Daniel Bell 山东院长：一位中国大学小官僚的自白

《山东院长：一位中国大学小官僚的自白》

作者：丹尼尔·A·贝淡宁 (Daniel A. Bell)，2023年3月28日
https://www.amazon.ca/Dean-Shandong-Confessions-Bureaucrat-University/dp/0691247129/ref=

《金融时报》年度最佳图书

深入了解中国学术界及其揭示的中国政治体制

2017年1月1日，丹尼尔·贝淡宁被任命为山东大学政治与公共管理学院院长，这是中国大陆历史上第一位担任政治学院院长的外籍院长。在《山东院长》一书中，贝淡宁记录了他作为“小官僚”的经历，深入剖析了中国学术界的运作方式及其揭示的中国政治体制。贝淡淡地回忆起一些零星的失误和误解，但贝淡淡地担任院长一职，却为观察当今中国提供了一个独特的视角。

贝淡淡既不是中国公民，也不是中国共产党员，他因在儒家思想方面的研究而被任命为院长——但他很快发现自己不得不应对一系列与学术或孔子无关的问题。这些问题包括：头发颜色的重要性以及大学管理人员（无论男女）染发的盛行；山东的饮酒文化（每顿饭前都会无休止地举杯畅饮）；以及激烈的学术精英竞争带来的一些意想不到的后果。作为院长，他还面临着一些更重要的问题：党委书记在大学中的角色；全国性的反腐运动及其对学术界的影响（贝淡淡地问道：“腐败有什么问题？”）；以及正式和非正式的审查制度。考虑到过去三十年来儒家思想在中国的复兴，以及他所说的2008年以来的“共产主义回归”，贝淡宁预测，中国的政治未来很可能由儒家思想和共产主义共同决定。

引言：山东省一位小官僚的自白（第1-20页）

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f

我现在不是，也从未加入过中国共产党。然而，我却担任着中国一所大学政治学院院长，该学院致力于培养学生和省级干部，使他们成为共产党官员服务国家：鉴于这项工作的政治敏感性，这通常是为中共党员保留的职位。这令人感到意外。另一方面，我是加拿大公民，在蒙特利尔出生长大，没有任何中国血统。2017年1月1日，我被正式任命为……院长。

1 活力与活力（第21-29页）

前国家主席胡锦涛或许是当代最乏味的领导人。他唯一有记录的玩笑是在2007年访问美国时。当时的新泽西州州长詹姆斯·麦格里维对胡锦涛说，他看起来不像59岁的老实人。胡锦涛回答说：“中国很乐意分享这方面的技术。”¹ 在中国，政治领导人使用染发剂由来已久。为什么中国领导人要染发？这与共产主义意识形态无关。其根源可以追溯到中国历史。在……

2 和谐秘书（第30-44页）

我在中国与政府官员会面时，经常被问到，为什么我们在西方的形象如此糟糕？他们说：我们当然有很多问题。就人均GDP而言，我们仍然是一个相对贫穷的国家。贫富差距很大，污染严重，腐败问题严重，香港和新疆的动荡局势众所周知。也许我们有时反应过度，地方官员经常滥用职权。但我们取得了一些进展，尤其是在扶贫和反腐败方面。在……之后，我们很好地应对了新冠疫情。

3 论集体领导（第45-64页）

1966年至1976年的文化大革命是一场灾难性的经历，充斥着激进的民粹主义和疯狂的个人崇拜。为了避免重蹈覆辙，一人独裁，邓小平和其他领导人建立了旨在限制“坏皇帝”出现的机制。统治者的任期限制旨在提供帮助：自1982年起，宪法规定国家主席连任不得超过两届。邓小平在1997年去世前一直行使着巨大的幕后政治权力，这使得人们对正式退休的实际意义产生了怀疑。但江泽民和胡锦涛……

4 腐败何罪？（第65-73页）

在中国，腐败是一切政治罪恶之源。从儒家观点来看，最好的生活是以公职人员的身份服务社会，反之，最坏的生活则是将公款挪作他用。这种观念影响了历史。明朝为何覆灭？清朝为何覆灭？原因有很多，但腐败的爆发式增长在破坏这些长期统治王朝的合法性方面发挥了重要作用。为什么中共能在中国内战中击败国民党？原因并非在于武器装备的先进。一个重要原因……

