新亚洲中的澳大利亚：没有美国
休·怀特教授，澳大利亚联邦国际事务协会会员，2017年12月14日
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-asia-extract/
美国会被中国阴影笼罩吗？
长期以来，澳大利亚受益于美国在亚洲无可争议的主导地位。然而，该地区的动态变化速度远超乎任何人的预期。
2010年，我撰写了一篇名为《权力转移》的季刊论文（也可在《澳大利亚国际事务杂志》上发表），其中指出，美国将无力维持其长期以来在亚洲享有的无可争议的地区主导地位。中国日益增长的财富和实力，以及其重夺亚洲大国地位的雄心，意味着它必然会挑战美国的主导地位，而这种挑战将强大到难以轻易回避。
因此，美国面临着三大选择：要么与中国展开不断升级的战略对抗，这将带来巨大的成本和真正的冲突风险；要么从亚洲战略性撤军，让中国主宰该地区；要么与中国达成某种协议，以平等的大国身份分享亚洲的权力。
堪培拉和华盛顿的许多人都批评了这种分析。他们认为，中国现在和将来都不足以、也不足以挑战美国在亚洲的主导地位，因此没有必要提供我所提议的那种妥协。
事实证明，我的批评者和我都错了。我们都高估了美国的实力和决心，而低估了中国的实力和决心。他们没有预见到中国实力和决心的增长速度和幅度。我没有预见到美国的反应会多么软弱，以及它的决心会多么迅速地瓦解。他们认为美国可以以很小的成本和风险遏制和威慑中国的挑战，结果证明他们完全错了。事实证明，我错了，我曾以为美国有能力和决心谈判并维持我所提议的那种权力分享协议。因此，现在我们面临着一个我们谁都没有清晰预见到的新局面。如今，美国和中国正争夺东亚的领导权，而中国显然正在赢得这场竞争。最有可能的结果是美国退出，中国将成为该地区的主导力量。
所有这些都对澳大利亚有着巨大的影响。随着美国在亚洲的战略领导地位被中国取代，澳大利亚与美国的联盟将会逐渐消亡。自欧洲殖民以来，澳大利亚将首次面临一个没有主要盎格鲁-撒克逊盟友支持和保护的亚洲。澳大利亚将比以往任何时候都更加孤立无援，而我们的任务就是认识到这一点并适应它。这是一个巨大的挑战，而迄今为止，澳大利亚几乎还没有开始着手应对。
军事层面
然而，这并非澳大利亚首次面临这样的前景：一个崛起的亚洲大国成功挑战其强大的盟友，迫使它们撤出亚洲，使澳大利亚失去保护，任由这个新的亚洲霸权摆布。澳大利亚历史上曾多次出现类似的情况：1914年、20世纪30年代末、20世纪60年代末和20世纪90年代初。每次危险都过去了。但这一次不同。
这场较量涉及多个层面，但尤其值得关注的是军事层面，因为人们常常错误地认为美国的优势最大，而军事层面恰恰是美国在亚洲与中国竞争的最终潜在成本最高的地方。要理解其中的原因，就必须认识到，当今中美在亚洲的较量是纯粹的旧式强权政治，其中军事力量发挥着核心作用。这并不是因为战争不可避免，正如“修昔底德陷阱”论者试图让我们相信的那样：各国总是可以选择通过撤军或妥协来避免战争。但当各国，尤其是大国，竞相确立其在国际体系中的相对地位时，最终结果首先取决于竞争者能在多大程度上说服对方，他们愿意为实现目标而开战。
这意味着，未来几年，美国和中国在亚洲的领导地位将取决于双方能否说服对方，愿意为哪些问题开战。过去，重心一直都在美国一边，但现在，重心正在迅速转向中国。中国利用南海和东海的局势表明，它更愿意冒险与美国对抗，而不是美国冒险，并且更有信心，如果发生对抗，美国会退缩，以避免冲突。这样做是有充分理由的：既然中国的利益显然是亚洲的，那么美国为什么要冒着与中国冲突升级的成本和风险——尤其是爆发核冲突的可能性——来维护其在亚洲的领导地位呢？
还要高得多吗？美国官方演讲的陈词滥调，根本无法为美国考虑做出这样的牺牲提供令人信服的理由。中国日益增长的实力正在推高美国在亚洲维持强大战略地位的成本，而美国的利益却远不如过去那么引人注目。
澳大利亚的选择
