风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
外交部新闻稿：2010 年 7 月 13 日，外交部长杨荣文关于中国在全球舞台上重新崛起的讲话
未来中国全球论坛问答环节的文字记录
外交部长杨荣文在“未来中国全球论坛”上关于中国在全球舞台上重新崛起的讲话，2010 年 7 月 13 日
过去两天，我们就中国的内部发展和对外关系进行了很多讨论。 我认为，在今天的演讲中，我们退后一步，以正确的视角来看待中国。 世界上有很多人担心中国的崛起； 他们想知道，在中国重新出现在世界舞台的过程中，他们是否会看到一个侵略性的、帝国主义的、统治性的、专横的中国。 在官方演讲中，人们会使用漂亮的言词，但在内部委员会和较暗的房间里，人们会表达真正的担忧，有时也会采取行动。 这是人类社会的本质。
丘吉尔曾经说过，要展望未来，我们必须回顾过去。 为了试图辨别中国在本世纪的重新崛起，重要的是要看到中国的早期形态。 对于我们东南亚人来说，中国深深地存在于历史记忆中。 就在上周，我们从阿曼收到了一艘小型单桅帆船，这是一艘古代单桅帆船的复制品，这艘单桅帆船在唐代沉没于距离新加坡 500 英里的地方，船上载有来自中国许多窑炉的 65,000 件中国陶器，主要是长沙，但也来自其他地方，如 出色地。 而且陶器上有佛教图案和伊斯兰教图案，因为那烂陀时代和阿拔斯时代也是如此。 即使在当时，这也是一笔巨大的贸易，给该地区带来了巨大的繁荣。 在宋代，中国可能是全球经济的重要组成部分，东南亚和南印度的王国为了对华贸易而相互竞争和争斗。 在其中一场战争中，一支来自印度南部的朱罗舰队击败了三佛齐。
所以当我说重新出现时，有一个特殊的含义。 中国能够在广阔的地理范围内一次又一次地重建自己，这对任何其他国家来说都是不同寻常的。 对我的欧洲朋友，我告诉他们，这就像罗马帝国被摧毁和分裂后，直到今天又重建了四、五倍。 当然，这在欧洲从未发生过。 直到今天，欧洲各国都对部落有着深厚的忠诚。 我们在世界杯期间看到了这一点，并通过他们的语言、食物、葡萄酒和激情来表达。 中国的不同寻常之处在于，90%以上的人口是汉族，而且有一种他们属于一个共同种族的感觉。 美国人由于其观念的特殊性，相信成为美国人对世界上的每个人都有好处。 作为美国人，拥有美国价值观对你有好处，那么你会过得更好，世界也会变得更美好。 因此，美国人有一种天生的传教精神，事实上，这种精神时不时地体现在美国的外交政策中。 对于汉族来说，情况就不同了。 汉族人有点像犹太人。 如果你不是天生的一员，那么你就没有必要成为一员。 我的意思是，是的，学习语言，了解习惯，享受食物，观察细节； 但如果有一天一个非中国人说，看我要成为中国人，每个人都会感到有点尴尬，因为如果你不是生来就是中国人，你怎么能成为中国人呢？ 就像那些皈依犹太教并宣称自己是犹太人的人一样。 从正式的角度来看，它们可能会被接受，但从深刻的情感角度来说，那就是另一回事了。 正因为如此，中国人对帝国这一西方术语的态度与欧洲在帝国主义时代创建的帝国有很大不同。 对于中国来说，决定性的是内部世界。 如果它连贯了，如果水道和灌溉渠修得很好，如果粮食可以自由流动，那么内部市场就会爆炸，变得非常繁荣，这就需要中央权威和中央官僚机构。 但当这种情况崩溃时，一切都会崩溃，这种情况可能会持续数十年或数百年，当这种情况发生时，数百万人会死亡。
因此，中国的执政者始终关注中国的内部发展。 很多时候，其外交政策实际上是为了确保稳定的环境，以便能够集中精力进行内部发展。 在其历史上，如果不解决外国威胁，如果不管理对外关系，那么这就会成为一个国内问题。 如果国内问题不解决，国家就会陷入困境。 我不认为中国因此而天生具有侵略性。 但当然，如果你是韩国人、蒙古人或者
中亚或越南，嗯，你有时会说我们被中国入侵，甚至可能并入他们的帝国，我认为这是一个公平的观点。 但如果你从中国的内部角度来看——确保边境地区及其供应线的安全——这确实是防御性的。 也许没有什么比从秦始皇时期开始重建中国的长城更能表达这一点了，甚至从战国时期或战国时期开始，一次又一次地在其 历史，是为了保护内部环境，使国家能够治理好。
所以当我们展望未来的中国时，中国当然会寻求影响边境地区的发展，这里的边境地区包括整个东南亚。 但它的主要目标是内部的，而不是为了生存空间、迁移其人民并将其他人变成臣民而进行的侵略。 理解这种心理很重要，因为它创造了一种政治文化，使中国可以接受作为一个政体进行治理。 而且因为担心地方官员会被当地民众俘虏，所以从明朝开始就有规定，在距县城四百里之内，不能做大官，不能做高官。 你的出生地。 这种制度在中华人民共和国已经被重新建立——你不能在你出生的地方担任高级官员，因为你无法逃避对家庭的忠诚和相互的义务。 所以今天如果你看看中国，省级领导，特别是党委书记和省长，几乎总是不是来自本省。 每个省的面积相当于一个欧洲主要国家的大小。 我再次告诉我的欧洲朋友，按照惯例，按照规定，德国总理不能是德国人，法国总统不能是法国人，英国首相不能是英国人。 但在中国，这是可以接受的，因为这是很久以前的制度。
这是否意味着，走向未来，中国将能够直线前进，没有大的坎坷，没有大的困难，成为地球上最强大的国家，尽管它可能自给自足，并确定 与外界的互动。 不会这么简单，因为今天中国内部的挑战是巨大的，总是回到如何治理国家，以便有和平，以便有发展，以便他们的地区平衡，有制度，有记录 、水路、道路，重新分配。