5 饮酒无度（第74-84页）

孔子与亚里士多德一样，崇尚中庸之道：“中庸之道，德之上也”（《论语》6.29）。唯独饮酒无节制（《论语》10.8）。爱德华·斯林格兰（Edward Slingerland）认为：“孔子能随心所欲地饮酒而不失节制，是其圣人之表。”¹ 孔子本人的自我评价则更为谦虚。他直到七十岁才能够“从心所欲，不逾矩”，这或许暗示着他在此之前就逾矩了……

6 中国儒家思想教学（第85-94页）

孔子（公元前551-479年），姓孔，尊称“子”，是一位政治家、哲学家和诗人。但他受人尊敬的首要原因，是他作为教师的功绩。曲阜孔庙雄伟的孔子雕像上方有句谚语：“万世师表”。为什么孔子——西方人称之为孔子——被视为万世师表呢？原因有很多。他创立了中国历史上最早的高等教育形式，不分阶级和家庭背景地教授学生。他最……

7 共产主义的回归（第95-105页）

2008年，我出版了一本书，宣称马克思主义意识形态在中国的终结¹。马克思主义作为一种激励人心的价值体系已经消亡。在中国，很少有严肃的思想家公开捍卫马克思主义作为现代世界的指导思想。中国共产党似乎只是名义上的共产主义政党，而且它越来越强调“中国特色”，即致力于实践。

语序变革以及中国自身的文化传统，例如儒家思想，都与此相关。我曾预言，中国共产党很快就会更名为“中国儒家党”。

讽刺的是，马克思主义传统在同一时期卷土重来，在官方和非官方圈子里都如此。它……

8 正式和非正式的审查制度（第106-126页）

约翰·斯图尔特·密尔的《论自由》于1859年首次出版，是迄今为止最具影响力的言论自由辩护著作。鲜为人知的是，密尔更担心的是“公众舆论”，而非国家审查制度。正如密尔所言，舆论暴政“比许多政治压迫更为可怕，因为它虽然通常不会受到如此严厉的惩罚，但却留下了更少的逃脱途径，更加深入地渗透到生活的细节中，奴役着灵魂本身。”¹ 是的，他写作的时代是维多利亚时代的英国，而我们这个时代或许并非如此墨守成规。但……

9 中国式的学术精英政治（第127-137页）

在选举民主制中，谁来选择政治领导人显而易见：投票给他们的人民。有时我被问到：在政治精英政治中，谁来选择领导人？在中国，我半开玩笑地回答说，是组织部。最高级别的任命由政治局委员决定。在最基层，人们通常可以投票选举他们的村干部。在这两者之间，绝大多数公职人员是由中组部选拔的。中组部就像是世界上最大、最有权力的人力资源部门，负责管理各级各类机构约七千万人事……

10 对“可爱”的批判（第138-148页）

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f.14
为了塑造国际社会对中国的舆论，习近平主席告诉高级官员，中国需要展现一个更加“可信、可爱、受人尊敬”的中国形象¹。这一令人惊讶的提法不仅仅是呼吁淡化“战狼”的论调。关键词是“可爱”。² “可爱”的字面意思是“可以爱”，官方媒体将其翻译为“lovable”（可爱的）。但在日常用语中，“可爱”的意思是“可爱的”。

将“可爱”视为软实力，乍一看似乎有些奇怪。但我们所能称之为……的迅速传播

11 象征性领导的案例（第149-160页）

中国于1912年废除了帝制。但君主制的理想并未消亡。儒家改革家康有为主张建立一个受宪法约束的象征性君主。1917年，康有为参与了清朝统治的复辟，但未能成功，这一主张遭遇挫折；而1949年中国共产党的胜利似乎对君主制统治体系造成了致命打击。然而，儒家思想的复兴引发了人们对中国帝国历史中理念和制度的重新思考。当代儒家思想家蒋庆在康有为的启发下，强烈捍卫