这引出了一个简单而直白的结论。澳大利亚再也无法承担这样的后果：美国在未来几十年里会后悔在亚洲扮演重要的战略角色。美国的力量和影响力很可能会逐渐减弱，要么缓慢衰落，要么迅速崩溃。届时，中国将成为东亚的主导力量。而澳大利亚与美国的联盟也将随之衰落，因为美国将不再有令人信服的战略理由来维持这种联盟。
在所有关于共同利益和价值观的华丽辞藻背后，澳美联盟始终建立在坚实的利益基础之上。在美国方面，这些利益源于澳大利亚作为支持美国在西太平洋地区战略领导地位的资产的价值。当这不再是美国的首要目标时，美国对澳大利亚的同盟价值将会消退，美国为支持澳大利亚付出实际代价的意愿也将随之消退。这应该不足为奇，因为这正是上个世纪英国在亚洲地位崩溃时的情况。但这一次，不会有新的英语强国像美国那样取代英国。澳大利亚将孤军奋战。
这让澳大利亚措手不及。多年来，中国崛起和美国实力及决心衰落的证据显而易见，但澳大利亚的政治和政策精英们却一直否认眼前的证据。从最近的《外交政策白皮书》来看，他们仍然在否认，该白皮书仍然自信地认为美国将以某种方式无限期地保持亚洲主要强国的地位。未来的历史学家将会困惑，澳大利亚怎么会如此盲目。原因之一是，当代政治家、公务员和分析人士仍然执着于20世纪90年代中期出现的后冷战全球秩序愿景。这一愿景基于这样的假设：在未来几十年里，美国将在国家实力的各个维度上享有无可争议的全球优势，从而能够以极低的成本行使无可争议的全球领导地位。这是一个极具吸引力的愿景，这或许可以解释为什么它抵挡住了几十年来在中东、东欧、亚洲以及美国本土积累的大量证据，这些证据表明世界并非如此。这一愿景仍然萦绕在白皮书中那种认为美国将永远照顾澳大利亚的幼稚乐观主义的阴影下。
我们必须摆脱这种印象，开始正视世界的本质——在这个世界上，中国经济规模几乎是美国的两倍，而美国在亚洲的影响力几乎肯定会因此减弱。澳大利亚有必要探讨如何在这个新的亚洲找到自己的位置。这将是澳大利亚历史上最艰巨、最重要的辩论之一。它不仅需要解决外交姿态和国防力量等重大问题，还需要探讨价值观和身份认同等问题。这将对澳大利亚人民及其领导人提出诸多挑战，包括智力和政治方面的挑战，但最重要的是，它需要一定的自信和勇气。
本文摘自休·怀特教授于2017年12月5日在其季刊（2017年第68期）《新亚洲中的澳大利亚：没有美国》发布会上的演讲。完整演讲稿可在此处获取。
休·怀特教授（澳大利亚皇家澳大利亚研究院院士，澳大利亚联邦国际事务研究所会员）是澳大利亚国立大学战略研究教授。
休·怀特著有《中国的选择》和《如何保卫澳大利亚》，以及广受好评的季刊论文《权力转移》和《没有美国》。他是澳大利亚国立大学战略研究荣誉教授，也是《2000年澳大利亚国防白皮书》的主要作者。
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本文摘自休·怀特的季刊论文《没有美国：新亚洲中的澳大利亚》。如需阅读全文，请订阅或购买本书。
季刊论文 68
没有美国
新亚洲中的澳大利亚
休·怀特
https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america/extract
摘录
近十年来，世界上两个最强大的国家一直在争夺谁将主宰世界上最重要、最具活力的地区。美国一直试图保持东亚主要强国的地位，而中国则试图取而代之。两国的竞争体现在贸易协定和基础设施计划、多边外交以及最重要的在南海、东海和朝鲜半岛等地区热点地区的军事博弈中。但所有这些都
这其实只是两国潜在竞争的表象。
这场竞争将如何进行——是和平还是暴力，是迅速还是缓慢——目前尚不确定，但最可能的结果正在逐渐明朗。美国将失败，中国将获胜。美国将不再在亚洲扮演重要的战略角色，而中国将取而代之，成为主导力量。战争依然可能爆发，尤其是在唐纳德·特朗普这样的人入主白宫的情况下。但随着美国胜算越来越小，华盛顿的人们逐渐认识到，美国无法通过与中国进行一场不可能取胜的战争来捍卫其在亚洲的领导地位，战争的风险正在消退。因此，美国和平撤军，甚至心甘情愿撤军的可能性越来越大。事实上，这种情况已经在发生，亚洲也因此而发生变化。美国主导的旧秩序正在消亡，中国主导的新秩序正在取而代之。