当今中国最大的问题是城市化——城市化的规模和速度是中国历史上前所未见的。 这是新事物。 过去一直是农村社会，治国其实就是让农村富有生产力。 如今，中国的城市化率达到40%。 毛泽东时代，城市化率达到20%。 有一天它会像台湾、韩国一样，80%到90%都是城市。 这将创造一个全新的局面，需要一套全新的技能。 当毛泽东从农村而非城市无产阶级手中夺取权力，从而与布尔什维克决裂时，中国共产党就取得了权力。 共产党的所有技能、本能和技巧都是基于对农村、农民的控制。 但现在城市正在迅速发展，创造了一种新的情况：小家庭，通常是独生子女，城市环境的匿名性，每个人都使用手机、即时消息和互联网——而中国的互联网用户已经比其他任何国家都多。 地球上的国家 - 以及不断增长的社会流动性。 这不仅是对共产党的挑战，也是对共产党的挑战。 这是对儒学本身的挑战。 因为自汉朝以来一直将中国社会维系在一起的儒家思想需要一套公认的等级社会关系，而这些关系现在在现代世界中全部溶解为网络。 因此，不知何故，我们在新加坡也面临这个问题，因为我们这里有四分之三的华人，我们需要一种新的……我称之为“城市儒学”。 这对中国社会来说将是一个新的挑战，因为在此基础上，共产党将不得不根据这些深刻的社会变革来重塑自己。 如果中国成功做到这一点，我毫不怀疑它将再次成为地球上最大的经济体和地球上最伟大的国家。 但这并不容易，因为这是一个新情况。 世界上没有人真正能解决这个问题； 每个人都在挣扎，我们也在挣扎。
你注意到在亚洲，所有传统政党都陷入了困境。 日本有自民党，台湾有国民党。 在韩国，这个问题从未完全解决。 在泰国，曼谷和乡村之间的紧张关系。 在马来西亚，巫统曾经以农村为基础，现在以城市为基础，变成了
城市化。 在印度尼西亚，专业集团。 在印度，我们有国大党。 现在，所有人都面临着不快乐的城市人口。 就好像发展得越多，城市人口就越多，他们对传统政府就越不满。 部分原因是近年来中国对新加坡的实验非常着迷。
与中国相比，新加坡就像盆景； 它太小，不具有普遍意义，但有一些遗传相似性。 因此，中国的研究人员和社会科学家有时会在研究新加坡时说：“哦，好吧，如果它在这里可行，也许在那里也可行。” 我们在多年来与中国的互动中发现，他们对新加坡实验的兴趣是间歇性的。 当它遇到问题并在世界范围内寻找解决方案时，它会不时地关注新加坡的做法。 有时它喜欢它所看到的，有时它不喜欢它所看到的。 然后总结并总结相关教训。 这当然使新加坡相对于中国处于一个相当有趣的位置。
我要表达的观点是，当人们说中国将主宰世界时，他们担心中国不仅会在经济上变得非常强大，而且会寻求征服其他国家并迫使他们像中国人一样行事。 我认为这种情况不会发生，因为这违背了中国历史的规律。 多年来，中国的治国之道，其基本目标大多是防御性的，一直是把外国人当作外国人对待； 明确区分内部和外部； 介于 nei（内）和 wai（外）之间。 还有非常复杂的方法来处理外部事物，使其不会对内部事物构成威胁。 我们在现行政策中一再看到这一点以现代术语表达。 所以说到世贸组织的贸易自由化，贸易是的，这个是的，那个是的，但是当它触及核心结构——国家经济的制高点、文化问题时，我认为中国，无论谁统治中国，都不会允许 外部世界决定国家内部的治理方式。 以最近与谷歌就如何在中国运营的问题发生的争执为例。 中国人不希望它成为一个大问题，但谷歌自己却想将其政治化。 当然，一旦将其政治化，中方就别无选择，只能坚持基本原则。 谷歌后来下台了，并决定，我们以务实的方式来处理这个问题，中国也准备以务实的方式来处理它。 在不影响其核心利益的情况下，可以采取灵活处理。 但如果确实如此，那就是另一回事了。
中国的金融机构也是如此。 19世纪鸦片战争后不久，中国就失去了对其金融体系的控制。 我记得几年前一位自民党高级政治家告诉我，日本人知道，当船只登陆亚洲大陆时，他们将受到欧洲人而不是亚洲人的检查。 日本知道，除非它迅速重建自己，否则它也会遭受中国的命运。 但不幸的是，日本认为解决办法是成为一个竞争性的帝国主义，这导致了悲伤。 因此，中国在从国际金融体系中受益的同时，在允许自己的金融业开放的同时，在核心架构上，绝不会允许自己失去自主意识——媒体、金融、 文化政策、国家战略产业。
在某种程度上，这或许可以追溯到汉语本身的本质，即它的表意特征。 小时候，读汉字比读字母更容易，因为汉字是图画。 所以两三岁的小孩子能认识中文单词，但看不懂字母单词。成人后，字母单词更方便。 因此，这种语言确实让你作为一个成年人很难完全理解。 但如果你生来就是这样，那么它自然就会成为你的一部分。 一些学者将汉字系统描述为数字系统，因为它不是表音的，因此不会随着时间的推移而改变——今天可以读到与一千年前、两千多年前相同的汉字。 然而如果你看看字母系统，这是不可能做到的。
展望21世纪，如果我们扪心自问，如果中国成功了，变得强大起来，影响力辐射到更广阔的地区，世界会是什么样子？ 我认为世界不会成为“中国治下的和平”，因为世界太大了。 而中国太专注于内部事务，没有真正渴望建立一个“中国治下的和平”。 我的意思是，中国对让缅甸人民民主化或让穆斯林信奉儒家不感兴趣。 中国完全准备好接受世界的多样性，只要“你”不威胁“我”（中国）。 但
必须有一定的结构稳定性，因为这是政治权力的本质。 这将是一个多极世界。 在我们这个世界的一部分，在亚洲，简化它，这当然是过度简化，我认为将存在三个主要极点。 将会有中国，将会有印度，并且将会有美国。 正是这个三角关系以及它们之间的关系，真正决定了本世纪战争与和平的重大问题。 中美关系已经讨论过了，我相信MM昨天晚上也谈到了，美国大使（洪博培）也在场，所以我想我没有必要再赘述了，你们已经很熟悉了，而且 你们中有些人比我知道得更多。
