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Victor Hanson 屠杀与文化 西方强国崛起中的里程碑式战役
屠杀与文化：西方强国崛起中的里程碑式战役
作者：维克多·戴维斯·汉森（Victor Davis Hanson），2002年8月27日
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
by Victor Davis Hanson (Author) Aug. 27 2002
维克多·戴维斯·汉森考察了从古至今的九场里程碑式战役——从寡不敌众的希腊人彻底击败薛西斯奴隶军队的萨拉米斯战役，到科尔特斯征服墨西哥，再到春节攻势——解释了西方军队为何是世界上最具杀伤力和作战效率的军队。
汉森抛开地理或先进技术等流行解释，认为正是西方的文化和价值观——持不同政见的传统、对创造力和适应力的重视以及公民意识——才使得西方始终拥有更强大的武器和士兵。 《屠杀与文化》以引人入胜的战争叙事和平衡的视角，避免了简单的必胜主义，展现了军队与孕育它们的文化密不可分，并解释了自由文化孕育的军队为何始终占据优势。
人工智能概览
+4
维克多·戴维斯·汉森的《屠杀与文化》是一部引人入胜的历史分析著作，探讨了西方军队为何在历史上如此高效。据亚马逊加拿大站介绍，该书认为西方的军事优势源于文化因素，而非仅仅源于技术进步。汉森探讨了从古代到春节攻势的九场里程碑式战役，以阐明自由、个人主义和理性主义等西方价值观如何造就了卓越的军事实力。
本书论点和主题的主要方面：
文化影响：
汉森认为，强调个人主动性、自由探索和民主理想的西方文化，是西方军事成功的关键驱动力。
里程碑式战役：
本书分析了历史上的关键战役，展现了西方军队如何始终战胜对手，尤其是在胜算渺茫的情况下。
超越科技：
汉森在承认科技作用的同时，也强调西方军队的战斗力也植根于其文化价值观以及他们组织和激励士兵的方式。
西方持久的优势：
汉森认为，西方军事主导地位源于其独特的文化和制度框架，这种框架促成了其卓越军事能力的发展。
总而言之，《屠杀与文化》一书以细致入微、发人深省的视角审视了西方军事力量的崛起，指出西方价值观在塑造军事历史进程中发挥了至关重要的作用。
产品描述
书评
“生动……雄心勃勃……挑战读者拓宽视野，审视自己的假设……[汉森] 的论述远胜于论证本身。”——《纽约时报书评》
“没有人能比他更引人入胜地展现战争如何反映和影响发动战争的社会，包括我们自己的社会。”——《国家评论》
“汉森……正在成为美国最知名的历史学家之一……[《大屠杀与文化》] 只会提升他的声誉。”——约翰·基根，《每日电讯报》（伦敦）
“维克多·戴维斯·汉森凭借另一部通俗易懂、浅显易懂的作品再次引发争议。他与约翰·基根并列为最引人入胜的战争史学家。” ——《妇女与战争》作者 Jean Bethke Elshtain
封底
维克多·戴维斯·汉森 (Victor Davis Hanson) 考察了从古至今九场具有里程碑意义的战役——从寡不敌众的希腊人彻底击败薛西斯奴隶军队的萨拉米斯战役，到科尔特斯征服墨西哥，再到春节攻势——解释了西方军队为何是世界上最具杀伤力和战斗力的军队。
汉森抛开地理或先进技术等流行解释，认为正是西方文化和价值观——持不同政见的传统、对创造力和适应力的重视以及公民意识——才持续造就了更优秀的武器和士兵。《屠杀与文化》以引人入胜的战役叙事和平衡的视角，避免了简单的必胜信念，展现了军队与孕育它们的文化密不可分，并解释了为什么自由文化孕育的军队始终占据优势。
关于作者
维克多·戴维斯·汉森是斯坦福大学胡佛研究所马丁和伊利·安德森古典文学和军事史高级驻留研究员、加州州立大学弗雷斯诺分校古典文学名誉教授，以及《论坛媒体服务》的全国专栏作家。他也是希尔斯代尔学院韦恩和玛西娅·布斯克杰出历史研究员，每年秋季学期在该学院教授军事史和古典文化课程。他著有《战争之魂》、《战争之秋》和《战争之涟漪》，均由Anchor Books出版。他的最新著作是《救世主将军》（Bloomsbury出版社，2013年）。汉森曾荣获
他于2007年获得美国国家人文奖章，于2008年获得布拉德利奖，并于2015年获得威廉·F·巴克利奖，于2006年获得克莱蒙特研究所政治家风度奖，以及于2002年获得埃里克·布雷德尔观点新闻奖。他平时生活在加州塞尔玛的农场（他于1953年出生）和斯坦福校园之间。
