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理查德·沃尔夫 – 美国领导人对中国政策存在分歧
2023 年 8 月 4 日
https://braveneweurope.com/richard-d-wolff-u-s-leaders-are-split-on-china-policy
美国面临的困难现实是，随着中国不断迈向世界第一，美国对世界第二大经济体的经济依赖不断加深。
理查德·D·沃尔夫 (Richard D. Wolff) 是马萨诸塞大学阿默斯特分校经济学名誉教授，也是纽约新学院大学国际事务研究生项目的客座教授
本文由独立媒体研究所的一个项目“全民经济”制作
一方面，美国的政策旨在限制中国的经济、政治和军事发展，因为中国现已成为美国的主要经济竞争对手，进而成为美国的敌人。 另一方面，美国的政策力求确保美国公司在与中国的贸易和投资中获得诸多利益。 美国关于两国经济“脱钩”与“去风险”的温和版本的争论，双方都体现了美国对华政策的分歧。
美国面临的困难现实是，随着中国不断迈向世界第一，美国对世界第二大经济体的经济依赖不断加深。 同样，中国近几十年来惊人的快速增长使其陷入了与美国市场、美元和美国利率的复杂经济相互依赖之中。 与此形成鲜明对比的是，苏联和俄罗斯都没有给美国提供过与中国现在相比的经济机会或竞争挑战。 在这种背景下，请考虑世界银行 2022 年俄罗斯、德国、中国和美国 GDP 数据：分别为 1.5 万亿美元、3.9 万亿美元、14.7 万亿美元和 20.9 万亿美元。
美国主要政党和军工联合体的政治右翼长期以来一直主导着美国主流媒体如何对待美国的外交政策。 特别是在过去十年里，媒体越来越多地指责中国积极扩大其全球影响力、国内独裁主义以及针对美国的政策。 近几十年来，大企业利益推动了一种截然不同的美国外交政策，优先考虑美国和中国之间的有利可图的共存。 美国的政策在这两个极点之间分裂和摇摆。 有一天，摩根大通银行的杰米·戴蒙和美国财政部长珍妮特·耶伦前往北京支持利益共同点，而与此同时，拜登总统却给习近平贴上了“独裁者”的标签。
冷战的历史和遗产使美国媒体、政治家和学者习惯于对共产主义及其与之相关的政党和政府进行夸张的谴责。 右翼政治势力一直渴望更新反苏、冷战逻辑和口号，用来反对中国政府和共产党作为持续的恶棍。 旧问题（台湾和香港）和新问题（维吾尔人）标志着一场持续的运动。
然而，随着冷战结束并随着苏联的解体而崩溃，尼克松和基辛格重新与已经开始从未停止过的经济发展浪潮的中国建立了联系。 来自七国集团（G7）体系旧中心（西欧、北美和日本）的资本家纷纷向中国投资，从其相对较低的工资和快速增长的内部市场中获利。 过去50年来，消费品和资本货物从中国的工厂流向世界各地的市场。 中国深深地融入了全球供应链。 中国的出口带来了美元支付的流入。 中国将其中许多美元借给美国财政部，为其不断增长的预算赤字提供资金。 中国与日本一起成为全球最大债务国美国的两大债权国。
中国将其积累的美元投资于美国国债，导致美国国债在过去半个世纪中快速上升。 这有助于美国保持低利率，从而推动美国经济增长并从几次经济危机中复苏。 中国相对低价的出口反映了其低工资和积极的政府发展支持。 这些年的大部分时间里，对美国的出口有助于防止通货膨胀。 反过来，低价格减少了雇员要求提高工资的压力，从而支撑了美国资本家的利润。 通过这些以及其他方式，美中关系深深植根于美国资本主义的运作和成功之中。 切断这些联系可能会给美国带来非常不利的经济后果。
此外，许多支持这种削减的建议都是无效的和不明智的幻想。 如果美国政府可以迫使美国和其他跨国公司关闭在中国的工厂，它们很可能会转移到其他低工资的亚洲地区。 他们不会返回美国，因为美国的工资和其他费用太高，因此没有竞争力。 他们要去的地方都需要从中国采购原料，中国已经是他们最具竞争力的生产国。 简而言之，迫使资本家离开中国，对美国的帮助最小，对中国的伤害也最小。 对美国微芯片制造商关闭中国市场同样是一个错误的幻想。 如果无法进入蓬勃发展的中国市场，美国公司将无法与其他未排除在中国市场之外的国家的芯片制造商竞争。
