黑社会监狱帮派管理美国的刑罚制度

地下世界的社会秩序， 监狱帮派如何管理美国的刑罚系统

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System    by David Skarbek (Author) June 18 2014

大卫·斯卡贝克，2014

门派各立 影响力外溢 揭秘美国监狱黑帮

 

佩利肯湾监狱内部一景。　

　

　在监狱内放风的囚犯犹如生活在外面的自由世界。

美国监狱防范严密。

监狱本该是罪犯接受惩罚和教育的地方，而在美国加利福尼亚州的一些监狱，犯人们私下里拉帮结派，继续违法勾当，其影响力甚至外溢到街头黑帮，对监狱管理构成新的挑战。

　　放风期间暗潮涌动

　　今年二月份的一天清晨，美国加州的佩利肯湾监狱，Ｂ区的囚犯们正等待走出牢房，开始早间时段的操场放风。狱警克里斯托弗·阿科斯塔对前来采访的《大西洋》月刊记者格雷姆·伍德低声提示道：“注意观察他们的行为。”

　　阿科斯塔当了１５年一线狱警，对囚犯们的“习性”了如指掌。按照他的提醒，记者伍德开始留心观察。囚犯们陆续走出牢房，逐一接受狱警搜身检查，然后步入操场呼吸新鲜空气。渐渐地，伍德开始有所察觉：队伍中第一个具拉美裔特征的犯人进入操场后，径直走向约４５米外的一张水泥台坐下来，似乎在等待；第一个黑人囚犯走到健身区，紧盯着场外；一个白人囚犯则选择了靠近篮球场的第三个地点……“显然，他们的行动是有目的性的：每个人为各自的团伙及同伴标出一个集合点，”伍德写道。

　　当“集合点”聚集了一定人数，比如５个人，他们会派出两名“侦察员”，在操场上先逛一圈，偷听其他团伙的谈话，摸清楚“局势”。“然后，他们回到自己的‘基地’汇报情况，比如谁打算揍谁，谁要倒卖什么货，等等。”

　　伍德得知，这所监狱中关押的几乎全是参与谋杀、盗窃、贩毒等犯罪的重罪犯，其中绝大多数人分别加入加州六大监狱黑帮：“我们的家族”、“墨西哥黑手党”、“亚利安兄弟会”、“黑色游击队”、“北方组织”、“纳粹飙车手”。囚犯们划分放风地盘的行为，正是监狱黑帮之间相互较量、制约的体现。

　　监狱黑帮机制成熟

　　加州监狱黑帮的存在由来已久，其势力不仅局限于监狱内部，还蔓延到社会上，与狱外犯罪分子勾结呼应。一些监狱黑帮的影响力甚至反超街头黑帮。

　　不过，外界对监狱黑帮的了解十分有限。他们如何在监狱管控下组织运作，是黑帮成员须严格保守的秘密。据称，透露细节的“告密者”会遭到监狱内外黑帮的追杀。

　　加州学者戴维·斯卡尔贝克研究监狱黑帮多年，今年夏天出版《地下世界的社会秩序》一书，试图揭开黑帮内幕。他的研究主要针对加州监狱系统，这是全美第二大监狱系统，目前共收押大约１３．５万囚犯。

　　斯卡尔贝克发现，加州监狱黑帮出现于上世纪５０年代，正值入狱人数激增、监狱系统亟待扩张之时。不同族裔的囚犯被混杂关押，年轻气盛的“初进宫”者和有犯罪前科的“老油条”们关在一起，拥挤的监狱内暴力事件不断，监狱管理者一时也无能为力。一些囚犯不得不联手合作，形成小团体，起初目的是为寻求自保，后来发展为争夺狱中有限资源和利益。监狱黑帮由此兴起。

　　“监狱黑帮是高度成熟的组织，有详尽的发展规划，有一套等级制度，甚至还有‘人力资源部门’，”斯卡尔贝克说，他们会用尽一切手段寻找空隙、瞒天过海，让手机、刀具、香烟、毒品等违禁品流入监狱，并实施地下交易。

