风萧萧_Frank
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美国面临的威胁日益严重，而我们却准备不足。以下是解决这一问题的方法
作者：简·哈曼， 埃里克·埃德尔曼 08/01/24
美国面临的国家安全威胁与冷战甚至第二次世界大战高峰时期一样严重，而且更加复杂。我们今天还没有准备好应对这些威胁，而且可能很快就会发现自己陷入了一场跨多个战区的战争，与实力相当甚至接近实力相当的对手作战，我们可能会输掉这场战争。
这是我们主持的国会成立的一个委员会的主要发现，该委员会旨在审查 2022 年发布的当前国防战略。我们两党一致的建议列出了现在避免这种结果所需的步骤。
我们的国家已经失去了数十年来无可争议的军事主导地位，尤其是在西太平洋。中国的军事和工业实力可与我们匹敌，甚至在某些方面超越了我们。俄罗斯的网络和太空能力旨在阻止或阻止我们干涉其在西太平洋的侵略行动。
尽管在乌克兰遭受损失，俄罗斯还是通过全面的战时动员实现了转型，并对北约构成威胁。中国和俄罗斯建立了“无限制”伙伴关系，并拥抱了流氓国家伊朗和朝鲜。俄罗斯获得了继续在乌克兰战斗的手段；伊朗和朝鲜将获得武器和专业知识，以及外交和经济保护。这四个国家都试图对抗美国的影响力，他们的结盟带来了真正的风险，即三个战场中的任何一个战场上的冲突都可能演变成一场全球战争。
所有这些都发生在国防部难以满足当前需求的时候。正如乌克兰所表明的那样，我们正在努力生产一场有限战争所需的武器和装备，更不用说我们可能很快面临的全面冲突了。我们的委员会建议采取一种新方法，更多地使用商用技术，充分拥抱我们的盟友和合作伙伴，并增加对制造能力和工业劳动力的投资。
尽管国防部的改革很难，但还不够。要匹敌中国的力量，需要采取全面综合的方法，涉及国家力量的所有要素：美国军方的力量与我们一流的创新基础的真正伙伴关系，以及外交、经济投资、网络安全、贸易、教育、工业能力、公民参与和国际合作方面的协调努力。
这一战略在冷战期间取得了成功，但自那以后，我们执行这一战略的能力就萎缩了。我们要求军方用太少的资源做太多的事情，让新的威胁不断积累，也让我们政府的其他部门低估了自己在国家安全中的作用。
也有亮点。拜登政府扩大和加强了北约，并加强了与太平洋沿岸盟友和伙伴的关系。这一点至关重要，因为没有盟友，美国就无法遏制或赢得未来的战争。通过资助和更好的信息共享、合作的工业关系和军事出口来加强盟友，既有助于盟友，也有助于我们。
我们的商业部门是另一个巨大的战略优势。它在军事创新方面迅速超越了国防部，包括人工智能、机器人技术和自主性。然而，国防部的文化仍然依赖于内部研发和几十年前的平台，这些平台更适合昨天的战争。乌克兰正在迅速将新技术与旧系统整合在一起——只需几周，而不是几年。俄罗斯已经吸取了这一教训；我们也必须吸取教训。
更好的技术意味着我们不需要将潜在对手的平台与平台相匹配，但美国的军事结构仍然不足。由于政策决定和招募不足，美国军队是几代人以来规模最小的。国防战略呼吁一支能够在一个战区作战并在其他战区遏制侵略的部队，这种做法已经过时了。我们已经卷入了欧洲和中东的战争，来自中国的威胁更大。
我们建议建立一支联合部队，能够同时保卫国土、带领盟友遏制中国，并带领盟友和合作伙伴遏制俄罗斯和伊朗。这要求我们在军事、外交和经济方面具有全球影响力，包括在全球南方，中国和俄罗斯在我们相对缺席的情况下正在获得影响力。
如果没有美国人民的支持，这一切都不可能实现，他们大多不知道也没有准备好应对我们面临的危险，包括美国本土不再是避难所或免受攻击。最终，公众将不得不承担所需的费用。
我们的国家安全预算必须比国防更广泛，包括国务院、财政部、国土安全部、商务部、教育部和其他部门的关键任务。我们还必须更明智地花钱，而不是
只是花更多的钱。这包括撤出不适合未来战争的遗产，并通过继续决议退出执政。
为了克服冷战的威胁，美国至少将 GDP 的 4.9% 用于国防。今天，我们的国防支出占 GDP 的 3%，我们用于偿还债务利息的支出比国防支出还多。我们的委员会一致建议通过增加收入和改革福利支出来支付额外支出。
美国需要一种新的国家权力方法，以保持其在世界上的地位，并威慑并在必要时击败我们的对手。我们的委员会向国会和白宫推荐了这些变化，我们敦促总统竞选团队就我们面临的威胁以及如何应对这些威胁进行严肃的公开对话。紧急改变和增加支出是困难的；输掉一场战争会更糟糕。
简·哈曼 (Jane Harman) 担任国家国防战略委员会主席。她曾九届担任加利福尼亚州第 36 区众议院议员。埃里克·埃德尔曼是该委员会的副主席。他曾任驻土耳其和芬兰大使以及国防部政策部副部长。
美国滑向“大国战争”预期需警惕
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317301.shtml?