但我想谈谈印度，因为印度无论从面积还是从文明年龄来看都可以与中国相媲美。 这两个国家，实际上是两个文明，由于喜马拉雅山脉高耸和中亚大沙漠的缘故，除了 1962 年的边境冲突之外，从未发生过战争。 是的，有僧侣，有商人——他们通过东南亚进行交流，都影响着东南亚国家，但他们从不打仗。 作为一个古老的民族，彼此之间有一定的深刻认识，也有一定的尊重。 中国人一直将印度视为佛教、功夫、天文学和数学知识的发源地。 喜马拉雅山那边的印度人一直都知道，那里有一位伟大的皇帝，统治着广阔的领土和丰富的市场。 在文化上他们并不接近。 事实上，在文化上，它们是非常不同的。 但存在一定的相互尊重，现在他们必须解决边界问题，必须解决一些困难。 与19世纪一样，中国已经是印度最大的贸易伙伴，而且贸易增长迅速。
几年前，印度西里古里走廊和西藏之间的乃堆拉山口已经重新开放。 去年8月我在西藏时，我遇到的一位当地官员告诉我，西宁至拉萨的高原铁路将延伸至日喀则。 他说，我们其实离乃堆拉山口很近，如果印度政府同意的话，我们可以直接接印度铁路，加尔各答也就几百公里远。 然后我们所有人都将更容易进入大海。 当我把这件事告诉印第安人时，他们看着我，有些担心。 虽然今天大多数中国人并不知道 1962 年发生过一场战争，但大多数印度人都记得那场战争。 它深深地铭刻在他们的记忆中，成为一道尚未完全愈合的伤疤。 但我相信有一天这些问题都会得到解决，因为他们之间不存在天然的反感。 贸易和交流的好处是巨大的，边界将开放。 将会有更多的联系，每个人都可以使另一个人受益匪浅。
为此，我和其他人深入参与了这个复兴古老那烂陀大学的项目，那烂陀大学在鼎盛时期是地球上最伟大的大学。 数百年来，鼎盛时期吸引了来自日本、韩国、中国、西藏、中亚、东南亚各国的上万名学生，多年来接待了唐代伟大的高僧玄奘、易经。 （义净）等。 直到今天，这一时期最好的记载是玄奘的记述《大唐西域记》，即《大唐西域史》。 那仍然是一千多年前印度在那段历史时期的最好记录。 因此，我们希望通过复兴这所大学并使其成为一所国际大学，它可以将来自世界各地的亚洲人聚集在一起，以便每个人都知道他们的祖先曾经相互帮助，和平相处，进行贸易 ，与僧人跨越国界。 如果我们能够在本世纪帮助重建一些这样的情况，我们维护更大和平的可能性就会提高。
有人觉得也许他们也可以利用印度来制衡中国。 对我来说，这太简单了。 是的，印度是世界上最大的民主国家，这常常被用来解释为什么印度和美国是天然的合作伙伴。 是的，在某些问题上，美国和印度是天然的合作伙伴。 在气候变化等其他问题上，印度和中国是天然的合作伙伴。 我相信最终每个人都会根据自己的利益来计算。 印度太古老、太智慧、太精神、太世俗，只能是它自己。 民主是一层，但还有很多层，绵延数公里。
我认为是在《奥义书》中，在印度教万神殿中，他们有 3.3 亿神——3.3 亿男神和女神。 这有点令人难以置信，不是吗？ 当然，印度人也相信一种精神本质。 几个世纪以来，人类状况的各个方面都是印第安人所不具备的。
没有经历过，没有思考过，也没有试图解释过。 它复杂的社会结构，根深蒂固的种姓制度，你只需要看看周日报纸上的婚姻分类广告就知道种姓制度有多活跃和好，就知道印度永远是印度。 印度不会被任何人利用，除非是为了自身利益。 因此，将会出现三个极点。 每一个本身都是深刻而深刻的。
我不相信美国正在衰落，正如许多人所描述的那样。 美国是新世界。 它创造了一种新的政治文化、社会结构，以自由个人的加入为基础。 它有点像互联网协议 TCP/IP。 如果你接受TCP/IP，你就可以加入美国。 所以你可以是中国人，你可以是犹太人，你可以是印度人，你可以是阿拉伯人； 你做出承诺，遵守他们的法律，你就是其中的一部分。 由于它是开放式的，它力求将其影响力扩展到全世界。 但如果你从另一个角度来看； 我们今天看到的全球化是美国式的全球化。 TCP/IP 是美国政治文化的核心，它实际上是将世界上的中国人、印度人、欧洲人和拉丁美洲人连接在一起的联系，使我们能够运营一个共同的贸易体系、一个共同的金融体系。
中国无法提供全球化软件，因为中国永远只关注国内，对外部世界感兴趣，这样才能改善其内部管理，永远处于自卫状态。 中国没有兴趣创建“中国治下的和平”，也没有兴趣拥有自己的 TCP/IP 版本。 是的，它有孔子学院； 它希望你学习中文等等，但就像犹太人一样，如果你不是天生的，非常感谢。 而美国的情况则不同。 是什么将中国和印度联系在一起？ 不是中国软件，不是印度软件； 它将是通过美国大学、通过英语、通过盎格鲁-撒克逊贸易规则和金融标准的美国软件。 我们正在进入一个有趣的多极世界； 一个正在强大地重新崛起的中国，一个也在增长但将成为自己的一极的印度，一个不仅是现实，而且是必然的美国。 谢谢。
2010 年 7 月 13 日在未来中国全球论坛上与外交部长杨荣文就中国在全球舞台上重新崛起问题进行问答的文字记录
主持人 国会议员 Josephine Teo：部长，我想问一下我们的东盟邻国的情况。 在您与他们的交往中，您感受到他们对中国的态度如何？ 当东盟领导人想到重新崛起的中国时，他们脑子里浮现出的是什么？
杨荣文部长：即使在中国衰落、经济无足轻重的时候，东南亚所有国家，没有一个国家对中国怀有某种深深的敬意，因为他们记得清朝的中国，他们记得郑和下西洋。 Ö£ºÍ£©。 东南亚各地都有华人社区，他们的表现和能力提醒他们中国可以再次成为什么样的国家。 因此，中国的重新崛起对于东南亚国家来说并非完全出乎意料，随着现实的冲击，在贸易数量、访问等方面，有历史依据的反应都回来了。 他们不想受中国支配，但他们想要中国的友谊。 他们小心翼翼地避免侵犯中国的核心利益，但同时，他们本能地希望实现多元化。 我举个例子，就是缅甸。 由于西方禁运，缅甸不得不严重依赖中国。 中国在缅甸有很大的影响力。 但缅甸并不想成为中国领土的一部分。 它更愿意留在东盟，尽管它知道在东盟每次我们见面时都会受到批评。 但它准备忍受这一切，因为这给了他们一些发挥的空间。 印度也是缅甸的邻国，不希望中国拥有排他性影响力，因此也保持边境开放。 我最近很惊讶地读到一篇报道，最近缅甸和印度之间决定修建一条从阿鲁纳恰尔邦到缅甸的公路。 我们知道中国声称对阿鲁纳恰尔邦拥有主权，但我认为缅甸政府已经决定为了自身利益而开放边境地区，因为这将有助于其自身发展。 所以我想说，东南亚国家尊重中国，希望与中国友好，同时又希望多元化，希望结交四面八方的朋友。
