美国和中国可以成为利益相关者吗？

美国和中国可以成为利益相关者吗？

Can America and China be Stakeholders?

https://www.brunswickgroup.com/bob-zoellick-can-america-and-china-be-stakeholders-i14750/ 

世界银行前行长、佐利克在美中贸易全国委员会成立40周年晚宴上致辞。

罗伯特·佐利克 (Robert Zoellick) 高级顾问，华盛顿特区，2019 年 12 月 11 日

12月4日，世界银行前行长、美国贸易代表、美国国务院副国务卿、现任布伦瑞克集团地缘政治负责人罗伯特·佐利克大使荣幸地在美中贸易全国委员会成立40周年晚宴上致辞。

十四年前，我在美中关系全国委员会发表了题为《中国向何处去：从成员身份到责任？》的演讲。 该标题包含一个问号。

我当时解释说，在基本实现了整合中国的目标之后，美国面临的问题是北京的行为：“中国将如何利用其影响力？”

我敦促中国的目光超越国际体系的成员资格——“成为该体系中负责任的利益相关者”。
讲话强调国际一体化的“规范”，而不仅仅是“形式”。

现在，为了使这项政策发挥作用，美国官员需要在盟友和商界人士的帮助下，与中国和更广泛地区的事态发展保持密切联系。 美国的政策需要处理细节并讨论战略。

我们过去称之为外交。
今天与中国不断对抗的逻辑拒绝了我概述的方法。
它拒绝接受中国可以在美国构建的体系中发挥建设性作用的观点。
它拒绝接受中国可以做出贡献的想法。
它甚至拒绝承认中国可以、甚至愿意以补充美国利益的方式行事。

请注意：如果美国政策认为中国不能在美国设计的体系内做任何这些事情，那么美国实际上将敦促中国支持一个平行的、独立的体系，其规则截然不同。

我理解今天的许多抱怨，但我们面临着忽视美国目标以及如何最好地实现这些目标的严重风险。直到 20 世纪 80 年代末，中国一直是世界上核武器和导弹的主要扩散国……它在 90 年代停止了核试验，并签署了《全面禁止核试验条约》——同时等待美国采取行动后再批准。

• 尽管中国曾经是伊朗的合作伙伴，但它与美国合作制裁和制止了伊朗的核计划。
• 尽管中国在朝鲜战争中与美国作战，但它仍与华盛顿合作，迫使朝鲜冻结并扭转平壤的核武器计划。
• 2000年至2018年间，在美国的大力推动下，中国支持了联合国安理会190项制裁违反国际规则国家的决议中的182项。
• 中国是联合国和联合国维和行动的第二大资助国……
• 中国是全球增长的最大贡献者。 中国将其全球经常账户盈余从占 GDP 的 10% 左右削减至零左右，这意味着其需求推动了全球扩张。
• 过去15年来，中国一直是美国出口增长最快的目的地——直到特朗普政府奉行保护主义并引发全球报复。
• 中国不再低估其汇率。 它减少了约1万亿美元的储备。
• 在全球金融危机期间，中国采取了最大规模、最快的刺激措施来应对可能出现的另一场大萧条。
• 中国作为最大的温室气体排放国，现在承认必须共同努力限制气候变化……

但那些乐观地认为美国与中国的合作没有产生符合美国利益的结果的人是完全错误的。
那些认为中国没有在美国主导的体系内采取建设性行动的人——那些认为中国只是破坏者的人——正在误导自己，自欺欺人在外交上是危险的。

我们需要清醒地认识到中国带来的真正战略挑战，并严守纪律，不要用全面的攻击分散注意力，这可能会导致误判和错误。

卡内基国际和平基金会的埃文·费根鲍姆最近指出，中国实际上正在采取双轨制应对不断变化的国际秩序。

作为国际组织的成员，中国寻求推动这些政权向中国的偏好和规范靠拢。

然而，正如费根鲍姆所解释的那样，中国也在寻求第二条替代道路：中国的“一带一路”提出了另一种国际模式，是中国长期以来对朝贡关系偏好的现代适应。 这一努力为那些加入中国的国家带来了经济利益，同时也对那些未能迁就北京的国家提出了警告。

我们需要在国际机构和国别内与中国竞争。 因为一无所有是很难打败的。

我们需要通过推广更好的想法和实践以及有吸引力的伙伴关系来与中国竞争，而不是通过退缩和欺凌。

我们还需要问，为什么中美关系会陷入不断的对抗？

我认为有六个发展趋同：

1. 首先，美国企业在市场准入方面的挫败感激增：缺乏互惠贸易和投资开放； 强制技术转让； 侵犯知识产权； 监管障碍和任意行为； 以及稀土矿产等出口限制。

2. 其次，美国人质疑中国的国家资本主义是否允许公平竞争。

3. 第三，美国人担心中国将主宰未来的技术。 这种批评针对的是“中国制造2025”计划，尽管党的领导人淡化了该计划的影响力。 我们已经处于分裂网络时代。 我预计电信、互联网和ICT服务以及5G系统将实现脱钩。