美国资本主义需要大部分中国出口产品的流入，并需要融入中国市场。 美国大型银行需要进入中国快速增长的市场，否则欧洲、日本和中国的银行最终将超越美国银行。 即使美国能够迫使或操纵七国集团银行加入美国主导的退出中国的行列，中国的银行及其在印度、俄罗斯、巴西和南非（金砖国家）的盟友的银行也将控制其获得有利可图的融资的机会。 中国的增长。 从GDP总量来看，金砖国家的经济体系已经超过了七国集团的经济体系，而且差距还在不断拉大。
如果美国在没有核战争的情况下在经济、政治和/或军事上恢复对中国的冷战远征，结果可能会导致美国资本主义出现重大混乱、损失和代价高昂的调整。 当然，核战争的风险更大。 除了美国右翼的极端分子之外，没有人愿意冒这样的风险。 美国的七国集团盟友肯定不这么认为。 他们已经在想象自己在一个两极世界中所期望的未来，这个世界分为衰落和崛起的霸权，或许还有其他国家的反霸权集团。 世界大多数国家都认识到中国的持续增长和扩张是当今世界经济的主要动力。 大多数人同样将美国视为反对中国崛起为全球超级大国的主要对手。
中美关系观察人士有多少？ 冲突失误是其根源和塑造者位于两个超级大国内部雇主与雇员阶级冲突的极端紧张和矛盾之中。 美国的这些阶级冲突回应了这个基本问题：谁的财富、收入和社会地位将不得不承担适应霸权衰落成本的主要负担？ 过去30-40年的财富向上再分配会持续、停止还是逆转？ 美国各地日益高涨的劳工斗志和美国右翼准法西斯主义的复兴是否预示着即将到来的斗争？
中国的显着提升迅速将农村、贫困、农业经济转变为城市、中等收入和工业经济。 西欧的平行转型持续了几个世纪，并引发了深刻、痛苦和暴力的阶级斗争。 在中国，这一转变花费了几十年的时间，因此可能造成更深刻的创伤。 那里会爆发类似的阶级斗争吗？ 它们是否已经在中国社会的表面下建立起来了？ 全球南方可能是全球资本主义——由雇主与雇员之间的生产核心所定义的体系——最终走向其利润最大化崇拜的终结之地吗？
美国和中国的经济体系都是围绕工作场所组织组织起来的，其中少数雇主支配着大量受雇雇员。 在美国，这些职场组织大多是私营企业。 中国呈现出一种混合体制，企业既有私营企业，也有国有企业，但两种类型的工作场所组织共享雇主与雇员的组织。 该组织的典型特征是雇主阶层积累的财富远远多于雇员阶层。 此外，富有的雇主阶层也可以而且通常也确实购买了主导的政治权力。 由此产生的经济和政治不平等会引发紧张、冲突和社会变革。
这一现实在美国和中国都已经确立。 例如，美国自 2009 年以来一直没有提高每小时 7.25 美元的联邦最低工资。两个主要政党都有责任。 耶伦发表讲话，哀叹美国不平等现象日益加深，但这种现象仍在继续加深。 按照指责受害者的传统，美国资本主义倾向于将贫困归咎于穷人。 习近平还公开担心不平等现象加剧：对于自称社会主义的国家来说可能更为紧迫。 尽管中国已采取重大措施来减少最近极端的经济不平等，但这些不平等仍然是一个严重的社会问题。 美中冲突不仅取决于两国内部的阶级冲突和斗争，也取决于两国之间的政策。
中国正在适应美国分裂政策方针的曲折。 它为两种可能发生的情况做好了准备：激烈的经济民族主义助长的残酷竞争可能包括军事战争或共同计划的和平经济共存。 当中国等待美国决定如何引导美国经济的未来时，中国的增长可能会持续下去，赶上并超越美国的全球经济足迹。 中国过去30年取得的惊人的经济增长成就确保了中国卓越的私营和国有企业的混合经济，并受到强大政党的监督和服从。 一个焦虑的世界正等待着资本主义的下一个篇章，资本主义总是危险地不平衡的阶级斗争和民族斗争。
Richard D. Wolff – U.S. Leaders Are Split on China Policy
The difficult reality for the United States is economic dependence on the world’s number two economy that deepens with China’s relentless march toward becoming the world’s number one.
