慕容青草的博客
哲学园地
正文
辩证法是康德在被称为是哲学史上最具影响力的著作之一的《纯粹理性批判》[1],[2]中讨论的一个核心的一个内容，甚至可以认为该书的其它重点就是围绕这辩证这个话题展开的。但是，非常奇怪地，与今天人们将辩证法与黑格尔哲学密切地联系在一起形成鲜明对比的是，今天很少有人将康德的哲学与辩证法联系在一起。甚至在谈论那本传世名著《纯粹理性批判》时，也常有人不对其中的辩证观进行探讨。造成这种现象的原因主要是辩证的概念在康德的笔下与传统的及现代的辩证概念相去甚远。
首先，同亚力士多德一样，康德给与传统的辩证法非常负面的评价：
古时的哲学家们将‘辩证’一词用作一门科学或艺术的名字时赋予了这个词汇各种不同的意思，但是他们对这个术语的实际的运用表明他们其实将它作为一个关于错觉的逻辑的名字---就是这样，仅此而已。在这个意义上，辩证是一套为无知甚至有目的之诡计制造出真理之烟幕的刁钻技巧，它滑稽地模仿逻辑通常具有的方法上的缜密，并运用它的技术性的手段来美化每一种空洞的吹嘘。
（英译原文：
The
ancient philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when
using it as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term
shows that they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing
else. Dialectic in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air
of truth to ignorance and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping
the methodical thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its
technical paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
ancient philosophers gave the term ‘dialectic’ various different meanings when
using it as the name of a science or art, but their actual use of the term
shows that they meant it as a name for the logic of illusion—that and nothing
else. Dialectic in this sense is a tricky set of techniques for giving an air
of truth to ignorance and even to intentional tricks, which it does by aping
the methodical thoroughness that logic always prescribes, and using its
technical paraphernalia to prettify every empty pretension.
）
而且认为哲学的一个主要任务便是除去辩证法中由错觉造成的影响：
既然总会有各种形而上学，就总会存在着纯理性的辩证，这是因为辩证对于理性来说是很自然的。所以哲学的第一要务便是，通过堵住错误的源头，来一劳永逸地除去辩证中的不良影响。
（英译原文：
For there always
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
has been, and always will be, some kind of metaphysics, so there will always be
a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. So the
first and most important task of philosophy is to deprive dialectic of its bad
influence, once and for all, by blocking off the source of the errors.
）
由此可见，虽然康德要堵住人们运用辩证时的错误的源头意愿是好的，但是他同样没有真正理解柏拉图所倡导的辩证法的真谛。与亚里士多德不同的是，康德把辩证法或者更确切地说是把人们在以辩证的名义或被认为是以辩证的名义进行表达时所表现出的一种逻辑模式称为错觉。
其实，人们熟知的错误地进行辩证表达的基本特点是评论一件事时似是而非，怎么都有道理，给不出任何确定性的积极有效的信息来；把康德的错觉说看作是对这种状况的一种评语确实会得到人们的很大程度上的认同。康德进一步指出辩证所对应的错觉是将主观的内容作为客观的道理强加给人们：
…我们这里面对的是一种很自然的无法避免的错觉，它将主观的原理作为客观的强加给我们；一种由模仿有效的推理而得出的人造的错觉。
（英译原文：
…we
have here is a •natural
and inevitable illusion, trading on
subjective principles that it foists on us as objective; with an illusion •artificially created by something imitating a valid
inference.
)
have here is a •natural
and inevitable illusion, trading on
subjective principles that it foists on us as objective; with an illusion •artificially created by something imitating a valid
inference.
