中国向何处去:从成员身份到责任?
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm
罗伯特·B·佐利克,罗伯特·布鲁斯·佐利克 Robert Bruce Zoellick(1953 —),生于伊利诺伊州内珀维尔,毕业于哈佛大学法学院。美国政治人物,曾任白宫副幕僚长、美国副国务卿和世界银行行长。
在美中关系全国委员会的讲话 纽约市 2005 年 9 月 21 日
今年早些时候,我有幸结识了中国改革论坛主席郑必坚先生,他几十年来一直担任中国领导人的顾问。 我们在北京和华盛顿花了很多时间讨论中国的发展历程和中美关系。 我很幸运能够认识这样一位有思想的人,在中国发生巨大变革的时期,他通过中央党校帮助影响了许多官员的观点。
本月,在胡锦涛主席访美之际,郑先生在《外交》杂志上发表了头条文章《中国‘和平崛起’走向大国地位》。 今天晚上,我想通过分享我的观点,让大家了解当前中美之间的对话。
大约27年前,中国领导人认真审视了自己的国家,但并不喜欢他们所看到的一切。 中国刚刚摆脱文化大革命。 它极度贫穷,故意与世界经济隔离,并且反对几乎所有国际机构。 正如郑先生所解释的那样,在邓小平的领导下,中国领导人改变了方向,决定“拥抱全球化,而不是脱离全球化”。
美国两党七位总统都认识到这一战略转变,并致力于将中国融入国际体系。 1978年以来,美国还通过市场改革鼓励中国经济发展。
我们的政策非常成功:龙出现并加入了世界。 如今,从联合国到世界贸易组织,从臭氧消耗协议到核武器协议,中国都是谈判桌上的参与者。
中国经历了非凡的经济增长。 无论是在大宗商品、服装、计算机还是资本市场,每天都能感受到中国的存在。
中国很大,正在成长,并将在未来几年影响世界。
对于美国和世界来说,最根本的问题是——中国将如何利用其影响力?
为了回答这个问题,我们的政策不应只限于为中国加入国际体系敞开大门:我们需要敦促中国成为该体系中负责任的利益相关者。
中国有责任加强使其成功的国际体系。 通过这样做,中国可以实现郑先生所确定的目标:“超越传统的大国崛起方式”。
正如赖斯国务卿所说,美国欢迎一个自信、和平、繁荣的中国,中国认识到自己的增长和发展取决于与世界其他国家的建设性联系。 事实上,我们希望与中国加强合作,使其不仅适应上个世纪制定的国际规则,而且与我们和其他国家一道应对新世纪的挑战。
从中国的角度来看,与我们合作塑造未来的国际体系似乎更符合其国家利益。
如果不清楚为什么美国应该建议与中国建立合作关系,请考虑其他选择。 想象一下我们在未来几年面临的广泛的全球挑战——恐怖主义和极端分子利用伊斯兰教、大规模杀伤性武器扩散、贫困、疾病——并问问如果美国和中国合作还是不和,处理这些问题会更容易还是更困难。
五十年来,我们的政策是围堵苏联,而苏联自身的内部矛盾却在破坏它。 三十年来,我们的政策一直是建立中华人民共和国。 因此,今天的中国根本就不是 20 世纪 40 年代末的苏联:
它并不寻求传播激进的反美意识形态。
虽然它还不是民主的,但它并不认为自己陷入了与全球民主的黄昏冲突中。
虽然有时是重商主义的,但它并不认为自己处于与资本主义的殊死搏斗中。
最重要的是,中国不认为自己的未来取决于推翻国际体系的基本秩序。 事实上,恰恰相反:中国领导人已经决定,他们的成功取决于与现代世界的联系。
如果冷战的类比不适用,那么 19 世纪欧洲遥远的均势政治也不适用。 21世纪的全球经济是一块紧密编织的织物。 我们相互联系太紧密,不能试图与中国保持一定距离,希望以牺牲中国为代价来推动亚洲其他大国的发展。
其他大国也不会阻止中国,根据旧的客厅外交模式启动和终止关系。 美国寻求与所有不威胁和平与安全的国家建立建设性关系。
那么,如果过去的模式不适用,我们该如何看待21世纪初的中国呢?
