“美国应该为了台湾问题派美军跑到西太平洋与解放军作战吗？”对于这一问题，“The American Conservative ”说了这么一句话：美国政客应该对美国人民负有责任。
美媒的这一题目很有意思：美国应该为了台湾去和中国作战吗？
美国“The American Conservative ”提醒道：台湾对中美两国有着不同的含义，它对中国而言可要比美国重要得多。美国国内的一些观察者总是认为，只要美国明确战时会“协防台湾”的承诺，就会发挥一个非常大的吓阻效果，同时也能够激发台军的战斗意志，这很有可能会让解放军“知难而退”。甚至还有美国的观察者认为，只要美国战时真的介入的话，一定会取得台海之战最后的胜利，因为美国的军力确保了美国的获胜。不过保守派杂志对这种言论是嗤之以鼻，它在文章中直接表示：持这种观点的观察家是在做梦。因为近年来，解放军的军力可谓突飞猛进，并不弱于西太平洋的美军。
美国“The American Conservative ”还提醒道：在打仗之前，美国政府应该审视一下成本、风险和收益。美国的政客们应该清楚一点：“保护台湾”、“协防台湾”不是美军的义务，也不值得美国拿自己的未来去冒险。台海有事时，美国没有必要介入，应该让台军自己去打。归根到底，为了台湾问题去和中国作战，这非常不符合美国选民的利益。
美媒的这篇文章主要谈论的是战时美军该不该介入台海，一直以来，美国国内对此众说纷纭，各有各有的观点。不过从这篇文章所表达的意思看，显然美军不该去，认为这是在拿美国的未来做赌注。下面就来看一下这篇文章到底是如何阐述的。
（一）美媒感受到了台海的火药味
日前，美国“The American Conservative ”网站就当前的台海局势以及未来台海有事时，美军是否应该介入台海发表了一篇分析文章。这篇文章的题目很有意思：为大事件做准备：美国应该在台湾问题上与中国作战吗？随后最底下出现了一行回答的小字：美国政客对美国人民负有责任。
首先来看一看这些话的含义。“为大事件做准备”，这句话说得有些耐人寻味，而这句话的后面是美军战时是否应该介入台海。做一个综合考量的话，“The American Conservative ”网站似乎已经感受到了台海越来越浓的火药味。从直观的角度看，当前的台海局势显然没有2022年8月佩洛西窜台时那样剑拔弩张，但媒体对局势的判断毕竟要比一般人有着更高的敏感性。
美媒感受到了台海的火药味，现在的台海正处于一种敏感时期
而文章正文的开头，“The American Conservative ”网站首先谈到的就是岛内2024选举结果。或许“The American Conservative ”已经预感到这次的选举结果可能真的是台海局势的重要分水岭，未来台海局势可能会走向一个火药味更浓的环境中。所以这也才有了战时美军是否应该介入台海，与解放军进行直接作战的谈论。
这篇文章首先写道：在1月13日，台湾岛内选举结果出炉，有着“台独”思想的民进党将在5月份之后继续上台，而且这次赢得选举的赖清德是一个“台独”思想更加激进的人，其过往的言论让很多人对他感到不放心。这次赖清德的“胜利”是非常脆弱的，他仅仅过了40%，距离最基本的半数民意差得很远。此外，在台立法机构，民进党时隔8年丢掉了掌控权，甚至连“第一大党”的位置都没保住。
从过去大陆对赖清德的政治定性看，这就是一个标准的“台独”分子，大陆有着极高的警惕心。1月13日岛内的选举过后，外界普遍认为，大陆会在台海周边有相应的军事动作，甚至会向民进党当局施加强大的军事压力。但从目前的情形看，这些都还未发生，或许大陆还在做观察。但有一点可以肯定，现在大陆正陆续出手整治“台独”，例如选后不久，瑙鲁在毫无征兆的背景下突然发出了与台当局的“断交”令，这让民进党当局感到猝不及防。
“The American Conservative ”在文章中写道：从一个更加现实的角度看，当前两岸毕竟还没有走到刀兵相见的那一步。但有一点不容忽视，大陆对和平统一的耐心正在减弱。
事实上，在选举之前，台湾岛内也有媒体舆论做过一个预判：这次的选举不仅对台湾而言是一个转折点，对大陆而言，这很有可能是对台政策的一个转折点，即如果说是民进党继续上台的话，那就意味着和平统一的可能性要变得更低，此时大陆很有可能会审视另一种国家统一政策。不过岛内也有其他人对这种说法做保留，毕竟三个候选人都是不谈“统”的，所以如果单从统一的角度看，其实三人谁上都一样。而且岛内学者赵春山还预测：2024年以后，大陆对台主要工作就是促统。
台湾是中国的台湾，统一是大势所趋，“台独”、“拖统”都是绝路
