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美驻华大使受访谈中国：“远比苏联强大” https://t.co/mLmNBYTBPN pic.twitter.com/hAbsVFPoxC
— RFI 华语 – 法国国际广播电台 (@RFI_Cn) April 29, 2023
每周，美国“政客”新闻网（POLITICO）的记者都会分享对全球思想家、政治家、权力人物或名人的采访。本周，“政客”新闻网中国问题记者林海（PhelimKine）与美国驻华大使伯恩斯 (Nicholas Burns)对话讨论了作为拜登政府在北京的最高外交官所面临的挑战。伯恩斯表示，在他看来，今天的中国，远比当年的苏联强大。
据“政客”新闻网报道，伯恩斯于1988年随当时的美国国务卿舒尔茨（George P.Shultz）首次访华。当时，中国国内生产年总值（GDP）为3120亿美元，中国政府已开始试行村级民主选举，而习近平正担任福建省厦门市常务副市长。34年后，当伯恩斯抵达北京出任美国驻华大使时，中国的国内生产总值已达到17.5万亿美元，习近平已成为中国稳固的最高领导人，领导着日益压制性的威权政府。
拜登政府认为中国“既有重塑国际秩序的意图，也有越来越多的经济、外交、军事和技术力量来实现这一目标”。
“政客”新闻网称，伯恩斯于去年4月开始在北京工作，当时正值中国严苛的疫情政策的严厉阶段。他作为拜登政府在中国的核心人物的角色恰逢双边关系因与台湾有关的紧张局势、新疆的侵犯人权行为以及2月份在美国大陆上空发现并随后被摧毁的中国间谍气球而陷入困境。这些紧张局势的一个可能反映是：习近平让伯恩斯等了一年多才在本周二接受他递交国书。
伯恩斯的外交生涯长达数十年。他于1980年代在里根总统的冷战时期政府任职，并于1990年代初担任老布什政府的苏联事务主任。他还曾担任美国国务院发言人和美国驻北约大使。
据“政客”新闻网采访记者称，与伯恩斯谈到了21世纪美国对华外交的压力、两国之间令人不安的沟通差距，以及将与苏联的旧冷战与更复杂的美中竞争进行比较的麻烦。
该网站解释，为清楚起见，对这位美国驻华大使的采访作了浓缩和编辑。
清零及其后果如何影响您管理大使馆的能力？
它影响了我们工作的方方面面。它影响了我们在这里的生活方式，影响了我们的家庭和在这里上学的美国孩子。在北京，当然还有上海、广州、武汉、沈阳即我们有领事馆的地方。在封城期间，商店有时会关门。政府办公室是禁区。很难乘坐公共交通工具。在北京春季和秋季的封城期间，甚至连公园也曾在某些时候关闭。
抵达中国时有检疫要求。所以，如果你到了，即使你的检测结果呈阴性，你也必须隔离。当我到达中国时，我和我的妻子在隔离区度过了21天。我想在头九个月里，我在三次不同的回中国旅行中总共度过了40天的隔离期。
我们也不能在中国国内旅行。这意味着我们驻北京大使馆和四个领事馆的很多官员无法真正做好他们的工作。如果你在这里为美国食品药品监督管理局工作，你必须查访（制造）工厂，但做不到。如果你是公共外交官员或政策官员，你想去云南、四川、广东，也都做不到。
我们开始达到某种程度的正常状态，但这是一个艰难而奇怪的开始。
美国人对中国有哪些误解，反之中国人对美国有哪些误解？
这里的主要问题是，由于新冠病毒，美国人民与中国人民在很大程度上隔绝了。又因为三年没有来回通航。在疫情大流行前，我们有成千上万的商务旅客在两国之间来回穿梭，现在已经基本断绝。而且由于目前航班稀缺，很难获得从一个国家到另一个国家的价格合理的商业航班。我们看到的是商务旅客的涓涓细流，但不是潮水涌流。
学生是（美中）这一关系的压舱石之一。就在10年前，每年有14000名至15000名美国学生在中国学习。目前在中国的美国学生只有大约350人。那是因为新冠疫情，美国学生无法获得学生签证。在过去的三年里，许多大学交流项目不得不关闭。我们现在没有过去那样的民间之间的联系。
在中国方面，由于审查制度和网络防火墙，我们很难真实地反映我们政府的信仰、美国正在努力做的事情、国会正在做的事情，或者普通美国人关于中国的想法。Google、Facebook和YouTube不允许在这里运营。作为美国驻华大使，我不被允许在《人民日报》上发表未经编辑的评论文章，就像中国驻美大使被欢迎在我们的媒体上发表评论文章那样。所以我们这里的所有人都担心，由于所有的这些障碍，中国人往往无法得到我们美国社会是怎样的真实写照。
是什么让您夜不能寐？
我们显然想避免意外的冲突。我不认为有发生冲突的可能或可能性很大，但显然是可能的。因此，这导致我们在美国政府方面关注在两国政府之间建立可靠沟通渠道的必要性。
我们许多最重要的渠道在2022年8月美国众议院议长佩洛西（NancyPelosi）访问台湾后，被北京政府暂停。我们认为恢复军事渠道是非常重要的，这些渠道将我们从五角大楼，从我们在夏威夷的司令部和美国印太司令部连接到中华人民共和国政府。在过去的一两年里，我们的外交渠道一直在断断续续。我们希望看到它们获得可靠地加强，以便我们能够一起工作，避免任何意外的冲突，任何误解，并处理日常的政府事务。
中国政府让您的工作有多难？
我们在这里的活动确实面临许多限制，这些限制是在莫斯科服务的美国外交官所熟悉的，例如，或前几代美国外交官在冷战最糟糕的年代在苏联服务（时所熟悉的）。
但在中国的美国外交官通常被限制访问中国的大学校园。这方面有一些例外情况。但我们希望在不久的将来，美国各级外交官有可能访问大学校园，与教师和学生交谈。
能够与省级领导人交谈很重要，因为他们是这里治理结构的重要组成部分。我认为这将改善（美中）这一关系的健康，但我们已经受到了一些限制。这并不罕见，因为在过去20或30年的大部分时间里，美国在这里的外交官都会遇到这种情况。但在过去一两年里，这些限制可能越来越严重。
您认为苏联的旧式威权主义和中国共产党领导下的威权主义之间有什么相似或不同之处？
当我想到苏联从1940年代末到90年代初的力量时，它与中国在世界舞台上展现的力量和实力完全不同。这就是为什么我认为人们在旧的冷战和我们现在的大国竞争与中国之间所做的这种比较，有时会对思考比较有帮助，但它们并不准确。
苏联曾是一个巨大的力量。它的核规模。以及它的军事层面，当时苏联在东德有几十万军队在富尔达缺口和德国北部平原上与美国人对峙。但是，中华人民共和国的力量比苏联曾经的力量无限的强大得多。而它是基于中国经济的非凡力量，其科学和技术研究基地，其创新能力，以及其在印度-太平洋成为未来主导力量的雄心。我确实认为来自中国的挑战更加复杂，更加根深蒂固，对我们未来的考验更大。