The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University 

March 28 2023 by Daniel A. Bell (Author)
https://www.amazon.ca/Dean-Shandong-Confessions-Bureaucrat-University/dp/0691247129/ref=

A Financial Times Best Book of the Year

An inside view of Chinese academia and what it reveals about China’s political system

On January 1, 2017, Daniel Bell was appointed dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University—the first foreign dean of a political science faculty in mainland China’s history. In The Dean of Shandong, Bell chronicles his experiences as what he calls “a minor bureaucrat,” offering an inside account of the workings of Chinese academia and what they reveal about China’s political system. It wasn’t all smooth sailing—Bell wryly recounts sporadic bungles and misunderstandings—but Bell’s post as dean provides a unique vantage point on China today.

Bell, neither a Chinese citizen nor a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was appointed as dean because of his scholarly work on Confucianism—but soon found himself coping with a variety of issues having little to do with scholarship or Confucius. These include the importance of hair color and the prevalence of hair-dyeing among university administrators, both male and female; Shandong’s drinking culture, with endless toasts at every shared meal; and some unintended consequences of an intensely competitive academic meritocracy. As dean, he also confronts weightier matters: the role at the university of the Party secretary, the national anticorruption campaign and its effect on academia (Bell asks provocatively, “What’s wrong with corruption?”), and formal and informal modes of censorship. Considering both the revival of Confucianism in China over the last three decades and what he calls “the Communist comeback” since 2008, Bell predicts that China’s political future is likely to be determined by both Confucianism and Communism.

INTRODUCTION: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat in Shandong Province(pp. 1-20)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f

I AM NOT NOW nor at any time have ever been a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet I serve as dean of a large faculty of political science in a Chinese university that trains students and provincial cadres to serve the country as Communist Party officials: It’s typically a post reserved for members of the CCP, given the political sensitivity of the work. That’s part of the surprise. The other part is that I’m a Canadian citizen, born and bred in Montreal, without any Chinese ancestry. On January 1, 2017, I was formally appointed dean of the...

1 Dye and Dynamism(pp. 21-29)

FORMER PRESIDENT HU JINTAO is perhaps the most boring leader in modern times. His only recorded joke came when he was visiting the United States in 2007. The then-governor of New Jersey, James McGreevey, told Hu—whose hair was jet-black—that he did not look his fifty-nine years. Hu replied: “China would be happy to share its technology in this area.”¹ The use of hair dye for political leaders has a long history in China. Why do Chinese leaders dye their hair? It has nothing to do with communist ideology. The roots go way back in Chinese history. In the...

2 The Harmony Secretary(pp. 30-44)

WHEN I MEET public officials in China, I’m often asked, why is our image so bad in the West? They say: Of course we have many problems. We’re still a relatively poor country in terms of GDP per capita. There’s a big gap between rich and poor, pollution is bad, corruption is a problem, and everybody knows about restlessness in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Perhaps we’ve overreacted at times and local officials often abuse their power. But we’ve made some progress, especially in terms of poverty alleviation and combatting corruption. We did a good job of dealing with Covid after...

3 On Collective Leadership(pp. 45-64)

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, from 1966 to 1976, was a disastrous experience with radical populism and a crazed personality cult. To avoid a repeat experience of arbitrary one-man dictatorship at the top, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders established mechanisms meant to limit the possibility of a “bad emperor.” Term limits for rulers were meant to help: As of 1982, the constitution stipulated that the president could not serve more than two consecutive terms. Deng Xiaoping continued to exercise substantial behind-the-scenes political power until his death in 1997, casting doubt on the practical implications of formal retirement. But Jiang Zemin and Hu...

4 What’s Wrong with Corruption?(pp. 65-73)

IN CHINA, corruption is the mother of all political evils. From a Confucian perspective, the best life involves serving the community qua public official and, conversely, the worst life involves misuse of public funds for private or family purposes. Such ideas influence history. Why did the Ming Dynasty collapse? Why did the Qing Dynasty collapse? There are many reasons, but the explosive growth of corruption had an important role to play in undermining the legitimacy of these long-lasting dynasties. And why did the CCP defeat the KMT in China’s civil war? It wasn’t due to superior weaponry. An important reason...