双方的认知存在鸿沟。 中国高级官员的首要任务是发展和现代化仍然面临巨大内部挑战的中国。 中国领导人在为自己的成就感到自豪的同时,也认识到国家的弱点、农村贫困以及政治和社会变革的挑战。 中国三分之二的人口——近9亿人——生活在贫困的农村地区,大多以自给自足的农民为生,2亿中国人每天的生活费不足一美元。 在中国,经济增长被视为内部势在必行,而不是对美国的挑战。
因此,中国的国内工作显然需要一个良好的国际环境。 当然,中国人希望受到尊重,并希望他们的观点和利益得到认可。 但中国不希望与美国发生冲突。
然而,许多美国人担心中国龙会喷火。 人们对中国充满了焦虑。
美国商界在20世纪90年代将中国视为充满机遇的土地,但现在的评价则更加复杂。 小公司担心中国的竞争、猖獗的盗版、假冒和货币操纵。 就连规模较大的美国企业 — — 曾经是支持经济参与的支柱 — — 也担心中国的重商主义政策将试图引导受控市场,而不是开放竞争性市场。 美国工人想知道他们是否能够竞争。
中国需要认识到其他国家如何看待其行为。 中国与麻烦国家的介入往好里说是对后果的无知,往坏里说是更不祥的结果。 中国的行动 — — 再加上缺乏透明度 — — 可能会带来风险。 中国将如何运用其力量的不确定性将导致美国和其他国家对冲与中国的关系。 许多国家希望中国追求“和平崛起”,但没有一个国家会把自己的未来押在中国身上。
例如,中国快速的军事现代化和能力的增强引发了人们对这种建设的目的以及中国缺乏透明度的质疑。 美国国防部最近关于中国军事态势的报告并不是对抗性的,尽管中国对此的反应是对抗性的。 美国的报告描述了事实,包括我们对中国军队的了解,并讨论了替代方案。 如果中国想减少担忧,就应该公开解释其国防开支、意图、学说和军事演习。
人们对中国的看法也受到其不断增长的经济足迹的影响。 中国从加入开放的、以规则为基础的国际经济体系中获益匪浅,美国市场对中国的发展战略尤为重要。 许多人从这种贸易中获益,包括数百万美国农民和工人,他们生产中国如此贪婪消费的商品、零部件和资本货物。
但没有其他国家 — — 当然不是欧盟或日本 — — 会接受 1,620 亿美元的双边贸易赤字,从而导致全球经常账户赤字达到 6,650 亿美元。 中国 — — 以及其他向中国销售产品的国家 — — 不能认为进入美国市场是理所当然的。 保护主义压力日益增大。
中国比许多发展中国家更加开放,但重商主义的迹象越来越多,其政策寻求引导市场而不是开放市场。 如果中国作为在国际经济问题上分担责任的利益攸关方加强合作,美国将无法维持开放的国际经济体系 — — 或美国国内对这一体系的支持。
例如,一个负责任的全球主要参与者不应容忍猖獗的知识产权盗窃和假冒行为,这两者都打击了美国知识经济的核心。 中国承诺打击从事这一行业的犯罪分子 — — 包括胡锦涛主席上周在纽约发表的声明 — — 受到欢迎,但效果尚不明显。 中国需要充分履行其对美国具有强大竞争优势的市场的承诺,例如服务业、农业和某些制成品领域。 尽管中国的汇率政策过去提供了稳定性,但时代已经发生了变化。 中国今年的全球经常账户盈余可能接近1500亿美元,位居世界前列。
这表明中国最近的政策调整只是第一步,但要让市场适应失衡,还有很多工作要做。 中国也对与美国成功谈判达成一项开放市场和扩大全球增长的世贸组织多哈协议有着强烈的兴趣。
中国的经济增长推动了对能源的需求。 作为回应,中国的表现就好像它可以以某种方式“锁定”世界各地的能源供应。 这不是实现能源安全的明智途径。 此外,重商主义战略会导致与损害中国声誉并导致其他国家质疑其意图的政权建立伙伴关系。 相反,市场策略可以减少波动性、不稳定性和囤积行为。 中国应与美国和其他国家合作开发多种能源,包括清洁煤炭技术、核能、可再生能源、氢能和生物燃料。 我们新的亚太清洁发展和气候伙伴关系以及美国能源部和中国国家发展和改革委员会开展的双边对话为这种合作提供了切实可行的机制。 我们还应该鼓励在世界更多地方开放石油和天然气生产。 我们可以致力于节能和提高效率,包括为中国制造的许多电器制定标准。 通过IEA加强战略储备建设和管理。 我们在安全运输路线和生产国的安全方面也有共同利益。