　　防范严密仍有罪恶漏洞

　　根据斯卡尔贝克的研究，加州六大监狱黑帮中，“我们的家族”、“墨西哥黑手党”和“北方组织”主要吸纳拉美裔囚犯；“亚利安兄弟会”是宣扬极端种族主义的白人囚犯团伙，曾在狱中制造多起骇人听闻的暴力谋杀，“纳粹飙车手”是其分支；“黑色游击队”的成员则是与白人势不两立的黑人囚犯。

　　狱警们深知，把属于不同黑帮的囚犯混在一起，就好比让不同化学元素接触，可能会导致灾难性“爆炸”。因此，在积累多年经验基础上，监狱方面如今也学会巧妙利用帮派之间的关系管理囚犯。

　　为了控制监狱黑帮，加州当局尝试过两种方式。第一种是拆散黑帮成员，把他们送到不同监狱关押，希望以此瓦解黑帮对某个监狱的影响力，结果却适得其反。黑帮成员转移到其他监狱后不但没有安分守己，反而继续招兵买马扩大势力，几乎“污染”加州所有监狱，甚至影响到其他州的部分监狱。

　　２０世纪９０年代起，当局新建佩利肯湾监狱，开始尝试现行做法：确认监狱黑帮的高级头目，全部送到佩利肯湾监狱关押。

　　监狱里有一栋六角形建筑，是专门关押黑帮头目等重犯的地方。他们通常被判终身监禁。不同于其他囚犯，这些重犯没有每天到操场放风的机会，只能被押往楼内一间玻璃顶空屋，单独晒晒太阳。

　　这间空屋四面都是水泥墙，空空荡荡，地上有一个小小的排污孔。即便如此，黑帮头目们依然能设法通过这个小孔，与其他牢房的帮派成员们传递信息。

　　记者伍德在狱警陪同下进入这一重犯牢区，打算就黑帮话题采访几个犯人，结果未能如愿。多数囚犯对他的提问置若罔闻，理都不理。一个身上文有刺青的拉美裔男囚隔着牢门，像赶苍蝇似的冲伍德挥手。只有一个犯人回答他：“监狱黑帮？这儿没什么黑帮。”

　　新华社供本报特稿

地下世界的社会秩序， 监狱帮派如何管理美国的刑罚系统

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System    by David Skarbek (Author) June 18 2014

大卫·斯卡贝克，2014
审阅者：Daniel J. D’Amico； 布朗大学,  发表在《独立评论》2015 年春季刊上。

大卫·斯卡贝克的新书《地下世界的社会秩序：监狱帮派如何治理美国刑罚系统》经过精心研究，推理合理，文笔优美，适合专业学者和普通读者阅读。 对于任何对经济学或犯罪与惩罚应用领域有认真研究兴趣的人来说，即使不是立即阅读，也应该被认为是必读的。

首先，斯卡贝克的著作重申了经济思维方式的解释力。 他对理性选择分析的致力于，以及他对自我调节和自发进化的社会制度潜力的理解，为理解近年来相对未通过类似技术进行研究的重要主题提供了新的见解。 此前的研究人员将监狱帮派的崛起和稳定归因于潜在的种族敌对情绪，但这种分析有很多无法解释的地方，也未能完全符合这一趋势的特定时间和程度。 相比之下，斯卡贝克认为看似精神病的帮派成员是理性且有目的的代理人。 他们的偏好是由他们的犯罪身份主观决定的，就像他们所追求的行动方针受到监禁的独特限制一样。 基于这种观点，他能够认识到监狱社会的独特条件因素——例如资源极度匮乏、潜在的暴力和敌对人员以及公共当局不可靠的安全保障——如何影响囚犯的动机和行为。 有利于监狱帮派组织形式中所激发的规则和习俗的出现。

斯卡贝克为整个美国监狱系统中犯罪团伙组织最近兴起的令人费解的现象提供了独特而令人信服且我认为准确的解释。 简而言之，囚犯们之所以形成监狱帮派的组织形式，是因为在二十世纪末监狱人口急剧增长的情况下，戒备森严的治安和以前的社会习俗已经不再有效，囚犯们从帮派组织中获得了类似于合同执行、个人利益等治理机制。 安全和争议解决。