)
今天的大多数不喜欢辩证法的人应该也可以接受康德关于辩证产生错觉的这种说法。如果人们在生活中见证的辩证表达都是符合客观实际的，那么他们就不会对辩证法感到反感了。但是这里要注意到，康德这里用的是“主观原理”而不是“主观认识”一词，这是康德的理论开始偏离我们的一般生活经验常识之处。康德认为造成这种错觉的原因是人们进行理性思维所遵循的一些公理与法则具有客观原理的外表：
这一类错觉的产生原因是某些指导我们（主观上作为人类知识的功能）进行理性思维的基本法则和公理具有客观原理的外表。
…
也就是说，那些其实表示东西具有‘在认知的活动中，做X’的形式的法则却表现为‘真实世界是Y’。这不是简单地实际为主观的看上去象客观的；他们实际上为指导或命令却看上去象提供信息的命题。
（英译原文：
The cause of this kind of illusion is
the fact that certain basic •rules and maxims that tell us how to use our
reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge) have all the appearance
of being •objective principles. ·
…
the fact that certain basic •rules and maxims that tell us how to use our
reason (subjectively regarded as a faculty of human knowledge) have all the appearance
of being •objective principles. ·
…
That is, rules that really mean things
of the form ‘When engaged in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of
being of the form ‘The real world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really
subjective yet appear to be objective; but also they are really advice or commands,
yet they appear to be informative propositions·.
of the form ‘When engaged in cognitive activities, do X’ have the appearance of
being of the form ‘The real world is Y’. It’s not just that they are really
subjective yet appear to be objective; but also they are really advice or commands,
yet they appear to be informative propositions·.
）
基于这个原因，康德认为辩证所对应的理性思维错觉是难以逃避的：
这是一种难以防止的错觉…就像天文学家无法防止月亮升起时看上去比较大一样，尽管他知道那不是真的。
…
所以我们面对的是：有一种自然而又无法避免的纯粹理性的辩证。它不是一个业余玩家可以无知地糊弄的，或者一个诡辩者刻意设计来让人们的思考陷入困惑的。相反地，它是无法与人们的理性相分隔的；即便当它的虚假性被识破之后，它将继续它对于理性的玩弄，继续使理性暂时地犯需要不断被纠正的错误。
（英译原文：
This is an illusion that can no more be
prevented than. . . .an astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger
as it rises, even though he knows that it isn’t really.
prevented than. . . .an astronomer can prevent the moon from appearing larger
as it rises, even though he knows that it isn’t really.
…
So there we have it: there’s a natural and
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. It’s not something that a bungler might
get tangled in through ignorance, or something that a sophist has contrived so
as to confuse thinking people. Rather, it is inseparable from human reason;
even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, it will go on playing tricks
with reason, continually tricking it into momentary aberrations that have to be
corrected over and over again.
）
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. It’s not something that a bungler might
get tangled in through ignorance, or something that a sophist has contrived so
as to confuse thinking people. Rather, it is inseparable from human reason;
even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, it will go on playing tricks
with reason, continually tricking it into momentary aberrations that have to be
corrected over and over again.
）
康德对于产生辩证错觉的原因的分析是基于将人的思维分为经验性思维与非经验性思维，也就是所谓的超验的思维，而所谓的纯粹理性就是不具备经验内容的理性。他指出，造成辩证的错觉的原因是人们将原本不属于经验范畴的逻辑运用于与经验相关的知识领域中去，关于感性经验与错觉的关系康德一方面他说：
……感觉是不会错的 --- 不是因为它们正确地进行判断而是因为它们根本不做判断！
……
对于感觉的直接反映从不会引入错误，因为它从不会对任何事情做判断，因而在完全遵守着理解定律的任何知识项目也不会有任何错误---除非受到外来的影响，自然力是不会偏离自己的规律的。
（英译原文：
……the senses
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
don’t err—not because they always judge correctly but because they don’t judge
at all!
……
A representation of the senses never
involves error, because it never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no
error, either, in any item of knowledge that completely accords with the laws
of understanding—a natural force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
involves error, because it never makes any judgment whatsoever; and there is no
error, either, in any item of knowledge that completely accords with the laws
of understanding—a natural force can’t deviate from its own laws unless it is
influenced from outside itself. . . .
