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新的外交政策：超越美国例外论
https://www.amazon.ca/New-Foreign-Policy-American-Exceptionalism/dp/023118848X
作者：国际发展中心 Jeffrey D Sachs 2018 年 10 月 2 日
美国世纪始于1941年，结束于2017年1月20日。虽然美国仍然是军事大国，仍然是经济强国，但它不再像以前那样主导世界经济或地缘政治。 当前外交政策转向民族主义和“美国优先”单边主义不会让美国变得伟大。 相反，它代表着我们在面对严重的环境威胁、政治动荡、大规模移民和其他全球挑战时放弃责任。
在这本深刻而有力的书中，杰弗里·D·萨克斯为新的外交政策提供了蓝图，该政策拥抱全球合作、国际法和对全球繁荣的渴望，而不是民族主义和过去辉煌的虚幻梦想。 他认为，美国对世界的态度必须从军事实力和选择战争转向致力于可持续发展的共同目标。 我们对首要地位的追求使我们卷入了不明智且无法获胜的战争，现在是从战争转向缔造和平的时候了，是时候拥抱国际合作提供的机会了。 新的外交政策探讨了“美国优先”思维的危险和新的前进道路的可能性，提出了及时且可实现的计划，以促进全球经济增长、为二十一世纪重新配置联合国以及建立多极世界 一个繁荣、和平、公平、有活力的世界。
新的外交政策：超越美国例外论
2019 年秋季 • 卡托期刊卷。 39号 3
作者：约翰·格拉泽 (John Glaser)，《电源问题》播客主持人
美国例外论对不同的人有不同的含义。 由于这个术语在我们的政治词典中使用，它至少有四个不同的版本，每个版本都以某种方式与另一个版本融为一体。 传统版本让人回想起 1630 年马萨诸塞湾殖民地总督约翰·温思罗普 (John Winthrop) 的著名劝告，即“我们将成为山上之城”，“所有人的目光”都会注视着我们。 温思罗普最初的目的更多的是鼓励遵守当时清教徒所解释的基督教教义，但温思罗普的语言在政治世代中传递了不同的含义：我们是例外的，因为美国是一个受上帝普罗维登斯指导的国家，是一个榜样。 世界。
另一个相关版本赞扬了美国的建国原则，并将我们的例外论定位于我们独特的开端，作为第一个摆脱殖民主义锁链并建立基于启蒙思想的政府的国家。 还有一个在二战后时代成熟的版本，也许罗纳德·里根最雄辩地阐述了这一点：我们是地球上人类最后最好的希望，是暴政世界中民主和自由的避风港。
还有最新版本的美国例外论。 尽管它在我们的历史中有着悠久的历史，但它的鼎盛时期却是在冷战后时代到来的——即所谓的单极时刻，美国没有遇到能够与我们的实力和影响力相媲美的地缘政治敌人。 这个版本说，我们的特殊之处在于，我们在全球治理方面拥有其他国家所不具备的专属特权和特殊责任。
这个版本的傀儡不是约翰·温思罗普，而是比尔·克林顿总统1997年至2001年的国务卿马德琳·奥尔布赖特。正如她所说，“如果我们必须使用武力，那是因为我们是美国；如果我们必须使用武力，那是因为我们是美国；如果我们必须使用武力，那是因为我们是美国。” 我们是不可或缺的国家。 我们昂首挺胸，比其他国家看得更远。” 根据这一学说，我们不仅仅是国家中的一个国家。 我们对于全球和平与安全不可或缺，为了履行这些责任，我们有权采取其他人会因此受到惩罚和谴责的方式行事。
这些在某种程度上都是非历史的民族主义神话。 大多数时候，这样的叙事被用来灌输一定的爱国热情，满足人们增强国家实力的愿望，并创造一种归属感和使命感。 但以奥尔布赖特傲慢言论为代表的例外论已经以更为具体的方式体现出来，特别是在美国外交政策的实施中。 世界秩序要求美国经常在海外使用武力，以免霍布斯式的混乱降临到国际社会，这种想法似乎占据了整个华盛顿。
这就是世界著名哥伦比亚大学经济学家杰弗里·萨克斯在其最新著作《新外交政策：超越美国例外论》中所瞄准的例外论。 萨克斯认为，对美国外交政策影响最大的美国例外论起源于华盛顿的二战后制度建设，当时“美国领导人认为，美国是与众不同的，最终是例外的，拥有创造和破坏美国的固有权利”。 国际游戏规则。” 萨克斯认为，这种自以为是的想法已经将美国的外交政策推向了国际虚伪和无情军事干预主义的极端，浪费了资源，制造了新的敌人，并错失了和平合作的机会。 在特朗普时代，它变得尤其具有威胁性。
萨克斯写道：“唐纳德·特朗普的‘美国优先’外交政策代表了一种新的、粗俗的美国例外论。” 它仍然优先考虑“美国无与伦比的军事优势”来维护“全球稳定”，但也夹杂着对国际法和国际准则的更加恶毒的漠视，并且不时夹杂着幼稚的经济保护主义。
