欧洲央行行长 Christine Lagarde 战略评估 经验教训

欧洲央行行长 Christine Lagarde 战略评估 经验教训

战略评估：经验教训

Strategy assessment: lessons learned

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp250630_1~ba0ef03e6f.en.html

Sintra, 30 June 2025  辛特拉

欧洲央行行长克里斯蒂娜·拉加德在欧洲央行2025年中央银行论坛“适应变化：宏观经济转型与政策应对”开幕式上的致辞

正如尼采所说：“我们的未来决定了我们今天的法律。”

四年前，当我们上次回顾我们的战略时，我们的思维方式很自然地受到了近期历史的影响：过去十年的低通胀，以及疫情的冲击。

但正如尼采所警告的那样，让过去主导我们的思维是危险的。有时，正是我们对未来——尽管我们对此仍知之甚少——正在塑造我们的现在。

在那次评估之后不久，世界发生了我们未曾预料到的变化。

疫情过后，各国经济重启，带来了重大的行业转型。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰引发了能源市场的根本性转变。

地缘政治格局被颠覆，重塑了全球贸易。劳动力市场的结构性变化日益明显——这主要受人口结构变化、技术转型和工人偏好变化的驱动。

鉴于所有这些发展，我们战略的基本面依然保持良好——理应如此，因为一个健全的战略必须能够应对不断变化的环境。

事实证明，我们2%的对称通胀目标能够有效地稳定预期，即使在近代经济史上一些最严重、最持久的冲击中也是如此。

我们的中期导向为吸收巨大冲击提供了必要的灵活性——有助于降低通货紧缩给经济带来的总体成本，同时仍能使通胀及时回升至目标水平。

因此，我们认为无需重新审视这些核心支柱——正因如此，我们将刚刚完成的这项工作称为战略评估而非回顾。

我们工作的核心主题是更新框架，以便货币政策能够在我们面临的新型冲击面前继续保持价格稳定。

今晚，在不低估其他经验教训的情况下，我想强调这项工作得出的三个关键结论。

它们涉及新环境的性质、我们如何评估由此产生的风险，以及我们如何调整反应函数以维护新世界中的价格稳定。

不断变化的环境

最近几周，一个词主导了公众辩论：不确定性。

这是我们战略评估得出的首批关键结论之一：未来的世界更加不确定——而且这种不确定性可能会使通胀更加波动。

首先，我们看到明显的迹象表明，供给冲击正在变得更加频繁。

欧洲央行工作人员基于模型的分析表明，在近期通胀飙升期间，此类冲击在推动通胀方面发挥的作用远超过去二十年。即使在今天，供给侧力量仍在双向产生通胀风险。

其次，我们看到越来越多的证据表明，更频繁的供应中断导致企业更频繁地调整价格，从而加剧了通胀波动。

这并非简单地从近期冲击中推断出来。相反，它反映了企业在持续较高的不确定性条件下运营方式的结构性转变。

研究表明，在这种环境下，企业往往会对冲击（尤其是供应冲击）做出更快的反应，以防范未来潜在的损失。[1] 与此同时，它们更有可能采取更灵活的定价策略，这意味着价格不仅可能对重大冲击做出反应，也可能对较小的摩擦和局部扰动做出反应。[2]

第三，如果通胀波动加剧，我们可能会看到价格两端都呈现非线性。

在我们上一次的战略评估中，我们正确地关注了长期过低通胀环境下出现的非线性动态——利率最终会被推至其有效下限。这种限制反过来又会加剧通胀预期，并有可能造成一个自我实现的低通胀陷阱。我们对再次出现下行通胀冲击的可能性保持警惕。

但近期经验也揭示了上行方面也存在非线性因素。

由于企业通常提价速度快于降价速度，更频繁的价格调整意味着通胀可能会因大幅上行冲击而迅速上升。如果工资只是逐渐适应这些价格上涨——正如我们近年来所看到的那样——那么随着工资增长缓慢跟上，通胀可能会在更长时间内保持在目标水平之上。这反过来又会增加通胀预期在上行过程中脱锚的风险。[3]