问：先生，下午好。 我叫陈志兴，是新加坡管理大学（SMU）法律系三年级学生。 您提到了 nei（Ú-内部）和 wai（Íâ-外部）元素。 我的追求
问题是：从中国的角度来看，决定什么是“内”和“外”的指导原则是什么？ 我们是否知道什么对他们来说很重要，什么是他们的核心利益，但他们决定某件事是内部还是外部的指导原则是什么？ 谢谢。
部长：你知道，很难将其简化为规则。 我认为我们这些作为中国人长大的人本能地感受到了这一点，并将其作为核心原则，从小就学习如何与与你不同的人打交道。 对待那些与你不同的人的方法就是对他们格外友善。 你对待陌生人总是比对待自己人好，因为你害怕陌生人。 所以最好的食物、最好的物品都是为陌生人保留的[笑声]。 在你们中间，你们是第二好的，但是当一个外国人来的时候，总是用慷慨来赢得他，因为你们害怕他。 你如何定义它？ 是遗传的吗？ 这不是遗传因素，因为汉族人的基因非常多样化。 它是一套固定的文化规范吗？ 但东北的规范与甘肃的规范有很大不同，与南方的规范也有很大的不同。 奇怪的是，即使是中国以外的中国人也经常对 nei（Ú）和 wai（Íâ）做出明确的区分。 如果你和印尼华人、马来西亚华人交谈，他们会非常清楚地区分这一点。 即使是那些在菲律宾和泰国被同化的人，这些区别也常常持续存在。 但我很难说——我认为这需要学者们对此进行研究——说看，这些是区分内部和外部的一百条规则。
主持人：嗯，甚至我们的祖父母也认为我们是内孙（外孙）或外孙（外孙）。 当我们作为外宾（Íâ±ö-外国游客）访问中国时，我们必须支付更高的入场费。 所以有时候，如果我们能逃脱惩罚的话，假装成nei bin（Ú±ö-国内游客）是可以的[笑声]。 但是部长，我还有另一个问题想向您提出。 您之前非常简短地说过，中国人对新加坡的兴趣有一定程度的差异，有时他们喜欢在新加坡看到的东西，有时他们不喜欢他们在新加坡看到的东西 - 这让我非常感兴趣。 在你们的交往中，您发现哪些是中国人喜欢的方面和不喜欢的方面？
部长：你的意思是，他们喜欢我们什么，不喜欢我们什么？
主持人：是的。
部长：嗯，我认为因为新加坡很小，而且有着不同的历史，所以新加坡模式对中国人来说是有限的。 但与此同时，内地领导人也知道，新加坡和中国之间有着深厚的历史和文化联系，可以追溯到清朝。 前几天我讨论过万庆园（孙中山在新加坡时住的房子）。 他在那里八次，他和他的情妇在这所房子里住了六次，我认为中国的三四次起义是在新加坡组织的，钱是在新加坡收的。 事实上，同盟会在东京（东京）成立后，六个月后在新加坡成立，成为国民会的前身。 Dang（当）。 国民党旗帜，也就是今天的台湾旗帜，是从四个不同的样本中选出的，比赛在新加坡举行。 当他们选择模型时，平房的主人张永福（也就是我们国防部长的曾祖父）和他的妻子将这面旗帜缝制在一起，而这面旗帜的原件今天就在台北的国民党博物馆里。 当时中国的抗日斗争中，新加坡是筹集资金、提供援助的主要基地。 志愿者来自东南亚各地，但新加坡是总部的总部。 许多讨论是在怡和轩（Ee Hoe Hean Club）进行的，这是一家最近翻新的商务俱乐部，至今仍然存在。 日本皇军在台湾制定入侵新加坡的计划时，就已经列出了一份必须消灭新加坡数千名华人社区领袖的名单。 所以继南京之后，发生最大屠杀的地方就是新加坡，这并非偶然。 再后来，中国发生的大曲折，都在新加坡有反映。 我想，一位想写新加坡左翼运动历史的学者，将社阵的衰落归因于它对中国文化大革命政策的模仿，我认为是在今天的报纸上。 现实是他们在新加坡被击败了。 在毛泽东时代，接触很少，但在毛泽东时代之后，当中国开放时，当邓小平试图为中国寻找新的前进道路时，
新加坡因其与中国的联系而成为中国的灵感来源。 如果新加坡能成功，中国为什么不能成功？ 因为中国有更多的人、更聪明的人、更值得骄傲的传统。 因此，当经济特区建立时，中国外交部长任命吴庆瑞博士为国务委员古牧的顾问。 此后，无论是经济特区、工业区苏州、天津等，时不时地，无论中国关注什么，都去新加坡看看能不能吸取教训，觉得可以就继续走下去。 它已经学到了。 但我注意到近年来人们对城市政治的管理产生了极大的兴趣，因为人民行动党，即人民行动党，可能是亚洲最成功的城市政党，而中国人想知道其中的秘密是什么 。 每年都有许多中国代表团访问我们的选区，在国会议员举行人民会议和政治诊所时拜访他们。 嗯，如果我们能为中国发挥帮助作用，我们就应该这样做。 我们不需要付出什么代价，一个强大的中国、一个富裕的中国，对新加坡来说是有好处的。 我们还希望，不仅仅是中国从我们的错误和失败中吸取教训； 我想我们也应该有理智、有智慧、有谦虚的态度，去学习中国的经验和失败，并在这个过程中不断完善自己，保持我们自己模式的针对性。
主持人：关于这一点，部长，我有一个关于新加坡角色的问题。 将新加坡视为中国与世界的桥梁是不是有些牵强？ 如果我们可以做一件事来增强自己……？
部长：不，新加坡不能成为一座桥梁。 一座桥暗示着某种专有的沟通渠道。 我们处于一个网络世界，有无数的、几乎无限数量的旁路。 新加坡能做什么...
