英中对照： Jerome Powell\'s speech on Aug 24， 2025

### Full English Transcript of Jerome Powell's Most Recent Speech

The most recent speech by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, as of August 24, 2025, is titled "Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review," delivered on August 22, 2025, at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Here is the complete transcript:

**Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review**  
Jerome H. Powell  
Chair, Federal Reserve Board  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System  
Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium  
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming  
August 22, 2025  

For release on delivery 10:00 a.m. EDT (8:00 a.m. MDT) August 22, 2025  

Over the course of this year, the U.S. economy has shown resilience in a context of sweeping changes in economic policy. In terms of the Fed’s dual-mandate goals, the labor market remains near maximum employment, and inflation, though still somewhat elevated, has come down a great deal from its post-pandemic highs. At the same time, the balance of risks appears to be shifting. In my remarks today, I will first address the current economic situation and the near-term outlook for monetary policy. I will then turn to the results of our second public review of our monetary policy framework, as captured in the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that we released today.  

### Current Economic Conditions and Near-Term Outlook  
When I appeared at this podium one year ago, the economy was at an inflection point. Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year. That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply. Inflation had moved much closer to our objective, and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state. Upside risks to inflation had diminished. But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point, a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions. Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, we recalibrated our policy stance, setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year (figure 1). For example, after the July 2024 employment report, the 3-month average of the unemployment rate had increased more than 0.5 percentage point above its lowest value over the previous 12 months. For more information, see Claudia Sahm (2019), “Direct Stimulus Payments to Individuals,” in Heather Boushey, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, eds., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American Economy (Washington: Hamilton Project and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, May), pp. 67–92, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/AutomaticStabilizers_FullBook_web_20190508.pdf.  

This year, the economy has faced new challenges. Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system. Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth. Over the longer run, changes in tax, spending, and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity. There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be. Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply. In this environment, distinguishing cyclical developments from trend, or structural, developments is difficult. This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes. The labor market is a case in point. The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024 (figure 2). This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago, as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially. But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market—an outcome we want to avoid. The unemployment rate, while edging up in July, stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year. Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly, including quits, layoffs, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and nominal wage growth. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the “breakeven” rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months. Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment. 

At the same time, GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent, roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 (figure 3). The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending. As with the labor market, some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output. Turning to inflation, higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods. Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July. Excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent, above their level a year ago. Within core, prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months, a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024. In contrast, housing services inflation remains on a downward trend, and nonhousing services inflation is still running

- 4 - at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation (figure 4). 4 The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible. We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months, with high uncertainty about timing and amounts. The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem. A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived—a one-time shift in the price level. Of course, “one-time” does not mean “all at once.” It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks. Moreover, tariff rates continue to evolve, potentially prolonging the adjustment process. It is also possible, however, that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed. One possibility is that workers, who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices, demand and get higher wages from employers, setting off adverse wage–price dynamics. Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks, that outcome does not seem likely. Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up, dragging actual inflation with them. Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations, however, as reflected in market- and survey-based measures, 4 Using the consumer price index and other information, an estimate of the contribution of housing services to 12-month core PCE inflation in July was 0.7 percentage point, while core services excluding housing contributed 2.0 percentage points. The contribution from each of these categories remains slightly above its average during the 2002–07 period, during which core PCE inflation averaged about 2 percent. In contrast, the contribution of core goods to 12-month core PCE inflation in July was about 0.25 percentage point, compared with the 2002– 07 average of −0.25 percentage point.

- 5 - appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent. Of course, we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted. Come what may, we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem. Putting the pieces together, what are the implications for monetary policy? In the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside—a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate. Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago, and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance. Nonetheless, with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance. Monetary policy is not on a preset course. 