这出乎任何人的意料。七年前，我在《季度论文》第39期上撰文指出，随着权力从华盛顿转移到北京，以及中国对亚洲领导地位的野心日益增长，美国在亚洲面临着一场难以彻底取胜的竞争。因此，美国的最佳选择是协商建立一个新的地区秩序，在亚洲保留一个较小但仍然重要的战略角色，以平衡中国的力量，限制其影响力，并防止东亚落入中国霸权的统治。
许多人不同意。他们认为，美国的实力将远远超过中国，美国没有必要做出任何此类让步。只要美国坚持立场，它就能压制中国，迫使其退缩，并再次让美国在亚洲的领导地位不受挑战。
唉，我的批评者和我都错了。我们迟迟没有意识到中美之间日益加剧的竞争，也没有意识到，或者不允许自己承认，这种竞争已经变得多么严重，以及它对美国的不利影响有多么深远。这是因为我们都低估了中国的实力和决心，而高估了美国的实力。美国不仅未能保持主导地位，甚至未能保住任何实质性的战略地位。许多人预计，中国在发展到足以与美国展开平等竞争之前，会先行一步。然而，中国在经济、军事和外交上都不断增强，而美国的决心却在减弱。现在，中国正在与美国对抗。习近平在2017年10月召开的中共十九大上，对中国的地位和实力的惊人阐述，传递了清晰的信息。这场竞争确实不平等，但并非我们想象的那样。因此，我们发现自己身处一个新的亚洲，我们并不喜欢它。但这是历史留给我们的，我们必须充分利用它。
我们澳大利亚人没有预见到这种情况，因为华盛顿也没有预见到，而且我们已经习惯了通过华盛顿的视角看世界。我们乐于接受华盛顿方面保证其掌握了中国的尺度，而华盛顿自身却迟迟未能理解中国面临的挑战有多么严峻，以及其在这场竞争中处理得有多么糟糕。
更广泛地说，近代历史让我们无法理解正在发生的事情。中美之间的竞争是典型的强权政治，而且是最残酷的那种。自越南战争结束以来，我们在亚洲从未见过这种斗争，自冷战结束以来，在全球范围内也从未见过。一代又一代在强权政治的熏陶下成长起来并深谙其运作之道的政治家、公务员、记者、分析人士和公民都已退出公共舞台。像孟席斯和弗雷泽、科廷和惠特拉姆、霍克、基廷和霍华德这样的政治领袖；像亚瑟·坦格这样的公务员；像彼得·黑斯廷斯和丹尼斯·沃纳这样的记者；像赫德利·布尔、汤姆·米勒和科拉尔·贝尔这样的学者；以及那些经历过二十世纪前四分之三战争与斗争的选民们：他们都会发现，今天的亚洲比我们更容易理解。我们有很多东西要学，但时间却不多了。
当然，承认亚洲正在发生的事情也更加困难，因为我们很难想象它将把我们带向何方。我们正走向一个我们从未了解过的亚洲，一个没有一个讲英语的强大盟友来主宰该地区、保障我们的安全、维护我们的利益的亚洲。对这种情况可能发生的担忧——艾伦·金格尔称之为“害怕被抛弃”——自二战以来，甚至更早，一直是澳大利亚外交政策的主要动力。但自从冷战结束以来——距今已有一代人——我们已经忘记了这些旧时的恐惧，开始将美国的权力和保护视为理所当然。随着美国在亚洲的地位越来越弱，我们越来越依赖美国。
我们很高兴能从中国的发展中获益，相信美国
哥斯达黎加可以保护我们免受中国力量的威胁。现在，这种信心显然是错误的；我们需要开始独立思考，如何在一个由中国主导的亚洲国家中站稳脚跟，并站稳脚跟。
这正是本文的主题。它首先探讨美国如何在与中国的竞争中落败，然后探讨澳大利亚：迄今为止，我们是如何应对美中竞争的，为什么我们犯了如此严重的错误，以及我们现在可以做些什么来应对我们面临的新现实。
Australia in the New Asia: Without America
For a long time, Australia benefitted from the United States’ uncontested dominance in Asia. However, the dynamics of the region have changed much faster than anyone expected.