）
但另一方面他又专门对上述的论点做了一个注解：
当感性服从于理解而为理解提供材料时，它是真实的知识的来源。但是当同样的感性影响理解应如何作业并决定理解所做出的判断时，它是错误的基础。
（英译原文：
When sensibility is subordinated to
understanding, as providing the understanding with something to work on, it is
the source of real items of knowledge. But when that same sensibility
influences how the understanding works and dictates the judgments that it
makes,
understanding, as providing the understanding with something to work on, it is
the source of real items of knowledge. But when that same sensibility
influences how the understanding works and dictates the judgments that it
makes,
it’s the basis of error.
）
可见他指的是感觉所带来的信息的原始性，强调它不具有应判断而产生的错误。而后面那个注解或许表明他并不排除直接的感性出错的可能性，但也可能只是要强调不能由感性来支配人的理解而应反之而已。至于为什么试图超验地运用理性（即他所谓的将理性直接运用于经验领域）会产生超验错觉，他做了如下的解释：
它（理性）的对象是概念与判断。因此，即便纯粹理性想要关心客观对象，它直接涉及到的也不会是客观对象或关于对象的直觉，而是理解以及理解所做出的判断，它们才是直接与感观及其直觉打交道以建立起关于客观对象的事实的。理解的（内在）统一性是可能的经验的统一……使经验成为可能不是理性的工作；这就剥夺了理性将任何综合性的统一加在经验上的任何机会……
……
正如理解可以被认为是运用法则来统一表观的功能，理性可以被认为是运用原理来统一理解所依据的法则的功能。因此，理性从不直接应用于经验或任何客观物体。它所作用的是理解：它的角色是通过概念来将理解的复杂的知识网络先验地统一起来。
（英译原文：
What it deals with are •concepts and
•judgments. Thus, even if pure reason does
•judgments. Thus, even if pure reason does
·somehow· concern itself with objects,
what it is immediately related to are not •objects and the intuition of them,
but rather •the understanding and its judgments, which do deal at first hand
with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about
their object. The unity of understanding is the unity of a possible experience
what it is immediately related to are not •objects and the intuition of them,
but rather •the understanding and its judgments, which do deal at first hand
with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of establishing facts about
their object. The unity of understanding is the unity of a possible experience
…… reason doesn’t have the job of
making experience possible; and that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience
any such synthetic unity…...
making experience possible; and that deprives it of any chance of imposing on experience
any such synthetic unity…...
……
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its
Just as understanding can be seen as the faculty that uses rules to unify
appearances, reason can be seen as the faculty that uses principles to unify
the understanding’s rules. Thus, reason never applies directly to experience or
to any object. What it applies to is the understanding: its
role is to give an a priori unity by
means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
means of concepts to the understanding’s complex web of items of knowledge.
）
而《纯粹理性批判》一书中最容易造成误解的是，康德实际上把辩证一词在同一本书里既用于超验思维产生的错觉又用于帮助识别及克服错觉的方法。他在对传统的辩证法进行否定之后说：
这样方法是配不上哲学之高贵的，因而我们不需要‘辩证’或任何其它的词汇来为这样一种坏东西命名。所以我宁可用‘辩证’这个名词来表示对于前述的辩证错觉的批判；这样一种批判不属于逻辑的一部分，这就是‘辩证’在本书中的意义。
…
所以超验辩证法将用于揭示超验判断的错觉，同时也帮助我们避免被它欺骗。
（英译原文：
Such a
procedure is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need
‘dialectic’ or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the
noun ‘dialectic’ to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique
does count as part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in
the present work.
procedure is quite unworthy of the dignity of philosophy, ·and we don’t need
‘dialectic’ or any other word to name something so bad·. So I prefer to use the
noun ‘dialectic’ to stand for a critique of dialectical illusion; such a critique
does count as part of logic, and that’s how ‘dialectic’ is to be understood in
the present work.
…
So the transcendental dialectic will
content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also
keeping us from being deceived by it.
content itself with exposing the illusion of transcendent judgments, while also
keeping us from being deceived by it.