FOMC members will make these decisions, based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance of risks. We will never deviate from that approach. Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework Turning to my second topic, our monetary policy framework is built on the unchanging foundation of our mandate from Congress to foster maximum employment and stable prices for the American people. We remain fully committed to fulfilling our statutory mandate, and the revisions to our framework will support that mission across a broad range of economic conditions. Our revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as our consensus statement, describes how we pursue our dual-mandate goals. It is designed to give the public a clear sense of how we think about monetary policy, and that understanding is important both for transparency and accountability, and for making monetary policy more effective. The changes we made in this review are a natural progression, grounded in our ever-evolving understanding of our economy. We continue to build upon the initial consensus statement adopted in 2012 under Chair Ben Bernanke’s leadership. Today’s revised statement is the outcome of the second public review of our framework, which we conduct at five- year intervals. This year’s review included three elements: Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, a flagship research conference, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings. 5 In approaching this year’s review, a key objective has been to make sure that our framework is suitable across a broad range of economic conditions. At the same time, the framework needs to evolve with changes in the structure of the economy and our understanding of those changes. The Great Depression presented different challenges from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn are different from the ones we face today. 6 At the time of the last review, we were living in a new normal, characterized by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound (ELB), along with low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve—meaning that inflation was not very responsive to slack in the economy. 7 To me, a statistic that captures that era is that our policy rate was stuck at the ELB for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in late 2008. Many here will recall the sluggish growth and painfully slow recovery of that era. It appeared highly likely that if the economy experienced even a mild downturn, our policy rate would be back at the ELB very quickly, probably for another extended period. Inflation and inflation expectations could then decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned near zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations, triggering an adverse dynamic. The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. 8 The 2020 consensus statement included several features that addressed the ELB-related risks that had become increasingly prominent over the preceding two decades. We emphasized the importance of anchored longer-term inflation expectations to support both our price-stability and maximum-employment goals. Drawing on an extensive literature on strategies to mitigate risks associated with the ELB, we adopted flexible average inflation targeting—a “makeup” strategy to ensure that inflation expectations would remain well anchored even with the ELB constraint. 9 In particular, we said that, following periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time. In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world. Like most other central banks and private-sector analysts, through year-end 2021 we thought that inflation would subside fairly quickly without a sharp tightening in our policy stance (figure 5). 10 When it became clear that this was not the case, we responded forcefully, raising our policy rate by 5.25 percentage points over 16 months. That action, combined with the unwinding of pandemic supply disruptions, contributed to inflation moving much closer to our target without the painful rise in unemployment that has accompanied previous efforts to counter high inflation. 9 See David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66; Michael T. Kiley and John M. Roberts (2017), “Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 317–72, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/kileytextsp17bpea.pdf.

(Note: The transcript appears to end here based on the available content, with no further text provided in the source. Any references to figures are as in the original, but images are not included.)

### Chinese Translation (中文翻译)

以下是演讲稿的完整中文翻译。我力求翻译准确、流畅，并保留原意：

**货币政策与美联储框架审查**  
杰罗姆·H·鲍威尔  
美联储主席  
美联储理事会  
2025年8月22日  
于堪萨斯城联储主办的杰克逊霍尔经济政策研讨会，怀俄明州杰克逊霍尔  

于东部时间上午10:00（山地时间上午8:00）发布，2025年8月22日  

今年，美国经济在经济政策全面变革的背景下展现出韧性。就美联储的双重使命目标而言，劳动力市场仍接近最大就业，通胀虽然仍略微偏高，但已从疫情后高点大幅回落。同时，风险平衡似乎正在转变。在今天的讲话中，我将首先讨论当前经济形势以及货币政策的近期展望。然后，我将讨论我们第二次公开审查货币政策框架的结果，该结果体现在我们今天发布的修订版《长期目标和货币政策策略声明》中。  

### 当前经济状况与近期展望  
一年前，当我站在这个讲台上时，经济正处于拐点。我们的政策利率已维持在5-1/4%至5-1/2%超过一年。这种限制性政策立场有助于降低通胀，并促进总需求与供给之间的可持续平衡。通胀已接近我们的目标，劳动力市场从以前过热的状态冷却下来。通胀上行风险已减弱。但失业率上升了近一个百分点，这种发展历史上仅在衰退之外未曾发生。在随后的三次联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）会议上，我们重新校准了政策立场，为劳动力市场在过去一年中保持平衡接近最大就业奠定了基础（图1）。例如，在2024年7月就业报告后，3个月平均失业率比前12个月的最低值上升了超过0.5个百分点。更多信息，请参阅Claudia Sahm (2019), “Direct Stimulus Payments to Individuals,” in Heather Boushey, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, eds., Recession Ready: Fiscal Policies to Stabilize the American Economy (Washington: Hamilton Project and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, May), pp. 67–92, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/AutomaticStabilizers_FullBook_web_20190508.pdf。  