张家栋 2024年8月3日 复旦大学美国研究中心教授 bizopinion@globaltimes.com.cn
美国国防战略委员会最近发布了一份关于2022年美国国防战略（NDS）的报告。报告强调NDS“过时”，美国军队结构不正确，国家工业基础“严重不足”，并声称这些缺陷使其无法同时应对“俄罗斯和中国”的双重威胁。报告提出了“全要素动员”的解决方案，呼吁加强美军在多战区作战的战备能力。
兰德公司的信息显示，美国国防战略委员会是根据美国2022财年国防授权法案成立的，主席是前众议院情报委员会高级成员，并得到兰德公司的分析和行政支持。因此，这份报告虽然不是美国政府的正式文件，但由于其代表了两党，仍然具有重要的参考价值。具体来说，这份报告和美国官员在过去两年中的一些其他行动和言论，揭示了美国政策的几条主线。
首先，美国军事战略有可能从和平预期转向战争预期。冷战结束后，美国对两场同时发生的地区冲突有着长期的应对计划，而不是与大国开战的预期。基于这些考虑，美国打造了一支高度先进、机动灵活的军事力量，强调全球部署和介入能力而非长期作战能力。但随着俄乌冲突长期化的趋势，美国正在改变和调整此前的军事战略，更倾向于为“大国战争”做准备。
其次，美国进一步调整对中俄的态度。在俄乌冲突之初，美国战略界倾向于区分中俄，避免在战略层面把中俄推到一起。但自2023年底以来，美国战略界出现了将中俄视为几乎单一威胁的趋势。今年，美国前任和现任印太司令都发表了类似言论。一方面，这表明美国试图通过展示其对内对外“两线作战”的无畏姿态来塑造其依然强大的形象；另一方面也表明华盛顿试图通过强行将中俄挂钩、夸大相关“威胁”来促进西方内部团结。
第三，试图以战争预期带动美国制造业复苏。在这份报告中，美国国防战略委员会特别关注国防工业的恢复和发展。客观地说，和平时期国防制造业一般都处于相对低迷的状态，与满足战时需求所需的“全速”状态自然无法相比。因此，美国国防战略委员会所谓美国国防工业不足以满足“大国冲突需求”的说法，是故意装傻。
第四，报告旨在促进国内民族团结。以此报告为最新例证，美国一些政客不断强调跨党派、跨阶级动员的重要性，甚至借所谓“大国战争预期”来推动美国社会的共识与团结。在美国社会分裂和政治两极分化加剧的背景下，他们自以为找到了一条快速团结国家的“捷径”，但实际上，他们可能将自己置于危险境地，最终可能面临严重的反弹。
第五，表明华盛顿可能正在重新评估来自俄罗斯的军事威胁。该报告认为，当前的美国国防战略“低估了来自俄罗斯的威胁”，并建议增加美国在欧洲的军事部署。在俄乌冲突持续的背景下，这些发现表明，美国一些人可能试图提升俄罗斯在美国国家安全战略中的优先级，强调来自俄罗斯的威胁是统一国内和外交政策共识的手段。
简而言之，该报告建议增加对与中国和俄罗斯潜在冲突的军事预期和准备。它提出，美国将需要做出重大改变和投资，甚至可能是“战时动员”。目前尚不清楚这些建议将如何纳入美国官方政策中
虽然这一报告可能引起争议，但从该报告的两党立场以及近年来美国国内政界人士的类似表态来看，我们应保持警惕。我们必须警惕美国这些表态中隐含的战争隐患，做好舆论引导和战略部署。我们必须保持定力，警惕落入美国国内极端反华势力的陷阱，防止他们的极端言论成为现实。
中美关系作为全球最重要的双边关系，不会轻易陷入个别美国政客试图挑起的“新冷战”甚至“热战”。两国关系的复杂性和国际环境的不断变化，导致中美关系中存在着多种声音。中国必须时刻警惕一些极端声音所暴露出的危险动向，比如华盛顿一些人所鼓吹的“大国战争”预期进一步转向。同时，我们要把握大局，不被极端言论带偏，继续推动中美关系朝着积极的方向发展。