In 2010, I wrote a Quarterly Essay called Power Shift (also available in the Australian Journal of International Affairs), which argued that America would not be able to maintain the uncontested regional primacy which it had exercised in Asia for so long. China’s growing wealth and power, and its ambition to regain the position and status of a great power in Asia, meant that it was bound to challenge America’s primacy, and that challenge would be too strong to be simply deflected.
America therefore faced a choice between three broad options: it could confront China in an escalating strategic rivalry that would carry big costs and real risk of conflict; it could withdraw strategically from Asia and leave China to dominate the region; or it could strike some kind of deal with China to share power in Asia as equal great powers.
Many people criticised that analysis, both in Canberra and in Washington. They argued that China was not, and would not become, either powerful enough or determined enough to challenge American primacy in Asia, so there was no need to offer the kind of accommodation I had proposed.
It turns out that my critics and I were both wrong. We all overestimated America‘s power and resolve and underestimated China’s. They didn’t see how far and fast China’s power and resolve would grow. I didn’t see how weak America’s response would be, and how quickly its resolve would collapse. They turned out to be quite wrong that America could contain and deter China’s challenge at little cost or risk. I turned out to be wrong that America would have the skill and resolve to negotiate and sustain the kind of power-sharing deal I had proposed. So now we face a new situation, which none of us clearly foresaw. Today, America and China are locked in a contest for leadership in East Asia, which China is plainly winning. The most likely outcome is that America will withdraw, leaving China as the predominant regional power.
All this has huge implications for Australia. As America’s strategic leadership in Asia is replaced by China’s, Australia’s alliance with the US will fade away. Australia will find itself, for the first time since European settlement, facing an Asia without the backing, support and protection of a major Anglo-Saxon ally. Australia will be, more than ever before, on its own, and the task is to recognise and adapt to that. It is a huge challenge and so far Australia has hardly begun to address it.
The military dimension
This is not however the first time Australia has faced the prospect that a rising Asian power would successfully challenge its great and powerful friends and force them to withdraw from Asia, leaving it unprotected at the mercy of the new Asian hegemon. There have been apparently similar situations several times in Australia’s history: in 1914, in the late 1930s, in the late 1960s and in the early 1990s. Each time the danger passed. But this time is different.
There are many dimensions to this contest, but it is worth focusing especially on the military dimension, because this is where people most often wrongly assume America’s advantage is greatest, and yet it is where the ultimate potential costs to America of rivalry with China in Asia are highest. To see why, it’s necessary to recognise that the US-China contest in Asia today is pure power politics of the old school, in which armed force plays a central role. That is not because war is in any way inevitable, as the ‘Thucydides Trap’ folk would have us believe: countries can always choose to avoid war by withdrawal or compromise. But when states, especially great powers, compete to establish their relative positions in an international system the outcome is determined above all by the extent to which the contestants can convince one another they are willing to go to war to achieve their objectives.