主持人：所以说是桥而不是桥。
部长：可以是一个节点。 如果我们有创造力，如果我们有远见，我们就可以扩大这个节点并增加它与其他节点的连通性。 但如果我们变得自满或内向，那么我们就会退缩，从而与他人变得不那么相关。 但它正在成为一个网络世界，每个人都有旁路。 没有一个人是不可或缺的。
主持人：作为那个节点，我们可以做一件事来增强自己的实力？
部长：这有点自相矛盾，我们越想加强与中国的联系，我们也应该这样做，我们就越必须加强与世界其他地区的联系。 因为如果你把它看作是大脑中具有许多突触连接的节点，我们与印度、东南亚、欧洲、日本、非洲的联系越紧密，我们与中国、中国人的联系就越有价值 人们。 新加坡与中国保持良好关系的关键在于我们有能力与世界其他地区建立突触联系，特别是在全球化早期创建新加坡的地区。 在大英帝国的时代，印度人来到这里，犹太人通过巴格达和加尔各答来到新加坡，印度尼西亚人和马来西亚人、泰国人和越南人来到这里，澳大利亚人和日本人也来到了这里。 所有那些在 19 世纪创造了我们的联系，现在我们应该复兴，因为这些联系将为我们在本世纪的所有生命提供养分，使其成长和繁荣。
主持人：女士们、先生们，虽然我们邀请了杨荣文部长来给我们讲中国问题，但是从他知识的广度和他对历史的兴趣，以及他对当今世界发生的一切的敏锐观察中，你们可以看到。 世界上，你不仅仅会得到中国，你会得到突触，你会得到TCP/IP，你会以最有趣、最刺激和最吸引人的方式得到与之相关的一切。 我谨请我们所有人向杨乔治先生表示感谢，感谢他如此慷慨地与我们分享。 太感谢了！
MFA Press Release: Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo on China's Re-Emergence on the Global Stage and transcript of the question & answer session at The Future China Global Forum, 13 July 2010
SPEECH BY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGE YEO ON CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE, THE FUTURE CHINA GLOBAL FORUM, 13 JULY 2010
In the last two days, we have discussed much about China's internal developments and its external relations. I thought for my presentation today, we take a step back and set China in perspective. There are many people in the world who fear the rise of China; who wonder whether in this re-emergence of China on the global stage, they will see a China that is aggressive, imperialistic, dominant and domineering. In official speeches, fine words are used but in the inner councils and in the darker rooms, real concerns are expressed and sometimes the fears are acted upon. That is in the nature of human society.
Churchill once said that to see far into the future, we must look far back into the past. To try and discern China's re-emergence in this century, it is important to see China in its earlier incarnations. For us in Southeast Asia, China is deep in the historical memory. Just last week, we had from Oman, a small dhow, a replica of an ancient dhow which sank 500 miles from Singapore during the Tang Dynasty, carrying 65,000 pieces of Chinese pottery from many kilns in China, principally Changsha but also from other places as well. And on the pieces of the pottery were Buddhist motifs and Islamic motifs, because that was also the age of Nalanda and the age of the Abbasids. Even then, it was a huge trade and it brought great prosperity to the region. During the Sung Dynasty, China was probably a large part of the global economy and the kingdoms in Southeast Asia and Southern India competed and fought each other over the China trade. And in one of those wars, a fleet from south India, the Cholas, defeated Srivijaya.
So when I say re-emergence, there is a particular meaning. Unusual for any other country, China has been able, over a wide geographical expanse, to reconstitute itself again and again. To my European friends, I tell them that it is like the Roman Empire after it was destroyed and broken up, reconstituting itself four, five times more till today. Of course, it never happened in Europe. And till today the nations of Europe have deep tribal loyalties. We see it during the World Cup, and it is expressed in their languages, in their food, in their wines and in their passions. China is unusual in that over 90% of its population consists of Han Chinese and there is a sense that they belong to a common race. The Americans, because of the exceptional nature of their conception, believe that it is good for everybody in the world to become American. It is good for you to be American, to have American values, then you would be better off and the world will be a better place. So there is a natural missionary spirit among Americans, and indeed which is expressed from time to time in American foreign policy. For the Han Chinese, it is different. The Han Chinese are a little like the Jews. If you are not born one, there is no need for you to become one. I mean yes, learn the language, understand the habits, enjoy the food, observe the niceties; but if one day a non-Chinese were to say, look I will become Chinese, everyone will feel a little awkward because if you are not born one, how can you be one? It is like those who convert to Judaism and proclaim themselves Jewish. In formal terms, they may be accepted but in deep emotional terms, that is a different story. And because of this, the Chinese attitude towards empire, which is really a western term, is very different from the empires created by Europe in the age of imperialism. For China it was the world inside which was decisive. If it coheres, if the waterways and irrigation canals are in good repair, if the grain can flow freely, the internal market explodes and becomes very prosperous, for which it requires central authority and a central bureaucracy. But when that breaks down, all hell breaks loose and it can go on for decades or centuries, and millions of people die when that happens.
For this reason, those who govern China are always preoccupied with its internal development. Very often, its foreign policy is really to secure an environment of stability so that it can concentrate on its internal development. All too often in its history, if foreign threats are not addressed, if foreign relations are not managed, then that becomes a domestic problem. And when domestic issues are not resolved, the country goes into difficulty. I do not think China is naturally aggressive for this reason. But of course, if you are Korean or Mongolian or Central Asian or Vietnamese, well, you will say from time to time we were invaded by China, maybe even incorporated into their empire, and I think that is a fair perspective. But if you look at it from the internal perspective of China - securing the border regions, its supply lines - it's really defensive. And nothing perhaps expresses it more than the rebuilding of the Great Wall of China from [the time of Emperor] Qin Shi Huang （秦始皇）- even from before that during the Zhan Guo （战国）or Warring States period - again and again in its history, in order to protect the internal environment so that the country can be well-governed.
So when we look at China into the future, China will of course seek to influence developments in the border regions, and in this case the border regions include all of Southeast Asia. But its dominant objective is internal, not aggression for the sake of lebensraum, of migrating its people and turning others into subject populations. It is important to understand this psyche because that has created a political culture which makes it acceptable for China to be governed as one polity. And because of the fears that local officials will be captured by local populations, so from the time of the Ming Dynasty they had a rule that you cannot be a high official, cannot be a gao guan （高官）, within four hundred miles of the place of your birth. And the system has been recreated in the PRC - you cannot be a high official near where you were born because you cannot escape all the loyalties of family and mutual obligations. So today if you look at China, the provincial leaders, particularly the Party Secretary and the Governor, are almost always not from their own province. And each province is about the size of a major European country. Again I tell my European friends, it is as if by practice, by regulation, the Chancellor of Germany cannot be German, the French President cannot be French, and the British Prime Minister cannot be British. But in China, it is considered acceptable because this has been the system from a long time ago.
Does it mean, going into the future, that China will be able to progress on a straight line and without major hiccups, without major difficulty, become the greatest power on Earth, even though it may be self-contained, and determining the terms of interaction with the outside world. It will not be so simple because the challenges within China today are enormous, always going back to how to govern the country so that there is peace, so that there is development, so that their regions are in balance and there are the systems, records, the waterways, the roads, to redistribute.