萨克斯的书是一本面向外行的外交政策论文。 他简化了国际关系领域关于美国在世界上适当角色的更为激烈的辩论。 有时，这会导致缺乏细微差别。 例如，他对现实主义学派的理解是“一场新的军备竞赛是保持权力平衡和维护美国安全所必须付出的必要和不可避免的代价”，这是一种相当肤浅的理解。 他还提出了一些笨拙的论战——谴责科赫兄弟的恶意黑钱影响，尽管他们自己明显不满美国的军事行动。 但萨克斯知道的足够多，足以违背华盛顿特区外交政策界的专家共识和总体主旨
萨克斯的案例既符合常识又令人信服。
萨克斯认为，美国应该利用其财富、权力和安全优势，奉行国家间的合作外交，而不是扮演世界警察，不断干涉其他主权国家的事务，并习惯性违反国际法的准则。 我们经常惩罚违反规则和规范的人。 萨克斯批评冷战后北约的扩张背叛了其最初的战略目的，并且不必要地对抗俄罗斯。 他毫不留情地谴责伊拉克战争，并将奥巴马政府干预利比亚的理由斥为“宣传”。 他解释了为什么美国在朝鲜半岛局势方面并非无可指责，并大胆地指出了在华盛顿仍然存在争议的明显现实，即我们应该愿意“接受一个被威慑的拥有核武器的朝鲜”，而不是 “冒着一场美国领导的选择战争的风险。”
萨克斯还指责特朗普政府的主要外交政策文件《国防战略》和《国家安全战略》夸大了对美国利益的威胁，并继续坚持将军事主导地位作为首要目标。 这些官方文件中提出的世界日益危险的观点“过于确定性和悲观”并且“与事实不符”。 萨克斯认为，他们将俄罗斯和中国的大国竞争描述为对世界秩序和美国国家安全的主要威胁，这只是例外主义倾向的例证。
萨克斯抱怨道，虽然“美国安全国家指责中国和俄罗斯破坏全球体系”，但美国“在没有必要的联合国支持的情况下发动了灾难性的‘政权更迭’战争”。 美国“在近四分之一世纪的时间里未能批准联合国支持的条约”，并一再采取不符合国际法和规范的外交政策。 正是美国“在 2002 年单方面放弃了《反弹道导弹条约》，从而破坏了美俄核合作”，特朗普政府效仿了这一错误，退出了中程核力量（INF）。 ) 2019 年条约。
同样，官方将中国描述为“一个危险的扩张主义国家”，忽视了这样一个事实：美国“在军费上比中国多出二比一”，而且美国“在不间断的海外战争和政权更迭中一直是一个公开的修正主义超级大国”。 几十年来的运营”，与中国更加规避风险的安全政策形成鲜明对比。 萨克斯冷静地指出：“虽然中国在南海的领土主张值得担忧，但到目前为止，这些海洋主张似乎主要是为了确保中国的贸易路线，而不是阻碍邻国。”
因此，来自俄罗斯和中国的更直接的危险源于美国对它们的强硬政策创造“自我实现的预言”的风险。 萨克斯警告说，一边与俄罗斯和中国为敌，一边坚持全球军事主导地位和维持世界治安的特权，不太可能满足缺乏安全感、愤愤不平的俄罗斯，也不太可能遏制崛起的中国。 相反，结果可能是“对美国来说是一场巨大的失败，对世界来说是一个潜在的威胁”。 萨克斯认为，尽管俄罗斯、中国和其他对手“确实在反击美国的主导地位”，但这并不意味着他们是系统破坏者。 华盛顿不应该假设我们必须在军事上对抗坚决的修正主义，而应该容纳这些国家并将其纳入现有的国际秩序——这种做法只有在没有好战的美国例外论的情况下才能成功。
萨克斯在底线上表现出了令人钦佩的清晰：“有一个外交政策目标比其他所有目标都重要，那就是让美国远离一场新的战争。” 为了让美国做到这一点，萨克斯提出了几项改革。 首先，美国必须从阿富汗、伊拉克、叙利亚、也门、索马里、利比亚、尼日尔等地的选择性战争中撤出当前的敌对行动。 萨克斯建议重组中央情报局，将重点放在情报上，而不是充当“总统不负责任的秘密军队”。 他呼吁国会“重建其对战争与和平的决策权”。 过度保密使得行政部门秘密地将美国卷入海外战争，也必须加以遏制。 最后，美国必须调整其外交政策，将缔造和平、外交和经济合作置于使用武力之上。
萨克斯的诊断和他的处方都非常适合关于美国大战略未来的新兴争论。 思想之争本质上分为两个阵营。 有人认为，我们当前的大战略（首要地位）仍然是
全球和平、繁荣和民主的必要性，对特朗普时代战略混乱的正确回应是加倍甚至扩大美国的海外军事承诺。 另一种主张采取另一种克制的大战略，即美国取消其全球军事承诺，更狭隘地界定其国家利益，并重新赋予外交作为外交政策主要工具的地位。
然而，这位著名经济学家的处方的一个主要内容是大力推动分配美国援助和经济发展援助的计划。 萨克斯对美国援助计划的有效性比他在外交政策上的自由主义盟友更有信心，但他至少是市场经济和跨境自由贸易的倡导者，尽管他是中左派。 在某种程度上，特朗普总统的孤立主义冲动对新的军事干预产生了（高度选择性的）厌恶，他对关税的渴求保护主义使他成为反对军事行动主义但了解市场和贸易的自由主义者的相对较差的权宜之计。 丰富世界和平国际政治。 萨克斯进一步证明，存在着一个多元化的知识分子联盟，他们理解美国紧缩开支的必要性，但也拒绝某些其他意识形态阵营中日益恶化的反移民和反贸易偏见。
战略的改变至关重要。 美国近20年来一直处于持续战争状态。 数万亿纳税人的钱被浪费在无法获胜和不必要的战争上。 数百万人的无辜生命被卷入风暴之中。 在国内，美国人面临着不断膨胀的国债、政府权力的不祥增长以及对公民自由和宪法制衡构成持续威胁的国家安全状态。