In Asia over coming years that means the future leadership roles of America and China will depend on the issues that each can convince the other it is willing to go to war over. In the past the weight has all been on the US side, but now it is shifting fast China’s way. China has used the situations in the South and East China seas to show that it is more willing to risk a confrontation with America than vice versa, and more confident that America will back off from a confrontation if it occurs to avoid a conflict. And there is good reason for that: why would America risk the costs and risks of an escalating conflict with China—especially the possibility of a nuclear conflict—to preserve its leadership in Asia, when China’s stake is obviously so much higher? The boilerplate phrases of US official speeches fail to provide a compelling reason for America to contemplate such sacrifices. China’s growing power is driving up the costs of preserving a strong US strategic role in Asia, while US interests are if anything less compelling than they have been in the past.
Australia’s choice
This leads to a stark and simple conclusion. Australia can no longer afford to assume that America will be contrite to play a major strategic role in Asia over coming decades. Most likely its power and influence will dwindle, either in a slow fade or a swift collapse. When that happens, China will emerge as East Asia’s dominant power. And Australia’s alliance with America will wither as that happens, because America will no longer have a compelling strategic reason to sustain it.
Beneath all the flowery rhetoric of shared interests and values, the alliance has always rested on a hard foundation of interests. On the US side, those interests have flowed from the value of Australia as an asset in supporting US regional strategic leadership in the Western Pacific. When that is no longer a prime US objective, the value of the alliance to America will fade, and its willingness to pay real costs to support Australia will fade with it. That should come as no surprise, because it is just what happened when Britain’s role in Asia crumbled in the last century. But this time there will be no new English-speaking great power to take Britain’s place as America did. Australia will be on its own.
And this is taking Australia by surprise. The evidence of China’s rise and America’s waning power and resolve has been clear for many years, but Australia’s political and policy elites have been in denial about the evidence before their eyes. They are still in denial, to judge by the recent Foreign Policy White Paper, which continues confidently to assume that America will somehow remain the primary power in Asia indefinitely. Future historians will be puzzled at how Australia could be so blind. One reason is that the current generation of politicians, public servants and analysts have remained in thrall to the vision of the post-Cold War global order that emerged in the mid-1990s. That vision was based on the assumption that America would, for decades to come, enjoy an unchallengeable global preponderance in every dimension of national power, allowing it to exercise uncontested global leadership at very little cost. It was an immensely appealing vision, which may explain why it has resisted the mountain of evidence which has built up over the decades since—in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, in Asia, and in America itself—to show that this is just not the way the world is. It still haunts the White Paper’s jejune optimism that America will always be there to look after Australia.
It’s necessary to shake that image off, and start to see the world as it is – the world in which China is credibly set to build an economy almost twice as big as America’s, and America’s power in Asia is almost certain to dwindle as a result. It’s necessary to debate how Australia can find its place in this new Asia. This will be one of the most demanding and important debates in Australia’s history. It will need to address not just major issues about diplomatic posture and defence forces, but questions about values and identity. This will demand a lot of Australians and their leaders, intellectually and politically, but above all it will require a measure of confidence and courage.
This is an edited extract from a speech given by Professor Hugh White on 5 December 2017 at the launch of his Quarterly Essay (Issue 68, 2017), ‘Australia in the New Asia: Without America’. The full transcript is available here.
Professor Hugh White AO FAIIA is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
Hugh White is the author of The China Choice and How To Defend Australia, and the acclaimed Quarterly Essays Power Shift and Without America. He is emeritus professor of strategic studies at ANU and was the principal author of Australia’s Defence White Paper 2000.
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This is an extract from Hugh White's Quarterly Essay, Without America: Australia in the New Asia.To read the full essay, subscribe or buy the book.
QUARTERLY ESSAY 68
WITHOUT AMERICA
Australia in the New Asia
HUGH WHITE
EXTRACT
For almost a decade now, the world’s two most powerful countries have been competing over which of them will dominate the world’s most important and dynamic region. America has been trying to remain East Asia’s primary power, and China has been trying to replace it. Their contest is playing out over trade deals and infrastructure plans, in the diplomacy of multilateral meetings, and above all through military gamesmanship in regional hotspots like the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. But all these are really just symptoms of their underlying rivalry.