4. 第四，我去年在中国指出，没有人解释“一带一路”的动机：这是地缘政治举措吗？ 计划利用中国过剩产能建设基础设施？ 一个开发项目？ 我的猜测就是以上所有。 中国可以通过中国式的运输走廊建设欧亚大陆的想法很可能会增加债务，而不是可持续发展。
5. 第五，中国的外交和安全政策显然已经超越了邓小平所说的“韬光养晦”。 这些目标虽然令人不安，但并不令人意外。 他们应该得到战略性的、资源充足的、一致的回应。

海军上校阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉 (Alfred Thayer Mahan) 在撰写有关 20 世纪之初美国在亚太地区战略的文章时，预计该地区的实力仍将“充满争议”。换句话说，美国需要与其他国家竞争、机动和平衡力量。 我们可以从马汉的 21 世纪历史和地缘政治视角中受益。 马汉还希望促进美国与亚洲的贸易。 他写道，关税就像“一艘现代铁甲舰，装甲厚重，但发动机和火炮较差； 防守强，进攻弱。” 为什么我们要采取铁定的贸易政策？

6. 最后，我的第六点是习近平的领导优先考虑共产党并限制中国的开放和辩论。 中国为侵入性技术和再教育营的反乌托邦社会树立了榜样，这伤害了自己。 香港“一国两制”模式赖以存在的法治和开放可能会被推翻或践踏。 如果中国压制香港，中国将在经济和心理上长期伤害自己。

美国吸引力的基础是我们自己的故事。 我们需要为世界想象和渴望的美国而努力。
当我们的领导人未能认识到美国的做法应该成为榜样和典范时，我感到很难过，这是一项可以追溯到美国革命一代和亚伯拉罕·林肯的基本原则。

美国不会通过变得更像中国来赢得竞争。

这让我回到了 2005 年“负责任的利益相关者”演讲的起点。

我在结束讲话时解释说，“自由是美国的核心……”，这是我们对“不可协商的尊严要求”的呼吁的指导。

我指出，我们倡导思想和理想的目的不是“削弱中国”。 正如乔治·W·布什总统当时所说，我们的目标是“帮助他人找到自己的声音，获得自己的自由，开辟自己的道路”。
中国的未来篇章仍有待书写。

正如我今晚所概述的那样，美中关系面临的挑战与夸夸其谈和关税攻势格格不入。

如果与目标无关，仅靠“强硬”作为政策是失败的。

随着时间的推移，美国失去了世界各地的朋友和信任。 中国与美国进行战术演习，并可能带着苦涩的满足感看着美国消散几十年来积累的国际实力。

问问自己：美国真的能期望剥夺中国在国际体系中的地位以及对规则制定的影响力吗？
如果我们承认中国在谈判桌上的大国角色，难道我们不应该敦促中国承担起系统性利益相关者的责任吗？

美国也是利益攸关方。 20 世纪约有 25 万美国人死于亚洲。 用拿破仑的话来说，一个国家影响力的边界是以该国士兵的坟墓为标志的。

我们不应该因为不稳定的短期贸易公告而放弃我们的利益，也不应该将联盟降格为基于军队、贡品和贸易的不正当核算的便利关系。

最后，我将向你们所有人——美国商界的领袖们提出一个直接的观察：你们脚下的土地正在发生变化。

你们对中国的担忧导致你们中的许多人退缩了，这也许是可以理解的。

然后你小心翼翼地采取行动，以避免特朗普总统的愤怒——更不用说中国的愤怒了。
现在的赌注更高了。 警惕误判和意外后果的更大风险。

澳大利亚前总理、美国的好朋友、中国的亲密学生陆克文最近警告说：“一个完全‘脱钩的世界’将是一个极度不稳定的地方，它会破坏过去 40 年的全球增长假设，预示着东西方之间铁幕的回归，以及新的常规军备竞赛和核军备竞赛的开始，以及随之而来的战略不稳定和风险。”

你准备好了吗？

你需要决定你是否认为美国仍然可以与中国合作以实现互利共赢，同时管控分歧——如果可以，如何合作。

您需要决定是否可以通过与盟友和合作伙伴的长期伙伴关系来增强美国的影响力。
你们需要决定我们是否应该保存、更新、甚至扩大开放、有规则、公平解决争端的国际贸易体系。

你需要决定是否希望在国外代表美国作为原则和商业的传播者，以尊严和尊重的方式对待来自其他国家的人民。

然后你需要阐述你的观点——不仅是向政府，而且是向国会、州长和市长； 与您的员工、客户和供应商； 与媒体和意见领袖。

当我在2005年选择“利益相关者”这个词时，我想到的是利益相关者在共享企业中拥有利益。 这种兴趣值得付出努力，甚至坚持不懈，才能保持、适应和发展。 只有愚蠢或胆怯的人才会屈服或放弃企业。