在监狱社会中，从基本设施到麻醉品的物质资源都受到管理当局的严格监管和/或禁止，但对它们的需求仍然强劲，因此它们的利润潜力很高。 就其本质而言，囚犯中充满了邪恶的成员，但以前监狱生活的限制足以让囚犯认识到长期合作而非冲突的好处。 因此，非正式的、自我强制执行的囚犯行为守则的历史可以追溯到监狱本身。

在过去的几十年里，囚犯人口规模较小且更加同质，走私、生产和冲突裁决的协调成本相对较低。 然而，随着近几十年来监狱人口激增，非正式法规的效力开始减弱并最终瓦解。 规模更大、异质性更强的犯罪群体使得合作与协调的发展和维持变得更加困难。 反过来，由种族、族裔身份和生产性比较优势组成的信任网络随着不断发展的组织结构而出现，这些组织结构附有内部强制制衡，以填补安全和冲突裁决所需的角色。 斯卡贝克表明，从囚犯的角度来看——他在全文中通过原始资料、二次学术研究和新闻报道对囚犯的角度进行了彻底调查——监狱帮派在维持监狱内的社会秩序方面发挥着至关重要的作用。

斯卡贝克的工作还为目前占主导地位且可以说不完整的犯罪和惩罚模型提供了急需的方法和理论更新。 在某种程度上，监狱建筑象征并肯定了一个标准框架。 刀片刺网和炮塔传达出这样的信息：这些装甲箱内潜伏着危险的东西，而这些笼子可能可以保证社会的安全。 监狱空间不仅向囚犯传达这种隐含的社会秩序和治理模式，还巧妙地向整个社会的所有公民传达这种隐含的社会秩序和治理模式。 人类拥有极其危险的邪恶和暴力能力。 犯罪是非法的，对社会有害。 监狱本质上是同时用来惩罚恶人、保护无辜、震慑邪恶的工具。

正如早期刑罚理论家和监狱设计者杰里米·边沁 (Jeremy Bentham) 所总结的那样，“道德改革——健康保护——工业活跃，教育普及——公共负担减轻——经济如同磐石一般——济贫法的棘手结没有被割断” ，但又不受束缚——这一切都源于建筑中的一个简单想法！” （“全景敞视监狱”，《全景敞视监狱著作》，Miran Bozovic 编辑 [伦敦：Verso]，第 30 页）。

然而，衡量和肯定刑事处罚监禁模式的实证效果的尝试却产生了相对模糊的结果。 累犯依然存在； 刑事增长的财务成本似乎不可持续； 跨国犯罪率似乎与监狱趋势并不直接相符。 天生好奇的人理所当然地想知道这些设施内发生了什么。 然而近年来，监狱人种学研究越来越少。 我们可以庆幸的是，斯卡贝克就是这样一个充满好奇心的人，他的理性选择和新的制度方法超越了他的主题的经验挑战。

他的研究结果中最令人不安的是那些显示监狱帮派对监狱围墙之外和整个传统社会的影响的结果。 监狱是解决犯罪和社会混乱的默认手段。 大多数人自然地认为，如果有人违法，他或她就应该入狱，但斯卡贝克的研究发现，在监禁范围内形成的社会组织的影响力要复杂得多，甚至可能存在问题。 一旦进入监狱围墙，个体罪犯必须使自己的行为适应由极端暴力、独裁等级制度和不信任所强制执行的规则和权力关系体系。 鉴于获释囚犯的数量庞大且不断增加，以及他们重新融入自由社会的困难，人们必须想知道，放弃与在监狱社区生存相关的文化学习是多么困难，甚至可能是不可能的。 城市街头帮派的突出地位及其协调非法移民和毒品生产和分销的能力，即使不是直接受到监狱帮派组织结构的鼓励，也间接受到监狱空间条件因素的影响，似乎也受到影响。 在某种程度上，阅读《地下世界的社会秩序》会让人们以一种新的眼光看待监狱建筑。 装甲箱孕育着这样的社会体系：暴力权力和残酷报复得到回报，善意被剥削，信任永远不确定。 然后，那些不得不生活在这些系统中的个体会定期返回传统社会，从而带来毫不奇怪的危险后果。