The biggest issue in China today is urbanisation - urbanisation on a scale and at a speed never seen before in Chinese history. This is something new. It has always been a rural society in the past, and governing the country was really about making sure that the countryside was productive. Today China is 40% urban. During Mao, it was 20% urban. One day it will be like Taiwan, like Korea, it will be 80% - 90% urban. And this will create a whole new situation requiring a whole new set of skills. The Chinese Communist Party achieved power when Mao Zedong broke from the Bolsheviks by capturing power from the countryside, not from the urban proletariat. All the skills and instincts and techniques of the Communist Party are based on control of the countryside, of the peasantry. But now the cities are growing rapidly, creating a new situation: small families, very often one-child, the anonymity of city environments, everybody on handphones, instant messaging, on the Internet - and China has already has more internet users than any other country on earth - and growing social mobility. This is a challenge, not only for the Communist Party; this is a challenge for Confucianism itself. Because Confucianism, which is what has held Chinese society together from the time of the Han dynasty, requires a certain accepted set of hierarchical social relationships which is all dissolving now in the modern world into networks. So somehow, and we face that problem in Singapore too because we are three-quarters Chinese here, we need a new ... what I call "Urban Confucianism". And that will be a new challenge for Chinese society because upon that, the Communist Party will have to re-invent itself based upon these profound social changes. If China succeeds in doing this, I have no doubt it will once again be the biggest economy on earth and the greatest country on earth. But it is not going to be easy because it is a new situation. No one in the world really has a solution for it; everybody is grappling, we are grappling.
You notice in Asia, all the traditional political parties have come into trouble. We had the LDP in Japan, the KMT in Taiwan. In Korea it is never quite settled. In Thailand, the tension between Bangkok and the countryside. In Malaysia, UMNO which was rural-based, now becoming urban-based, becoming urbanised. In Indonesia, Golkar. In India, we had the Congress party. And all are now confronting urban populations which are not happy. It is almost as if the more you develop, the bigger urban populations become, the more disaffected they are with traditional government. And it is partly for this reason that in recent years, China has became quite fascinated with the Singapore experiment.
Compared to China, Singapore is like a bonsai; it is too small to be of general relevance but it has some genetic similarities. So from time to time, researchers and social scientists in China, they study Singapore and say: "Oh well, if it can work here, maybe it can work there." We found in our interaction with China over the years that their interest in the Singapore experiment is episodic. From time to time when it confronts issues and it scours the world for solutions, it looks at what Singapore does. Sometimes it likes what it sees, sometimes it does not like what it sees. And then it draws and abstracts the relevant lessons. This of course puts Singapore in a rather interesting position vis-a-vis China.
The point I am making is that when people say China is going to dominate the world, they worry that China is not only going to become very strong economically, but that it will seek to subjugate others and force them to behave like Chinese. I do not think that will happen because that goes against the grain of Chinese history. Chinese statecraft over the years, mostly defensive in its fundamental objectives, has always been to treat foreigners as foreigners; making a clear distinction between what is within and what is outside; between nei （内）and wai（外）. And very elaborate methods to handle what is outside so that it is not a threat to what is inside. We see this again and again expressed in modern terms in present policies. So when it comes to WTO trade liberalisation, trade yes, this yes, that yes, but when it impinges upon core structures - the commanding heights of the state economy, cultural issues, I do not think China, whoever governs China, will ever allow the world outside to determine how the country is governed within. You take say, the recent quarrel with Google over how it should operate in China. The Chinese did not want it to become a big problem but Google on its own wanted to politicise it. Of course once you politicise it, then China has no choice but to stick to its fundamental principles. Google has since stepped down, and decided, let's handle this in a pragmatic way, and China is prepared to handle it in a pragmatic way. That insofar as it does not impinge upon its core interests, they can be flexible. But if it does, well that is a separate matter.
So too for China's financial institutions. In the 19th century within a short period after the Opium War, China lost control of its financial system. I remember one senior LDP politician telling me some years ago that the Japanese knew that the moment ships landed on Asia's mainland, they would be inspected not by Asians but by Europeans. Japan knew that unless it quickly re-created itself, it too would suffer the fate of China. But unfortunately Japan thought the solution was to become a competing imperialism and that led to grief. For this reason, while China will benefit from the international financial system, while it will allow its own financial industry to be opened up, when it comes to core structures, it will never allow itself to lose its sense of autonomy - media, finance, cultural policy, strategic state industries.
In some way, this may go back to the nature of the Chinese language itself, its ideographic character. As a child, it's easier to read Chinese characters than alphabetic words because the Chinese characters are pictures. So little children of two - three years old can recognise Chinese words but they cannot read alphabetic words As an adult, alphabetic words are more convenient. So it is a language which really makes it difficult for you to fully access as an adult. But if you are born into it, then it becomes a part of you naturally. Some scholars have described the Chinese character system as a digital system because it is not phonetic, so it does not alter over time - the same characters can be read today as they were a thousand years ago, two thousand years ago. Whereas if you look at alphabetic systems, that cannot be done.
If we look into the 21st century and ask ourselves, let us say China succeeds and it becomes strong and powerful and its influence radiates into a much wider region - what will the world be like? I think the world will not become a Pax Sinica because the world is too big for that. And China is too internally preoccupied, to really have aspirations towards creating a Pax Sinica. I mean, China is not interested in making the Myanmar people democratic, or in making Muslims Confucianist. China is quite prepared to accept the world in all its diversity, so long as "you" do not threaten "me" (China). But there has to be a certain structural stability, for that it is in the nature of political power. And it will be a multi-polar world. In our part of the world, in Asia, to simplify it, and it is of course an over-simplification, I think there will be three major poles. There will be China, there will be India, and there will be the US. It is this triangle and how they relate to one another, which really will decide the big issues of war and peace in this century. Sino-US relations have already been discussed, I believe MM talked about it last night, the US Ambassador (Jon Huntsman) was here, so I think there is no need for me to go over ground which is already familiar to you, and which some of you know more about than I do.
But I will like to talk a little about India because India in terms of size and in terms of the age of its civilisation is comparable to China. And the two countries, really the two civilisations, because of the high Himalayas and the great deserts of Central Asia, except for the border skirmish in 1962, [have] never fought each other. Yes, there were monks, there were traders - they communicated through Southeast Asia, both influencing the countries of Southeast Asia, but they never fought. There is a certain deep recognition of each other as an ancient people, and a certain respect. The Chinese have always seen India as a source of Buddhism, of Kung Fu, of knowledge about astronomy and mathematics. The Indians on their side of the Himalayas, have always known that beyond there was a great emperor who ruled a vast realm with a rich market. Culturally they are not close. In fact culturally, they are very different. But there is a certain mutual respect and now they have got to settle their borders, they have got to work through some of their difficulties. As it was during the 19th century, China is already India's biggest trading partner and that trade is growing rapidly.
