a little time to read John Maynard Keynes’s famous description of the leisurely life of an upper-middle-class Londoner in 1913 — just before the Great War changed everything:
Keynes then describes how this Londoner could speculate on the markets and travel wherever he wanted without a passport or the bother of changing currency (the gold standard meant that his money was good everywhere). And then the famous economist delivers his coup de grace by going inside the privileged Londoner’s head:
"A book published in 1919 on “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” isn’t the obvious starting place for understanding the economic consequences of the current war in Ukraine. But it’s worth taking a little time to read John Maynard Keynes’s famous description of the leisurely life of an upper-middle-class Londoner in 1913 — just before the Great War changed everything:
The inhabitant of London [in 1913] could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages.
Keynes then describes how this Londoner could speculate on the markets and travel wherever he wanted without a passport or the bother of changing currency (the gold standard meant that his money was good everywhere). And then the famous economist delivers his coup de grace by going inside the privileged Londoner’s head:
[The Londoner] regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice.
Keynes’s cosmopolitan Briton, completely unaware that the first great age of globalization was about to be shot to pieces at the Somme, is the urban equivalent of the cavorting toffs in “Gosford Park,” Robert Altman’s movie about a weekend in a grand country house just before the outbreak of war. One of us possesses a photograph of the Bullingdon, Oxford’s poshest dining club, in 1913: The future rulers of the world stare out at us with frozen arrogance. Within a year most of them were in the trenches.
Foppish aristocrats weren’t the only ones who were complacent. Intellectuals agreed. Norman Angell’s “The Great Illusion,” the Edwardian bestseller published in 1909, argued that war was impossible given the interconnectedness of the world. The great businesses of Europe and the U.S. operated on the same assumption. "
Two days after President Vladimir Putin sent his armed forces into Ukraine, Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published an article that assumed imminent victory. It celebrated “a new era,” marked by the end of Western domination, the severing of bonds between the U.S. and continental Europe and the return of Russia to its rightful “space and place” in the world.
As the war rages on, heralding the arrival of a single Russian World to unite Ukraine with Belarus and Russia looks at best premature. RIA Novosti soon took the article down. But the author was right about one thing: Putin’s decision to invade does appear to be changing the international order, just not necessarily in the way he planned.
From Berlin to London and Baltic capitals like Tallinn, the metrics of defending Europe have been torn up. A large scale war is no longer unthinkable and nations are reconsidering what they spend, what they buy, and how they would need to fight.
Rather than split from the U.S., NATO’s European members have cleaved to it. Rather than shrink to its pre-expansion size of the 1990s — as Putin demanded before his invasion — the alliance is positioning more personnel on its frontiers. NATO has sent about an additional 3,000 troops to its eastern flank, as well as helicopters, tanks and fighter jets, to deter any potential Kremlin decision to expand the battlefield.
“No matter how this war turns out — and as cynical as it sounds now — historians will say that Putin’s attack on Ukraine gave Europe the time it needed to recover so it could confront Russia and, further down the road, China,” said General Richard Barrons, a former commander of the U.K.’s Joint Forces Command. “Ukraine is paying a high price to buy us time.”
The big question for Europe will be what it does with that time. Germany’s commitment to spend an additional 100 billion euros ($110 billion) is only the most obvious example of stepping up militarily, one that has implications for the balance of power within Europe, as well as with Russia.
Others are upping their defense budgets, too, including the three tiny Baltic States, which have long rung the alarm bell over Putin. They are also asking NATO for permanent bases, as well as long-range anti-aircraft systems, even if it’s less clear they’ll get them.
None of that suggests a return to stability in Europe, but a recognition of its loss. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine “is a post-imperial, post-colonial land grab,” Fiona Hill, the former senior director for European and Russian affairs on the U.S. National Security Council, said last week at the Metropolitan State University of Denver. “If we let this happen, we’re setting a precedent for the future.”
Those extra billions can be spent effectively, or not. As the initial shock of the war and inspirational impact of the Ukrainian resistance inevitably fades, NATO’s unity and determination may do so too.
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Putin may yet be able to achieve some of his goals and there’s every indication he may choose isolation for Russia — and permanent instability for Ukraine and Europe — over acknowledging his mistake. Defeat could call into question his political survival.
“It is still a race,” said David Shlapak, senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, a U.S. think tank. “It is a race where they have motivated us to start running, but it is still a competition that neither side is pre-ordained to win or lose. There are a lot of cards that still need to be played on the NATO side to figure that out.”
Shlapak was responsible for a war game Rand conducted after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, to predict what would happen if Russia were to invade the three Baltic states. The results made news headlines because they were sobering: Russian forces would reach the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian capitals in 60 hours.
In a “fait accompli,” they would also close the so-called Suwalki Gap — a land corridor that runs from the border of Belarus to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad — before other, larger NATO allies had time to respond.
It’s natural to be skeptical of such a lightning attack after the events in Ukraine over the past three weeks, but also too early to say what the war will change among the assumptions fed into Rand’s war game, said Shlapak. Russia’s leaders and commanders would surely go about an attack on NATO very differently.
Still, the Russian military has been mauled and its stock of precision guided missiles depleted. Barring a catastrophic escalation of the current conflict, that should make a Russian war of choice with NATO less likely in future than it was before Feb. 24, according to Michael Mazarr, a former special assistant to the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
For sure, in three or five years, Putin’s generals will have learned lessons, regrouped and rearmed, he said, but they’ll be hobbled by sanctions that limit access to technologies and finance. On Tuesday, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters that allies would seek to tighten and expand sanctions on Russia when they meet later this week.
That, said Mazarr, is where the more worrying change to Europe’s security order comes in. Stability between great powers depends on reaching some mutual agreement to maintain the status quo, he said. That was achieved even with the Soviet Union after the 1960s, but never with Putin’s Russia. And, whatever the wisdom of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion, such a deal may now be impossible.
After Ukraine, “there is no treating the kind of regime that’s in the Kremlin as a geopolitical partner,” said Mazarr. “We are now locked into an indefinite confrontation with an increasingly humiliated, hyper-nationalistic and dangerous great power in decline.”
Concern in Washington has focused on whether China decides to help Russia evade sanctions and reequip, a move that would invite further U.S. sanctions and accelerate the world’s redivision into economic and geopolitical blocs. China has denied Moscow even asked for help and so far there are few concrete signs that it will.
In front-line NATO states, defense officials are less focused on Russian military snafus in Ukraine and more on the evidence that Putin can act on false assumptions.
“Russia wants to restore this Soviet type bloc of states in this part of the world,” said Brigadier General Riho Ühtegi, commander of the Estonian Defense League, a volunteer reserve of 19,000 adults and 6,000 cadets. “Maybe we are not next – there is Moldova and still Georgia, there’s a frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and there’s Kazakhstan — there are many places Russia has to do something. But we have to be ready.”
Ühtegi said he’s received about 1,000 applications to join his force since the invasion of Ukraine began, half from women. He’s also planning to buy more of the anti-tank weapons and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles that the Ukrainians have deployed to such effect.
Most of all, though, Ühtegi is convinced that events have proved wrong Rand’s assumptions about how such a war would in fact play out in the Baltics. No doubt Russian forces would move quickly to the capitals, but the war would — as in Ukraine — be fought behind Russian lines and in cities. It would not be a done deal. “If NATO forces took a while to come they would not be coming to occupied territory,” said Ühtegi. “They would be coming to a war zone.”