摘录。© 经许可转载。保留所有权利。
第一
西方为何获胜
号角吹响，士兵们拿起武器冲锋陷阵。他们冲锋越发迅猛，发出一声大喊，然后各自向营地奔去。但野蛮人的大军却被巨大的恐惧所笼罩；西里西亚女王驾着马车仓皇而逃，市场上的人们也扔下货物，仓皇逃窜。就在这时，希腊人放声大笑，逼近了营地。西里西亚女王对方阵的辉煌壮丽和井然有序赞叹不已；居鲁士则欣喜地看到蛮族人看到希腊人时所展现出的惊恐之色。
——色诺芬，《远征记》（1.2.16-18）
开明的暴徒
即使是那些积极进取的杀手的困境也能说明一些问题。公元前401年夏天，小居鲁士雇佣了10700名希腊重装步兵——这些步兵全副武装，手持长矛、盾牌和盔甲——来帮助他巩固波斯王位。这些新兵大多是之前27年伯罗奔尼撒战争（公元前431-404年）中久经沙场的老兵。作为雇佣兵，他们来自整个希腊语世界。其中许多人是嗜杀成性的叛徒和流亡者。无论是接近青春期的少年，还是依然健壮的中年人，都应征入伍领取报酬。在几乎摧毁希腊世界的内战余波中，希腊人精疲力竭，许多人失业，不惜一切代价寻找杀手这份高薪工作。然而，队伍中也有一些享有特权的哲学和演说家，他们与这些穷困潦倒的雇佣兵并肩作战，向亚洲进军——其中既有像苏格拉底的学生色诺芬和波奥蒂亚将军普罗克塞努斯这样的贵族，也有医生、职业军官、未来的殖民者，以及居鲁士王子富有的希腊朋友。
在成功向东行进1500多英里，击溃所有敌军后，希腊人在巴比伦北部的库纳克萨战役中突破了波斯皇家防线。摧毁波斯军队一翼的代价，是一名希腊重装步兵被箭射伤。然而，在波斯王位争夺战的巅峰之战中，万里长征的胜利却付诸东流。他们的雇主居鲁士鲁莽地追击其弟阿塔薛西斯，越过战线，被波斯禁卫军斩首。
突然面对大批敌人和充满敌意的前盟友，他们远离家乡，既没有金钱、向导、粮食，也没有未来的国王，也没有足够的骑兵或远程部队，这些孤儿寡母的希腊远征步兵最终投票拒绝向波斯君主投降。相反，他们准备一路杀回希腊世界。这段穿越亚洲向北，最终抵达黑海沿岸的残酷旅程，构成了色诺芬《远征记》（《向内陆进军》）的核心内容，作者本人正是撤退万里长征的领导者之一。
尽管被成千上万的敌人包围，原有的将军被俘斩首，被迫穿越二十多个不同民族的争夺之地，困于雪堆、险峻的山口和缺水的草原，饱受冻伤、营养不良和频繁生病之苦，还要与各种野蛮的部落作战，希腊人最终安全抵达了黑海——这距离他们离开家园不到一年半。他们击溃了途中所有亚洲敌对势力。六人中有五人活着出来，大多数阵亡者并非死于战斗，而是葬身亚美尼亚的冰雪之中。
在严酷的考验中，一万人被陶奇人惊呆了，他们的妇女和儿童从村子高耸的悬崖上跳下，举行集体自杀的仪式。他们也同样对野蛮的白皮肤莫西诺伊奇人感到困惑，他们竟然在公共场合公开进行性交。卡利比亚人带着被杀对手的首级行军。就连波斯皇家军队也显得有些奇怪；追击的步兵，有时被军官鞭笞，在希腊方阵的第一次猛攻下就溃不成军。《远征记》最终震撼读者的，不仅仅是希腊军队的勇气、技巧和残暴——毕竟，他们在亚洲除了杀戮和金钱之外，别无他求——而是这支“万人骑兵”与他们所对抗的勇敢部落之间巨大的文化鸿沟。
在地中海，还有哪里能让哲学家和修辞学学者列队行进，与杀戮者并肩作战，一头扎进敌人的血肉？还有哪里能让每个士兵都感到与军队中的其他人平等——或者至少认为自己是自由的，能够掌控一切？
自己的命运？古代世界上还有哪支军队选举自己的领袖？如此小规模的军队，如何通过选举委员会，在成千上万的敌军中，跋涉数千英里，返回故乡？
这支既是“行军民主”又是雇佣军的万民军，离开库纳克萨战场后，士兵们例行举行集会，就其选举领袖的提议进行投票。在危机时刻，他们会组建临时委员会，以确保有足够的弓箭手、骑兵和医务兵。当面临各种突如其来的自然和人为挑战——无法通行的河流、粮食匮乏以及陌生的部落敌人——时，他们会召开会议，讨论新战术、制造新武器，并调整组织架构。民选将军与士兵并肩作战，并仔细地提供财政支出报告。