Few years ago, the mountain pass of Nathu La between the Siliguri corridor of India and Tibet, has been re-opened. When I was in Tibet last August, a local official whom I met, told me that the Gaoyuan Tielu （高原铁路-the high railroad) from Xining to Lhasa, would be extended to Shigatse. He said that we are actually very close to the Nathu La pass and if the Indian government would agree, we could just link up to the Indian railroad, and Calcutta will only be a few hundred kilometres away. And then all of us will have much easier access to the sea. When I tell it to the Indians, they looked at me, they are a little worried. While most Chinese today are not aware there was a war in 1962, most Indians remember it. It is deeply etched in their memory, a scar not completely healed. But I believe one day these problems will be resolved because there is no natural antipathy between them. The benefits of trade and exchange are overwhelming, and the borders will be open. There will be more connections, and each can benefit the other hugely.
For this reason, I and others have been deeply involved in this project to revive the ancient University of Nalanda, which in its heyday was the greatest university on earth. Hundreds of years, attracting at its peak, 10,000 students from Japan, Korea, China, Tibet, Central Asia, all of Southeast Asia, and which received for many years, the great Tang dynasty monks, Xuan Zang （玄奘）, Yi Jing (义净) and others. And till today, the best records of that period was the account by Xuan Zang, the Da Tang Xi Yu Ji （大唐西域记）, the Great Tang Western Region History. That is still the best record of India during that period of history more than a thousand years ago. So we are hoping that by reviving this university and making it an international university, it can bring together Asians from all over, so that each will know that their forefathers had once upon a time, helped one another, live together in peace, with trade, with monks crossing borders. And if we can help recreate some of that in this century, the likelihood that we will be able to preserve that larger peace will be improved.
There are people who feel that maybe they can also use India to counterbalance China. To me, that is much too simplistic. Yes, India is the world's biggest democracy and that is often trotted out as an explanation why India and America are natural partners. For certain issues, yes, America and India are natural partners. For other issues like climate change, India and China are natural partners. I believe each will, in the end, calculate upon its own interests. India is too old, too wise, too spiritual, too worldly, to be anything but itself. Democracy is one layer, but there are many layers, going down many kilometres.
I think it was in the Upanishads, in the Hindu pantheon, they have 33 crore gods - 330 million gods and goddesses. It is a bit mind boggling, isn't it? But of course, the Indians also believe in one spiritual essence. Over the centuries, there is no aspect of the human condition which the Indians have not experienced, or thought about, or tried to explain. Its complex social structures, the persistence of caste and you need only to look at the classified ads for marriages in the Sunday newspapers to know how alive and well caste is, to know that India will always be India. India is not going to be made use of by anybody, except in its own self interest. For this reason, there will be three poles. And each will be deep, profound unto itself.
I do not believe America is in decline, the way many people write about. America is the new world. It created a new political culture, social structure, based upon free individuals joining it. It is a little like the internet protocol, TCP/IP. If you accept TCP/IP, you can join America. So you can be Chinese, you can be Jewish, you can be Indian, you can be Arab; you take your pledge, adhere to their laws, you are part of it. And because it is open-ended, it seeks to extend its reach to the world. But if you look at it from another perspective; the globalisation that we see today, is an American globalisation. The TCP/IP which is at the heart of American political culture is really the connections now which is hyperlinking Chinese, and Indians, and Europeans, and Latinos together in the world, enabling us to operate a common trading system, a common financial system.
China cannot provide that globalisation software because China will always be internally preoccupied and to the extent that it is interested in the world outside, it is so that its internal management can be improved, and always in self-defence. China is not interested to create a Pax Sinica, or to have its own version of the TCP/IP. Yes it has Confucius Institutes; it wants you to learn Chinese and so on, but like the Jews, if you are not born one, thank you very much. Whereas, with America, it is different. What will link China and India together? Not Chinese software, not Hindu software; it will be American software through American universities, through the English language, through Anglo-Saxon rules of trade, of financial standards. This is an interesting multipolar world we are entering; a China which is re-emerging powerfully, an India which is also growing but which will be a pole unto itself and an America which is not only a reality, but also a necessity. Thank you.
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TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGE YEO ON CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE, AT THE FUTURE CHINA GLOBAL FORUM, 13 JULY 2010
Moderator MP Josephine Teo: Minister, I would like to ask you about our ASEAN neighbours. In your interactions with them, what do you sense as their attitude towards China? And what is it that consumes the minds of the leaders in ASEAN when they think of the re-emergent China?
Minister George Yeo: Even when China was down, when it was economically inconsequential, all the countries of Southeast Asia bar none had a certain deep respect for China because they remember the China of the Qing Dynasty, they remember the voyages of Zheng He £¨Ö£ºÍ£©. And all over Southeast Asia there are Chinese communities which by their performance and their abilities, are a reminder to them of what China can become again. For this reason the re-emergence of China is not completely unexpected among the countries in Southeast Asia and as the realities impinge upon them, in trade numbers, in visits and so on, the responses, which have historical antecedence, all come back. They do not want to be dominated by China but they want China¡¯s friendship. They are careful about impinging on China¡¯s core interests but at the same time, instinctively, they want diversification. I give you an example which is Myanmar. Myanmar, because of the western embargo has had to depend a lot on China. China has a lot of influence in Myanmar. But Myanmar does not want to be part of the Chinese realm. It prefers to remain in ASEAN even though it knows in ASEAN it gets criticised every time we meet. But it is prepared to bear with all that because it gives them some room to play. India, which is also a neighbouring country to Myanmar, doesn¡¯t want China to have exclusive influence so it keeps its border also open. And I was quite surprised recently to read a report that recently between Myanmar and India, they decided to build a road from Arunachal Pradesh into Myanmar. We know Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China but I think that the Myanmar government had decided that it would act in its own self interest and open up the border region because it would help its own development. So I would say that you find countries of Southeast Asia respectful of China, wanting China¡¯s friendship and at that same time wanting diversification and wanting to have friends in all directions.
Question: Good afternoon, sir. My name is Chan Zhixing and I'm a third year law student from the Singapore Management University (SMU). You mentioned about elements of nei (ÄÚ-internal) and wai (Íâ-external). My question is: What are some of the guiding principles which determine what is nei and what is wai from a Chinese perspective? Do we know what is considered important to them, what is their core interest, but what is the guiding principle for them in deciding whether something is internal or external? Thank you.