评估风险分布

接下来的问题是：如果经济环境变得更加动荡，我们如何才能确保我们的经济

评估是否更稳健？

巨大的冲击可能引发反馈回路和非线性效应，这必然会导致更广泛的可能结果。在一个不确定性更高的世界里，用替代风险情景来增强基线预测就显得尤为重要。

正因如此，我们评估的第二个关键结论是，货币政策需要采用系统性但又因地制宜的方法，将风险和不确定性纳入考量。

欧洲央行多年来一直运用情景分析和敏感性分析——自全球金融危机以来，欧洲央行一直在部署内部情景分析，并在疫情期间首次发布。

但我们近年来的经验凸显了情景分析在高度不确定时期的特殊优势。

一个明显的例子是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰及其造成的能源价格冲击。在这种情况下，情景分析提供的洞见是我们基线预测和围绕基线进行的标准敏感性分析都无法完全捕捉到的。

例如，在2022年3月——入侵发生仅几周后——我们根据市场隐含的能源期货价格，基线预测当年通胀率约为5%。敏感性分析显示通胀率略高，约为5.5%。相比之下，乌克兰战争情景已预示通胀率将超过7%，接近最终的年度8%以上。

与此同时，事后看来，发布情景分析有时可能有助于我们的政策制定和沟通。

例如，2021年疫苗接种速度和疫情后重启的性质存在高度不确定性，包括欧元区乃至全球商品和服务行业的供需变化。[4]

情景分析本可以帮助说明可能的通胀结果范围异常广泛，并降低向公众传递虚假确定性的风险。

因此，我们更新后的战略致力于确保我们的政策决策不仅考虑最可能的通胀和经济走势，还考虑相关的风险和不确定性，包括通过恰当运用情景分析和敏感性分析。

反应函数

那么，如果我们知道未来的道路可能更加不确定，我们的反应函数应该是什么呢？

在我们上次的战略评估中，我们明确承认了有效下限带来的风险。我们的战略声明呼吁，当政策利率接近下限时，应采取“特别有力或持续”的行动。

这种“不对称”的关注点源于政策空间的不对称及其可能产生的下行通胀偏差。面对巨大的通货紧缩冲击，下限持续制约着货币政策。

但近期通胀飙升揭示了上行非线性——随之而来的是，需要一个双侧反应函数，无论是在力度方面还是在持续性方面。这是我们战略评估的第三个关键结论。

这不是针对小幅或暂时的偏差做出反应，而是对可能在任一方向上脱锚通胀预期的通胀动态做出对称的承诺。

当通货紧缩冲击有可能将政策利率推向下限时，尽早采取有力行动有助于最大限度地缩短接近该约束的时间。同样，当通胀超调加剧了频繁价格调整和分阶段工资反应之间形成反馈回路的风险时，一开始就采取有力的紧缩措施是稳定预期的关键。

我们以前所未有的速度进行了历史上最大的加息，开启了最近的政策周期。我们的分析表明，如果我们没有采取行动，通胀预期脱锚的可能性在2022年和2023年将超过30%。[5]

同时，这一政策周期也为最佳政策路径提供了新的视角。

我们上次战略评估的一个洞见是，当利率接近下限时，坚持可以取代强硬——有助于以更少的副作用实施必要的政策立场。然而，直到最近，这一概念才被广泛应用于紧缩周期。

通常情况下，强力紧缩政策会呈现倒V型走势——先快速加息，随后相对迅速降息。但随着利率进一步下行，进一步紧缩的成本和副??作用也会随之增大。

此时，将重点从强力转向持久性可能成为最佳选择——即使原则上没有限制政策空间的上限。

模型模拟支持这一观点：强力和持久性可以相互替代，两者都能够实现必要的通货紧缩。但与持续加息相比，持久性尤其有助于限制经济和金融稳定成本。

这已在我们的自身经验中得到证实。当我们

在我所说的“维持阶段”之后，我们更加重视持续性维度。[6] 这使得通货紧缩进程得以稳步推进，而所谓的“牺牲率”与以往的通货紧缩时期相比仍处于历史低位。[7]