今年，经济面临新挑战。对贸易伙伴征收的显著更高关税正在重塑全球贸易体系。更严格的移民政策导致劳动力增长突然放缓。从更长期来看，税收、支出和监管政策的变革也可能对经济增长和生产力产生重要影响。这些政策最终将如何落地以及对经济产生何种持久影响存在重大不确定性。贸易和移民政策正在影响需求和供给。在这种环境中，区分周期性发展与趋势或结构性发展很困难。这种区分至关重要，因为货币政策可以稳定周期性波动，但对结构性变革几乎无能为力。劳动力市场就是一个例子。本月早些时候发布的7月就业报告显示，过去三个月薪资就业增长平均仅为每月35,000人，低于2024年的每月168,000人（图2）。这一放缓比一个月前评估的要大得多，因为5月和6月的早期数据大幅下修。但就业增长放缓似乎并未在劳动力市场打开大量闲置——这是我们希望避免的结果。失业率在7月小幅上升，但仍处于历史低水平4.2%，并在过去一年中大致稳定。其他劳动力市场状况指标也几乎未变或仅温和软化，包括辞职、裁员、空缺与失业比率以及名义工资增长。劳动力供给与需求一致软化，大幅降低了保持失业率稳定的“盈亏平衡”就业创造率。事实上，今年劳动力增长因移民急剧减少而大幅放缓，劳动力参与率在最近几个月小幅下降。总体而言，虽然劳动力市场似乎处于平衡，但这是一种奇怪的平衡，由工人供给和需求均显著放缓所致。这种异常情况表明，就业下行风险正在上升。如果这些风险实现，它们可能以大幅更高裁员和上升失业的形式迅速显现。 

同时，今年上半年GDP增长显著放缓至1.2%的速度，大约是2024年2.5%速度的一半（图3）。增长下降主要反映消费者支出放缓。与劳动力市场一样，GDP放缓的部分原因可能反映供给或潜在产出增长放缓。转向通胀，更高关税已开始推高某些类别商品的价格。根据最新可用数据估计，截至7月的12个月内，总PCE价格上涨2.6%。排除波动性大的食品和能源类别，核心PCE价格上涨2.9%，高于一年前水平。在核心中，商品价格在过去12个月上涨1.1%，这与2024年温和下降形成显著转变。相比之下，住房服务通胀仍处于下降趋势，非住房服务通胀仍略高于历史上与2%通胀一致的水平（图4）。4 关税对消费者价格的影响现在清晰可见。我们预计这些影响将在未来几个月积累，时机和金额存在高度不确定性。对于货币政策而言重要的问题是，这些价格上涨是否可能实质性提高持续通胀问题的风险。一个合理的基准情况是，这些影响将是相对短暂的——价格水平的单次转变。当然，“单次”并不意味着“一次性”。关税上涨仍需时间通过供应链和分销网络传导。而且，关税率继续演变，可能延长调整过程。然而，也可能关税的价格上行压力会引发更持久的通胀动态，这是需要评估和管理风险。一个可能性是，工人看到其实际收入因更高价格而下降，向雇主要求并获得更高工资，从而引发不利工资-价格动态。鉴于劳动力市场并不特别紧张并面临增加的下行风险，这种结果似乎不太可能。另一个可能性是通胀预期可能上升，拖累实际通胀随之上升。通胀已超过我们的目标四年多，仍是家庭和企业的突出关切。然而，市场和调查基于的长期通胀预期措施4 使用消费者价格指数和其他信息，7月住房服务对12个月核心PCE通胀的贡献估计为0.7个百分点，而排除住房的核心服务贡献2.0个百分点。这些类别的贡献仍略高于2002–07时期的平均水平，当时核心PCE通胀平均约为2%。相比之下，7月核心商品对12个月核心PCE通胀的贡献约为0.25个百分点，而2002–07平均为−0.25个百分点。