5 Drinking without Limits(pp. 74-84)

CONFUCIUS, LIKE ARISTOTLE, favored a moderate approach to life: “The Middle Way is the highest level of virtue” (Analects 6.29). With one notable exception: “only with regard to alcohol did [Confucius] set no limits” (Analects 10.8). According to Edward Slingerland, “the fact that Confucius could drink to his heart’s content but never became unruly is a sign of his sagehood.”¹ Confucius himself was more modest in his self-assessment. He could “follow what [his] heart desired, without transgressing what was right” only at the age of seventy (Analects 2.4), with the implication that he transgressed what was right before then, perhaps...

6 Teaching Confucianism in China(pp. 85-94)

KONGZI (551–479 BCE)—family name Kong (孔)，with “zi” (子)as an honorific title—was a politician, philosopher, and poet. But he is revered first and foremost for his role as a teacher. The saying above the imposing Kongzi statue at the Confucius temple in Qufu is “万世师表,” which can be translated as “The Model Teacher for Ten Thousand Generations.” Why is Kongzi—known as Confucius in the West—regarded as the teacher of teachers? There are several reasons. He established the earliest form of higher education in China’s history and taught students regardless of class or family background. His most...

7 The Communist Comeback(pp. 95-105)

IN 2008, I published a book proclaiming the end of Marxist ideology in China.¹ Marxism was dead as a motivating value system. Few serious thinkers in China openly defended Marxism as a guiding ideology for the modern world. The Chinese Communist Party seemed to be communist in name only, and it increasingly emphasized “Chinese characteristics,” meaning commitment to pragmatic change and to China’s own cultural traditions such as Confucianism. I predicted that the CCP would soon be renamed the Chinese Confucian Party.

Ironically, the Marxist tradition mounted its comeback at the same time, in both official and unofficial circles. It...

8 Censorship, Formal and Informal(pp. 106-126)

JOHN STUART MILL’S On Liberty, first published in 1859, is the most influential defense of free speech ever written. What is less well known is that Mill worried more about “public opinion” than about state censorship. As Mill puts it, the tyranny of public opinion is “more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”¹ Yes, he was writing in Victorian England and our time may not be as conformist. But it’s...

9 Academic Meritocracy, Chinese-Style(pp. 127-137)

IN AN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY, it’s clear who chooses the political leaders: the people who vote for them. I’m sometimes asked: Who chooses the leaders in a political meritocracy? In China, I respond, only half-jokingly, it’s the Organization Department (组织部). The most senior-level appointments are decided by Politburo members. At the lowest level, people usually get to vote for their village leaders. In between, the large bulk of public officials are selected by the Organization Department, which is like the world’s largest and most powerful human resources department, responsible for approximately seventy million personnel assignments across all forms and levels of...

10 A Critique of Cuteness(pp. 138-148)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f.14
IN A BID TO SHAPE international public opinion about China, President Xi Jinping told senior officials that the country needed to present a more “credible, loveable, and respectable” image of China.¹ This surprising formulation is more than a call to tame down the “Wolf Warrior” rhetoric. The key word is “可爱” (ke ai).² Ke ai literally means “can love” and it is translated by official media as “lovable.” But ke ai means “cute” in everyday usage.

The idea of “cuteness” as soft power may seem odd on the face of it. But the rapid spread of what we can term...

11 The Case for Symbolic Leadership(pp. 149-160)

CHINA ABOLISHED THE imperial system in 1912. But the ideal of monarchy didn’t die. The Confucian reformist Kang Youwei argued for the establishment of a symbolic monarch bound by constitutional constraints. The cause was set back when Kang participated in the abortive restoration of the Qing ruler in 1917, and the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in 1949 seemed to deliver the fatal blow to the system of monarchical rule. But the revival of Confucianism has led to the reconsideration of ideals and institutions from China’s imperial past. The contemporary Confucian thinker Jiang Qing, inspired by Kang Youwei, strongly defends the...