Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness
https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/munich-security-report-2022-turning-the-tide-unlearning-helplessness
Feb 17, 2022 Munich Security Conference 2022, Munich Security Index 2022, Munich Security Report 2022
A mounting tide of crises that reinforce each other threatens to overwhelm our societies and political systems. The Munich Security Report 2022 explores the emergence of a sense of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of global challenges and stimulates the debate on how it can best be overcome.
越来越多的危机相互加强，威胁着我们的社会和政治制度。 《2022 年慕尼黑安全报告》探讨了面对大量全球挑战时出现的“集体无助感”，并引发了关于如何最好地克服它的辩论。
2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Whether it was the seemingly endless coronavirus pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or rising geopolitical tensions, all these challenges added up to a feeling of a loss of control.
2021 年显然不是地缘政治乐观的一年。 无论是看似无休止的冠状病毒大流行、气候变化日益明显的威胁、相互关联的世界令人烦恼的脆弱性，还是不断加剧的地缘政治紧张局势，所有这些挑战都加剧了失控感。
As data from the Munich Security Index 2022 shows, since the last wave of research on risk perceptions in February and March 2021, concern about risk has not only grown among societies in the G7 and BRICS countries. There is also a widespread sense of helplessness in the face of present and looming threats among the twelve countries surveyed. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed. The new Munich Security Report (MSR) argues that just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. This belief, the report warns, may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and prevent the world from addressing the most important crises before it is too late.
正如 2022 年慕尼黑安全指数的数据显示，自 2021 年 2 月和 2021 年 3 月的上一波风险认知研究以来，对风险的担忧不仅在 G7 和金砖国家的社会中有所增长。 在接受调查的 12 个国家中，面对当前和迫在眉睫的威胁也普遍存在无助感。 自由民主国家似乎感到特别不知所措。 新的慕尼黑安全报告 (MSR) 认为，就像人们会遭受“习得性无助”——一个描述任何人所做的任何事情都无法产生积极变化的感觉的心理学术语——社会也可能会开始相信他们无法获得 抓住他们面临的挑战。 报告警告说，这种信念可能会变成一种自我实现的预言，并阻止世界在为时已晚之前解决最重要的危机。
The 2022 edition of the Munich Security Report covers security challenges in Afghanistan, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and Eastern Europe, as well as risks posed by dependencies in the supply chains of critical technologies and by growing inequality. While the challenges are real, the report argues, the tools and resources needed to address them are, in fact, available. Transatlantic leaders need to revive the optimism and momentum palpable in the early days of the Biden administration. If they can “unlearn helplessness” and demonstrate that democracies can still deliver, they have a chance to turn the tide.
2022 年版慕尼黑安全报告涵盖了阿富汗、萨赫勒地区、非洲之角和东欧的安全挑战，以及关键技术供应链中的依赖性和不平等加剧带来的风险。 报告认为，虽然挑战是真实存在的，但应对这些挑战所需的工具和资源实际上是可用的。 跨大西洋领导人需要重振拜登政府初期的乐观情绪和势头。 如果他们能够“忘记无助”并证明民主仍然可以实现，他们就有机会扭转局势。
Bibliographic data: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Randolf Carr, Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Luca Miehe, and Amadée Mudie-Mantz, “Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2022, https://doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724.
Source – MSC 2022
Executive Summary
2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Almost every month, a new crisis dominated the news, contributing to a sense that this mounting tide of crises threatens to overwhelm us.
2021 年显然不是地缘政治乐观的一年。 几乎每个月，一场新的危机都会占据新闻头条，让人感觉这种不断升级的危机浪潮有可能淹没我们。
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in Europe and beyond, concern about a growing loss of control is prevalent (Chapter 1). In fact, findings from the Munich Security Index 2022 not only reflect the high level of risk perceived by respondents in the G7 and BRICS countries; they also suggest the emergence of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of crises that reinforce each other. Just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. Whether it is the seemingly endless pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or increasing geopolitical tensions, all these challenges contribute to a feeling of a loss of control. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed.
在这种背景下，在欧洲及其他地区普遍存在对日益失控的担忧（第 1 章）也就不足为奇了。 事实上，2022 年慕尼黑安全指数的调查结果不仅反映了七国集团和金砖国家受访者认为的高风险水平； 它们还表明，面对大量相互强化的危机，会出现“集体无助”。 就像人们可能会遭受“习得性无助”——一个描述任何人所做的任何事情都无法带来积极改变的感觉的心理学术语——社会也可能会开始相信他们无法应对所面临的挑战。 无论是看似无休止的流行病、气候变化日益明显的威胁、相互关联的世界令人烦恼的脆弱性，还是日益加剧的地缘政治紧张局势，所有这些挑战都会让人感到失控。 自由民主国家似乎感到特别不知所措。
This perception is highly dangerous because it can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Societies that have concluded that they cannot solve humankind’s most challenging problems might no longer even try to turn the tide. Will our stressed and overburdened societies end up accepting what they see as their fate, although they have the tools and resources to change it?