- 5 - 似乎仍保持良好锚定，并与我们2%的长期通胀目标一致。当然，我们不能视通胀预期的稳定性为理所当然。不管发生什么，我们不会允许价格水平的单次增加成为持续通胀问题。将这些拼图组合在一起，对货币政策有何含义？短期内，通胀风险偏向上行，就业风险偏向下行——这是一个挑战性情况。当我们的目标像这样紧张时，我们的框架要求我们平衡双重使命的两侧。我们的政策利率现在比一年前接近中性100个基点，失业率和其他劳动力市场措施的稳定性允许我们在考虑政策立场变革时谨慎行事。尽管如此，随着政策处于限制性领域，基准展望和风险平衡转变可能保证调整我们的政策立场。货币政策并非预设路径。 

FOMC成员将基于他们对数据及其对经济展望和风险平衡的影响的评估，仅做出这些决定。我们永远不会偏离这种方法。货币政策框架的演变 转向我的第二个话题，我们的货币政策框架建立在国会赋予我们促进美国人民最大就业和稳定价格的不变基础之上。我们仍完全致力于履行我们的法定使命，本次框架修订将支持我们在广泛经济条件下的这一使命。我们修订的《长期目标和货币政策策略声明》，我们称之为共识声明，描述了我们如何追求双重使命目标。它旨在向公众清晰传达我们对货币政策的思考，这种理解对于透明度和问责制以及使货币政策更有效都很重要。我们在本次审查中做出的变革是自然进展，基于我们对经济的不断演变理解。我们继续在2012年本·伯南克主席领导下采用的初始共识声明基础上构建。今天修订的声明是我们每五年进行第二次公开框架审查的结果。本次审查包括三个要素：在全国联储银行的Fed Listens活动、一场旗舰研究会议，以及在FOMC会议系列中支持的政策制定者讨论和审议，由工作人员分析支持。5 在接近本次审查时，一个关键目标是确保我们的框架适用于广泛的经济条件。同时，框架需要随着经济结构变革和我们对这些变革的理解而演变。大萧条呈现的不同挑战与大通胀和大缓和不同，后者又与我们今天面临的挑战不同。6 在上次审查时，我们生活在一种新常态中，其特征是利率接近有效下限（ELB），伴随低增长、低通胀和非常平坦的菲利普斯曲线——意味着通胀对经济闲置不太敏感。7 对我来说，一个捕捉那个时代的数据是我们政策利率在2008年末全球金融危机（GFC）爆发后被困在ELB七年之久。这里许多人会回忆那个时代的缓慢增长和痛苦缓慢恢复。似乎极有可能，如果经济经历即使温和衰退，我们的政策利率将很快回到ELB，可能又是一个延长时期。在弱经济中，通胀和通胀预期可能下降，随着名义利率固定在零附近，提高实际利率。更高实际利率将进一步压低就业增长，并强化通胀和通胀预期的下行压力，触发不利动态。将政策利率带到ELB并驱动2020框架变革的经济条件被认为根源于缓慢移动的全球因素，这些因素将持续延长时期——如果不是疫情，本可能如此。8 2020共识声明包括几个特征，应对过去二十年日益突出的ELB相关风险。我们强调锚定长期通胀预期的重要性，以支持我们的价格稳定和最大就业目标。借鉴缓解ELB相关风险策略的广泛文献，我们采用了灵活平均通胀目标——一种“补偿”策略，以确保即使在ELB约束下通胀预期仍保持良好锚定。9 特别是，我们说，在通胀持续低于2%时期后，适当货币政策可能旨在一段时间内实现通胀适度高于2%。事实上，而不是低通胀和ELB，后疫情重开为全球经济带来了40年来最高通胀。与大多数其他央行和私营部门分析师一样，到2021年底，我们认为通胀将在不急剧收紧政策立场的情况下相当快速消退（图5）。10 当清楚这并非如此时，我们有力回应，在16个月内将政策利率提高5.25个百分点。这一行动结合疫情供给中断的解除，有助于通胀接近我们的目标，而没有伴随以往对抗高通胀努力的痛苦失业上升。9 见David Reifschneider and John C. Williams (2000), “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32 (November), pp. 936–66; Michael T. Kiley and John M. Roberts (2017), “Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 317–72, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/kileytextsp17bpea.pdf。

（注：根据可用内容，演讲稿似乎在此结束，没有来源中提供的进一步文本。任何对图表的引用均如原稿，但未包括图像。）