基于这一经验，管理委员会认为，其应对机制的最佳描述是“需要采取适当有力或持续的货币政策行动，以应对通胀在任何一个方向上持续大幅偏离目标的情况”。

为此，我们所有的工具仍然在我们的工具箱中。但“适当”一词至关重要，因为它强调了工具的选择以及我们使用它们的强度必须体现比例。

结论

最后，我来总结一下。

我们的战略评估一直在不断演变，而非革命——事实上，其中的许多结论已经反映在我们当前的政策行为中。

面对近期的通胀冲击，我们最初采取了强有力的措施，随后则持续采取行动，力求尽快将通胀率控制在目标水平，同时尽可能避免痛苦。

情景分析正在帮助我们更好地理解未来的各种风险，以及如何以最佳方式应对这些风险。

例如，我们对潜在美国进口关税的情景分析帮助我们应对了充满不确定性的全球贸易格局，同时也使我们能够更清晰地传达影响我们当前货币政策立场的双重风险。

在6月份的上一次货币政策新闻发布会上，我将我们的货币政策立场描述为“处于良好状态”。

在完成本次战略评估后，我想补充一点，我们的货币政策战略也处于良好状态——经验不断强化，并更有能力应对未来的挑战。

用尼采的话来总结一下：“知道为什么而活的人，几乎可以承受任何生存方式。”

即使我们周围的世界发生了变化，我们也清楚自己的目标。我们将竭尽所能实现这一目标——确保欧洲人民的价格稳定。

Kase, H. 和 Rigato, R. (2025)，《欧元区的货币政策、供给冲击和投入产出联系》，油印本。

Arndt, S. 和 Enders, Z. (2024)，《不同通胀制度下的供给冲击传导》，工作论文系列，第938号，法国央行，1月；Khalil, M. 和 Lewis, V. (2024)，《不确定时期的产品周转率和内生价格灵活性》，经济政策研究中心讨论论文系列，第18941号，巴黎和伦敦，3月22日。

Lagarde, C. (2025)，《新时代的稳健战略》，在由歌德大学货币与金融稳定研究所主办的第25届“欧洲央行及其观察者”会议上的演讲，法兰克福，3月12日。

Lagarde, C. (2021)，《非典型复苏时期的货币政策》，在9月28日法兰克福举行的欧洲央行中央银行论坛“超越疫情：货币政策的未来”上的演讲。

Christoffel, K. 和 Farkas, M. (2025)，《管理通胀预期脱锚的风险》，欧洲央行工作论文系列，即将出版。

拉加德，C. (2024)，《构建对未来道路的信心》，在欧洲央行及其观察员第24届会议上的演讲，该会议由法兰克福歌德大学货币与金融稳定研究所主办，美因河畔法兰克福，3月20日。

德意志联邦银行 (2024)，《全球通货紧缩进程及其成本》，《月报》，7月。

Strategy assessment: lessons learned

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp250630_1~ba0ef03e6f.en.html

Sintra, 30 June 2025

Introductory speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the opening reception of the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2025 "Adapting to change: macroeconomic shifts and policy responses"

As Nietzsche once observed, “it is our future that lays down the law of our today.”

When we last reviewed our strategy four years ago, our thinking was shaped – quite naturally – by the recent past: a decade of too-low inflation, compounded by the pandemic.

But as Nietzsche warned, there is a danger in letting the past dominate our thinking. Sometimes, it is the future – still dimly understood – that is already shaping our present.

And soon after that review, the world changed in ways we had not foreseen.

The reopening of our economies after the pandemic brought about major sectoral shifts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a fundamental shift in energy markets.

The geopolitical landscape was upended, reshaping global trade. And structural changes in labour markets became increasingly apparent – driven by demographics, technological transformation, and evolving worker preferences.

Given all these developments, the fundamentals of our strategy have held up well – as they should, because a sound strategy must be robust to a changing environment.

Our symmetric 2% inflation target has proven effective in anchoring expectations – even through some of the most severe and persistent shocks in recent economic history.

And our medium-term orientation has provided essential flexibility to absorb an extremely large shock – helping to reduce the overall cost of disinflation to the economy, while still enabling a timely return of inflation to target.

We therefore saw no need to revisit these core pillars – which is why we refer to the exercise we have just concluded as a strategy assessment rather than a review.

The central theme of our work has been to update the framework so that monetary policy can continue to deliver price stability in the face of the new types of shocks we are confronting.

This evening, without downplaying the other lessons learned, I would like to highlight three key conclusions that have emerged from this work.