士兵们寻求与敌人进行面对面的冲击性战斗。所有人都认同严格纪律的必要性，并尽可能并肩作战。尽管他们自身骑兵严重短缺，但他们对大王的骑兵却唯唯诺诺。“在战斗中，没有人死于马的咬伤或踢伤，”色诺芬提醒他那些被围困的步兵（《远征记》3.2.19）。抵达黑海沿岸后，这支万人军对其领导层在过去一年中的表现进行了司法调查和审计，而心怀不满的个人则自由投票决定分头返回家园。一位卑微的阿卡迪亚牧羊人与苏格拉底的学生、即将成为从道德哲学到古雅典收入潜力等各领域著作的贵族色诺芬拥有同样的投票权。
想象一个相当于波斯万人军的组织是不可能的。想象一下，波斯国王的精锐重步兵——所谓的“不朽者”或“阿姆塔卡”，同样有 10,000 人——在数量上以十比一处于劣势，被切断并丢弃在希腊，从伯罗奔尼撒半岛行军到色萨利，在到达安全的赫勒斯滂海峡时，击败了他们入侵的每个希腊城邦数量上占优势的方阵。历史提供了一个更悲惨的真实案例：公元前 479 年，波斯将军马多尼乌斯的庞大入侵军队在普拉提亚战役中被数量上处于劣势的希腊人击败，随后被迫撤退到北部 300 英里处，穿过色萨利和色雷斯。尽管军队规模庞大，而且没有任何有组织的追击，但很少有波斯人返回家园。他们显然没有一万人。他们的国王很久以前就抛弃了他们；在萨拉米斯战役战败后，薛西斯于前一年秋天撤回了安全的宫廷。
技术优势本身并不能解释希腊人取得的奇迹般的成就，尽管色诺芬曾在多处指出，这支万人大军沉重的青铜、木材和铁质盔甲是亚洲任何武器都无法比拟的。也没有证据表明希腊人本质上与阿塔薛西斯国王的士兵“不同”。后来，欧洲人种族优越于波斯人的伪科学观点在当时的希腊人中并不普遍。尽管这支万人大军是经验丰富的雇佣兵，热衷于掠夺和偷窃，但他们并不比当时其他劫掠者更野蛮或好战；更不用说他们比在亚洲遇到的部落更仁慈或更有道德了。希腊宗教并不推崇以德报怨，也不认为战争本身是不正常的或不道德的。气候、地理和自然资源对我们并无多大帮助。事实上，色诺芬的士兵们只能羡慕小亚细亚的居民，因为他们拥有的可耕地和丰富的自然资源与希腊贫瘠的土地形成了鲜明对比。他们甚至警告士兵，任何向东迁移的希腊人，在如此富饶的自然景观中，都可能变成迟钝的“食莲者”。
然而，《远征记》明确指出，希腊人的作战方式与他们的对手截然不同，而这些独特的希腊式战斗特征——个人自由意识、卓越的纪律、无与伦比的武器、平等的友爱精神、个人主动性、持续的战术适应和灵活性、对重装步兵突击战的偏爱——本身就是整个希腊文化的杀戮红利。希腊人独特的杀戮方式源于协商一致的政府、中产阶级的平等、对军事事务的民事审计、与宗教无关的政治、自由和个人主义以及理性主义。万人行的严酷考验，在陷入困境、濒临灭绝之际，唤醒了所有希腊士兵与生俱来的城邦精神，他们在战场上如同各自城邦的平民一般行事。
在万人行之后，同样残酷的欧洲将以某种形式重现。
入侵者：阿格西劳斯和他的斯巴达人、雇佣兵队长查理斯、亚历山大大帝、尤利乌斯·凯撒及其数个世纪的军团统治地位、十字军、埃尔南·科尔特斯、亚洲海域的葡萄牙探险家、印度和非洲的英国红衣军，以及其他众多盗贼、海盗、殖民者、雇佣兵、帝国主义者和探险家。随后的大多数西方远征军寡不敌众，而且往往部署在远离家乡的地方。尽管如此，他们还是战胜了数量上占优势的敌人，并在不同程度上借鉴了西方文化的元素，无情地屠杀对手。
在欧洲悠久的军事实践史上，过去2500年来，西方军队的主要军事担忧几乎是另一支西方军队。在马拉松战役（公元前490年）中，几乎没有希腊人阵亡。后来在尼米亚和科罗尼亚（公元前394年）的希腊战争中，数千人丧生。后期的希波战争（公元前480-479年）中，希腊人的死亡人数相对较少。希腊城邦之间的伯罗奔尼撒战争（公元前431-404年）是一场惨烈的血战。亚历山大本人在亚洲屠杀的欧洲人比大流士三世统治下的数十万波斯人还要多。罗马内战几乎摧毁了这个共和国，其程度甚至比汉尼拔都未曾有过。滑铁卢战役、索姆河战役和奥马哈海滩战役，都进一步印证了西方人与西方人相遇时必然发生的浩劫。
本书试图解释这一切为何如此，为何西方人如此善于利用其文明去杀戮他人——如此残酷地交战，却往往毫发无损。过去、现在和未来，世界军事活力的故事最终是对西方武器威力的探究。战争学者或许会对如此广泛的概括感到不满。大学里的学者会认为这种论断带有沙文主义色彩，甚至更糟——因此他们会列举从温泉关到小巨角战役的每一个例外来反驳。公众本身大多并未意识到其文化自身在武器方面独特而持续的杀伤力。然而，在过去的2500年里——即使在“军事革命”之前的黑暗时代，——这并非仅仅是文艺复兴、欧洲人发现美洲或工业革命的结果——西方战争中就存在着一种独特的实践，一种共同的基础和持续的作战方式，这使得欧洲人成为文明史上最致命的士兵。