但美国不必完全放弃其令人垂涎的独特感。 事实上，美国例外论的一种派系，即已在历史中很大程度上消失的例外论的另一种形式，认为美国只有在抵制全球统治诱惑的情况下才能例外，即与其他国家不同。 约翰·昆西·亚当斯 (John Quincy Adams) 在 1821 年宣称，美国“尊重其他国家的独立，同时主张并维护自己的独立”。 “即使是因为她所坚持的原则而发生冲突，她也不会干涉他人的担忧”，这恰恰说明了她的与众不同。
19世纪末，当美国与西班牙开战并吞并新领土作为战利品时，当时的反帝国主义者为美国例外论的丧失而哀悼。 当时的历史学家罗伯特·贝斯纳解释说，美国“肆意放弃了她的孤立避难所，陷入了欧洲竞争和冲突的陷阱”。 反帝国主义者认为，“美国无法再作为世界上最受青睐的国家闪耀光芒，在冲突中保持超然的、不受玷污的特殊地位。”
A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism
https://www.amazon.ca/New-Foreign-Policy-American-Exceptionalism/dp/023118848X
by Center for International Development Jeffrey D Sachs Oct. 2 2018
The American Century began in 1941 and ended on January 20, 2017. While the United States remains a military giant and is still an economic powerhouse, it no longer dominates the world economy or geopolitics as it once did. The current turn toward nationalism and "America first" unilateralism in foreign policy will not make America great. Instead, it represents the abdication of our responsibilities in the face of severe environmental threats, political upheaval, mass migration, and other global challenges.
In this incisive and forceful book, Jeffrey D. Sachs provides the blueprint for a new foreign policy that embraces global cooperation, international law, and aspirations for worldwide prosperity--not nationalism and gauzy dreams of past glory. He argues that America's approach to the world must shift from military might and wars of choice to a commitment to shared objectives of sustainable development. Our pursuit of primacy has embroiled us in unwise and unwinnable wars, and it is time to shift from making war to making peace and time to embrace the opportunities that international cooperation offers. A New Foreign Policy explores both the danger of the "America first" mindset and the possibilities for a new way forward, proposing timely and achievable plans to foster global economic growth, reconfigure the United Nations for the twenty-first century, and build a multipolar world that is prosperous, peaceful, fair, and resilient.