They concern the nature of the new environment, how we assess the risks that arise from it, and how we have adjusted our reaction function to safeguard price stability in this new world.

The changing environment

One word has dominated the public debate in recent weeks: uncertainty.

And this is one of the first key conclusions from our strategy assessment: the world ahead is more uncertain – and that uncertainty is likely to make inflation more volatile.

First, we see clear signs that supply shocks are becoming more frequent.

Model-based analysis by ECB staff shows that, during the recent inflation surge, such shocks played a much greater role in driving inflation than they had over the previous two decades. And even today, supply-side forces continue to generate inflation risks in both directions.

Second, we see mounting evidence that more regular supply disruptions are leading firms to adjust prices more frequently – thereby contributing to greater inflation volatility.

This is not simply an extrapolation from the most recent shock. Rather, it reflects a structural shift in how firms operate under conditions of permanently higher uncertainty.

Research shows that, in such an environment, firms tend to react more quickly to shocks – especially supply ones – in order to protect against potential future losses.[1] At the same time, they are more likely to adopt more flexible pricing strategies, which means prices may respond not just to major shocks, but also to smaller frictions and local disruptions.[2]

Third, if inflation becomes more volatile, we could see non-linearities on both sides.

In our last strategy review, we rightly focused on the non-linear dynamics that emerge in a prolonged environment of too-low inflation – where interest rates are eventually pushed to their effective lower bound. That constraint can, in turn, feed into inflation expectations and risk creating a self-fulfilling low-inflation trap. And we remain alert to the possibility of renewed downside inflation shocks.

But recent experience has also revealed non-linearities on the upside.

Since firms are generally quicker to raise prices than to lower them, more frequent price adjustments mean inflation can rise quickly in response to large upside shocks. If wages then adjust only gradually to these price increases – as we saw in recent years – inflation may remain above target for longer as wage growth slowly catches up. This, in turn, can raise the risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring on the upside.[3]

Assessing the distribution of risks

The next question that follows is: if the economic environment becomes more volatile, how can we make our economic assessment more robust?

Large shocks can trigger feedback loops and non-linear effects that inherently give rise to a broader range of possible outcomes. In a world of higher uncertainty, it is all the more important to augment the baseline with alternative risk scenarios.

This is why the second key conclusion of our assessment is the need for monetary policy to take into account risks and uncertainty, using a systematic but context-specific approach.

The ECB has used both scenario and sensitivity analysis for many years – deploying internal scenarios since the global financial crisis and publishing them for the first time during the pandemic.

But our experience in recent years has underscored the particular strength of scenario analysis in times of elevated uncertainty.

A clear example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy price shock. In that case, scenarios provided insights that neither our baseline projections nor standard sensitivity analyses around the baseline could fully capture.

For instance, in March 2022 – just a few weeks after the invasion – our baseline projected inflation at around 5% for that year, based on market-implied energy futures. The sensitivity analysis suggested a slightly higher figure of about 5.5%. In contrast, the Ukraine war scenario already pointed to inflation exceeding 7% – close to the final annual figure of over 8%.

At the same time, there were moments when – in hindsight – publishing scenarios could have supported both our policymaking and our communication.

One example was the high uncertainty in 2021 about the speed of vaccine rollout and the nature of post-pandemic reopening, including the sectoral shifts in supply and demand across goods and services sectors, both in the euro area and globally.[4]

Scenario analysis could have helped in illustrating that the range of possible inflation outcomes was unusually wide – and reduced the risk of projecting false certainty to the public.

This is why our updated strategy commits to ensuring that our policy decisions account not only for the most likely path of inflation and the economy, but also for the surrounding risks and uncertainty – including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analyses.

The reaction function

So what should our reaction function be, if we know that the road ahead is likely to be more uncertain?

In our last strategy review, we explicitly acknowledged the risks posed by the effective lower bound. Our strategy statement called for “especially forceful or persistent” action when policy rates are close to the lower bound.

This “asymmetric” focus was grounded in the asymmetry of policy space and the downward inflation bias it can produce. The lower bound continues to constrain monetary policy in the face of large disinflationary shocks.

But the recent inflation surge has revealed upside non-linearities – and with them, the need for a two-sided reaction function, both in terms of forcefulness or persistence. This is the third key conclusion of our strategy assessment.