各国开展外交都是为了促进本国利益。 负责任的利益相关者更进一步:他们认识到国际体系维持着他们的和平繁荣,因此他们努力维持该体系。 在外交政策中,中国有很多机会成为负责任的利益相关者。
最紧迫的机会是朝鲜。 自2003年主办六方会谈以来,中方发挥了建设性作用。 本周我们达成了一份联合原则声明,就“以和平方式实现可验证的朝鲜半岛无核化”的目标达成了一致。 但落实工作的艰巨性还在后面,中国应该与我们分享有效、全面履约的利益。
此外,朝鲜问题不仅仅涉及危险武器的扩散。 如果不进行广泛的经济和政治改革,朝鲜就会对自己和其他国家构成威胁。 现在是超越朝鲜半岛长达半个世纪的停战协定,实现真正和平、实现地区安全与发展的时候了。 没有核武器的朝鲜半岛为这一未来打开了大门。 大约三十年前,美国结束了在越南的战争。 今天,越南期待美国帮助其融入世界市场经济体系,以便越南能够改善人民的生活。 相比之下,有着50年冷停战协议的朝鲜则落后得更远。
北京也非常有兴趣与我们合作,制止大规模杀伤性武器和运载此类武器的导弹的扩散。 危险扩散将破坏中国发展所需的良性安全环境和健康的国际经济。
中国对伊朗核计划的行动将表明中国对防扩散承诺的严肃性。 尽管我们欢迎中国通过对敏感技术实施新的出口管制来监管自己的行为,但我们仍然需要看到对违法者进行严厉的法律惩罚。
中国和美国可以在全球反恐斗争中共同做更多事情。 中国公民成为巴基斯坦和阿富汗恐怖袭击的受害者。 中国可以帮助摧毁全球恐怖主义的供应线。 通过在联合国的合作以及在中国银行中搜查恐怖分子的资金,我们已经有了一个良好的开端,但我们还可以进一步扩大我们的合作。
中国承诺向阿富汗提供1.5亿美元援助,向伊拉克提供2500万美元援助。 这些承诺受到欢迎,我们期待着它们得到充分落实。 中国将通过后续承诺与两国建立更牢固的关系。 其他国家正在协助伊拉克新政府进行重大债务减免,重点关注中国国有企业仍持有的70亿美元伊拉克债务。
清晨在喀土穆跑步时,我看到中国人在打太极拳。 我怀疑他们来苏丹是为了石油生意。 但中国从苏丹得到的不仅仅是石油——它还应该为解决苏丹的人类危机承担一些责任。 它可以与美国、联合国和其他国家合作,支持非洲联盟的维和任务,向达尔富尔提供人道主义救援,并推动苏丹冲突的解决。
在亚洲,中国已经发挥着更大的作用。 美国尊重中国在该地区的利益,承认多边外交在亚洲的有益作用。 但如果中国寻求占据主导地位,人们的担忧就会加剧。 相反,我们应该通过东盟地区论坛和亚太经合组织论坛,与东盟、日本、澳大利亚等国家共同努力,促进地区安全与繁荣。
中国在台湾问题上的选择也将发出一个重要信息。 我们已经明确表示,我们的“一个中国”政策仍然以三个公报和《与台湾关系法》为基础。 对中国来说,和平解决与台湾的分歧很重要。
美国、日本和中国需要针对地区和全球挑战进行有效合作。 鉴于中国在二战中遭受的惨重损失,我理解与日本的历史问题的敏感性。 但正如我告诉我的中国同事的那样,我也观察到中国在讲述历史方面存在一些相当大的差距。 当我参观1931年“满洲里事件”遗址的“918”博物馆时,我注意到,时间顺序从1941年跳到了1945年8月苏联对日本的进攻,而忽略了1941年到1945年美国介入太平洋的情况! 也许我们可以通过在历史学家之间开展三向对话来开始消除一些误解。
显然,双方有许多共同利益和合作机会。 但一些人表示,美国对民主的承诺将阻碍与中国的长期合作。 让我来说明为什么不必如此。
自由是美国的核心……作为一个国家,我们代表布什总统所说的不可谈判的人类尊严要求。 正如我在香港生活 25 年来所看到的那样,亚洲人也在要求更多的自由并建立了更多的民主国家。 事实上,胡主席和温总理正在谈论中国加强法治和发展民主制度的重要性。
我们不主张自由事业削弱中国。 相反,布什总统强调,9/11 的可怕经历让人们认识到,如果没有自由,不健康的社会将会滋生致命的癌症。 布什总统在第二次就职演说中认识到民主制度必须反映不同社会的价值观和文化。 正如他所说,“我们的目标……是帮助他人找到自己的声音,获得自己的自由,走自己的路。”