A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism
https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/fall-2019/new-foreign-policy-beyond-american-exceptionalism-jeffrey-d-sachs
FALL 2019 • CATO JOURNAL VOL. 39 NO. 3
Another related version lauds the principles of the American Founding and locates our exceptionalism in our peculiar beginnings as the first country to throw off the chains of colonialism and establish a government based on enlightenment ideas. There is also a version that came of age in the post‐?WWII era, perhaps articulated most eloquently by Ronald Reagan, that we are the last best hope of man on earth, a haven of democracy and freedom in a world of tyranny.
And then there’s the most recent version of American exceptionalism. Though it has antecedents deep in our history, its heyday arrived in the post‐?Cold War era — the so‐?called unipolar moment in which America faced no geopolitical enemy that could hold a candle to our power and influence. This version says that we are exceptional in that we have exclusive prerogatives and special responsibilities for global governance that no other country possesses.
The figurehead of this version is not John Winthrop, but Madeline Albright, President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. As she put it, “If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.” We are not just a nation among nations, according to this doctrine. We’re indispensable for global peace and security and, to carry out these responsibilities, we have the right to act in ways that others would be punished and condemned for.
These are all ahistorical nationalist myths to one extent or another. Most of the time, such narratives are used to inculcate a certain patriotic fervor, to feed the population’s desire to aggrandize the nation, and to create a sense of belonging and purpose. But the version of exceptionalism epitomized by Albright’s hubristic rhetoric has manifested in far more tangible ways, particularly in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The idea that world order requires the United States to regularly use force abroad lest a Hobbesian chaos descend upon international society seems to possess all of Washington.
This is the exceptionalism at which world‐?renowned Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs takes aim in his latest book A New?Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism. According to Sachs, the American exceptionalism that most infects U.S. foreign policy had its origins in Washington’s post‐?WWII institution‐?building, when “American leaders held the view that America was different, ultimately exceptional, with the inherent right to make and break the international rules of the game.” This self‐?righteous idea, Sachs argues, has driven U.S. foreign policy to the extremes of international hypocrisy and unrelenting military interventionism, wasting resources, creating new enemies, and missing opportunities for peaceful cooperation. And it has acquired an especially menacing quality in the Trump era.
“Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy represents a new and vulgar strain of American exceptionalism,” Sachs writes. It still prioritizes “unrivaled U.S. military superiority” to maintain “global stability,” but it is mixed with an even more virulent disregard for international laws and norms and it is punctuated by naïve economic protectionism.
Sachs’s book is a foreign policy treatise for the layman. He simplifies a much denser debate in the field of international relations over the proper U.S. role in the world. Occasionally, this produces a lack of nuance. His understanding of the realist school as committed to “a new arms race [as] the necessary and inevitable price to pay to keep the balance of power and preserve U.S. security” is a rather shallow one, for example. He also offers a few clumsy polemics — condemning the malicious dark money influence of the Koch brothers despite their own apparent displeasure with U.S. military activism. But Sachs knows enough to buck the expert consensus of Washington, D.C.‘s foreign policy community, and the general thrust of Sachs’s case is both commonsensical and compelling.
Sachs argues that the United States should take advantage of its wealth, power, and security to pursue cooperative diplomacy as a nation among nations, rather than play policeman of the world, constantly intervene in the affairs of other sovereign countries, and habitually violate the very rules and norms we often punish others for transgressing. Sachs criticizes post‐?Cold War NATO expansion as a betrayal of its original strategic purpose and needlessly antagonistic toward Russia. He is unsparing in his denunciation of the Iraq War and dismisses the Obama administration’s justification for intervening in Libya as “propaganda.” He explains why America is not blameless when it comes to the situation on the Korean peninsula and boldly states the plain reality, still controversial in D.C., that we should be willing to “accept a nuclear‐?armed North Korea that is deterred” rather than “risk a U.S.-led war of choice.”
Sachs also takes aim at the Trump administration’s major foreign policy documents, the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy, for inflating threats to U.S. interests and continuing to insist on military dominance as a first‐?order objective. The view put forward in these official documents that the world is increasingly dangerous is “far too deterministic and pessimistic” and “belied by the facts.” Their depiction of great power competition from Russia and China as a major threat to world order and U.S. national security, according to Sachs, merely exemplifies the exceptionalist orientation.
While “the US security state is pointing the finger at China and Russia as undermining the global system,” Sachs complains, it is the United States that “launched catastrophic wars of ‘regime change’ without requisite UN backing.” The United States has “failed to ratify a UN‐?backed treaty in nearly a quarter‐?century” and has repeatedly adopted foreign policies inconsistent with international laws and norms. It was the United States that “was the first to undermine U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation by unilaterally abandoning the Anti‐?Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002,” a misstep the Trump administration emulated by backing out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.