）
上面这段话的真实意思恐怕要比它的字面意思复杂许多。康德这里要说的实际意思是他在《纯粹理性批判》这本书中将用‘辩证’一词来表示他所提出的方法，它是专门用来揭示传统的辩证错觉的根源从而帮助人们来对它加以克服的。换句话说，他提出了一种新的辩证法，是专门用来克服他所认为的与传统的辩证意义相关的理性错觉的。
虽然今天我们已不易找到古早时候人们是如何错误地用辩证法进行诡辩的例子，可以相信它应该与近代以来的模式差不多；至少它应该是具有那种典型的用一般的大道理代替具体的知识从而怎么都对的特征，或者说是亚里士多德所说的“而辩证法师则用他们的辩证法去拥抱一切，他们会讲对一切都一样的存在（dialecticians
embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things;）”那样的特征。而康德所说的把不具备经验内容的理性逻辑当作经验性的知识来用这一点和我们所熟悉的用一般的大道理代替具体的知识的错误的辩证思维特征是吻合的，因为所谓的一般的大道理通常都是康德所说的不属于感性领域的理性思维的内容，而康德在《纯粹理性批判》一书中又指出的纯粹理性总是以不受限制的一般性概念为目标的:
embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things;）”那样的特征。而康德所说的把不具备经验内容的理性逻辑当作经验性的知识来用这一点和我们所熟悉的用一般的大道理代替具体的知识的错误的辩证思维特征是吻合的，因为所谓的一般的大道理通常都是康德所说的不属于感性领域的理性思维的内容，而康德在《纯粹理性批判》一书中又指出的纯粹理性总是以不受限制的一般性概念为目标的:
所有这些都是按照理性自身的原理发生的---它自己的原理---给定任何一个通过理解而得到的具体知识项目，找出能够是理解完全统一的无条件的一般结果。我们可以将这一逻辑公理作为纯粹理性的原理---也就是，不将它仅仅当作告诉我们应该做什么的命令，而是作为高所我们实际存在着什么的结论---换言之，对于任何一个具体存在的事务它的条件一定存在。
(英译原文：
All of this happens in accordance with
reason’s principle—its very own principle—Given any conditioned item of
knowledge obtained through the understanding, find the unconditioned whereby
the understanding can be completely unified. We may want to treat this logical
maxim as a principle of pure reason—i.e. ·to regard it not merely as •a command
that tells us what to do, but as •a statement saying that something is the
case—namely that for everything conditioned there
is a condition·.
reason’s principle—its very own principle—Given any conditioned item of
knowledge obtained through the understanding, find the unconditioned whereby
the understanding can be completely unified. We may want to treat this logical
maxim as a principle of pure reason—i.e. ·to regard it not merely as •a command
that tells us what to do, but as •a statement saying that something is the
case—namely that for everything conditioned there
is a condition·.
）
我们来看一个大家对之可以感觉非常熟悉的假想例子。路人甲做了一件事，路人乙对之评论道：“凡事都有两个方面，好的一面和坏的一面，这件事也一样。”如果接下来，路人乙针对那件事的具体内容来具体分析哪些方面或哪些意义上来说是好的及哪些方面或哪些意义上来说是不好的，那么就属于是有意义的辩证评论；但是，如果路人乙的评论就到上面那句话那里打住了，或者虽然还有很多内容却没有一句是针对具体的内容来说明为什么好及坏的，那就是构成了康德所说的辩证错觉，或超验错觉，而原因显然就是康德所说的用原不属于经验的理性内容作为经验性的评论来用了。虽然实际思维是经验与非经验的复杂的混合体，康德对于思维元素的划分所起到的积极作用是指出非经验的部分成为错觉的来源的可能形式。
如果康德对于他所谓的辩证错觉的分析仅仅到这一层次而且再提供一些诸如本文上面提到的路人甲乙这一类的相关例子的话，那么对于我们认识并防范对于辩证法的错误运用确实会有很大帮助。但是，康德的分析并没有在这里打住，也没有提供相关的例证，而是进一步将他分出的非经验思维进一步分为一般非经验性思维（或逻辑性非经验性思维）与具有如下特殊意义的非经验性思维（或先验的思维）：
“超验”这个术语并适用于所有的先验知识，而只适用于那些让我们知道能够以完全先验的方式使用某些表现（直觉或概念）以及如何达到这一点。“超验”的东西一定是关于某种先验知识的可能性的……这样一门学科应该被称为“超验逻辑”，因为它仅对理解与理性的规律感兴趣，只关心它们与客观物体的先验关系---不象一般的逻辑，一般逻辑对经验的与纯粹理性的知识都感兴趣，不在它们之间做任何区别。
(英译原文：
The term ‘transcendental’ does not apply
to all items
of a priori knowledge,
but only to ones through which we know that certain representations (intuitions
or concepts) can be
used in an entirely a priori way
and know how this
is so. Something is ‘transcendental’ only if it is about the possibility of a
certain kind of apriori knowledge……Such a
science would have to be called ‘transcendental logic’, because it deals merely
with the laws of understanding and of reason, attending only to their a priori dealings with
objects—unlike general logic, which attends to empirical as well as pure rational
knowledge, without marking any distinction between them.