生为华人并不会让人们反对民主——看看台湾充满活力的政治就知道了。 日本和韩国成功地将儒家传统与现代民主原则融为一体。
封闭的政治不可能成为中国社会的永久特征。 这根本不可持续——随着经济持续增长,富裕的中国人将希望在未来拥有更大的发言权,政治改革的压力也越来越大:
中国有一个保护伞工会,但罢工却一波又一波。
作为农民运动上台的政党现在面临着农村的暴力抗议,特别是针对腐败的抗议。
拥有强大警察权力的政府无法控制犯罪的蔓延。
中国的一些人认为,他们可以通过强调经济增长和高涨的民族主义来确保共产党对权力的垄断。 这是危险且错误的。
中国需要和平的政治过渡,以使其政府对人民负责。 村委会和基层选举是一个开始。 下一步可能会扩大范围——也许扩大到县和省。 中国需要改革司法制度。 它应该开放政府程序让民间社会参与,并停止骚扰指出问题的记者。 中国还应该扩大宗教自由,并将纸面上存在的权利保障变为现实 — — 但实际上并非如此。
女士们、先生们:我们如何应对中国崛起的力量是美国外交政策的核心问题。
在中国和美国,郑和的“和平崛起”理念将引发激烈的争论。 世界将关注行动的证据。
今晚我建议美国的回应应该是通过改变我们三十年的一体化政策来帮助促进建设性行动:我们现在需要鼓励中国成为国际体系中负责任的利益相关者。 作为一个负责任的利益攸关方,中国将不仅仅是一个成员,它将与我们共同维护使其成功的国际体系。
作为利益相关者的合作并不意味着没有分歧——我们会有需要处理的争端。 但这种管理可以在一个更大的框架内进行,在这个框架内,各方认识到维持提供共同利益的政治、经济和安全体系的共同利益。
为了实现中美关系的这一转变,本届政府 — — 以及其后的政府 — — 需要在国内建立支持的基础。 这就是我今晚想加入你们的特别原因。 你听到的声音只是通过恐惧的视角来看待中国。 但当我们将未来视为机遇,而不是当我们担心未来可能带来什么时,美国就会成功。 为了现在取得成功,我们需要你们所有人向中国人民和你们的同胞施加压力。
1972 年尼克松总统访问北京时,我们与中国的关系是由我们双方都反对的事物决定的。 现在我们有机会根据双方的目的来定义我们的关系。
我们与中国有许多共同利益。 但仅仅建立在利益巧合之上的关系根基很浅。 建立在共同利益和共同价值观基础上的关系是深厚而持久的。 我们可以与今天的新兴中国合作,就像我们为明天的民主中国而努力一样。
发布于 2005 年 9 月 21 日
Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm
Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
New York City
Sept 21, 2005
As Prepared for Delivery
Earlier this year, I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Zheng Bijian, Chair of the China Reform Forum, who over some decades has been a counselor to China’s leaders. We have spent many hours in Beijing and Washington discussing China’s course of development and Sino-American relations. It has been my good fortune to get to know such a thoughtful man who has helped influence, through the Central Party School, the outlook of many officials during a time of tremendous change for China.