战争的首要地位
战争作为文化
我在此并不关心欧洲军事文化在道德上是否优于非西方文化，或者是否比非西方文化更加糟糕。征服者们在墨西哥城的大金字塔上终结了活人祭祀和酷刑，他们离开的是一个饱受宗教裁判所和残酷的收复失地运动摧残的社会，身后留下了一个病态残破、几近毁灭的新大陆。我也不太关心特定战争的正义性——秘鲁的皮萨罗（他平静地宣布“印加时代结束了”）是否比他那些杀戮成性的印加敌人更好或更坏，印度是否从英国殖民统治中遭受了巨大的苦难或获得了些许的利益，日本人轰炸珍珠港或美国人焚毁东京是否有正当理由。我好奇的并非西方人内心的黑暗，而是他们的战斗能力——特别是他们的军事实力如何反映出更广泛的社会、经济、政治和文化实践，而这些实践本身似乎与战争无关。
价值观与战争之间的联系并非原创，而是源远流长。希腊历史学家的叙事以战争为中心，几乎总是试图从文化中汲取教训。在修昔底德所著的伯罗奔尼撒战争史中，大约2500年前，斯巴达将军布拉西达斯对伊利里亚和马其顿部落的军事实力不屑一顾，因为他们与他的斯巴达重装步兵交锋。布拉西达斯在谈到这些野蛮的对手时说，这些人缺乏纪律，因此无法承受冲击性战斗。“就像所有暴民一样”，当他们面对纪律严明的士兵冷酷的铁甲时，他们一改以往令人畏惧的姿态，发出惊恐的叫喊。为什么会这样？因为正如布拉西达斯继续告诉他的士兵们的那样，这样的部落是“多数人统治少数人，而是少数人统治多数人”的文化的产物（《修昔底德》4.126）。
与这些由喊叫着“野蛮人”组成的庞大军队形成对比的是，他们没有协商一致的政府，也没有成文的宪法——“体型庞大，令人难以忍受的大声叫喊，以及挥舞武器的可怕景象”——布拉西达斯向他的士兵们保证：“像你们这样的国家的公民，坚守阵地。”请注意，布拉西达斯对肤色、种族或宗教只字未提。相反，他简单地将军事纪律、列队作战和对突击战的偏好与民意一致的政府的存在联系起来，这种政府赋予了方阵中的普通步兵一种平等感和优于敌人的精神。
米斯。无论我们是否想将布拉西达斯自私自利地描绘的狂热部落成员视为西方沙文主义的“建构”或“虚构”，也无论我们是否想争论他笔下的斯巴达寡头政治是否是一个基础广泛的政府，亦或批评欧洲步兵经常遭到更敏捷的游击队伏击和伏击，毋庸置疑的是，在实行宪政统治的希腊城邦中，存在着训练有素的重装步兵的传统，而北方的部落民族中却没有这种传统。
在分析文化与冲突时，我们为什么要专注于几个小时的战斗和普通士兵的战斗经验，而不是史诗般的战争，以及它们蕴含的宏伟战略、战术机动和广阔的战场行动，而这些更适合进行细致的社会和文化阐释？军事史绝不能偏离杀戮的悲剧故事，而杀戮最终只能在战斗中发生。军队作战的文化决定了成千上万几乎无辜的年轻人在预定的战斗时间后是生是死。资本主义或公民军国主义之类的抽象概念在战争面前几乎不再抽象，而是具体的现实，最终决定了勒班陀战役中二十多岁的土耳其农民是幸存下来，还是成千上万地被鱼叉刺死，决定了雅典的鞋匠和制革工人在萨拉米斯屠杀之后是安全返回家园，还是被冲到阿提卡海岸，成为一块块的肉块。
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values–the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship–which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage.
- Hanson argues that Western culture, with its emphasis on individual initiative, free inquiry, and democratic ideals, has been a key driver of Western military success.
- The book analyzes key battles across history to demonstrate how Western armies have consistently triumphed over opponents, often against long odds.