Likewise, official depictions of China as “a dangerously expansionist power” ignore the fact that the United States “outspends China on the military by more than two to one” and that America has been an openly revisionist superpower “in nonstop overseas wars and regime change operations for decades,” much in contrast to China’s more risk‐?averse security policies. “While there’s room to be concerned about China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea,” Sachs soberly points out, “so far those maritime claims seem mainly designed to secure China’s trade routes rather than to impede the neighboring countries.”
The more immediate danger from Russia and China, therefore, is born of the risk that America’s hardline policies against them create “a self‐?fulfilling prophecy.” Making enemies of Russia and China while insisting on global military dominance and special privileges in policing the world, Sachs warns, is not likely to satiate an insecure, aggrieved Russia or to stifle a rising China. Instead, the results could be “a huge debacle for the United States and a potential threat for the world.” Although Russia, China, and other adversaries “are indeed pushing back against U.S. assertions of dominance,” Sachs argues, “that does not make them system breakers.” Rather than assume a determined revisionism that we must confront militarily, Washington should accommodate and incorporate these states into the existing international order — an approach that can only succeed in the absence of a belligerent American exceptionalism.
Sachs exhibits admirable clarity on the bottom line: “There is one foreign policy goal that matters above all the others, and that is to keep the United States out of a new war.” For the United States to do this, Sachs proposes several reforms. First, the United States must withdraw from active hostilities in elective wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Niger, and beyond. Sachs recommends restructuring the CIA to focus on intelligence instead of serving as “an unaccountable secret army of the president.” He calls on Congress “to reestablish its decision‐?making authority over war and peace.” Excessive secrecy, which has allowed the executive branch to covertly involve the United States in overseas wars, must be reined in too. Finally, the United States must reorient its foreign policy to prioritize peace‐?making, diplomacy, and economic cooperation over the use of force.
Both Sachs’s diagnosis and his prescription fit nicely within an emerging debate about the future of U.S. grand strategy. The contest of ideas essentially splits into two camps. One argues that our current grand strategy, primacy, is still imperative for global peace, prosperity, and democracy and that the proper response to the strategic confusion of the Trump era is to double down on, and even expand, America’s overseas military commitments. The other argues for an alternative grand strategy of restraint in which America rolls back its global military commitments, defines its national interests more narrowly, and reenergizes diplomacy as the primary tool of foreign policy.
A major element of the prominent economist’s prescription, however, is a massive boost to programs that distribute U.S. aid and economic development assistance. Sachs is much more confident in the effectiveness of U.S. aid programs than his libertarian allies on foreign policy, but he is at least an advocate, albeit a left‐?of‐?center one, for market economies and free trade across international borders. To the extent that President Trump’s isolationist impulses produce a (highly selective) aversion to new military interventions, his tariff‐?hungry protectionism makes him a comparatively poor ally‐?of‐?convenience for libertarians who oppose military activism but understand that markets and trade enrich the world and pacify international politics. Sachs is further proof that there is a diverse coalition of intellectuals who understand the need for U.S. retrenchment but who also reject the anti‐?immigrant and anti‐?trade biases that fester within certain other ideological camps.
A change in strategy is of paramount importance. The United States has been in a constant state of war for almost 20 years. Trillions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted on unwinnable and unnecessary wars. Millions of innocent lives have been caught in the storm. At home, Americans are faced with a ballooning national debt, an ominous growth of government power, and a national security state that is a constant threat to civil liberties and constitutional checks and balances.
But America need not entirely abandon its coveted sense of distinction. Indeed, one strain of American exceptionalism, another version of exceptionalism that’s been largely lost to history, held that the United States could be exceptional — that is, different from the rest — only insofar as it resisted the temptations of global dominion. America, John Quincy Adams proclaimed in 1821, “respected the independence of other nations while asserting and maintaining her own.” That “she has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings” spoke precisely to what made her exceptional.
At the close of the 19th century, as the United States fought a war with Spain and gobbled up new territories as the spoils of victory, anti‐?imperialists, as they were then called, mourned the loss of that American exceptionalism. America “had wantonly relinquished her refuge of isolation to enter the enmeshing trap of European rivalry and conflict,” explains Robert Beisner, a historian of the period. “The United States,” anti‐?imperialists felt, “could no longer shine as the world’s favored nation, detached and unstained in her special place above the fray.”