作为利益相关者的合作并不意味着没有分歧。 利益相关者也参与竞争。 管理它们之间的差异应该在一个提供共同利益的更大框架内进行。

这是可以做到的。但前提是有您的支持和积极行动。

在这里阅读完整的演讲。

Can America and China be Stakeholders?

https://www.brunswickgroup.com/bob-zoellick-can-america-and-china-be-stakeholders-i14750/ 

Ambassador Robert Zoellick was honored to address the 40th Anniversary Gala dinner of the US-China Business Council.

Robert Zoellick  Senior Counselor, Washington, D.C.   Dec.11, 2019

On December 4th, Ambassador Robert Zoellick, former President of the World Bank, US Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary at the US Department of State and current Geopolitical Principal at Brunswick Group, was honored to address the 40th Anniversary Gala dinner of the US-China Business Council.

Fourteen years ago, I gave a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations titled: “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” That title included a question mark.
Having largely accomplished the aim of integrating China, the question for the United States, I explained back then, concerned Beijing’s conduct: “How will China use its influence?”
I urged China to look beyond membership in the international system— “to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.”
The speech stressed the “norms,” not just the “forms,” of international integration.
Now to make such a policy effective, U.S. officials needed to remain in close touch with developments in China and the wider region—with the help of allies and all of you in the business community. American policy needed to work the details as well as discuss strategy.
We used to call this diplomacy.
Today’s logic of constant confrontation with China rejects the approach I had outlined.
It rejects the idea that China can play a constructive role within the system that America constructed.
It rejects the idea that China can make contributions.
It even rejects the idea that China can, or even would, act in ways that complement U.S. interests.
Be aware: If U.S. policy assumes China cannot do any of those things within the system America designed, then the United States will, in effect, be prodding China into championing a parallel, separate system, with very different rules.
I understand many of today’s complaints, but we are at serious risk of losing sight of American aims and how best to achieve them.Until the late 1980’s, China was the world’s leading proliferator of nuclear weapons and missiles… It ceased nuclear tests in the 1990s and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—while waiting for U.S. action before ratifying.

• Although China once had been a partner of Iran, it worked with the United States to sanction and halt Iran’s nuclear program.
• Although China fought against the United States in the Korean War, it has worked with Washington to press North Korea to freeze and reverse Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.
• Between 2000 and 2018, China supported 182 of 190 UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on states violating international rules, prodded by vigorous U.S. efforts.
• China is the second largest funder of the UN and UN peacekeeping missions…
• China is the largest contributor to global growth. China cut its global current account surplus from about 10 percent of GDP to around zero—meaning that its demand has fueled worldwide expansion.
• For the past 15 years, China has been the fastest growing destination for U.S. exports—until the Trump Administration embraced protectionism and sparked worldwide retaliation.
• China no longer undervalues its exchange rate. It reduced reserves by about $1 trillion.
• During the global financial crisis, China had the largest and quickest stimulus to counteract what could have been another Depression.
• China, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, now accepts that it must join in efforts to limit climate change…

But those who blithely assume that U.S. cooperation with China didn’t produce results in America’s interest are flat wrong.
Those who assume that China has not acted constructively within the U.S.-guided system—who assume that China is only a disrupter—are misleading themselves, and self-deception is dangerous in diplomacy.
We need to be clear-eyed about the real strategic challenges that China presents and disciplined not to distract with blanket blasts that will likely lead to misjudgments and mistakes.
Evan Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out recently that China is in fact pursuing a two-track approach toward the changing international order.
As a member of international organizations, China seeks to nudge those regimes toward Chinese preferences and norms.
As Feigenbaum has explained, however, China is pursuing a second, alternative track as well: China’s Belt and Road presents another international model, a modern adaptation of China’s long-standing preference for tributary ties. This effort offers economic benefits to those who join China, combined with warnings for states that fail to accommodate Beijing.
We need to compete with China within international institutions and country-by-country. Because it’s hard to beat something with nothing.
We need to compete with China by promoting better ideas and practices and through attractive partnerships, instead of by retreating and bullying.
We also need to ask why Sino- American relations have tumbled into constant confrontation.
I believe six developments have converged:

1. First, frustrations boiled over for U.S. businesses on market access: a lack of reciprocal trade and investment openings; forced technology transfers; IPR violations; regulatory hurdles and arbitrary actions; and restrictions on exports, such as rare earth minerals.
2. Second, Americans question whether China’s state capitalism permits fair competition.
3. Third, Americans fear that China will dominate the technologies of the future. This critique targets the “Made in China 2025” plan, although Party leaders have downplayed that plan’s influence. We are already in the age of the splinternet. I expect to see decoupling in telecom, internet and ICT services, and 5G systems.
4. Fourth, I pointed out in China last year that no one had explained the motivation for Belt and Road: Was it a geopolitical move? A plan to employ excess Chinese capacity to build infrastructure? A development project? My guess is all of the above. The idea that China could build out Eurasia with Chinese-style transport corridors may well be building debts, not sustainable development.
5. Fifth, China’s foreign and security policy has clearly moved beyond Deng Xiaoping’s adage of “Hide your strength, bide your time.” These goals, while disconcerting, should not be surprising. They merit a strategic, well-resourced, and consistent response. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing about American strategy in the Asia-Pacific at the dawn of the 20th Century, expected power in the region to remain “debated and debatable.” In other words, the United States would need to compete, maneuver, and balance power with others. We could benefit from Mahan’s historical and geopolitical perspective in the 21st Century. Mahan also wanted to boost U.S. trade with Asia. Tariffs, he wrote, were like “a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but inferior engines and guns; mighty for defense, weak for offense.” Why have we adopted an ironclad trade policy?
6. Finally, my sixth point is that Xi Jinping’s leadership has prioritized the Communist Party and restricted openness and debate in China. China hurts itself by forging a role model for dystopian societies of intrusive technologies and reeducation camps. The rule of law and openness upon which Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” model rests may topple or be trampled. If China crushes Hong Kong, China will wound itself—economically and psychologically—for a long time.

The foundation of America’s appeal is our own story. We need to work on the America of the world’s imagination and aspiration.
I am saddened when our leaders fail to appreciate that America’s practices should be examples and models, a founding principle dating back to America’s Revolutionary generation and then Abraham Lincoln.
The United States will not win a competition by becoming more like China.
Which brings me back to where I began, with the “Responsible Stakeholder” speech of 2005.
I closed those remarks by explaining that, “Freedom lies at the heart of what America is…” guided by our call for the “non-negotiable demands of dignity.”
I pointed out that our purpose in championing ideas and ideals was not “to weaken China.” Our goal, as President George W. Bush then stated it, has been “to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, make their own way.”
China’s future chapters are still to be written.
The challenges of U.S.-China relations, as I’ve outlined them tonight, fit poorly with bombast and tariff barrages.
“Toughness” alone fails as policy if unconnected to objectives.
As time passes, the United States loses friends and trust around the world. China maneuvers tactically with America and watches, probably with wry satisfaction, as the United States dissipates the international strengths built up over many decades.
Ask yourself: Can the United States really expect to deny China a place in the international system, with influence over rule-making?
If we acknowledge China’s role as a power at the table, shouldn’t we urge China to assume responsibilities as a systemic stakeholder?
The United States is a stakeholder with interests, too. Some 250,000 Americans died in Asia in the 20th Century. To paraphrase Napoleon, the borders of a nation’s influence are marked by the graves of its soldiers.
We should not abandon our stake for shaky, short-term trade announcements or by degrading alliances into ties of convenience based upon shady accountings of troops, tribute, and trade.

I'll conclude with a direct observation for all of you, leaders in America’s business community: The ground is shifting under your feet.
Your own concerns with China led many of you, perhaps understandably, to pull back.
You then stepped cautiously to avoid President Trump’s wrath—not to mention China’s.
The stakes are higher now. Be alert to greater risks of miscalculations and unintended consequences.
Kevin Rudd—former Prime Minister of Australia, a good friend of the United States, and a close student of China—recently warned: “A fully ‘decoupled world’ would be a deeply destabilizing place, undermining the global growth assumptions of the last 40 years, heralding the return of an iron curtain between East and West and the beginning of a new conventional and nuclear arms race with all its attendant strategic instability and risk.”
Are you ready for this?
You need to decide whether you think the United States can still cooperate with China to mutual benefit while managing differences-- and if so, how.
You need to decide whether U.S. influence can be enhanced through long-term partnerships with allies and partners.
You need to decide whether we should save, update, and even expand the international trading system of openness, rules, and fair settlements of disputes.
You need to decide whether you wish to represent America abroad as purveyors of principles, as well as commerce, treating people from other lands with dignity and respect.
Then you need to make your case—not just with the Administration, but with Congress, Governors, and Mayors; with your employees, customers, and suppliers; with the media and opinion leaders.
When I selected the word “stakeholder” in 2005, I had in mind that stakeholders have interests in a shared enterprise. That interest is worth work, even perseverance, to preserve, adapt, and grow. Only the foolish or faint-hearted just yield or abandon the enterprise.
Cooperation as stakeholders does not mean the absence of differences. Stakeholders compete, too. The management of their differences should take place within a larger framework that offers common benefits.
This can be done.But only with your support and activism. 

Read the full speech here.