《航空周刊》关于J20的文章（附在后面）在最后说到：
“自从（中国的）军事现代化开始以来，新武器越来越有创意。虽然还不能排除以色列人提供了技术援助，J-10与任何其它战斗机都不同，J-10B更是这样。在其它领域，像022导弹快艇一样的系统是独一无二的（也许正因为此，美国才会让ONR/DARPA立项，快速开发一种远程反舰导弹LRASM？）”
查一下LRASM就知道，这是美国的“下一代导弹”，其目的是“对抗预估的来自中国岸基或海基弹道导弹对美国航母群从数百公里外产生的威胁。”此项目从2008开始，显然是在得知中国对航母有“高速、远程打击”能力之后。
美国对“远程反舰导弹”投下的初步研发费用大约为一亿六千万美元（哪儿够啊）。对其基本要求是：使用现有的垂发系统VLS-41或空中发射，能够低空、远距、超音速巡航。其最重要的特点，也许要算这两点：首先此导弹完全自我导航，不再依赖GPS之类系统；其次此导弹有“紧急规避”能力，以突破各种空防系统。
另外一种在研的未来导弹ArcLight（弧光）则更为先进。他会用助推火箭加速到多倍音速，然后高速滑行，从而可以在30分钟内攻击到2000海里距离的目标。这种导弹可以使得普通军舰也成为远程打击力量的一部分。一个很有意思的特点是它的“机翼”。滑行时需要机翼，发射时不能有，因此机翼或者要能“变形”，或者可以由软变硬最后成形。
中国的军工队伍也许早有同样甚至更好的构想，尚未可知。
AviationWeek 12/30：
How Not To Think About The J-20
Posted by Bill Sweetman at 12/30/2010 10:50 AM CST
Now that the last few skeptics have been converted to the idea that the J-20 is a real airplane, and not the product of a network of Chinese teenage boys armed with Photoshop, the internetz are rife with speculation about the project's schedule, technology and capabilities.
Much of it is both premature and misguided, the result of several basic errors in analysis, politics and prejudice.
The first mistake is "mirror imaging". The Tu-22M Backfire was not a B-1, but the USAF wanted it to be one, because they desperately wanted to resurrect the B-1. The MiG-25 looked like the air-superiority fighters that the USAF was sketching in the late 1960s, but it was nothing of the sort. And just because the front end of the J-20 looks like an F-22 does not mean that it is an F-22 clone.
One problem with mirror-imaging is the unspoken assumption that the other guys face the same challenges that you do. But to take a couple of examples, the Russians in the Cold War never had to worry about a dense, layered surface-to-air missile threat and the US does not face an adversary with a significant carrier force.
A related source of error is an attempt to exploit the appearance of a new Chinese or Russian system to support a pre-existing belief system. That's why people who want more defense spending will upsell the threat, and predict that the new whatever-it-is will be operational next week and in production at a rate of 100 per year, and those on the other side will point to the adversary's primitive technology level, and argue that the new aircraft is merely an X-plane. The right answer usually lies between those points, but more importantly, it won't be found that way.
There's a healthy dose of cultural prejudice behind both errors. Mirror-imaging, in the Cold War and today, is supported by the idea that Communists are unimaginative bureaucrats who can't innovate their way out of a wet paper bag. We found out this wasn't true, on a massive scale, after 1991: for instance, the combination of helmet-mounted sights and high off-boresight missiles sent the US scrambling to develop the AIM-9X, and US spy satellites fly on Energomash RD-180 engines.
China's military engineers and planners have unintentionally reinforced this image over the decades, preferring to upgrade Soviet-era systems rather than developing new platforms. But that tends to obscure the fact that (to take one example) the latest version of the HQ-2 surface-to-air missile bears only an external resemblance to the Soviet V-750.
Since the current military modernization started, new weapons havev been increasingly innovative. The question of Israeli technical assistance notwithstanding, the J-10 does not resemble any other fighter, and the J-10B less so. In other domains, systems like the Type 022 fast missile boat resemble nothing anywhere else (and could that be one reason for the fast-paced ONR/DARPA LRASM program?).
Next question: what does the J-20 look like from a Chinese perspective? Watch this space.