to all items
of a priori knowledge,
but only to ones through which we know that certain representations (intuitions
or concepts) can be
used in an entirely a priori way
and know how this
is so. Something is ‘transcendental’ only if it is about the possibility of a
certain kind of apriori knowledge……Such a
science would have to be called ‘transcendental logic’, because it deals merely
with the laws of understanding and of reason, attending only to their a priori dealings with
objects—unlike general logic, which attends to empirical as well as pure rational
knowledge, without marking any distinction between them.
）
这或许对于思维哲学的发展有帮助，对于错误地运用辩证法的研究来说却是偏了题，而康德在对他所认为的错误的辩证思维的分析中并没有对上述特殊意义上的超验现象与一般地将纯粹理性的状况区分开来。更确切地说，从他有限的举例来看，他的分析主要是针对上面的窄化了的非经验的思维。当然，他对于非经验性思维的细化分析的一些结果在帮助我们了解思维的一般特性的同时也确实可以帮助我们认识作为一般思维的特例的辩证思维。比如，他提出判断分类以及相应的作为理解的对象的概念可以帮助我们认识一些可以被超验地运用在思维中的先验的内容，而这些内容既然会出现在一般的思维中就同样会出现在我们日常感兴趣的辩证思维之中。但是，虽然康德的分析能够提供人们的一般思维特性的一些知识，却偏离了对于造成我们日常所面对的错误地运用辩证法的根本原因的探讨。
另外，对于经验与非经验的复杂混合体的实际思维来说，经验的内容同样可能产生错觉。除了诸如喝醉酒时候的感觉错误之外，数据本身就可能造成逻辑上的错误，比如“我们班最厉害的是麦克”这样一句话是我们常见的一类可以被认为是错觉的生活用语的一个例子，它可能指平时班里没人敢惹麦克，但并不等于他生病的时候或者一个人面对一群人的时候或者被暗算的时候仍然是最厉害的。而如果要对“我们班最厉害的是麦克”进行思维元素的分解来判断什么部分产生错觉，其实没什么意义，因为这句明显是基于生活经验的不严格的论断的要害不在于它自身的经验依据以及根据经验进行的实用性的逻辑推论，而涉及到了实际的心理效果与逻辑思考的周全的问题。换句话说，我完全不需要了解康德的分析也可以指出这句话的问题，而即使我非常熟悉康德的分析也无法帮仅仅运用康德的分析来指出这句话的问题。当然，这句话虽属于常见的一类生活用语，却并没有反映出我们日常所遇到的错误地运用辩证法的特征，这一事实本身也反映出康德的分析对于分析错误的辩证根源的缺陷，因为康德文章中除了复杂的例子外就是类似这样的单句例子，他从未给出类似我上面提到的路人甲乙的那样的例子来。
不仅如此，康德在《纯粹理性批判》中还可以说是相当莫名奇妙地说只有三种纯粹理性的错觉：
纯粹超验理性概念可以说是我们对之毫无概念的东西，尽管这些概念是理性在自己内在的本性驱使之下创造出来的……理性的纯粹概念的超验（主观）现实依赖于我们通过理性的推论得出这些概念。没有经验前提的理性推论将使我们从我们所知道的一些事情得出我们没有概念的另一些内容来，而不可避免的错觉导致我们认为它是客观地真实。鉴于它们所得出的结论的特点，这样的思维活动最好被称为‘诡辩’而不是‘理性的推论’，尽管它们的起源使得它们可以拥有后者的头衔，因为它们并非虚拟的也不是随机产生的而是由理性的本性决定了的。它们不是人为的诡辩而是纯粹理性自身的诡辩，因而即便是最聪明的人也无法免于这样的诡辩。如果他非常努力地抵挡它，他或许可以免于犯下实际的错误；但是他将永远无法摆脱那无止境地嘲笑他的错觉。所以，这就是我们所面对的：正正好三种理性的辩证的理性推论---恰好对应着它们的结论所产生的三种理性概念。
(1) ……
超验谬误推论
超验谬误推论
……
(2) ……纯粹理性二律背反
……
(3) ……纯粹理性之理想
(英译原文：
The object of a purely transcendental
idea can be said to be something of which we have no concept, despite the idea’s
being something that reason is compelled by its own inherent nature to produce……The
transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure conceptsof reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a
necessary inference of reason. There will therefore beinferences of reason, having no empirical premises, throughwhich we infer from something we know something