不过有一点需要注意：两岸已经持续分离了70多年，这一时间是很漫长的，台湾也需要知道，和平统一虽然是大陆首要对台政策，但大陆的耐心是有限的，“拖统”注定是一条无法持续的绝路。
（二）美媒表示，认为美军会在台海击败解放军的言论完全是一种梦话
在这么一种背景下，“The American Conservative ”在文章中开始讨论“对台武统”，而其中一个最重要的问题是：一旦大陆决定“对台武统”的话，美军是否会真的介入？
“The American Conservative ”在文章中写道：群体思维主导着华盛顿在台湾问题上的立场。美国政治领导人不计代价地假设美国对台北的支持，但他们很少对此做详细说明，拜登一直在嘴上说自己会支持台湾，会在战时“协防”。但随后他的幕僚又极力辩解，表示会继续美国的“模糊”政策，这很令外界质疑，美国政府究竟是否对此达成了内部一致。而美国政治领导层的想法和基层选民的想法又出现了差异。大多数选民都是反对使用美军“协防”台湾的。
该文章还提到：美国国内的一些政策研究者认为，只要美国政府能够明确自己会在战时“协防台湾”的意图，就能够起到所谓的“吓阻”作用，同时台军的军心也会受到振奋，战时顽抗的心会非常大，他们心中想定，自己至少要撑到美军的到来。甚至还有其他的观察家认为，凭借美军现有的军力，如果美军一旦决定介入的话，最后一定会“打赢”。
对于这一想法，该文章表示：不幸运的是，这些观察家的想法是在做梦。中国的军机正在突飞猛进地发展，目前中国海军已经是世界第二强，他的海军舰艇规模数量已经超越了美国海军。更关键的一点是，美军的军力是全球性的，他不仅要关注西太平洋，还要顾及全球其他热点地区。而解放军的军力投射主要集中在西太平洋，准确地说，是集中在中国周边海域。北京在台海作战有着自己的主场优势，他可以依靠数十个大陆军事基地直接在台海作战，而美军则需要把军力做跨越太平洋式的远程投送。
如果从这一层面进行计算的话，中美两国围绕台海局势展开的军事较量，谁优谁劣恐怕最后要超出想象，至少美军的实力没有想象中的乐观。
美军的军力需要覆盖全球，美军能够向西太平洋部署多少军力完全值得质疑
该文章还表示：一旦美国真的决定准备为台湾而与解放军作战的话，那结果将是非常可怕的。他引用了美国海军战争学院研究员莱尔·戈德斯坦的警告：在整个西太平洋地区，尤其是在台海周边，军事力量的平衡已经出现了决定性的变化，如果美军决定在战时增援这个被围困的岛屿的话，海军和空军要做好承受巨大损失的准备。美军需要跨越6500海里的大洋做远程力量投送，北京的导弹可以很轻松地把美军远道而来的舰队阻击在台海之外。即使美军最依赖的水下潜艇部队恐怕也没有那么乐观。
过去美国海军总是认为自己的潜艇部队是在台海周边击败解放军舰队的关键，但他们忽视的另一个现实是，北京多年来一直在研究如何应对美军的水下潜艇部队，而且解放军的水下潜艇部队也正在飞速发展。如果美军贸然介入台海战事的话，这将是非常悲伤的一天，最可怕的后果就是核战争的诉诸，中美两国都是拥核国家，尽管双方一直都在强调避免使用核武器，一直在常规力量发力，但战争的进程是令人难以想象的。
不得不说，从美国研究人员的表态看，显然，如果美军贸然介入台海战事的后果将是非常惨重的，它绝没有西方观察家所想象得那么轻松。“The American Conservative ”还在这篇文章中做了一个相对细化的说明：根据美国国内智库过往的推演，无论介入的最终结果是胜还是败，美军通常都会付出这么一些代价：多艘航母沉没，数百架飞机被击落，数千名军事人员丧生。
（三）美媒认为，美军贸然介入台海不符合美国的国家利益
“The American Conservative ”还提醒道：美国的对手可不仅仅只在亚太，欧洲、中东都有美国的对手存在。美军如果因为为了台湾，而在西太平洋地区蒙受巨大军事损失的话，在其他地区恐怕要面临一种非常大的军事挑战。
事实上这个给美国的提醒很大，现在俄罗斯可是还在欧洲作战，目前俄乌战场是一种僵持状态，俄军推不动，乌军也推不动。而且由于地缘政治的原因，欧洲国家对乌克兰的关注可要远远大于对台海的关注，这可是欧洲家门口的事。如果台海有事，美军贸然想贸然介入的话，估计欧洲国家的意见将非常大，因为这会为乌克兰战场上的俄军提供一个战略机遇期，更直白地讲：俄军甚至会利用这么一个机会在乌克兰战场上直接平推。
对美国而言，欧洲、亚太哪一个更重要呢？前者可是资本主义的大本营和发源地，而且纵观冷战后的美国对外军事行动，能够跟着美军前往海外作战的基本上都是欧洲国家，打阿富汗、打伊拉克、打利比亚，打叙利亚，基本上都是欧洲国家在跟着美军打冲锋。所以从这一点看的话，相信美国自己心目中有一杆秤：欧洲和台海，到底哪一个更重要。