Minister: You know, it's hard to reduce this into rules. I think those of us who are raised as Chinese instinctively feel it, and learn that as a core principle, learning as a young child how to deal with people who are not like you. And the way to treat those who are not like you is to be extra nice to them. You always treat strangers better than your own people because you are afraid of strangers. So the best food, the best items are reserved for strangers [Laughter]. Among yourselves you get the second best, but when a foreigner comes, always win him over by generosity because you are afraid of him. How do you define that? Is it genetic? It is not genetic because Han people are genetically very diverse. Is it a fixed set of cultural norms? But the norms in dong bei (¶«±±-the Northeast) are very different from the norms in gan su (¸ÊËà), very different from norms in the South. And strangely even the Chinese outside China often make this clear distinction between nei(ÄÚ) and wai (Íâ). If you talk to the Indonesian Chinese, the Malaysian Chinese, they make that distinction very clearly. And even those who are assimilated in the Philippines and Thailand, very often these distinctions persist. But I am hard put - I think it would require scholars to do research into this - to say look, these are the hundred rules by which you distinguish inside from outside.
Moderator: Well, even our grandparents think of us as nei sun (ÄÚËïpaternal grandson) or wai sun (ÍâËï-maternal grandson). When we visit China as wai bin (Íâ±ö-foreign visitor) we have to pay higher entrance fees. So sometimes if we can get away with it it's ok to pretend to be nei bin (ÄÚ±ö-domestic visitor) [Laughter]. But Minister, I have another question that I will like to pose to you. You said very briefly earlier that there are episodic levels of interest in Singapore from the Chinese and sometimes they like what they see in Singapore, sometimes they don't like what they see - that got me very interested. In your interactions, what have you uncovered as likeable aspects and not-so-likeable aspects, as far as the Chinese are concerned?
Minister: You mean, what they like of us and what they don't like of us?
Moderator: That's right.
Minister: Well, I think because Singapore is so small and has a different history, so there are limits to what the Singapore model can hold to the Chinese. But at the same time, the leaders in the mainland know that there are deep historical and cultural connections between Singapore and China going back to the Qing dynasty. I had a discussion about Wan Qing Yuan £¨ÍíÇçÔ° £©the other day which was the house which Sun Zhong Shan lived in when he was in Singapore. He was there eight times, he lived in the house six times with his mistress and I think three or four of the uprisings in China were organised in Singapore and the money was collected in Singapore. In fact the Tong Meng Hui £¨Í¬Ã˻ᣩafter it was established in Dong Jing £¨¶«¾©-Tokyo£©, six months later it was established in Singapore and that became the precursor to the Guo Min Dang£¨¹úÃñµ³£©. And the Guo Min Dang flag, which is the flag of Taiwan today, was chosen from four different specimens and the contest was held in Singapore. When they chose the model, the owner of the bungalow Teo Eng Hock, who was our Defence Minister¡¯s great grand uncle, his wife sewed together the flag and that original flag today is in the KMT Museum in Taipei. Then during the anti-Japanese struggle in China, Singapore was a major base for the raising of funds, to help. Volunteers went from throughout Southeast Asia but Singapore was the Zong Bu £¨×ܲ¿-headquarters£©. A lot of the discussions were held in the Yi He Xuan(âùºÍÐù - Ee Hoe Hean Club) which was the business club still existing today, refurbished recently. The Japanese Imperial Army, when they drew up their plans in Taiwan to invade Singapore, they had already drawn up a list of thousands of Chinese community leaders in Singapore who would have to be neutralised. So it was not an accident that after Nanjing, the place where the greatest slaughter took place was in Singapore. And then after that, the great twists and turns in China all had their reflections here in Singapore. I think a scholar who wants to write the history of the left wing movement in Singapore attributed, I think it was in today¡¯s newspapers, the decline of the Barisan Socialis to its aping of Cultural Revolution policies in China which was so out of line to reality in Singapore that they were defeated. Under Mao, the contacts were minimal, but after Mao, when China was opening up, when Deng Xiaoping was trying to find a new way forward for China, Singapore became an inspiration to China because of all the connections there. If Singapore could succeed, why can¡¯t China succeed? Because China has more people, cleverer people, a prouder tradition. So when the special economic zones were established, the Chinese Foreign Minister appointed Dr Goh Keng Swee as Adviser to the State Councillor Gu Mu. Since then, whether it was special economic zones, industrial estates Suzhou, Tianjin and so on, from time to time, whatever was China¡¯s focus - go to Singapore and see whether it could abstract lessons, and then moving on if it feels that it has learnt already. But I notice in recent years, a great interest in the management of urban politics, because the PAP, the People¡¯s Action Party, is probably the most successful urban political party in Asia, and the Chinese want to know what is the secret. And there are, every year, many Chinese delegations visiting our constituencies, visiting the Members of Parliament while they are holding their meet-the-people sessions, their political clinics. Well, if we can play a helpful role to China, we should. It costs us nothing, and a strong China, a wealthy China, is good for Singapore. We hope also that it is not just China learning from our mistakes and failures; I think we should also have the good sense and wisdom, the humility, to learn from China¡¯s experiences and failures, and in the process, also improve ourselves and keeping the relevance of our own model.
Moderator: On that note Minister, I have a question about the role of Singapore. Is it a farfetched idea to think of Singapore as a bridge between China and the world? If there is one thing we can do to strengthen ourselves¡?
Minister: No, Singapore cannot be a bridge. A bridge suggests a certain exclusive channel of communication. We are in a networked-world, there are numerous, almost infinite number of bypasses. What Singapore can do¡
Moderator: So a bridge rather than the bridge.
Minister: It can be a node. If we are creative, if we are far-seeing, we can enlarge this node and increase its connectivity to other nodes. But if we become self-satisfied or inward-looking, then we will shrink and then become less relevant to others. But it is becoming a networked-world, and everybody has bypasses. No one is indispensable.
Moderator: And the one thing we can do to strengthen ourselves as that node?
Minister: It is a little paradoxical, that the more we want to strengthen our links with China, and we should, the more we must strengthen our links to other parts of the world. Because if you look at it as a node in the brain with many synaptic connections, the more connected we are to India, to Southeast Asia, to Europe, to Japan, to Africa, the more valuable are our links to China, to the Chinese people. The key to Singapore¡¯s good relations with China is in our ability to grow synaptic connections to other parts of the world, in particular the parts of the world which in an earlier age of globalisation created Singapore. It was the age of the British Empire which brought Indians, which brought Jews through Baghdad and Calcutta into Singapore, which brought Indonesians and Malaysians, and Thais and Vietnamese, which brought Australians and Japanese here. All those links which created us in the 19th century, we should now revive because these are now the links which will give us all our life nutrients in this century to grow and to prosper.
Moderator: Well ladies and gentlemen, although we invited Minister George Yeo to speak to us on China, but you can see from the breadth of his knowledge and his interest in history, and also his keen observation of everything that¡¯s going around in the world, you do not get just China, you will get synapses, you will get TCP/IP, you will get everything else that is related to this in the most interesting, stimulating and engaging way. May I just ask all of us to just show our appreciation to Mr George Yeo for sharing with us so generously. Thank you so much!