elseof which we have no concept though an
inevitable illusionleads us to regard it as
objectively real. Because of the conclusions
they come to, these movements of the mind would
be better called ‘sophistical’ [vernünftelnde]
rather than‘inferences of reason’ though
their origin gives them some claim to the latter title,since they aren’t fictitious and have arisen not by chancebut from the very nature of reason.They are sophistries not of men but of pure
reason itself, and noteven the wisest of
men can free himself from them. If he works hard at it he may be able to guard himself
against actual error; but he’ll never be able to free himself from the illusion,
which unceasingly mocks and teases him. So there we have it: there are exactly
three kinds of dialectical inferences of reason—just as there are three ideas in
which their conclusions result.
idea can be said to be something of which we have no concept, despite the idea’s
being something that reason is compelled by its own inherent nature to produce……The
transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure conceptsof reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a
necessary inference of reason. There will therefore beinferences of reason, having no empirical premises, throughwhich we infer from something we know something
elseof which we have no concept though an
inevitable illusionleads us to regard it as
objectively real. Because of the conclusions
they come to, these movements of the mind would
be better called ‘sophistical’ [vernünftelnde]
rather than‘inferences of reason’ though
their origin gives them some claim to the latter title,since they aren’t fictitious and have arisen not by chancebut from the very nature of reason.They are sophistries not of men but of pure
reason itself, and noteven the wisest of
men can free himself from them. If he works hard at it he may be able to guard himself
against actual error; but he’ll never be able to free himself from the illusion,
which unceasingly mocks and teases him. So there we have it: there are exactly
three kinds of dialectical inferences of reason—just as there are three ideas in
which their conclusions result.
(1) ……
transcendental paralogism.
transcendental paralogism.
……
(2) ……antinomyofpure
reason.
reason.
……
(3) ……idealof pure reason.
