笨狼发牢骚
发发牢骚，解解闷，消消愁
Present at the conversation: Cdes. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko.
Cdes: Deputy Chairmen of the CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhao Enlai and Lin Biao; Members of the Politburo Peng Zhen and Chen Yi; Member of the Secretariat Wan Xia Sang.
Today, together with cde. M.A. Suslov and A.A. Gromyko, I paid a visit to Mao Zedong at his request in his residency.
Mao Zedong: We acquainted ourselves with the content of the message from Eisenhower to you, Cde. Khrushchev, which at your instruction was passed to us this morning.
N.S. Khrushchev: Good. Besides, we would like to acquaint you with the excerpt concerning China from my conversation in the US with President D. Eisenhower on 27 September 1959, and after that let us exchange opinions on the issue regarding my trip to the US and on the issues of relations with America. Most advisable would be if the above mentioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower would be translated here orally by the interpreter.
The interpreters Yang Ming Fu and Li Yue Zhen translate orally the aforementioned excerpt from my conversation with Eisenhower.
The Chinese paid greatest attention to the issue of detention of 5 Americans in China, as well as the remark by Eisenhower about the reason for which the USSR did not take the same position on the Taiwan question as on the German question.
N.S. Khrushchev (after the translation ended): It is clear why Eisenhower was in a hurry to send his message to China.
Mao Zedong: As far as I understand it, the meaning of Eisenhower's observations can be summarized as follows: that moderate and restrained policy should be conducted.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes.
Mao Zedong: Eisenhower also says that 45 countries allegedly recognize Taiwan and there are smaller number of [countries that recognize] us, and [that] war is unnecessary. There are positive points in Eisenhower's dispatch, in particular his observation that one should not let war break out. We also do not want war.
N.S. Khrushchev: You understood this correctly. I would like to emphasize that there is a thought in Eisenhower's message which implies not removing forever, only postponing the resolution of the Taiwan issue. The main idea of the Eisenhower message is that there should be no war. We do not want war over Taiwan.
Mao Zedong: Taiwan is an internal PRC issue. We say that we will definitely liberate Taiwan. But the roads to liberation may be different - peaceful and military. Zhou Enlai declared at the Bandung conference in 1955 that China is ready to conduct negotiations with the US. In effect, since then there have been talks between Americans and us, first in Geneva, then in Warsaw. At first, the representatives at these talks met once a week, then once every two weeks, and recently once a month. Both sides do not want to derail the talks. For a while the Americans attempted to derail the talks. We declared that it was bad and set the terms for its resumption. The Americans declared that they were also in favor of continuing the talks, but they could not accept the "ultimatum" schedule. We disagreed. Then, after our shelling of the off-shore Chinese islands Quemoy and Matsu, the talks resumed. We Chinese always put forth the following idea at the talks: Americans, please, leave Taiwan, and after that there will not be any problems between us. We would then begin resolving the remaining issues with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] on the basis of negotiations. Jiang Jieshi does not want the Americans to leave. The US, in turn, is afraid that Jiang Jieshi may establish ties with the PRC. There were military actions in this region but they did not constitute war. In our opinion, let Taiwan and other islands stay in the hands of the Jiang Jieshi-ists for ten, twenty and even thirty years. We would tolerate it.
N.S. Khrushchev: I would like to say that at the first lunch meeting at the Soviet embassy in the USA, Eisenhower said that they, the Americans, had been negotiating with the PRC for a number of years and there were no results, and that the Chinese did not even agree to liberate five Americans that were in confinement in the PRC, and this complicated the situation and seriously irritated the American people. Moreover, Eisenhower told me, let all the Chinese that live in the US leave, if they like, we will not hold them back. Eisenhower also told me that there was no use for me to go to China.
Mao Zedong: China cannot be equaled with Germany, not only because the population of Taiwan is considerably smaller than the population on the Chinese mainland, but also because China was not a defeated country at the end of World War II, but among the victorious powers. Germany was divided into two states as a result of the Potsdam Agreement. In Korea, the 38th parallel was also established per agreement between Kim Il Sung and us, on one side, and Americans on the other. Vietnam was divided into North and South in accordance with the Geneva agreements. As for Taiwan is concerned, there was no decision on it at any international conference. The appearance of Americans on Taiwan arouses discontent not only in socialist countries, but also in England, in the US itself and other countries.