纵观世界历史，许多冲突或战争往往是由误判或误算引发的。美国国内不少人不断鼓吹对华强硬立场，试图在这个问题上形成某种战略共识，但实际上，美国国内对如何处理对华关系的声音仍然多元且具有可塑性。我们要继续争取那些理性的进步力量，同时对极端激进的言论保持警惕和批判。
委员会就美国面临的威胁发出严重警告
08/02/2024
国会委托的一个委员会的领导人表示，需要“采取重大而紧急的行动”来让美国为今天面临的国家安全威胁做好准备。
“我们的委员会一致认为，对美国国家安全和我们利益的威胁比二战以来的任何时候都大，也比冷战时期更加复杂，”美国国防战略委员会主席简·哈曼和副主席埃里克·埃德尔曼在参议院军事委员会的书面证词中表示。
该委员会还表示，陆军规模太小，无法完成其控制对手和增强联合部队能力的任务。 “乌克兰战争的教训表明，美国陆军需要在关键领域扩大其部队结构——特别是防空、反无人机系统、电子战和远程火力——这些领域适用于所有战区，包括西太平洋应急行动，”委员会在报告中表示。
此外，“公众不知道威胁有多大，也没有动员起来应对，”哈曼 7 月 30 日告诉委员会。“公众支持对于实施我们需要做出的改变至关重要。两党和政府的领导人都需要向公众说明情况并获得他们的支持。”
哈曼曾任国会议员，领导伍德罗·威尔逊国际学者中心 10 年。她曾担任中央情报局、国家情报局局长、国防部、国土安全部和国务院的顾问委员会成员。
该委员会建议五角大楼和其他政府机构“从根本上改变”其工作方式，同时敦促美国全面拥抱其合作伙伴和盟友，并更好地与私营部门技术进行整合。
委员会的几名成员曾在 2018 年国防战略委员会任职，该委员会敲响了美国正在失去决定性军事优势的警钟，该委员会的联合主席埃德尔曼说。“六年后，威胁更加严重，我们未能跟上步伐，”他说。
埃德尔曼曾任美国驻芬兰和土耳其大使，现任战略与预算评估中心顾问。他之前还曾在国务院、国防部和白宫担任高级职务。
哈曼和埃德尔曼警告说，可能会发生“近期战争，也可能会失败”，并指出中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜之间的伙伴关系是“我们尚未考虑到的重大战略转变”。
哈曼和埃德尔曼表示，中国被国防部领导人称为美国的“步调挑战”，而中国“在某些方面超越了美国”。
“中国的网络能力、太空资产、不断增长的战略力量和全面现代化的常规力量旨在阻止美国介入台湾海峡或南海或东海，”他们说。“中国已经渗透到我们的关键基础设施网络中，通过争夺我们的后勤、破坏电力和水资源，以及以其他方式夺走美国在国内长期享有的庇护所，来阻止或阻止美国的行动。”
委员会表示，俄罗斯在入侵乌克兰后重新崛起，也继续构成威胁。他们说，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京“寻求重新确立俄罗斯的大国地位，并乐于破坏世界稳定。”
哈曼和埃德尔曼表示，国防部不能也不应该自己提供国防。 “需要采取一种真正‘全要素’的方法来协调和利用国防部、其他行政部门、政府和私营部门的资源。
US faces growing threats, and we're woefully unprepared. Here's how to fix that.
