一些澳大利亚人对 AUKUS 越来越持怀疑态度

一些澳大利亚人对 AUKUS 越来越持怀疑态度

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/04/11/some-australians-are-increasingly-sceptical-of-aukus

政府需要更加努力地推销其突破性的安全协议

2024 年 4 月 11 日
澳大利亚、美国和英国于 2021 年 9 月达成的名为 aukus 的防务协议是一个庞大的项目。 但这是为了应对更大的问题。 中国决心按照自己的意愿重塑印太地区，必要时使用武力，特别是针对台湾。

该协议的核心是承诺帮助澳大利亚利用英国设计和美国技术建造至少八艘核动力攻击潜艇。 这些潜艇将于 2040 年之后开始服役。作为权宜之计，从 2027 年左右开始，美国将通过西澳大利亚斯特灵海军基地轮换最多四艘弗吉尼亚级潜艇。 澳大利亚本身将在 2030 年代初期购买三到五艘弗吉尼亚级潜艇。 它们快速而隐秘，将把电力投射到远离澳大利亚海岸的地方。 然而，这笔交易不仅涉及潜艇，还涉及量子传感和高超音速导弹等技术方面的合作。

因此，长达数十年的承诺代价高昂——仅潜艇一项预计就将花费澳大利亚高达 3680 亿美元。 作为回报，奥库斯将澳大利亚的安全与美国的安全更紧密地联系在一起，澳大利亚希望将美国更安全地与印度太平洋地区联系起来。 4月8日，这三个国家的国防部长发表了一份谨慎的声明，称他们也在“考虑与日本合作”。

并非所有澳大利亚人都对此感到满意。 事实上，一支奥库斯尴尬的队伍，有着不同的政治主张和各种并不总是一致的不满情绪，正在放弃一位奥库斯支持者所称的“异议深水炸弹”。 批评者包括两位前总理保罗·基廷和马尔科姆·特恩布尔、前外交部长加雷斯·埃文斯和战略家休·怀特。

批评始于实际情况——最重要的是，美国能否交付弗吉尼亚级潜艇。 它正在努力提高产量，三月份五角大楼要求国会只资助一艘新潜艇，而不是预期的两艘。 特恩布尔先生表示，澳大利亚可能不会看到“弗吉尼亚”号，“仅仅是因为美国海军无法饶恕它们”。 这只会让澳大利亚变得更不安全，而不是更安全。

其他人则质疑对英国国防能力的依赖，因为英国在按时、按成本或达标交付方面的记录不佳。 与此同时，怀特先生认为，澳大利亚将陷入补贴其他两个成员国国防工业的困境。 他说，尽管这三个国家之间都在谈论国防一体化，但在国防采购一体化的政治化世界中，美国和英国承包商比澳大利亚承包商更有可能受益。

再加上唐纳德·特朗普可能重返白宫的风险。 埃文斯认为，如果特朗普认为美国为澳大利亚的利益花钱，他可能会否决整件事。 他指出，澳大利亚没有 b 计划。 但对奥库斯最强烈的批评与主权机构的丧失有关——正如特恩布尔先生所认为的那样，澳大利亚的命运被一个越来越不可靠的超级大国所束缚，或者如埃文斯先生所说的那样，一个有责任将澳大利亚拖入台湾问题战争的超级大国。 这违背了澳大利亚的利益。

目前，两党对 aukus 的支持仍然强劲。 然而，该协议在未来几年内几乎不会产生具体成果。 风险在于，所有的抱怨都将开始削弱公众的信心。 从一开始，aukus 的支持者就没有给出足够坦率的理由。 该交易是秘密谈判的。 时任反对党领袖安东尼·阿尔巴内斯 (Anthony Albanese) 只得到了几个小时的时间来表达支持。 现在担任总理的他将奥库斯主要描绘成一个就业计划，而不是一个具有重大威慑作用的项目。