对美国而言，欧洲可要比台海重要太多，这里才是他的核心地缘利益所在
“The American Conservative ”还在文章中做了这么一个提醒：如果美军真的打算要介入台海，与解放军作战的话，他需要为庞大的军费开支做好准备，武器的生产、人员伤亡抚恤，这些都需要巨大的财政开支。而当前美国的债务水平正在不断攀升，正不断接近新的债务纪录。难道美国政府想通过削弱选民的社会福利项目，国内基建项目的方式来节省军费，跑到台海为台湾打仗吗？如果真是这样的话，美国的选民可就有意见了，他们不可能在牺牲自己生活的背景下去为了大多数所不知道的台湾而打仗。
随后“The American Conservative ”在文章中发出了这么一个问题：台湾有什么样的利益值得美国去承担这些巨大的风险和代价，甚至让美国可能要赌上自己的未来。
从伊拉克战争之后，美国国内就开始思考这么一个问题：打仗应该需要极其重要的利益。对中美两国而言，台湾给他们所带的利益各不相同，它对中国而言是国家领土主权问题，也是历史问题，更事关中华民族的荣辱。从1895年甲午战争签署《马关条约》至今，除了1945年至1949年外，台湾就一直处于与大陆所分离的状态，百年来，中国人希望台湾能够回归，这事关民族的历史荣辱。所以毫无疑问，台湾绝对是中国的核心利益。
台湾是中国核心利益中的核心，它事关中国的国家统一和民族荣辱
但对美国却并非如此，台湾从来都不是美国的核心利益，如果是美国是因为半导体的原因而准备“协防台湾”的话，华盛顿更应该清楚一点：如果美军真的介入，扩大冲突，无论最终是谁获胜，台湾岛上的半导体恐怕都遭到巨大的损失，美国自己不是也发出过“毁台论”吗，并直言要摧毁台湾岛上的半导体工厂。
如果说是为了保证所谓的“第一岛链”，让台湾岛成为阻止解放军前进太平洋的军事基地，美军同样也应该看到这么一个现实：即使在台湾没有回归的背景下，解放军已经大大扩大了其舰队的地理范围，山东舰编队不是曾一度抵达过关岛海域附近吗？
如果是按照美国国内鹰派所说的那样，如果不“协防台湾”的话，这会损害美国的声誉，令盟国质疑美国的安全承诺，对美国失去信心。但他们更应该清楚一点：所谓的安全承诺是建立在正式的防务条约上的。而从1979年之后，美国和台当局没有任何的军事防务条约，就连一向“亲台”的美国国会都没有提过此事，何来的对台安全承诺问题。美国会为了日本、韩国的安全去打一场仗，但不会为了台湾去打仗。
此外，美国还应该清楚，自己的盟国没有一个承诺会为台湾去作战的。
如果从美国自己的利益去考虑的话，他应该关注美国的未来。中美两国都是拥核国家，两个核大国爆发直接冲突，即使双方再想打一场常规战争的话，但后续的进程恐怕不是他们所能够把控的。
美媒总结了一句：美军的职责是保护美国，而不是台湾
这篇文章最后总结了一点：归根结底，在台湾问题上与北京作战不符合美国人民的利益，华盛顿应该代表美国人民行事，他的职责是保护美国人，而不是台湾人。
Preparing for the Big One: Should America Battle China Over Taiwan?
https://www.cato.org/commentary/preparing-big-one-should-america-battle-china-over-taiwan?
U.S. politicians' responsibility is to the American people.
By Doug Bandow Jan 25, 2024
Washington’s duty is to protect Americans, not Taiwanese, however sympathetic the latter’s cause. The U.S. should firmly rule out military intervention while pursuing other policies designed to dissuade China from loosing the uncertain furies of war.
Taiwanese voters have spoken, elevating Vice President Lai Ching‐?te to the presidency. By selecting a candidate from the independence‐?minded Democratic Progressive Party for the third time in a row, the island state’s 24 million people gave a collective uplifted middle finger to the People’s Republic of China, and especially President Xi Jinping.