）
就这样，康德将他那原本涵盖极广的超验错觉分析局限于对他所提出的那三种著名的超验错觉的分析，而他的那些具体分析如黑格尔对其中一条的评论那样“乏善可陈[3]”。其中，他对柏拉图的理念进行了批判性的讨论，认为柏拉图的理念的主要意义是作为思维的理想原型，然后又提出他自己的与柏拉图不同的理想概念并将之称为Ideal以区别于被柏拉图用作理念以及被用作一般的理性概念的Idea。
康德在《纯粹理性批判》一书中对于辩证概念的这种脱离了现实中人们所熟悉的错误的辩证特征的处理，使得人们，至少是我们这个时代的人们很难将康德的讨论与生活中所遇到的各种错误地运用辩证思维的现象联系在一起。另一方面，康德显然没有认识到柏拉图正确地运用辩证法的意义，因此，他对辩证法的观点是消极的，他所强调的只是对应着传统的辩证概念的思维之不可避免及其所带有的错觉性，而丝毫没有触及到传统的辩证思维的积极意义。所以，虽然如我前面给出的路人甲与路人乙的例子中所表现的，康德的分析确实可以帮助人们认识到当把作为纯粹理性的大道理脱离了具体的实际示例进行运用时便会产生错误的辩证现象，但是，他的理论却无法帮助人们认识辩证法之所以能够存在的内在生命力，更无法帮助人们正确地运用辩证法。
康德将思维分成经验与先验部分的目的是为了更好地认识先验的潜力。如他自己所说的：
关于主观的探讨对于我这里的主要目的是有大意义的，但它不是最基本的部分，因为这里的主要议题是：‘当理解与理性与经验相分离后它们还能知道多少？以及它们这样能够知道什么’
（英译原文：
This ·subjective· inquiry matters a lot
for my main purpose, but it’s not an essential part of it, because the main
question
for my main purpose, but it’s not an essential part of it, because the main
question
is always: ‘How much can understanding
and reason know when they are cut loose from all experience? And what can
and reason know when they are cut loose from all experience? And what can
they
know in this way?’
know in this way?’
）
康德认为传统的形而上学强调人们的知识要符合客观物体导致他那个时期的哲学家们对于形而上学的各种困惑，因而他提出要改变那种基本的观点而把形而上学建构在我们所认识的物体是要符合我们的知识体系这样的认识前提之下：
直到现在我们一直假设我们的知识必须符合它们所表达的客观物体；但是在那样的基础之上我们从未成功通过概念来先验地学到任何东西---从未给我们的知识增加任何东西。所以让我们换一个角度来试着将形而上学建立在这样的假设上：物体必须符合我们的知识。那将更适合于我们需要的结果，也就是可以告诉我们关于客观物提在我们接触它们之前的确定信息的先验知识。
（英译原文：
Until now it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to the objects ·that
it is knowledge of ·;
but working on that basis we have never succeeded in learning anything—never added anything to our stock
of knowledge—in an a priori way
through concepts. So let us now ·change our tack· and experiment with doing metaphysics
on the basis of the assumption that the
objectsmust
conform to our knowledge. That would fit better
with the upshot that we want, namely a
priori knowledge of the objects that will tell
us something definite about them before they are given to us.
it is knowledge of ·;
but working on that basis we have never succeeded in learning anything—never added anything to our stock
of knowledge—in an a priori way
through concepts. So let us now ·change our tack· and experiment with doing metaphysics
on the basis of the assumption that the
objectsmust
conform to our knowledge. That would fit better
with the upshot that we want, namely a
priori knowledge of the objects that will tell
us something definite about them before they are given to us.
）
相应地，康德指出我们不可能知道客观物体本身（things in themselves）是什么样的，我们知道的只是物体的外在表现（appearance）而已。在这两个方面上康德是正确的，是得到现代心理学知识的肯定的。但是，康德在这个基础上过于夸大先验的作用却是有失偏颇的。他之所以会那样做是因为，他把形而上学看成是一个完全由理性构成的自容的知识体系：
形而上学是一个完全自容的通过理性进行思辨的知识体系；它翱翔于经验的教导之上；它的是知识完全来源于单纯的概念（而不象数学那样是通过经概念加在大脑构造出的直觉之上）。
（英译原文：
Metaphysics is a completely
self-contained speculative knowledge through reason; it soars above the
teachings of experience; its knowledge comes through mere concepts (and not,
like mathematics, through bringing
self-contained speculative knowledge through reason; it soars above the
teachings of experience; its knowledge comes through mere concepts (and not,
like mathematics, through bringing
concepts
to bear on ·mentally constructed· intuitions).
to bear on ·mentally constructed· intuitions).