BY JANE HARMAN AND ERIC EDELMAN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 08/01/24
The national security threats against the U.S. are as significant as and more complex than they were at the height of the Cold War or even World War II. We are not prepared to meet these threats today and could, in very short order, find ourselves in a war across multiple theaters with peer and near-peer adversaries that we could lose.
This is the key finding of a commission established by Congress, which we chaired, to review the current National Defense Strategy, published in 2022. Our bipartisan, unanimous recommendations lay out the steps needed now to avoid this outcome.
Our country has lost its decades-long uncontested military dominance, especially in the Western Pacific. China’s military and industrial strength rivals and in some ways outpaces our own. Its cyber and space capabilities are designed to deter or prevent us from interfering with its aggressive actions in the Western Pacific.
Despite losses in Ukraine, Russia has transformed itself through a full wartime mobilization and threatens NATO. China and Russia have forged a “no-limits” partnership and they have embraced rogue states Iran and North Korea. Russia receives the means to keep fighting in Ukraine; Iran and North Korea stand to gain weapons and expertise, along with diplomatic and economic protection. All four states seek to counter U.S. influence and their alignment presents a real risk that conflict in any of their three theaters would become a global war.
All this comes when the Department of Defense is struggling to meet current demands. As Ukraine demonstrates, we’re straining to produce the weapons and equipment needed for one limited war, let alone the all-out conflict we could soon face. Our commission recommends a new approach, greater use of commercially available technology, fully embracing our allies and partners, and an increased investment in manufacturing capacity and our industrial workforce.
Change at the Defense Department, as hard as that is, will not be enough. Matching China’s strength requires a fully integrated approach involving all elements of national power: the strength of the U.S. military in true partnership with our first-class innovation base, plus a coordinated effort involving diplomacy, economic investment, cybersecurity, trade, education, industrial capacity, civic engagement and international cooperation.
This strategy was successful in the Cold War but since then our ability to execute it has atrophied. We have asked the military to do too much with too little, allowed new threats to accumulate, and allowed other elements of our government to under-prioritize their own role in national security.
There are bright spots. The Biden administration has expanded and strengthened NATO and enhanced relationships with allies and partners across the Pacific. This is critical as the U.S. cannot deter or win future wars without our allies. Strengthening them, through funding and better information sharing, cooperative industrial relationships and military exports, helps them and us.
Our commercial sector is another enormous strategic advantage. It rapidly outpaces the Defense Department at military innovation, including AI, robotics and autonomy. Yet the Defense Department’s culture still relies on internal research and development and decades-old platforms better suited to yesterday’s wars. Ukraine is integrating new technology rapidly with older systems — on the order of weeks, not years. Russia has learned this lesson; we must as well.
Better technology means we need not match our potential adversaries platform to platform, but still the U.S. force structure is insufficient. The U.S. military is the smallest it has been in generations due to policy decisions and recruitment shortfalls. The National Defense Strategy is outdated in calling for a force able to fight in one theater and deter aggression elsewhere. We are already involved in wars in Europe and the Middle East, with a larger threat looming from China.
We recommend a Joint Force able to simultaneously defend the homeland, lead allies in deterring China, and spearhead allies and partners to keep Russia and Iran in check. This demands a worldwide presence — military, diplomatic and economic — including across the Global South, where China and Russia are gaining influence in our relative absence.
None of this is possible without the support of the American people, who are largely unaware and unprepared for the dangers we face, including that the U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary or immune from attack. Ultimately, the public will have to shoulder the cost of what is needed.
Our national security budgets must be broader than Defense and include the critical missions at the departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Education and others. We also must spend smarter, not just spend more. That includes divesting from legacy ill-suited to future warfare and quitting governing through continuing resolutions.
To overcome the threats of the Cold War, the U.S. spent at minimum 4.9 percent of GDP on defense. Today, we are at 3 percent of GDP and we spend more servicing the interest on debt than we do on defense. On a unanimous basis, our commission recommends paying for additional spending by raising revenues and reforming entitlement spending.