相反，工党和保守反对派应该更好地强调迄今为止取得的进展。 这包括使斯特林号成为友方潜艇的有用停靠站，以及美国和澳大利亚新拨款用于建设潜艇工业基地。

最重要的是，他们应该谈论中国雄心所带来的挑战。 他们应该更清楚澳大利亚对威慑贡献的重要性。 他们应该坦率地说明财务成本，更严峻的是，人力成本。

如果澳大利亚政界人士不坦白并以诚实的方式寻求对奥库斯的支持，怀疑论者很可能会削弱对此的共识。 这也对澳大利亚自身的安全造成严重后果。 因为如果威慑的目的是为了防止一场战争，那么你就必须让别人看到你已经做好了打仗的准备。

Some Australians are increasingly sceptical of AUKUS

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/04/11/some-australians-are-increasingly-sceptical-of-aukus

The government needs to sell its ground-breaking security pact much harder

Apr 11th 2024

The defence pact known as aukus and reached in September 2021 between Australia, America and Britain is a huge project. But it is intended to counter an even bigger one. China is bent on reshaping the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms, using force if necessary, notably against Taiwan.

At the pact’s heart is a promise to help Australia build at least eight nuclear-powered attack submarines using British designs and American technology. These will start to come into service after 2040. As a stop-gap, from around 2027 America will rotate up to four of its Virginia-class submarines through hmas Stirling, a naval base in Western Australia. Australia itself will buy three to five Virginia-class subs in the early 2030s. Fast and stealthy, they will project power far from Australia’s shores. However, the deal is not only about subs, but also collaboration on technology such as quantum sensing and hypersonic missiles.

A decades-long commitment, then, with a big price tag—the subs alone are expected to cost Australia up to $368bn. In return, aukus ties Australia’s security more closely to America’s and, Australia hopes, ties America more securely into the Indo-Pacific region. On April 8th the defence ministers of the three countries released a cautious statement saying they were “considering co-operation” with Japan, too.

Not everyone in Australia is pleased. Indeed an aukus awkward squad, with varied political persuasions and an assortment of not always cohering grievances, is dropping what one aukus backer calls “depth charges of dissent”. The critics include Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull, two former prime ministers, Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister, and Hugh White, a strategist.

Criticisms start with practicalities—above all, whether America can deliver the Virginia-class subs. It is struggling to ramp up production, and in March the Pentagon asked Congress to fund just one new sub rather than an expected two. Mr Turnbull says Australia may see no Virginias “simply because the us Navy won’t be able to spare them”. That would leave Australia less secure, not more.

Others question reliance on Britain’s defence capacity, with its underwhelming record for delivering on time, at cost or up to standard. Meanwhile, Mr White contends, Australia will get suckered into subsidising the other two members’ defence industries. For all the talk of defence integration among the three countries, he says, in the politicised world of defence procurement integration American and British contractors are more likely to benefit than Australian ones.

Add to that the risk of Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House. If Mr Trump saw America as spending money on Australian interests, Mr Evans argues, he could nix the whole thing. Australia, he points out, has no plan b. But the strongest criticisms of aukus have to do with a loss of sovereign agency—hitching Australia’s fortunes to an ever-less dependable superpower, as Mr Turnbull sees it, or one liable, as Mr Evans argues, to drag Australia into a war over Taiwan that is counter to Australia’s interests.

For now bipartisan support for aukus remains strong. Yet the pact will have few concrete results to show for years to come. The risk is that all the griping will start to erode public confidence. From the start aukus’s backers have not made a frank enough case for it. The deal was negotiated in secrecy. Anthony Albanese, then leader of the opposition, was given only hours to throw his support behind it. Now prime minister, he paints aukus chiefly as a jobs scheme rather than as a project of vital deterrence.

Rather, Labor and the conservative opposition should better highlight the progress made so far. This includes making hmas Stirling a useful pit-stop for friendly subs, and new American and Australian money being allocated to building up a submarine industrial base.

Above all, they should talk of the challenge posed by Chinese ambitions. They should be clearer about the importance of Australia’s contribution to deterrence. And they should be upfront both about the financial costs and, more grimly, the human ones.

If Australia’s politicians do not come clean and seek support for aukus on honest terms, the sceptics may well erode the consensus for it. That also poses grave consequences for Australia’s own security. For if the point of deterrence is to prevent a war, then you have to be seen to be ready to fight one.