Lai’s victory was modest: 40 percent of the vote in a three‐?way race, with the DPP losing its parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, the PRC exhibited its displeasure, issuing warnings against separatism and undertaking military operations nearby. More significant was China’s political counterattack, as the Pacific island nation of Nauru shifted its recognition from the Republic of China to the PRC, reducing Taipei’s diplomatic partners to just 12.
So far, this looks a bit like Kabuki theater—a seemingly intense battle in which no one gets hurt. Yet Beijing’s patience appears to be waning, with Xi insisting that the issue must be resolved and the People’s Liberation Army training to seize Taiwan if necessary.
Groupthink dominates Washington’s position on Taiwan. U.S. political leaders assume America’s support for Taipei irrespective of cost, which few detail. Indeed, President Joe Biden has repeatedly promised to fight for Taiwan (which his staff has equally often, but unconvincingly, repudiated). In contrast, a majority of Americans oppose the use of U.S. troops.
Some otherwise serious policymakers assume that the Chinese would scatter if Washington simply declared its intentions. Others figure the U.S. would have to win since America always wins, or at least is supposed to.
Unfortunately, such observers are living a dream.
China has been rapidly expanding its military forces and currently deploys the world’s second most powerful navy. The PRC has embarked upon a major nuclear build‐?up to shrink America’s advantage in this critical area. China concentrates its forces in Asia rather than dispersing them globally. Beijing can rely on scores of mainland military bases while Washington must project power across the Pacific Ocean.