）
同时，如本文前面提到的，康德又认为理性只与理解与判断打交道而从不直接与经验或任何客观物体打交道的。因此，他就有必要将思维中的非经验部分单独分离出来作为形而上学的对象来进行研究。他这样的观点其实本身是有缺陷的。
康德在这里混淆了几个概念，那就是概念的客观性与主观的生成之间的不同，以及概念有意识的生成与无意识的生成之间的不同，还是遗传的影响的因素。首先，因为我们首先有认识与思考的能力使得我们能够认识物体，而我们所认识的都是物体的外在表现，这与康德的理论是一致的。这里其实已经涉及到我们作为人的生理与心理的本性问题，其中就涉及到遗传的因素。有些今天看来是先天的本能根据遗传学的理论是人类祖先长期进化的结果，因此从遗传进化的轨迹上来看，我们很难将今天的先验的本能与历史上的经验完全分开，这一点显然是康德没有意识到的；即便是不考虑遗传的因素，有些被他看来可以是被先验地运用的概念，比如因果关系概念的建立也不一定就如他所说的是完全丝毫与经验无关；虽然由于遗传的原因而使得人类在婴孩期可以很快就建立起因果的概念而其它动物则不行，但是，我们并无法完全从逻辑上严格地，如康德所说的那样，彻底排除婴孩在相对快速地建立起因果概念的过程中外界刺激所起的作用。
实际上，对于那些被认为是可以被先验地运用的概念的意义其实是存在的特性，对它们的认识既是人的本能使然也是因为它们体现在客观的特性之中。其实，并非所有的人，尤其是没有接受过很多教育的人，能够在未经解释的情况就完全清楚地把握康德列出的那些可以被先验地运用的概念的，难道你能否认他们具有人的基本能力吗？而一旦他们学习了之后就可以正确地把握那些概念，那样一来按照康德的划分那些概念就不能被称为先验的，因为它们是通过学习得到的了。另外，人们在对于概念的学习或抽象生成的过程中很难将有意识的思维与无意识的思维明确分开，而大量的活动是在无意识的过程中完成的。很显然，象康德那样把反映客观存在之间关系的概念与人的先验本能硬拉在一起是不明智的。
鉴于此，不但如前所述用非经验与经验思维的对比来解释辩证法相关的错误偏离了根本原因，而且由于康德对于经验与非经验的划分本身就存在这合理性上的缺陷，将传统辩证法有关的错误的产生归于非经验思维本身就不是一件很有意义的事情。。。
[1] Critique of Pure
Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 1929,
London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. URL:
http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-kemp-smith.pdf
[3]黑格尔在《逻辑学》中提到，“康德对于纯粹理性的二律背反的论述，当被仔细检查时…实在不值得任何特别的夸奖（Kant's expositions in the antinomies of pure reason, when closely
examined…… do not indeed deserve any great praise）”
examined…… do not indeed deserve any great praise）”
网友：康德认为传统的辩证意义对应的是一种错觉：古时的哲学家们赋予了‘辩证’这个词汇本意是辩论的技巧，这是古希腊智者学派的主要内容。也许康德说的也是这种辩证的意思。
本人：康德说古时人们赋予辩证很多意义，而他认为那些总起来说都与错觉有关。亚里士多德则认为辩证所批判而得到的结论都是哲学早已知道的。。但这都不是辩证的全意。。柏拉图对辩证有很高的评价，他是对的，只不过他没说清楚，更没指出康德提出的错觉。亚里士多德与康德也都对。一个复杂的话题:)
本人：不过有一点需要强调，那就是你的帖中暗示的将今天的辩证法与古时的截然区别开，那是错误的。当然，错误的原因很明显：先是亚里士多德批，再是康德加以区别，再是黑格尔又区别。但是他们那样做是不对的尽管他们对辩证法所做的评述都是有道理的。
中国人认为中国的古哲学是辩证的却不认为古希腊的是辩证的。。呵呵
本人上面的第二个回帖被新浪删了，不明白犯了他们的什么禁忌。。。