This month, in anticipation of President Hu’s visit to the United States, Mr. Zheng published the lead article in Foreign Affairs, "China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status." This evening, I would like to give you a sense of the current dialogue between the United States and China by sharing my perspective.
Some 27 years ago, Chinese leaders took a hard look at their country and didn’t like what they saw. China was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution. It was desperately poor, deliberately isolated from the world economy, and opposed to nearly every international institution. Under Deng Xiaoping, as Mr. Zheng explains, China’s leaders reversed course and decided "to embrace globalization rather than detach themselves from it."
Seven U.S. presidents of both parties recognized this strategic shift and worked to integrate China as a full member of the international system. Since 1978, the United States has also encouraged China’s economic development through market reforms.
Our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world. Today, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, from agreements on ozone depletion to pacts on nuclear weapons, China is a player at the table.
And China has experienced exceptional economic growth. Whether in commodities, clothing, computers, or capital markets, China’s presence is felt every day.
China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead.
For the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its influence?
To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.
China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success. In doing so, China could achieve the objective identified by Mr. Zheng: "to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge."
As Secretary Rice has stated, the United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century.
From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better served by working with us to shape the future international system.
If it isn’t clear why the United States should suggest a cooperative relationship with China, consider the alternatives. Picture the wide range of global challenges we face in the years ahead – terrorism and extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, disease – and ask whether it would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the United States and China were cooperating or at odds.
For fifty years, our policy was to fence in the Soviet Union while its own internal contradictions undermined it. For thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the People’s Republic of China. As a result, the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s:
If the Cold War analogy does not apply, neither does the distant balance-of-power politics of 19th Century Europe. The global economy of the 21st Century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm’s length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense. Nor would the other powers hold China at bay, initiating and terminating ties based on an old model of drawing-room diplomacy. The United States seeks constructive relations with all countries that do not threaten peace and security.
So if the templates of the past do not fit, how should we view China at the dawn of the 21st Century?
On both sides, there is a gulf in perceptions. The overwhelming priority of China’s senior officials is to develop and modernize a China that still faces enormous internal challenges. While proud of their accomplishments, China’s leaders recognize their country’s perceived weaknesses, its rural poverty, and the challenges of political and social change. Two-thirds of China’s population – nearly 900 million people – are in poor rural areas, living mostly as subsistence farmers, and 200 million Chinese live on less than a dollar a day. In China, economic growth is seen as an internal imperative, not as a challenge to the United States.
Therefore, China clearly needs a benign international environment for its work at home. Of course, the Chinese expect to be treated with respect and will want to have their views and interests recognized. But China does not want a conflict with the United States.
Nevertheless, many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.
The U.S. business community, which in the 1990s saw China as a land of opportunity, now has a more mixed assessment. Smaller companies worry about Chinese competition, rampant piracy, counterfeiting, and currency manipulation. Even larger U.S. businesses – once the backbone of support for economic engagement – are concerned that mercantilist Chinese policies will try to direct controlled markets instead of opening competitive markets. American workers wonder if they can compete.
China needs to recognize how its actions are perceived by others. China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to consequences and at worst something more ominous. China’s actions – combined with a lack of transparency – can create risks. Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States – and others as well – to hedge relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a "Peaceful Rise," but none will bet their future on it.