- While acknowledging the role of technology, Hanson emphasizes that Western armies' effectiveness is also rooted in their cultural values and the way they organize and motivate soldiers.
- Hanson argues that Western military dominance is a result of a unique cultural and institutional framework that has allowed for the development of superior military capabilities.
“No one offers a more compelling picture of how wars reflect and affect the societies, including our own, that wage them.” —National Review
“Hanson . . . is becoming one of the best-known historians in America . . . [Carnage and Culture] can only enhance his reputation.” —John Keegan, Daily Telegraph (London)
“Victor Davis Hanson is courting controversy again with another highly readable, lucid work. Together with John Keegan, he is our most interesting historian of war.” —Jean Bethke Elshtain, author of Women and War
From the Back Cover
Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values-the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship-which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage.
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Why the West Has Won
When the trumpet sounded, the soldiers took up their arms and went out. As they charged faster and faster, they gave a loud cry, and on their own broke into a run toward the camp. But a great fear took hold of the barbarian hosts; the Cilician queen fled outright in her carriage, and those in the market threw down their wares and also took to flight. At that point, the Greeks in great laughter approached the camp. And the Cilician queen was filled with admiration at the brilliant spectacle and order of the phalanx; and Cyrus was delighted to see the abject terror of the barbarians when they saw the Greeks.