China ‘is infinitely stronger than the Soviet Union ever was’
By PHELIM KINE
Welcome back to Global Insider’s Friday feature: The Conversation. Each week a POLITICO journalist shares an interview with a global thinker, politician, power player or personality. This week, D.C.-based China Correspondent Phelim Kine talks to U.S. Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns, about the challenges of being the Biden administration’s top man in Beijing.
Follow Phelim on Twitter | Send ideas and insights to pkine@politico.com
THE CONVERSATION
U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns attends a plenary session for the World Peace Forum on July 4, 2022, in Beijing. | Ng Han Guan/AP Photo
Nicholas Burns made his first trip to China in 1988 accompanying then-Secretary of State George Schultz. At that time, China had an annual gross domestic product of $312 billion, the Chinese government had begun experimenting with village-level democratic elections and Xi Jinping was toiling as the executive vice-mayor of the city of Xiamen in Fujian province. Thirty-four years later, when Burns landed in Beijing to become U.S. ambassador, the value of China’s GDP had hit $17.5 trillion and Xi had become China’s unchallenged paramount leader at the top of an increasingly repressive authoritarian government that the Biden administration views as having “both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it.”
Burns began work in Beijing last April in the depths of the country’s draconian zero-Covid policy. His role as Biden’s point person in China has coincided with bilateral relations cratering over tensions related to Taiwan, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the discovery — and subsequent destruction — of a Chinese spy balloon over the continental U.S. in February. A possible reflection of those tensions: President Xi made Burns wait more than a year before accepting his credentials on Tuesday.
Burns’ diplomatic career has spanned decades. He served in President Ronald Reagan’s Cold War era administration in the 1980s and was President George H.W. Bush’s director of Soviet Affairs in the early 1990s. He also did stints as State Department spokesperson and U.S. ambassador to NATO.
I spoke with Burns about the rigors of 21st century U.S. diplomacy in China, the troubling communication gap between the two countries and the trouble with comparing the old Cold War with the Soviet Union with the much more complex U.S.-China rivalry.
The following interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.
How did Zero-Covid and its aftermath affect your ability to run the embassy?