Richard D. Wolff is professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University, in New York
This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
On the one hand, U.S. policy aims to constrain China’s economic, political, and military development because it has now become the United States’ chief economic competitor and thus enemy. On the other hand, U.S. policy seeks to secure the many benefits to the United States of its companies’ trade with and investments in China. U.S. debates over “decoupling” the two countries’ economies versus the milder version of the same thing—“de-risking”—exemplify, on both sides, U.S. policy’s split approach to China.
The difficult reality for the United States is economic dependence on the world’s number two economy that deepens with China’s relentless march toward becoming the world’s number one. Likewise, China’s stunningly rapid growth over recent decades entangled it in a complex economic codependence with the U.S. market, the U.S. dollar, and U.S. interest rates. In stark contrast, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia ever offered the U.S. economic opportunities or competitive challenges comparable to what China now does. In this context, consider World Bank 2022 data on GDPs in Russia, Germany, China, and the United States: $1.5 trillion, $3.9 trillion, $14.7 trillion, and $20.9 trillion, respectively.
The political right wings of both major U.S. political parties and the military-industrial complex have long prevailed in shaping how U.S. mainstream media treat the country’s foreign policies. Over the last decade especially, the media has increasingly accused China of aggressively expanding its global influence, of authoritarianism at home, and of policies targeting the United States. Over recent decades, big business interests promote a quite different U.S. foreign policy prioritizing profitable coexistence between the United States and China. U.S. policy splits and oscillates between these two poles. One day Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase bank and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen go to Beijing to support mutuality of interests while at the same time, President Biden labels Xi Jinping a “dictator.”
The history and legacy of the Cold War accustomed U.S. media, politicians, and academics to traffic in hyperbolic denunciations of communism plus parties and governments they link to it. Right-wing political forces have always been eager to update anti-Soviet, Cold War logics and slogans for use against China’s government and Communist Party as continuing villains. Old (Taiwan and Hong Kong) and new issues (Uyghurs) mark an ongoing campaign.
Yet as the Cold War wound down and then collapsed with the USSR’s demise, Nixon and Kissinger reconnected with a China already launched on an economic development surge that never stopped. Capitalists from the system’s old centers in the G7 (Western Europe, North America, and Japan) poured investments into China to profit from its relatively much lower wages and its rapidly growing internal market. Over the last 50 years, consumer goods and capital goods flowed out of factories in China to markets around the world. China became deeply entangled in global supply chains. Exports from China brought an inflow of payments in U.S. dollars. China lent many of those dollars back to the U.S. Treasury to fund its growing budget deficits. China joined Japan as the two major creditor countries of the United States, the world’s greatest debtor country.
China’s investment of its accumulating dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds helped to enable the fast-rising U.S. national debt over the last half-century. That helped keep U.S. interest rates low to fuel U.S. economic growth and its recoveries from several economic crashes. China’s relatively low-priced exports reflected its low wages and active government development supports. Those exports to the United States helped prevent inflation over most of those years. In turn, low prices reduced pressures from employees for higher wages and thereby supported U.S. capitalists’ profits. In these and still other ways, U.S.-China connections became deeply embedded in the functioning and success of U.S. capitalism. Cutting those connections would risk very adverse economic consequences for the United States.
Moreover, many proposals favoring such cutting are ineffective and ill-informed fantasies. If the U.S. government could force United States and other multinational corporations to close up shop in China, they would most likely move to other low-wage Asian locations. They would not return to the United States because its wages and other expenses are too high and thus non-competitive. Where they do go will entail sourcing inputs from China, already their most competitive producer. In short, forcing capitalists to leave China will help the United States minimally and hurt the Chinese minimally as well. Closing off the China market for U.S. microchip-makers is likewise a faulty fantasy. Without access to the booming Chinese market, U.S.-based companies will be uncompetitive with other chip-makers based in countries not closed out of the Chinese market.