--Xenophon, Anabasis (1.2.16-18)
ENLIGHTENED THUGS
EVEN THE PLIGHT of enterprising killers can tell us something. In the summer of 401 b.c., 10,700 Greek hoplite soldiers--infantrymen heavily armed with spear, shield, and body armor--were hired by Cyrus the Younger to help press his claim to the Persian throne. The recruits were in large part battle-hardened veterans of the prior twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.). As mercenaries, they were mustered from throughout the Greek-speaking world. Many were murderous renegades and exiles. Both near adolescents and the still hale in late middle age enlisted for pay. Large numbers were unemployed and desperate at any cost for lucrative work as killers in the exhausted aftermath of the internecine war that had nearly ruined the Greek world. Yet there were also a few privileged students of philosophy and oratory in the ranks, who would march into Asia side by side these destitute mercenaries--aristocrats like Xenophon, student of Socrates, and Proxenus, the Boeotian general, as well as physicians, professional officers, would-be colonists, and wealthy Greek friends of Prince Cyrus.
After a successful eastward march of more than 1,500 miles that scattered all opposition, the Greeks smashed through the royal Persian line at the battle of Cunaxa, north of Babylon. The price for destroying an entire wing of the Persian army was a single Greek hoplite wounded by an arrow. The victory of the Ten Thousand in the climactic showdown for the Persian throne, however, was wasted when their employer, Cyrus, rashly pursued his brother, Artaxerxes, across the battle line and was cut down by the Persian imperial guard.
Suddenly confronted by a host of enemies and hostile former allies, stranded far from home without money, guides, provisions, or the would-be king, and without ample cavalry or missile troops, the orphaned Greek expeditionary infantrymen nevertheless voted not to surrender to the Persian monarchy. Instead, they prepared to fight their way back to the Greek world. That brutal trek northward through Asia to the shores of the Black Sea forms the centerpiece of Xenophon's Anabasis ("The March Up-Country"), the author himself one of the leaders of the retreating Ten Thousand.
Though surrounded by thousands of enemies, their original generals captured and beheaded, forced to traverse through the contested lands of more than twenty different peoples, caught in snowdrifts, high mountain passes, and waterless steppes, suffering frostbite, malnutrition, and frequent sickness, as well as fighting various savage tribesmen, the Greeks reached the safety of the Black Sea largely intact--less than a year and a half after leaving home. They had routed every hostile Asian force in their way. Five out of six made it out alive, the majority of the dead lost not in battle, but in the high snows of Armenia.
During their ordeal, the Ten Thousand were dumbfounded by the Taochians, whose women and children jumped off the high cliffs of their village in a ritual mass suicide. They found the barbaric white-skinned Mossynoecians, who engaged in sexual intercourse openly in public, equally baffling. The Chalybians traveled with the heads of their slain opponents. Even the royal army of Persia appeared strange; its pursuing infantry, sometimes whipped on by their officers, fled at the first onslaught of the Greek phalanx. What ultimately strikes the reader of the Anabasis is not merely the courage, skill, and brutality of the Greek army--which after all had no business in Asia other than killing and money--but the vast cultural divide between the Ten Thousand and the brave tribes they fought.
Where else in the Mediterranean would philosophers and students of rhetoric march in file alongside cutthroats to crash headlong into enemy flesh? Where else would every man under arms feel equal to anyone else in the army--or at least see himself as free and in control of his own destiny? What other army of the ancient world elected its own leaders? And how could such a small force by elected committee navigate its way thousands of miles home amid thousands of hostile enemies?
Once the Ten Thousand, as much a "marching democracy" as a hired army, left the battlefield of Cunaxa, the soldiers routinely held assemblies in which they voted on the proposals of their elected leaders. In times of crises, they formed ad hoc boards to ensure that there were sufficient archers, cavalry, and medical corpsmen. When faced with a variety of unexpected challenges both natural and human--impassable rivers, a dearth of food, and unfamiliar tribal enemies--councils were held to debate and discuss new tactics, craft new weapons, and adopt modifications in organization. The elected generals marched and fought alongside their men--and were careful to provide a fiscal account of their expenditures.