It affected every aspect of our work. It affected the way we could live here, and affected our families and affected American kids in schools here. There were times here in Beijing and certainly in Shanghai, in Guangzhou, in Wuhan, Shenyang — where we have our consulates — that during the lockdown stores were closed. Government offices were off limits. It was hard to get on public transportation. Even the parks were closed at some points during the Beijing spring and autumn lockdowns.
There were quarantine requirements on arrival. So if you arrived, even if you tested negative, you had to quarantine. When I arrived, my wife and I spent 21 days in quarantine. I think in my first nine months, I spent a total of 40 days in quarantine on three different trips back into China.
We also could not travel internally. And that meant that a lot of our officers here at the Embassy in Beijing and our four consulates couldn’t really do their jobs. If you’re working for the Food and Drug Administration here, you have to inspect [manufacturing] plants, and they couldn’t do that. If you’re a public diplomacy officer or a political officer, you want to go to Yunnan, to Sichuan Province, to Guangdong Province, but we couldn’t do that.
We’re beginning to arrive at some degree of normalcy, but it’s been a difficult, strange beginning.
What misconceptions do Americans have about China, and vice versa?
The major issue here is that the American people have been largely cut off from the Chinese people — because of Covid. And because of three years of a lack of travel back and forth. We had thousands of business travelers going back and forth between the two countries pre-pandemic and that has largely dried up. And because of the paucity of flights right now, it’s very difficult to get a commercial flight that’s reasonably priced from one country to the other. We’re seeing a trickle of business travelers, but not a flood.
Students are part of the ballast of this relationship. As recently as 10 years ago, there were 14,000-15,000 American students in China on an annual basis. There are now only about 350 American students in China. And that’s because of Covid —student visas were not available to American students. A lot of the university exchange programs had to shut down for these last three years. We don’t have the people-to-people connections right now that we’ve had in the past.
On the Chinese side, because of censorship and because of the Great Firewall, it’s very difficult for us to project the true sense of what our government believes in, what it’s trying to do, what Congress is doing, or what the average American is thinking about China. Google and Facebook and YouTube are not permitted to operate here. And as the American ambassador, I am not allowed to print an unedited op-ed in the People’s Daily, the way that the Chinese ambassador to the United States is welcome to print op-eds in our press. So all of us here worry that the Chinese people often aren’t able to get a true picture of who we are as a society because of all these because of all these barriers.
What keeps you up at night?
We obviously want to avoid an accidental conflict. I don’t think one is probable or likely but it’s obviously possible. And so that leads us on our side in the U.S. government to focus on the need for reliable channels between the two governments.
Many of our most important channels were suspended by the government here in Beijing in the wake of Speaker [Nancy] Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. We think it’s very important to resurrect the military channels that connect us from the Pentagon, from our command and Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii to the PRC government. Our diplomatic channels have been kind of on and off for the last year or two. We’d like to see them reliably stronger so that we can work together to head off any accidental conflict, any misunderstandings and deal with the normal business of government on a daily basis.
How difficult does the Chinese government make it to do your job?
We do face many restrictions in our activities here that are familiar to American diplomats serving in Moscow, for instance, or previous generations of American diplomats serving in the Soviet Union during the worst years of the Cold War.
American diplomats here in China are routinely restricted from visiting university campuses in China. There are some exceptions to that. But we would hope that in the near future, it’d be possible for American diplomats at all levels to be able to visit a university campus and talk to faculty and students.
It’s important to be able to talk to provincial leaders because they’re so much a part of the governing structure here. I think it would improve the health of this relationship, but we’ve had a number of restrictions put on us. It’s not unusual — it’s happened to American diplomats here for the better part of the last 20 or 30 years — but the restrictions have probably been growing in intensity over the last year or two.
What similarities or differences do you see between the old Soviet authoritarianism and authoritarianism under the Chinese Communist Party?
When I think about the power that the Soviet Union had from the late 1940s into the early 90s, it was nothing like the power and the strength that China is exhibiting on the world stage. That’s why I think this comparison that people have made between the old Cold War and our present great power rivalry [with China] can be helpful at times to think about the comparisons, but they’re not exact.
The Soviet Union was a colossal power. Its nuclear dimensions. Its military dimension when it had hundreds of thousands of troops in East Germany facing Americans in the Fulda Gap and on the north German plain. But the power of the People’s Republic of China is infinitely stronger than the Soviet Union ever was. And it’s based on the extraordinary strength of the Chinese economy — its science and technology research base, its innovative capacity, and its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific to be the dominant power in the future. I do think the challenge from China is more complex and more deeply rooted and a greater test for us going forward.
Thanks to editor Heidi Vogt and producer Andrew Howard.
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