许多活动人士和分析人士长期以来一直主张监狱改革，但这种努力在很大程度上受到阻碍，因为社会对与此类制度形式相关的全面而准确的成本和收益相对无知。 毫无疑问，由于这篇开创性的文本，世界更加了解了情况。 老实说，《地下世界的社会秩序》是一本我希望自己有洞察力、时间、耐心和奉献精神来写的书。 我只希望类似的作品能够随之而来。

丹尼尔·J·达米科
布朗大学

The Social Order of the Underworld, How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System

https://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?id=1057

David Skarbek,   2014 

Reviewed by: Daniel J. D'Amico; Brown University

This book review appeared in the Spring 2015 issue of The Independent Review.

 

David Skarbek’s new book The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System is meticulously researched, soundly reasoned, well written, and accessible to specialist scholars and casual readers alike. It should be considered required if not immediate reading for anyone with serious research interests in either economics or the applied fields of crime and punishment.

 

First and foremost, Skarbek’s work reaffirms the explanatory power of the economic way of thinking. His commitment to rational-choice analysis and his understanding surrounding the potentials for self-regulating and spontaneously evolved social institutions offer fresh insights to comprehend an important topic relatively uninvestigated in recent years through similar techniques. Previous researchers attributed prison gangs’ rise and stability to latent racial hostilities, but such analysis leaves much unexplained and fails to fully accord with the particular timing and magnitudes of the trend. In contrast, Skarbek considers seemingly psychotic gang members as rational and purposeful agents. Their preferences are subjectively shaped by their criminal identities, just as their pursued courses of action are uniquely constrained by their imprisonment. As a result of this view, he is able to recognize how the distinctive conditional factors of prison society—such as extreme resource scarcity, a population of potentially violent and hostile agents, and unreliable security from public authorities—shape inmates’ incentives and behaviors in favor of the emergence of rules and customs galvanized within the organizational form of prison gangs.

 

Skarbek provides a uniquely compelling and I think accurate explanation for the puzzling and recent rise of criminal gang organizations throughout the American prison system. In short, inmates coalesced on the organizational form of prison gangs because guarded security and previously common social customs were less effective amid extreme prison population growth during the late twentieth century, and so the inmates received from gang organizations governance mechanisms akin to contract enforcement, personal security, and dispute resolution.

 

In prison societies, material resources from basic amenities to narcotics are heavily regulated and/or prohibited by managing authorities, yet demand for them remains intense and thus their profit potential high. By their very nature, inmate populations are filled with nefarious members, but the confines of prison life in previous eras sufficiently attuned inmates to the benefits of long-run cooperation over conflict. Hence, informal and self-enforced inmate codes of conduct date back historically as long as prisons themselves.

 

In earlier decades, smaller and more homogeneous inmate populations represented relatively low coordination costs for smuggling, production, and conflict adjudication. However, as prison populations exploded in recent decades, the efficacy of informal codes began to fray and ultimately to unravel. Larger and more heterogeneous groups of confined criminals made cooperation and coordination more difficult to develop and maintain. In turn, networks of trust aligned by race, ethnic identity, and productive comparative advantage emerged with evolved organizational structures that were affixed with internally enforced checks and balances to fill the needed roles of security and conflict adjudication. Skarbek shows that from the inmates’ perspective—which he has thoroughly surveyed with original source materials, secondary academic research, and journalistic reports throughout the text—prison gangs serve a crucial function in the maintenance of social order behind bars.

 

Skarbek’s work also serves as a much needed methodological and theoretical update to the currently dominant and arguably incomplete models of crime and punishment. In a way, prison architectures symbolize and affirm a standard framework. Razor wire and gun turrets communicate that something dangerous lurks within these armored boxes and that such cages presumably keep society safe. Prison spaces communicate this implicit model of social order and governance not only to their inhabitants but also subtly to all citizens living throughout society. Human beings possess an incredibly dangerous capacity for evil and violence. Crimes are illegitimate and harmful to society. Prisons are essentially tools used simultaneously to punish evildoers, to protect the innocent, and to deter evil henceforth. 