The soldiers in the ranks sought face-to-face shock battle with their enemies. All accepted the need for strict discipline and fought shoulder-to-shoulder whenever practicable. Despite their own critical shortage of mounted troops, they nevertheless felt only disdain for the cavalry of the Great King. "No one ever died in battle from the bite or kick of a horse," Xenophon reminded his beleaguered foot soldiers (Anabasis 3.2.19). Upon reaching the coast of the Black Sea, the Ten Thousand conducted judicial inquiries and audits of its leadership's performance during the past year, while disgruntled individuals freely voted to split apart and make their own way back home. A lowly Arcadian shepherd had the same vote as the aristocratic Xenophon, student of Socrates, soon-to-be author of treatises ranging from moral philosophy to the income potential of ancient Athens.
To envision the equivalent of a Persian Ten Thousand is impossible. Imagine the likelihood of the Persian king's elite force of heavy infantry--the so-called Immortals, or Amrtaka, who likewise numbered 10,000--outnumbered ten to one, cut off and abandoned in Greece, marching from the Peloponnese to Thessaly, defeating the numerically superior phalanxes of every Greek city-state they invaded, as they reached the safety of the Hellespont. History offers a more tragic and real-life parallel: the Persian general Mardonius's huge invasion army of 479 b.c. that was defeated by the numerically inferior Greeks at the battle of Plataea and then forced to retire home three hundred miles northward through Thessaly and Thrace. Despite the army's enormous size and the absence of any organized pursuit, few of the Persians ever returned home. They were clearly no Ten Thousand. Their king had long ago abandoned them; after his defeat at Salamis, Xerxes had marched back to the safety of his court the prior autumn.
Technological superiority does not in itself explain the miraculous Greek achievement, although Xenophon at various places suggests that the Ten Thousand's heavy bronze, wood, and iron panoply was unmatched by anything found in Asia. There is no evidence either that the Greeks were by nature "different" from King Artaxerxes' men. The later pseudoscientific notion that the Europeans were racially superior to the Persians was entertained by no Greeks of the time. Although they were mercenary veterans and bent on booty and theft, the Ten Thousand were no more savage or warlike than other raiders and plunderers of the time; much less were they kinder or more moral people than the tribes they met in Asia. Greek religion did not put a high premium on turning the other cheek or on a belief that war per se was either abnormal or amoral. Climate, geography, and natural resources tell us as little. In fact, Xenophon's men could only envy the inhabitants of Asia Minor, whose arable land and natural wealth were in dire contrast to their poor soil back in Greece. Indeed, they warned their men that any Greeks who migrated eastward might become lethargic "Lotus-Eaters" in such a far wealthier natural landscape.
The Anabasis makes it clear, however, that the Greeks fought much differently than their adversaries and that such unique Hellenic characteristics of battle--a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility, preference for shock battle of heavy infantry--were themselves the murderous dividends of Hellenic culture at large. The peculiar way Greeks killed grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism. The ordeal of the Ten Thousand, when stranded and near extinction, brought out the polis that was innate in all Greek soldiers, who then conducted themselves on campaign precisely as civilians in their respective city-states.
In some form or another, the Ten Thousand would be followed by equally brutal European intruders: Agesilaus and his Spartans, Chares the mercenary captain, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and centuries of legionary dominance, the Crusaders, Hernan Cortes, Portuguese explorers in Asiatic seas, British redcoats in India and Africa, and scores of other thieves, buccaneers, colonists, mercenaries, imperialists, and explorers. Most subsequent Western expeditionary forces were outnumbered and often deployed far from home. Nevertheless, they outfought their numerically superior enemies and in varying degrees drew on elements of Western culture to slaughter mercilessly their opponents.
In the long history of European military practice, it is almost a truism that the chief military worry of a Western army for the past 2,500 years was another Western army. Few Greeks were killed at Marathon (490 b.c.). Thousands died at the later collisions at Nemea and Coronea (394 b.c.), where Greek fought Greek. The latter Persian Wars (480-479 b.c.) saw relatively few Greek deaths. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.) between Greek states was an abject bloodbath. Alexander himself killed more Europeans in Asia than did the hundreds of thousands of Persians under Darius III. The Roman Civil Wars nearly ruined the republic in a way that even Hannibal had not. Waterloo, the Somme, and Omaha Beach only confirm the holocaust that occurs when Westerner meets Westerner.