This is not about reacting to small or temporary deviations, but about a symmetric commitment to respond to inflation dynamics that could de-anchor inflation expectations in either direction.

When disinflationary shocks risk pushing policy rates towards the lower bound, acting forcefully early on helps minimise the time spent near that constraint. Likewise, when inflation overshoots raise the risk of a feedback loop between frequent price adjustments and staggered wage responses, forceful tightening at the outset is key to anchoring expectations.

We began our recent policy cycle with historically large rate hikes delivered at an unprecedented pace. Our analysis shows that, had we not acted, the probability of inflation expectations de-anchoring would have exceeded 30% in 2022 and 2023.[5]

At the same time, this policy cycle also offered new perspectives on optimal policy paths.

One insight from our last strategy review was that, when rates are near the lower bound, persistence can substitute for forcefulness – helping to deliver the necessary policy stance with fewer side effects. Until recently, however, this concept had not been widely applied to tightening cycles.

Typically, forceful tightening follows an inverted V-shape – with rapid rate increases followed by relatively swift cuts. But as rates move deeper into restrictive territory, the costs and side effects of further tightening also grow.

At that point, it can become optimal to shift the focus from forcefulness to persistence – even if, in principle, there is no upper bound constraining policy space.

Model simulations support this insight: forcefulness and persistence can act as substitutes, both capable of delivering the necessary disinflation. But persistence, in particular, can help limit the economic and financial stability costs compared with continued rate increases.

This was borne out in our own experience. When we entered what I described as the “holding phase”, we placed greater weight on the persistence dimension.[6] This allowed the disinflation process to advance at a steady pace, while the so-called “sacrifice ratio” remained historically low compared with previous disinflation episodes.[7]

Reflecting this experience, the Governing Council considers that its reaction function is best described as requiring “appropriately forceful or persistent monetary policy action in response to large, sustained deviations of inflation from the target in either direction.”

To this end, all our instruments remain available in our toolkit. But the word “appropriately” is important, as it underscores that the choice of instruments, and the intensity with which we use them, must reflect proportionality.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

Our strategy assessment has been an exercise in evolution, not revolution – and in fact, many of its conclusions are already reflected in our current policy conduct.

We responded to the recent inflation shock with initially forceful and then persistent action, aiming to steer inflation back to target as swiftly as necessary, but as painlessly as possible.

And scenario analysis is helping us to better understand the range of risks ahead – and how best to respond to them.

For example, our scenarios on potential US import tariffs have helped us navigate an uncertain global trade landscape, while also enabling us to communicate more clearly the two-sided risks shaping our current monetary policy stance.

At our last monetary policy press conference in June, I described our monetary policy stance as being “in a good place”.

Following the conclusion of this strategy assessment, I would add that our monetary policy strategy is also in a good place – strengthened by experience, and better equipped for the challenges of the future.

To close the circle with Nietzsche: “he who has a why to live can bear almost any how.”

Even as the world changes around us, we know our purpose. And we will do whatever is necessary to deliver on it – ensuring price stability for the people of Europe.

1. Kase, H. and Rigato, R. (2025), “Monetary Policy, Supply Shocks, and Input-Output Linkages in the Euro Area”, mimeo.

2. Arndt, S. and Enders, Z. (2024), “The Transmission of Supply Shocks in Different Inflation Regimes”, Working Paper Series, No 938, Banque de France, January; Khalil, M. and Lewis, V. (2024), “Product turnover and endogenous price flexibility in uncertain times”, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No 18941, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Paris and London, 22 March.

3. Lagarde, C. (2025), “A robust strategy for a new era”, speech at the 25th “ECB and Its Watchers” conference organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 12 March.

4. Lagarde, C. (2021), “Monetary policy during an atypical recovery”, speech at the ECB Forum on Central Banking “Beyond the pandemic: the future of monetary policy”, Frankfurt am Main, 28 September.

5. Christoffel, K. and Farkas, M. (2025), “Managing the risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations”, Working Paper Series, ECB, forthcoming.

6. Lagarde, C. (2024), “Building confidence in the path ahead”, speech at The ECB and its Watchers XXIV Conference, organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 20?March.

7. Deutsche Bundesbank (2024), “The global disinflation process and its costs”, Monthly Report, July.