As early penal theorist and prison designer Jeremy Bentham summarized, “Morals reformed—health preserved— industry invigorated, instruction diffused—public burthens lightened— Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock—the Gordian knot of the Poor-Laws are not cut, but untied—all by a simple idea in Architecture!” (“Panopticon,” in The Panopticon Writings, edited by Miran Bozovic [London: Verso], p. 30).

Yet attempts to measure and affirm the empirical effects of the incarceral model of criminal punishment have born relatively ambiguous results. Recidivism persists; the financial costs of penal growth appear unsustainable; and cross-national crime rates do not seem to accord directly with prison trends. The naturally inquisitive mind rightly wonders simply what occurs inside these facilities. Yet prison ethnographic research has been increasingly rare in recent years. We can be thankful that Skarbek is one such inquisitive mind and that his rational-choice and new institutional approach transcends the empirical challenges of his subject matter.

Most disconcerting in his findings are those that show the effects of prison gangs beyond penitentiary walls and throughout traditional society. Prisons are the default resolution to crime and social disorder. Most people think naturally that if someone breaks the law, he or she should go to jail, yet Skarbek’s research uncovers that the influence of social organizations forged within the confines of incarceration is far more complicated and perhaps problematic. Once inside prison walls, the individual criminal must acclimate his behaviors to a system of rules and power relationships enforced by extreme violence, authoritarian hierarchies, and distrust. Given the high and growing numbers of released inmates and their difficulties reassimilating into free society, one must wonder how difficult or perhaps even impossible it may be to leave behind the cultural learning associated with surviving the prison community. The prominence of urban street gangs and their abilities to coordinate illegal immigration and the production and distribution of narcotics seem influenced if not encouraged directly by the organizational structures of prison gangs and indirectly by the conditional factors of prison space. In a way, reading The Social Order of the Underworld causes one to see prison architectures in a new light. Armored boxes incubate social systems where violent power and cut-throat retaliation are rewarded, kindness exploited, and trust is never certain. The individuals who have had to live in these systems are then periodically cycled back into traditional society with unsurprisingly hazardous consequences.

Many activists and analysts have long argued for prison reform, but such efforts are largely stunted by society’s relative ignorance regarding the full and accurate costs and benefits associated with such institutional forms. In no uncertain terms, the world is better informed thanks to this groundbreaking text. In full honesty, The Social Order of the Underworld is a book I wish I had had the insight, time, patience, and dedication to write. I only hope that similar works will follow in its wake.

Daniel J. D’Amico
Brown University

黑社会的社会秩序：监狱帮派如何管理美国的刑罚制度

https://www.amazon.ca/Social-Order-Underworld-Prison-American/dp/0199328501

作者：David Skarbek（作者）2014 年 6 月 18 日

摘要
本书研究监狱黑社会的社会秩序，以了解法外机构如何形成、运作和演变。 它利用经济学来探索囚犯文化、囚犯等级制度和监狱帮派政治的秘密世界。 与国家薄弱国家的企业家一样，从事非法活动的囚犯不能依赖国家治理机构，例如法院和警察。 惩教人员不会解决海洛因交易出错的纠纷，也不会帮助杀死掠夺性强奸犯。 囚犯必须制定规则来管理俘虏社会。 在当今的监狱中，帮派在保护囚犯和在违禁品市场进行非法交易方面发挥着关键作用。 它们具有复杂的内部结构，并且常常依赖于详尽的成文章程。 为了维持社会秩序，帮派裁决冲突并策划战略性暴力行为，以协商囚犯、帮派成员和惩教人员的相互竞争的要求。 本书利用经济学来解释监狱帮派为何形成、他们如何与正式机构互动以及他们如何影响监狱围墙外的犯罪。 经济学解释了监狱生活中看似非理性、真正令人震惊且往往是悲剧性的世界。

当大多数人想到监狱帮派时，他们会想到由暴力、种族主义暴徒组成的混乱群体。 很少有人认为帮派是复杂的组织（通常有详尽的成文章程），负责监管监狱黑市、裁决冲突并从战略上平衡囚犯、帮派成员和狱警的相互竞争的需求。