For example, China’s rapid military modernization and increases in capabilities raise questions about the purposes of this buildup and China’s lack of transparency. The recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense on China’s military posture was not confrontational, although China’s reaction to it was. The U.S. report described facts, including what we know about China’s military, and discussed alternative scenarios. If China wants to lessen anxieties, it should openly explain its defense spending, intentions, doctrine, and military exercises.
Views about China are also shaped by its growing economic footprint. China has gained much from its membership in an open, rules-based international economic system, and the U.S. market is particularly important for China’s development strategy. Many gain from this trade, including millions of U.S. farmers and workers who produce the commodities, components, and capital goods that China is so voraciously consuming.
But no other country – certainly not those of the European Union or Japan – would accept a $162 billion bilateral trade deficit, contributing to a $665 billion global current account deficit. China – and others that sell to China – cannot take its access to the U.S. market for granted. Protectionist pressures are growing.
China has been more open than many developing countries, but there are increasing signs of mercantilism, with policies that seek to direct markets rather than opening them. The United States will not be able to sustain an open international economic system – or domestic U.S. support for such a system – without greater cooperation from China, as a stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.
For example, a responsible major global player shouldn’t tolerate rampant theft of intellectual property and counterfeiting, both of which strike at the heart of America’s knowledge economy. China’s pledges – including a statement just last week by President Hu in New York – to crack down on the criminals who ply this trade are welcome, but the results are not yet evident. China needs to fully live up to its commitments to markets where America has a strong competitive advantage, such as in services, agriculture, and certain manufactured goods. And while China’s exchange rate policy offered stability in the past, times have changed. China may have a global current account surplus this year of nearly $150 billion, among the highest in the world. This suggests that China’s recent policy adjustments are an initial step, but much more remains to be done to permit markets to adjust to imbalances. China also shares a strong interest with the United States in negotiating a successful WTO Doha agreement that opens markets and expands global growth.
China’s economic growth is driving its thirst for energy. In response, China is acting as if it can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world. This is not a sensible path to achieving energy security. Moreover, a mercantilist strategy leads to partnerships with regimes that hurt China’s reputation and lead others to question its intentions. In contrast, market strategies can lessen volatility, instability, and hoarding. China should work with the United States and others to develop diverse sources of energy, including through clean coal technology, nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and biofuels. Our new Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate – as well as the bilateral dialogue conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy and China’s National Development and Reform Commission – offer practical mechanisms for this cooperation. We should also encourage the opening of oil and gas production in more places around the world. We can work on energy conservation and efficiency, including through standards for the many appliances made in China. Through the IEA we can strengthen the building and management of strategic reserves. We also have a common interest in secure transport routes and security in producing countries.
All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. In its foreign policy, China has many opportunities to be a responsible stakeholder.
The most pressing opportunity is North Korea. Since hosting the Six-Party Talks at their inception in 2003, China has played a constructive role. This week we achieved a Joint Statement of Principles, with an agreement on the goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner." But the hard work of implementation lies ahead, and China should share our interest in effective and comprehensive compliance.
Moreover, the North Korea problem is about more than just the spread of dangerous weapons. Without broad economic and political reform, North Korea poses a threat to itself and others. It is time to move beyond the half century-old armistice on the Korean peninsula to a true peace, with regional security and development. A Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons opens the door to this future. Some 30 years ago America ended its war in Viet Nam. Today Viet Nam looks to the United States to help integrate it into the world market economic system so Viet Nam can improve the lives of its people. By contrast, North Korea, with a 50 year-old cold armistice, just falls further behind.
Beijing also has a strong interest in working with us to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them. The proliferation of danger will undermine the benign security environment and healthy international economy that China needs for its development.
China’s actions on Iran’s nuclear program will reveal the seriousness of China’s commitment to non-proliferation. And while we welcome China’s efforts to police its own behavior through new export controls on sensitive technology, we still need to see tough legal punishments for violators.
China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism. Chinese citizens have been victims of terror attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China can help destroy the supply lines of global terrorism. We have made a good start by working together at the UN and searching for terrorist money in Chinese banks, but can expand our cooperation further.