A new approach to national power is needed for the United States to retain its position in the world and deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries. Our commission recommends these changes to Congress and the White House and we urge both presidential campaigns to conduct a serious public conversation about the threats we face and how to deal with them. Urgent change and increased spending are difficult; losing a war would be far worse.
Jane Harman chairs the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. She represented California’s 36th District in the House of Representatives for nine terms. Eric Edelman is the vice chair of the Commission. He was previously ambassador to Turkey and Finland and under secretary of Defense for Policy.
US sliding toward the expectation of a "great power war" requires vigilance
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317301.shtml?
By Zhang JiadongPublished: Aug 03, 2024
A recent report on the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) was released by the US National Defense Strategy Commission. The report highlighted that the NDS is “out of date,” the US military is not correctly structured and the nation's industrial base is "grossly inadequate," and claimed that these shortcomings make it impossible to simultaneously confront the dual "threat of Russia and China.” The report proposed a solution called "all elements of national power" and called for strengthening the US military's readiness to operate across multiple theaters of war.
Information from the RAND Corporation shows that the US National Defense Strategy Commission was created under the US 2022 fiscal year National Defense Authorization Act, with the chair being a former senior member of the House Intelligence Committee, and receiving analytic and administrative support from the RAND Corporation. Therefore, while this report is not an official US government document, it still holds significant reference value due to its bipartisan representation. Specifically, this report, along with some other actions and statements by US officials in the past two years, reveals several throughlines in US policy.
Firstly, there is the possibility that the US military strategy is shifting away from an expectation of peace to an expectation of war. After the end of the Cold War, the US had long-term plans for dealing with two simultaneous regional conflicts, rather than the expectation of war with major powers. Based on these considerations, the US built a highly advanced and mobile military force, emphasizing global deployment and intervention capabilities rather than long-term combat capabilities. However, with the trend toward a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US is changing and adjusting its previous military strategy, leaning more toward preparing for “great power wars.”
Secondly, the US is further adjusting its attitude toward China and Russia. At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US strategic community tended to differentiate between China and Russia to avoid pushing them together at a strategic level. However, since the end of 2023, there has been a trend in the US strategic community to treat China and Russia as an almost singular threat. This year, both former and current US Indo-Pacific Commanders have made similar remarks. On one hand, this indicates that the US is trying to shape its image as still strong by showing that it is not afraid of "fighting on two fronts" internally and externally; on the other hand, it also suggests that Washington intends to promote internal unity in the West by forcibly linking China and Russia and exaggerating related "threats."
Thirdly, there is an attempt to use war expectations to drive the revival of the American manufacturing industry. In this report, the US National Defense Strategy Commission pays particular attention to the recovery and development of the defense industry. Objectively speaking, in peacetime, defense manufacturing typically operates at relatively low levels, which naturally cannot be compared to the "full throttle" state required to meet wartime demands. Therefore, the US National Defense Strategy Commission's claim that the American defense industry is not sufficient to meet the “demands of great power conflict” is a deliberate act of pretending to be ignorant.
Fourth, the report aims to promote domestic national unity. With this report as the latest example, some politicians in the US have been emphasizing the importance of bipartisan and cross-class mobilization, even using the so-called expectation of a "great power war" to promote consensus and unity in American society. Amid growing social division and political polarization in the US, they believe they have discovered a "shortcut” to unite the country quickly. However, in reality, they may be placing themselves in a risky situation and could ultimately face a serious backlash.
Fifth, it indicates that Washington may be reassessing the military threat from Russia. This report suggests that the current US defense strategy "understates the threat from Russia" and recommends increasing US military deployments in Europe. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, these findings reveal that some in the US may be attempting to elevate Russia's priority in the US national security strategy, emphasizing the threat from Russia as a means to unite domestic and foreign policy consensus.
In short, this report suggests increasing military expectations and preparations for potential conflict with China and Russia. It proposes that the US will need to make major changes and investments, possibly even “wartime mobilization.” It is unclear how these recommendations will be incorporated into official US policy, but the bipartisan nature of the report and similar statements from domestic politicians in recent years serve as a reminder to remain vigilant. We must be cautious of the potential for war implied in these US statements and prepare public opinion and strategic plans accordingly. Additionally, we must maintain our composure, be wary of falling into the trap set by the extreme anti-China faction in the US, and prevent their extreme rhetoric from becoming a reality.