这种看法非常危险，因为它可能会变成一种自我实现的预言。 断定他们无法解决人类最具挑战性的问题的社会甚至可能不再试图扭转局势。 尽管我们拥有改变命运的工具和资源，但我们压力重重、负担过重的社会最终会接受他们所认为的命运吗？
Unfortunately, 2021 overall did not alleviate these concerns. With the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, for instance, the past year has also reinvigorated a debate about what international interventions are able to realistically accomplish. In light of the limited achievements of the United States and its partners in Afghanistan (Chapter 2), hard questions arise about the West’s ability to build capable, legitimate state structures and promote stability elsewhere in the world. As Afghanistan now finds itself on the brink of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with civil liberties being severely restricted under Taliban rule, the investments of two decades of external intervention are at risk. While the West has ended an “endless war,” people in Afghanistan are looking toward an uncertain future.
不幸的是，2021 年总体上并未缓解这些担忧。 例如，随着从阿富汗的混乱撤军，过去一年也重新引发了一场关于国际干预能够实际实现什么的辩论。 鉴于美国及其合作伙伴在阿富汗取得的有限成就（第 2 章），西方在世界其他地方建立有能力、合法的国家结构和促进稳定的能力出现了尖锐的问题。 由于阿富汗现在正处于世界上最严重的人道主义危机的边缘，公民自由在塔利班统治下受到严格限制，二十年来外部干预的投资面临风险。 虽然西方已经结束了一场“无休止的战争”，但阿富汗人民正在展望一个不确定的未来。
The developments in Afghanistan have also spurred a debate on European engagement in Mali and the Sahel region (Chapter 3). Even though this region has seen a massive increase in peacebuilding activities since 2013, the security situation has continuously deteriorated. The Malian government has been an exceedingly difficult partner for the international community – even before it entered talks with a Russian mercenary group. And increasing levels of violence in Mali and neighboring states have made it difficult for external actors to address the root causes of the problems afflicting the region – among these are poor development, human rights abuses, and rampant corruption.
阿富汗的事态发展也引发了一场关于欧洲参与马里和萨赫勒地区的辩论（第 3 章）。 尽管该地区自 2013 年以来建设和平活动大幅增加，但安全局势却持续恶化。 对于国际社会来说，马里政府一直是一个极其棘手的伙伴——甚至在它与俄罗斯雇佣军组织进行谈判之前也是如此。 马里和邻国日益严重的暴力事件使得外部行为者难以解决困扰该地区的问题的根源——其中包括发展不畅、侵犯人权和猖獗的腐败。
The Sahel is not the only conflict region where the headwinds for international stabilization efforts are growing stronger. After a period of democratization and hope for regional reconciliation in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Gulf, a profound destabilization is now evident (Chapter 4). Since November 2020, civil war engulfs Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, causing a large-scale humanitarian emergency. Because the Red Sea region is a crucial choke point of international trade, an important security link between the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, plus a major hub for extremists, the ripple effects of escalating conflicts will likely be felt far beyond the region. In that regard, the situation in the Horn of Africa demonstrates that conflicts around the world are not waiting for the West to draw its lessons from Afghanistan.
萨赫勒地区并不是国际稳定努力的阻力越来越大的唯一冲突地区。 在非洲之角和阿拉伯湾经历了一段时间的民主化和区域和解希望之后，现在明显出现了严重的不稳定（第 4 章）。 2020年11月以来，内战席卷埃塞俄比亚北部提格雷地区，引发大规模人道主义紧急情况。 由于红海地区是国际贸易的重要咽喉要道，是连接地中海、中东和印太地区的重要安全纽带，也是极端分子的主要集散地，冲突升级的连锁反应可能会影响到很远的地方 超出区域。 在这方面，非洲之角的局势表明，世界各地的冲突不会等待西方从阿富汗汲取教训。
At the same time, rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe have also raised another type of fear among the transatlantic partners: that of actual war. Nothing illustrates the renewed focus on territorial defense in the West better than the increasingly tense security situation on NATO’s eastern flank (Chapter 5). In recent months, Moscow has made it abundantly clear that it is looking for a revision of the European security order. As the Russian draft proposals for new security treaties demonstrate, Russia insists on a “sphere of influence” in its neighborhood, effectively limiting the sovereignty of countries like Ukraine. Russia’s rhetorical escalation and military buildup have raised profound security concerns across Europe.
与此同时，印太和东欧地区日益紧张的局势也引发了跨大西洋合作伙伴的另一种恐惧：对实战的恐惧。 没有什么比北约东翼日益紧张的安全局势更能说明西方对领土防御的重新关注（第 5 章）。 近几个月来，莫斯科非常明确地表示，它正在寻求修订欧洲安全秩序。 正如俄罗斯新安全条约提案草案所表明的那样，俄罗斯坚持在其周边地区建立“势力范围”，有效地限制了乌克兰等国家的主权。 俄罗斯的言辞升级和军事集结在整个欧洲引发了深刻的安全担忧。
While analysts disagree on what President Vladimir Putin’s specific goals are, the debate about the basic principles of European security – and how to defend them – will only intensify in the coming months, posing difficult political and military questions to European leaders who are forced to take a stand and reconsider their strategic posture.