This book attempts to explain why that is all so, why Westerners have been so adept at using their civilization to kill others--at warring so brutally, so often without being killed. Past, present, and future, the story of military dynamism in the world is ultimately an investigation into the prowess of Western arms. Scholars of war may resent such a broad generalization. Academics in the university will find that assertion chauvinistic or worse--and thus cite every exception from Thermopylae to Little Big Horn in refutation. The general public itself is mostly unaware of their culture's own singular and continuous lethality in arms. Yet for the past 2,500 years--even in the Dark Ages, well before the "Military Revolution," and not simply as a result of the Renaissance, the European discovery of the Americas, or the Industrial Revolution--there has been a peculiar practice of Western warfare, a common foundation and continual way of fighting, that has made Europeans the most deadly soldiers in the history of civilization.
THE PRIMACY OF BATTLE
War as Culture
I am not interested here in whether European military culture is morally superior to, or far more wretched than, that of the non-West. The conquistadors, who put an end to human sacrifice and torture on the Great Pyramid in Mexico City, sailed from a society reeling from the Grand Inquisition and the ferocious Reconquista, and left a diseased and nearly ruined New World in their wake. I am also less concerned in ascertaining the righteousness of particular wars--whether a murderous Pizarro in Peru (who calmly announced, "The time of the Inca is over") was better or worse than his murdering Inca enemies, whether India suffered enormously or benefited modestly from English colonization, or whether the Japanese had good cause to bomb Pearl Harbor or the Americans to incinerate Tokyo. My curiosity is not with Western man's heart of darkness, but with his ability to fight--specifically how his military prowess reflects larger social, economic, political, and cultural practices that themselves seemingly have little to do with war.
That connection between values and battle is not original, but has an ancient pedigree. The Greek historians, whose narratives are centered on war, nearly always sought to draw cultural lessons. In Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, nearly 2,500 years ago the Spartan general Brasidas dismissed the military prowess of the tribes of Illyria and Macedonia, who confronted his Spartan hoplites. These men, Brasidas says of his savage opponents, have no discipline and so cannot endure shock battle. "As all mobs do," they changed their fearsome demeanor to cries of fright when they faced the cold iron of disciplined men in rank. Why so? Because, as Brasidas goes on to tell his soldiers, such tribes are the product of cultures "in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many" (Thucydides 4.126).
In contrast to these enormous armies of screaming "barbarians" without consensual governments and written constitutions--"formidable in outward bulk, with unbearable loud yelling and the frightful appearance of weapons brandished in the air"--"citizens of states like yours," Brasidas assures his men, "stand their ground." Notice that Brasidas says nothing about skin color, race, or religion. Instead, he simplistically connects military discipline, fighting in rank, and the preference for shock battle with the existence of popular and consensual government, which gave the average infantryman in the phalanx a sense of equality and a superior spirit to his enemies. Whether or not we wish to dismiss Brasidas's self-serving portrait of frenzied tribesmen as a chauvinistic Western "construct" or "fiction," or debate whether his own Spartan oligarchy was a broad-based government, or carp that European infantrymen were often ambushed and bushwhacked by more nimble guerrillas, it is indisputable that there was a tradition of disciplined heavy infantrymen among the constitutionally governed Greek city-states, and not such a thing among tribal peoples to the north.
In an analysis of culture and conflict why should we concentrate on a few hours of battle and the fighting experience of the average soldier--and not the epic sweep of wars, with their cargo of grand strategy, tactical maneuver, and vast theater operations that so much better lend themselves to careful social and cultural exegesis? Military history must never stray from the tragic story of killing, which is ultimately found only in battle. The culture in which militaries fight determines whether thousands of mostly innocent young men are alive or rotting after their appointed hour of battle. Abstractions like capitalism or civic militarism are hardly abstract at all when it comes to battle, but rather concrete realities that ultimately determined whether at Lepanto twenty-year-old Turkish peasants survived or were harpooned in the thousands, whether Athenian cobblers and tanners could return home in safety after doing their butchery at Salamis or were to wash up in chunks on the shores of Attica.