然而，正如大卫·斯卡贝克（David Skarbek）所说，帮派的形成是为了在不法之徒之间建立秩序，产生替代性的治理机构来促进非法活动。 他用经济学来探索罪犯文化、囚犯等级制度和监狱帮派政治的秘密世界，并解释监狱帮派为何形成、正式制度如何影响他们，以及为什么他们对监狱之外的犯罪行为具有强大的影响力。 他的发现的影响远远超出了看似非理性且常常是悲剧性的俘虏社会。 它们还阐明了在传统治理机构不存在的情况下社会和政治秩序如何出现。

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System

 https://www.amazon.ca/Social-Order-Underworld-Prison-American/dp/0199328501

by David Skarbek (Author)June 18 2014

Abstract
This book studies the social order of the prison underworld to understand how extralegal institutions form, operate, and evolve. It uses economics to explore the secret world of the convict culture, inmate hierarchy, and prison gang politics. Like entrepreneurs in countries with weak states, inmates engaged in illegal activity cannot rely on state-based governance institutions, such as courts of law and the police. Correctional officers will not resolve a dispute over a heroin deal gone wrong or help kill a predatory rapist. Inmates must create rules to govern the society of captives. In today’s prisons, gangs play a pivotal role in protecting inmates and enforcing illicit deals in contraband markets. They have sophisticated internal structures and often rely on elaborate written constitutions. To maintain social order, gangs adjudicate conflicts and orchestrate strategic acts of violence to negotiate the competing demands of inmates, gang members, and correctional officers. This book uses economics to explain why prison gangs form, how they interact with formal institutions, and how they influence crime beyond prison walls. Economics explains the seemingly irrational, truly astonishing, and often tragic world of prison life.

When most people think of prison gangs, they think of chaotic bands of violent, racist thugs. Few people think of gangs as sophisticated organizations (often with elaborate written constitutions) that regulate the prison black market, adjudicate conflicts, and strategically balance the competing demands of inmates, gang members, and correctional officers. 

Yet as David Skarbek argues, gangs form to create order among outlaws, producing alternative governance institutions to facilitate illegal activity. He uses economics to explore the secret world of the convict culture, inmate hierarchy, and prison gang politics, and to explain why prison gangs form, how formal institutions affect them, and why they have a powerful influence over crime even beyond prison walls. The ramifications of his findings extend far beyond the seemingly irrational and often tragic society of captives. They also illuminate how social and political order can emerge in conditions where the traditional institutions of governance do not exist.

大卫·斯卡贝克 (David Skarbek) 是布朗大学政治学和政治理论项目系副教授。 他的新书《监狱秩序之谜》解释了为什么世界各地的监狱生活各不相同。 该书荣获刑事司法科学院国际部颁发的“杰出图书奖”。 在他的第一本书《地下世界的社会秩序》中，他用经济学来解释为什么帮派已经主宰了许多美国监狱。

他的学术文章发表在《美国政治科学评论》、《法律、经济学和组织杂志》、《经济行为与组织杂志》、《刑事司法杂志》和《公共选择》等领先期刊上。

他就美国和世界各地的政治和经济问题发表演讲，包括最近在威尔士、比利时、意大利、英格兰和美国加州大学伯克利分校、哈佛大学、麻省理工学院、斯坦福大学举办的学术研讨会和公开演讲 ，以及国家经济研究局。 他还曾在杜克大学、伦敦国王学院和加州大学伯克利分校担任过专业职务。

David Skarbek is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Political Theory Project at Brown University. His new book, The Puzzle of Prison Order, explains why life behind bars varies around the world. It recieved the "Outstanding Book Award" from the International Section of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. In his first book, The Social Order of the Underworld, he uses economics to explain why gangs have come to dominate many American prisons.

His academic articles have been published in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Criminal Justice, and Public Choice.

He gives talks about political and economic issues across the United States and around the world, including recent academic seminars and public talks in Wales, Belgium, Italy, England, and in the United States, including at UC Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, Stanford University, and the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has also held professional appointments at Duke University, King's College London, and University of California, Berkeley.

His personal webpage is www.davidskarbek.com, and he tweets at @davidskarbek.