China pledged $150 million in assistance to Afghanistan, and $25 million to Iraq. These pledges were welcome, and we look forward to their full implementation. China would build stronger ties with both through follow-on pledges. Other countries are assisting the new Iraqi government with major debt forgiveness, focusing attention on the $7 billion in Iraqi debt still held by Chinese state companies.
On my early morning runs in Khartoum, I saw Chinese doing tai chi exercises. I suspect they were in Sudan for the oil business. But China should take more than oil from Sudan – it should take some responsibility for resolving Sudan’s human crisis. It could work with the United States, the UN, and others to support the African Union’s peacekeeping mission, to provide humanitarian relief to Darfur, and to promote a solution to Sudan’s conflicts.
In Asia, China is already playing a larger role. The United States respects China’s interests in the region, and recognizes the useful role of multilateral diplomacy in Asia. But concerns will grow if China seeks to maneuver toward a predominance of power. Instead, we should work together with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and others for regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.
China’s choices about Taiwan will send an important message, too. We have made clear that our "one China" policy remains based on the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. It is important for China to resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully.
The United States, Japan, and China will need to cooperate effectively together on both regional and global challenges. Given China’s terrible losses in World War II, I appreciate the sensitivity of historical issues with Japan. But as I have told my Chinese colleagues, I have observed some sizeable gaps in China’s telling of history, too. When I visited the "918" museum at the site of the 1931 "Manchurian Incident," I noted that the chronological account jumped from 1941 to the Soviet offensive against Japan in August 1945, overlooking the United States involvement in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945! Perhaps we could start to ease some misapprehensions by opening a three-way dialogue among historians.
Clearly, there are many common interests and opportunities for cooperation. But some say America’s commitment to democracy will preclude long-term cooperation with China. Let me suggest why this need not be so.
Freedom lies at the heart of what America is… as a nation, we stand for what President Bush calls the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. As I have seen over the 25 years since I lived in Hong Kong, Asians have also pressed for more freedom and built many more democracies. Indeed, President Hu and Premier Wen are talking about the importance of China strengthening the rule of law and developing democratic institutions.
We do not urge the cause of freedom to weaken China. To the contrary, President Bush has stressed that the terrible experience of 9/11 has driven home that in the absence of freedom, unhealthy societies will breed deadly cancers. In his Second Inaugural, President Bush recognized that democratic institutions must reflect the values and culture of diverse societies. As he said, "Our goal… is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way."
Being born ethnically Chinese does not predispose people against democracy – just look at Taiwan’s vibrant politics. Japan and South Korea have successfully blended a Confucian heritage with modern democratic principles.
Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society. It is simply not sustainable – as economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in their future, and pressure builds for political reform:
Some in China believe they can secure the Communist Party’s monopoly on power through emphasizing economic growth and heightened nationalism. This is risky and mistaken.
China needs a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people. Village and grassroots elections are a start. They might be expanded – perhaps to counties and provinces – as a next step. China needs to reform its judiciary. It should open government processes to the involvement of civil society and stop harassing journalists who point out problems. China should also expand religious freedom and make real the guarantees of rights that exist on paper – but not in practice.
Ladies and Gentlemen: How we deal with China’s rising power is a central question in American foreign policy.
In China and the United States, Mr. Zheng’s idea of a "peaceful rise" will spur vibrant debate. The world will look to the evidence of actions.
Tonight I have suggested that the U.S. response should be to help foster constructive action by transforming our thirty-year policy of integration: We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.
Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences – we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.
To achieve this transformation of the Sino-American relationship, this Administration – and those that follow it – will need to build the foundation of support at home. That’s particularly why I wanted to join you tonight. You hear the voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear. But America succeeds when we look to the future as an opportunity, not when we fear what the future might bring. To succeed now, we will need all of you to press both the Chinese and your fellow citizens.
When President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, our relationship with China was defined by what we were both against. Now we have the opportunity to define our relationship by what are both for.
We have many common interests with China. But relationships built only on a coincidence of interests have shallow roots. Relationships built on shared interests and shared values are deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.
Released on September 21, 2005