How the contest will proceed – whether peacefully or violently, quickly or slowly – is still uncertain, but the most likely outcome is now becoming clear. America will lose, and China will win. America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power. War remains possible, especially with someone like Donald Trump in the Oval Office. But the risk of war recedes as it becomes clearer that the odds are against America, and as people in Washington come to understand that their nation cannot defend its leadership in Asia by fighting an unwinnable war with China. The probability therefore grows that America will peacefully, and perhaps even willingly, withdraw. Indeed, this is already happening, and Asia is changing as a result. The old US-led order is passing, and a new China-led order is taking its place.
This is not what anyone expected. Seven years ago, in Quarterly Essay 39, I argued that as power shifted from Washington to Beijing, and as China’s ambitions for leadership in Asia grew, America faced a contest in Asia which it would be unable to win outright. Its best option, therefore, would be to negotiate a new regional order, retaining a lesser but still substantial strategic role in Asia which would balance China’s power, limit its influence and prevent East Asia falling under Chinese hegemony.
Many people disagreed. They argued that America’s power would remain so much greater than China’s that it was unnecessary for America to make any such concessions. By holding firm, it could face down China, convince it to back off and leave American leadership in Asia unchallenged once more.
Alas, my critics and I were both wrong. We were slow to see the growing rivalry between America and China, and we didn’t recognise, or permit ourselves to acknowledge, how serious the rivalry has become, and how badly it has been going for America. That is because we all underestimated China’s power and resolve, and overestimated America’s. Not only is America failing to remain the dominant power, it is failing to retain any substantial strategic role at all. Many expected that China would falter before it grew strong enough to challenge America on anything like equal terms. Instead, China has kept growing stronger, economically, militarily and diplomatically, and America’s resolve has weakened. Now it is China that is facing down America. That was the clear message of Xi Jinping’s remarkable assertion of China’s status and power at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in October 2017. The contest is indeed unequal, but not in the way we thought. So we find ourselves in a new Asia, and we do not like it. But that’s the hand history is dealing us, and we must make the best of it.
We in Australia haven’t seen this coming, because Washington hasn’t seen it coming and we have got into the habit of seeing the world through Washington’s eyes. We have been happy to accept Washington’s assurances that it has China’s measure, and Washington itself has been slow to understand how serious China’s challenge has become and how badly it has mishandled the contest.
More broadly, our recent history has left us ill-equipped to understand what is happening. The contest between America and China is classic power politics of the harshest kind. We have not seen this kind of struggle in Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, or globally since the end of the Cold War. The generations of politicians, public servants, journalists, analysts and citizens who grew up with power politics and knew how it worked have left the public stage. Political leaders like Menzies and Fraser, Curtin and Whitlam, and Hawke, Keating and Howard; public servants like Arthur Tange; journalists like Peter Hastings and Dennis Warner; academics like Hedley Bull, Tom Millar and Coral Bell; and the voters who lived through the wars and struggles of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century: they would all find Asia today much easier to understand than we do. We have a lot to learn and not much time to learn it.
And of course it has been harder to acknowledge what has been happening in Asia because it has been so difficult to imagine where it is taking us. We are heading for an Asia we have never known before, one without an English-speaking great and powerful friend to dominate the region, keep us secure and protect our interests. The fear that this might happen – the “fear of abandonment,” as Allan Gyngell calls it – has been the mainspring of Australian foreign policy since World War II, and indeed long before. But since the Cold War ended – a generation ago now – we have forgotten those old fears and begun to take American power and protection for granted. We have come to depend more and more on America as its position in Asia has become weaker and weaker.
We have been happy to get rich off China’s growth, confident that America can shield us from China’s power. Now it is clear that confidence has been misplaced; we need to start thinking for ourselves about how to make our way and hold our corner in an Asia dominated by China.
That is what this essay is about. It looks first at how America is losing the contest with China, and then at Australia: how we have responded to the US–China contest so far, why we have got it so wrong, and what we can do now to manage the new reality we face.