Finally, Taiwan matters far more to the Chinese than the American people. One reason is history: Japan seized the islands in 1895 after defeating the Chinese Empire during what was known as the Century of Humiliation. Nationalistic Chinese want Taiwan back. Security is another important concern—little different than what animated Washington’s refusal to accept a Soviet military presence in Cuba in 1962.
Americans understandably sympathize with Taiwan. The Republic of China is a vibrant democracy, an outpost of liberty in the shadow of the world’s greatest despotism. Indeed, Beijing is moving backwards, with Xi Jinping looking more like Mao Zedong every day. Nevertheless, sympathy does not a casus belli make.
Especially when the costs of war would be so great. Any conflict would be very different from America’s recent Mideast fights. Defense Priority’s Lyle Goldstein, who long taught at the Naval War College, warned:
The military balance in the Western Pacific and especially around Taiwan has shifted decisively. U.S. Navy and Air Force units would face enormous losses in any attempt to reinforce the beleaguered island. Even the vaunted U.S. submarine force almost certainly could not prevail in such circumstances, since it has limited numbers and firepower. Moreover, Beijing has been working assiduously on decisive countermeasures to American submarines, including sea mines. Beijing would deploy its missile forces to easily gain vast superiority in the air, enabling an enormous mainland assault to go forward—spearheaded by heliborne infantry and commandos. The only thing worse than such a sad day would be either the utter defeat of American expeditionary forces at the lonely end of a 6,500 mile supply line, or the rather conceivable resort to nuclear war.
Although nothing is certain, the U.S. usually loses wargames of the potential conflict, and even victory, meaning Taiwan remains unconquered, comes at a heavy cost, with multiple carriers sunk, hundreds of aircraft downed, and thousands of military personnel killed. Moreover, escalation, including nuclear weapons, would be likely. The PRC would do whatever it thought necessary to prevent U.S. domination just off its coast. Washington would have to strike the Chinese mainland, which would force Beijing to in turn target American territory. Never have two major conventional combatants possessed nuclear weapons.
Even the minimum expected military losses, compounded by the significant economic harm, would undercut other American defense commitments. Proposals to accelerate military outlays ignore Washington’s rising debt burden, which is approaching record levels. Americans aren’t likely to slash social programs to protect Taiwan. Finally, even victory would be temporary, with China retreating to rearm and prepare for the next round, rather like Germany after its defeat in the First World War.
Is anything at stake with Taiwan worth incurring these costs and taking these risks?
Going to war should require an extremely important interest. Going to war against a powerful nuclear‐?armed state should require a truly vital or existential interest. None is present in Taiwan. The Taiwanese people deserve to decide their own political future, and virtually none identify with the PRC. Protecting that right, however, is neither an obligation of the U.S. nor worth risking America’s future.
Talk of democracy versus autocracy is meaningless boilerplate. Washington cares little about liberty when it overthrows democracies that it dislikes and embraces autocracies that it favors. Just watch President Joe Biden grovel before the Saudi royals. Freedom House ranks their loathsome regime even lower than the PRC. Anyway, democracy in America should be the highest priority for U.S. policymakers.
Nor is Taiwan’s dominant semiconductor chip industry reason for war, which would disrupt global supplies. China would blockade the island and combat could flatten the factories. Indeed, such facilities would not likely survive no matter who won. Washington probably would destroy them rather than allow them to fall into China’s hands. Fear of over‐?dependence on Taiwanese chip facilities should lead to production and supply diversification, not military intervention. (Oddly, former president Donald Trump equivocated on defending Taiwan because, he believes, it created its chip industry at America’s expense.)
U.S. officials also insist that Washington must preserve an autonomous Taiwan to inhibit Chinese naval operations further into the Pacific. Yet Beijing has greatly expanded its geographic reach without holding the island. Moreover, every time American policymakers announce that they want to protect Taipei to reinforce US domination of the Asia‐?Pacific, they intensify Chinese determination to regain Taiwan. It makes no sense to go to war with China to control a territory that is supposed to prevent China from starting a war.