尽管分析人士对弗拉基米尔·普京总统的具体目标是什么意见不一，但关于欧洲安全基本原则以及如何捍卫这些原则的辩论只会在未来几个月内愈演愈烈，向被迫采取行动的欧洲领导人提出棘手的政治和军事问题 站出来重新考虑他们的战略态势。
In addition to the return of very traditional security concerns, the coronavirus pandemic has relentlessly highlighted societies’ vulnerabilities in various policy areas. Among other things, it has unmasked strong dependencies in the supply chains of critical technologies, as well as gaping inequalities and their detrimental effects on global crisis resilience.
除了非常传统的安全问题回归外，冠状病毒大流行无情地凸显了社会在各个政策领域的脆弱性。 除其他外，它揭示了关键技术供应链中的强烈依赖性，以及巨大的不平等及其对全球危机恢复力的不利影响。
Both the pandemic and recent geopolitical power moves have brought vulnerabilities in the technology sector into focus (Chapter 6). The ongoing global semiconductor supply bottleneck exemplifies what can happen when supply chains depend on “single points of failure” and geopolitically fraught supply sources. Due to the strategic importance of tech supply chains, the risk to them is only growing in an era of systemic competition. This realization has spurred a rethink on industrial policy in the US, Europe, and other high-tech economies. Meanwhile, China has had a head start as its comprehensive approach to economic planning has long focused on boosting its indigenous tech sector. However, approaches based on “onshoring,” the shifting of supply from foreign soil to within national borders, are clearly limited. Accordingly, the focus for policymakers has shifted to achieving supply chain cooperation between like-minded partners to collectively become more resilient.
大流行病和最近的地缘政治权力动向都使技术部门的脆弱性成为人们关注的焦点（第 6 章）。 持续的全球半导体供应瓶颈体现了当供应链依赖于“单点故障”和充满地缘政治色彩的供应源时可能发生的情况。 由于技术供应链的战略重要性，它们面临的风险只会在系统性竞争时代增加。 这种认识促使美国、欧洲和其他高科技经济体重新思考产业政策。 与此同时，中国已经取得了先机，因为其综合经济规划方法长期以来一直专注于推动本土科技行业的发展。 然而，基于“在岸外包”（将供应从外国领土转移到国内）的方法显然是有限的。 因此，政策制定者的重点已转移到实现志同道合的合作伙伴之间的供应链合作，以共同提高弹性。
Covid-19 has brutally exposed inequalities that exist within and across states (Chapter 7). Pandemics are not the only grave threat facing humanity today that is inseparably tied to global divides. Climate change is, too. These threats to our health and habitats deepen existing disparities; and they will also defy successful containment if current levels of inequality persist. As long as the coronavirus rages on in other parts of the world, no country will be safe from the Covid-19 pandemic. And if less developed countries lack the resources to embark on low-carbon pathways, global warming cannot be effectively limited. It is becoming increasingly clear that improving global resilience in the face of present and future threats requires renewing social contracts, both within and between countries. Getting back on track to reach the UN Sustainable Development Goals would be the first important step.
Covid-19 残酷地暴露了各州内部和各州之间存在的不平等现象（第 7 章）。 流行病并不是当今人类面临的唯一与全球鸿沟密不可分的严重威胁。 气候变化也是如此。 这些对我们健康和栖息地的威胁加深了现有的差距； 如果当前的不平等程度持续存在，它们也将无法成功遏制。 只要冠状病毒在世界其他地区肆虐，就没有哪个国家可以免受 Covid-19 大流行的影响。 如果欠发达国家缺乏走低碳道路的资源，全球变暖就无法得到有效限制。 越来越明显的是，提高全球面对当前和未来威胁的复原力需要更新国家内部和国家之间的社会契约。 重回正轨以实现联合国可持续发展目标将是重要的第一步。
Despite these and the many other challenges on the agenda of this year’s Munich Security Conference, there is still good reason to believe that “unlearning helplessness” is possible. For this, transatlantic leaders need to revive the optimism and momentum palpable in the early days of the Biden administration and demonstrate that both democracy as a system and alliances based on liberal values can deliver for their states’ citizens and the world at large. Collectively, they have the chance to turn the tide.
Individually they risk being swept away.
尽管今年慕尼黑安全会议的议程上有这些以及许多其他挑战，但仍有充分理由相信“忘掉无助感”是可能的。 为此，跨大西洋领导人需要重振拜登政府初期明显的乐观情绪和势头，并证明民主作为一种制度和基于自由价值观的联盟都能为他们所在州的公民和整个世界带来好处。 总的来说，他们有机会扭转局势。
单独地，他们冒着被卷走的风险。