As the world’s most important bilateral relationship, the China-US relationship will not easily fall into the new Cold War or even hot war that some individual American politicians are trying to provoke. The complexity of the relationship between the two countries and the constantly changing international environment have led to a variety of voices in this relationship. China must always remain vigilant about the dangerous trends exposed by some extreme voices, such as the further shift toward expectations of a “great power war" advocated by some in Washington. At the same time, we must grasp the overall situation, not be led astray by extreme rhetoric, and continue to shape the China-US relationship in a positive direction.
Throughout world history, many conflicts or wars have often been sparked by misjudgments or miscalculations. Many in the US continue to clamor for a tougher stance against China and attempt to create a certain strategic consensus on this issue, but in reality, voices within the US on how to handle relations with China remain diverse and malleable. We must continue to strive for those rational and progressive forces, while remaining vigilant and critical of extreme and radical rhetoric.
The author is a professor with the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. bizopinion@globaltimes.com.cn
COMMISSION ISSUES DIRE WARNING ABOUT THREATS FACING US
“Significant and urgent action” is needed to prepare the United States for the national security threats it’s facing today, said the leaders of a commission tasked by Congress.
“Our commission believes unanimously that the threats to U.S. national security and our interests are greater than at any time since World War II and are more complex than during the Cold War,” Jane Harman and Eric Edelman, the chair and vice chair, respectively, of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy of the United States, said in written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The commission also said the Army is too small for its mission of dominating adversaries and enabling the joint force. “Lessons from the Ukraine war demonstrate that the U.S. Army needs to expand its force structure in key areas—particularly air defense, counter–unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare, and long-range fires—that are applicable across theaters, including in a Western Pacific contingency,” the commission says in its report.
Additionally, “the public has no idea how great the threats are and is not mobilized to meet them,” Harman told the committee July 30. “Public support is critical to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders on both sides of the aisle and across government need to make the case to the public and get their support.”
Harman is a former member of Congress who led the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for 10 years. She has served on advisory boards for the CIA, director of national intelligence and the departments of defense, homeland security and state.
Recommending “fundamental change” in the way the Pentagon and other government agencies do business, the commission also urges a full embrace of America’s partners and allies and better integration with private sector technology.
Several members of the commission served on the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission, which sounded the alarm that the U.S. was losing its decisive military edge, said Edelman, who was that group’s co-chair. “Six years later, the threats are more serious, and we have failed to keep pace,” he said.
A former U.S. ambassador to Finland and Turkey, Edelman is counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously also served in senior positions in the State Department, DoD and the White House.
Harman and Edelman warned that there is potential for “near-term war, and potential that we might lose,” citing the partnership between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as a “major strategic shift that we haven’t yet accounted for.”
China, which DoD leaders have called the U.S.’ “pacing challenge,” is “in some ways outpacing the United States,” Harman and Edelman said.
“China’s cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep the United States from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China Seas,” they said. “China has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter U.S. action by contesting our logistics, disrupting power and water, and otherwise remove the sanctuary that the United States has long enjoyed at home.”
Russia also continues to be a threat, as it has reconstituted after its invasion of Ukraine, the commission said. Russian President Vladimir Putin “seeks to re-assert Russia as a great power and is happy to destabilize the world to do it,” they said.
DoD cannot—and should not—provide for the national defense itself, Harman and Edelman said. “A truly ‘all elements of national power’ approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DoD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society and U.S. allies and partners,” they said.
For its part, DoD must change how it works with the technology sector, they said. “DoD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency. DoD’s structure is optimized for research and development for exquisite, irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI and large numbers of cheaper, attritable systems,” Harman and Edelman said.
The military also is too small for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges, the commission found. It also warned about the current recruiting challenges facing the force.
“The joint force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break,” they said. “The United States must spend more effectively and more efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one. We have to cancel legacy programs. Additional resources will also be necessary. Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base.”
Read the commission’s report here.