Hawks who insist on fighting every war big and small to maintain “credibility” warn that America’s Pacific allies would lose confidence in Washington if it did not combat Beijing over Taiwan. Yet the U.S. formalizes security commitments with defense treaties. Congress has not done so with Taipei for a reason. All great powers set priorities and make choices, just as Washington is not defending Ukraine. In contrast, America proved its willingness to defend South Korea, at great cost.
Moreover, none of America’s allies have committed to go to war with the U.S. on Taiwan’s behalf. The treaties with Japan and South Korea are supposed to be “mutual.” These nations have much more at stake in Taiwan than does America. Why should Washington commit if they won’t? Indeed, constantly reassuring allies against every contingency discourages them from doing more for their own defense. Both Seoul and Tokyo have long lagged in defense efforts since they can rely on America. In practice, Washington promising to do more means they will do less.
Ultimately, it is not in the interests of the American people, on whose behalf Washington is supposed to operate, to battle Beijing over Taiwan. However, that doesn’t mean the U.S. shouldn’t do anything. To start, Americans should help arm Taipei. The latter needs to do a much better job defending itself, in both staffing its military and deploying the right weapons, especially anti‐?ship missiles. There is much that the Taiwanese should learn from the Russo‐?Ukraine war. The U.S. and Taipei should even have discreet discussions about the latter’s interest in possessing nuclear weapons. Proliferation is undesirable, but still might be the least bad option. Better nations at risk deter China than rely on America.
The U.S. also should work with allied and friendly states, in Asia and Europe especially, to prepare economic penalties should the PRC use force against Taiwan. This won’t be easy, given how such nations benefit from Chinese trade. Nevertheless, war in Northeast Asia would have catastrophic regional and global impacts. One study estimated the likely economic cost at $10 trillion. The best way to deter Chinese military action would be to ensure that the denizens of Zhongnanhai counted the cost before they embarked on war.
Finally, the U.S. should seek to reassure the PRC. That might seem counterintuitive, but few Chinese want to go to war. They hope to force Taiwan to agree to some form of unification without fighting. Despite his increasingly tough rhetoric, even Xi realizes that military failure would be catastrophic for China and him personally. His ongoing military purges suggest that he is not confident in the PLA. Nothing is foreordained.
However, warn three China scholars, war is more likely “if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence.… Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification or would allow the United States to restore something akin to a defense alliance with Taiwan. And if China comes to that conclusion, then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.”
Analysts broadly agree that a Taiwanese declaration of independence likely would trigger a Chinese military response. Unfortunately, Beijing appears to believe that recent behavior by both Taipei and Washington indicates that Taiwan’s objectives have shifted toward independence, with Washington’s support. In fact, several Chinese officials have told me that there is no returning to the status quo ante because they believe that means eventual separation. What matters is not what the U.S. and Taiwan intend, but what Beijing believes they intend.
Thus, it is essential not to stoke Chinese paranoia. Politicians determined to use Taiwan to score partisan points risk spurring a catastrophic conflict with horrendous consequences. The best hope to avoid war is to convince Beijing that the peaceful status quo remains in its interest. That requires convincing the PRC that the peaceful status quo truly is the status quo. Negotiations for the U.S., China, and Taiwan to all step back from political contention and military conflict might offer the best hope to reduce the likelihood of conflict.
Unfortunately, the Taiwanese people live in a bad neighborhood and must adapt to local realities, meaning a potentially aggressive China. This may be unfair, but life is unfair. Washington’s duty is to protect Americans, not Taiwanese, however sympathetic the latter’s cause. The U.S. should firmly rule out military intervention while pursuing other policies designed to dissuade China from loosing the uncertain furies of war.