U.S. capitalism needs the inflow of most Chinese exports and needs inclusion in China’s markets. U.S. megabanks need access to China’s fast-growing markets or else European, Japanese, and Chinese banks will eventually outcompete the U.S. banks. Even if the United States could force or maneuver G7 banks to join a U.S.-led exit from China, China’s banks and those of its allies in India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa (the BRICS) would control access to the profitable financing of China’s growth. In terms of aggregate GDPs, the BRICS are already a bigger economic system, taken together, than the G7 taken together, and the gap between them keeps widening.
Were the United States to pursue its resumed Cold War crusade against China—economically, politically, and/or militarily without nuclear warfare—the results could risk major dislocations, losses, and costly adjustments for U.S. capitalism. With nuclear warfare, of course, the risks are still larger. Other than extreme parts of the U.S. right wing, no one wants to take such risks. The United States’ G7 allies surely do not. Already they are imagining their desired futures in a bipolar world split between falling and rising hegemons and perhaps counterhegemonic groupings of other nations. Most of the world recognizes China’s relentless growth and expansion as the major dynamic of today’s world economy. Most likewise see the United States as the major antagonist tilting against China’s rise into a global superpower position.
What many observers of the China-U.S. clash miss are those of its causes and shapers located in the extreme tensions and contradictions besetting the employer-employee class conflicts within both superpowers. Those class conflicts in the United States respond to this basic question: whose wealth, income, and social position will have to bear the major burden of accommodating the costs of declining hegemony? Will the redistribution of wealth upward across the last 30-40 years persist, be stopped, or be reversed? Are rising labor militancy across the United States and the quasi-fascistic resurging U.S. right wing foretastes of struggles to come?
China’s remarkable ascension rapidly transformed a rural, poor, agricultural economy into an urban, middle-income, and industrial economy. The parallel transformation in Western Europe took centuries and occasioned profound, bitter, and violent class struggles. In China, the transformation took a few decades and was likely the more profoundly traumatic for that reason. Will similar class struggles erupt there? Are they building beneath the surface of Chinese society already? Might the Global South be where global capitalism—the system defined by its employer-versus-employee productive core—goes finally to play the endgame of its profit-maximization fetish?
Both the United States and China display economic systems organized around workplace organizations where a small number of employers dominate a large number of hired employees. In the United States, those workplace organizations are mostly private enterprises. China displays a hybrid system whose enterprises are both private and state-owned and operated, but where both types of workplace organizations share the employer-versus-employee organization. That organization typically features the employer class accumulating far more wealth than the employee class. Moreover, that wealthy class of employers can and usually does buy dominant political power as well. The resulting mix of economic and political inequality provokes tensions, conflicts, and social change.
That reality is already well established in both the United States and China. Thus, for example, the United States has not raised its federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour since 2009. Both major political parties are responsible. Yellen gives speeches bemoaning the deepening inequalities in the United States, but the deepening persists. In the tradition of blaming the victim, American capitalism tends to fault the poor for their poverty. Xi Jinping also worries openly about deepening inequalities: likely more urgent in nations calling themselves socialist. Even though China has taken significant steps to reduce its recently extreme economic inequalities, they remain a serious social problem there too. The U.S.-China clash depends as much on each nation’s internal class conflicts and struggles as it depends on their policies toward one another.
China adjusts to the twists and turns in the United States’ split policy approach. It prepares for both eventualities: cutthroat competition abetted by intense economic nationalism possibly including military warfare or a conjointly planned peaceful economic coexistence. As China awaits the United States’ decisions on which way to guide the United States’ economic future, China’s growth will likely continue, matching and then surpassing the United States’ global economic footprint. China’s stunning economic growth success across the last 30 years secures China’s remarkable hybrid economy of private and state enterprises supervised by and subordinated to a powerful political party. An anxious world awaits the next chapter in capitalism’s always dangerously uneven mix of class and national struggles.