N.S. Khrushchev: Eisenhower understands this. But the problem is that he must first recognize the Chinese Revolution, and then the Chinese government. And recognize the Revolution is what he does not want.
Mao Zedong: Yes, this is true. The US understand[s] this, but they want to conduct talks in their direction. The US government hinted that the PRC should make a declaration on the non-use of violence in the Taiwan question. The Americans want to receive guarantees on the non-use of arms, but as for them, they intend to do there whatever they want.
N.S. Khrushchev: I did not even know that the PRC holds five Americans in captivity. Is this true? In the conversation with Eisenhower I only said that, as a matter of friendly advice, I could touch on this question in Beijing.
Zhou Enlai: On 1 August 1956, the Americans and we reached an agreement in Geneva according to which Americans who had long lived in the PRC (immigrants), could be returned to the US. However, we stipulated that if these people committed any crime, they could be arrested. Chinese law also stipulates that if a prisoner behaves well in prison, his sentence might be reduced. The second category of people on which agreement was reached to allow them the right of exit from the PRC were prisoners of war. A US plane shot down over China in the area of Andung, not in Korea. 18 US military personnel who were on this plane were taken prisoners. Subsequently we set them all free. You recall that the question of American prisoners of war was discussed by the United Nations, and that in 1955 UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjold came to the PRC on this business. Following Hammarskjold , [French Prime Minister] Mendes-France also came [to discuss] the same question. Via the British, the Americans informed us that they would like to hold talks with the PRC. We agreed to it and the talks began. We took the initiative and released 13 American prisoners of war. Therefore at the conference in Geneva the Americans had no axe to grind with us. After this there were two more Americans, Fekto and Downey, who were in our prisons; they are the agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency and were caught red-handed. Their plane was shot down when they tried without landing to raise their spies onboard with a special rig. A Chinese court sentenced them to lengthy prison sentences: one to life in prison, the other to 20 years in prison. When Hammarskjold came to the PRC, he said that negotiations about the fate of these Americans was not part of his mission. The remaining three are people who lived permanently in China and were arrested for conduct- ing espionage activities. We had overall something like 90 Americans. Most of them we released and now there are only five persons in prison in the PRC. All of them are spies, and, according to the Chinese law, they are subject to imprisonment. We believe that we, Chinese, let too many Americans go.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is the first time I am hearing about this. But if you want to hear my opinion, we, if we were you, would have acted differently. The Americans who are imprisoned in the PRC should, if you do not take the course on confrontation, either be expelled or traded for counterparts. Lenin did it at his time and was correct. If one, so to say, would "tease geese", then, of course, the Americans should be kept in detention. At some point we exchanged [Mattias] Rakosi for one of the Hungarian spies we detained. In a word, in our opinion, the Americans that you hold in prison should better be set free.
Mao Zedong (with obvious displeasure and testily): Of course, one can set them free or not, and we will not release Americans now, but we will do it at a more appropriate time. After all, the Americans sent a large number of our volunteers [who fought in] Korea to Taiwan, and a great deal of the fighters from the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] army they sent to South Korea.
N.S. Khrushchev: Good. This is your internal affair. We do not interfere. But your attitude and the fact that you probably took offense at us complicates the exchange of opinions. I would like to emphasize that I am not a representative of the US and not a mediator on behalf of the Americans. I am a representative of my own Soviet socialist state, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If I touched on this issue, I did it only because I wanted to sort it out and to lay before you our point of view, since this issue stirs up the international situation.
Mao Zedong: That means it complicates life for the Americans.
N.S. Khrushchev: This issue also complicates our life. We have more substantial grounds to present our claims to the US. After all, they detain a big number of the so-called displaced persons [peremeschennikh lits]. The weakness of our position stems from the fact that many of these people do not want to return to the USSR. Of course, we did not discuss with the Americans the issue of setting free the Americans who are imprisoned in the PRC. I only promised Eisenhower to raise this question in the form of a friendly advice during my stay in the PRC. And the Americans raised this question only indirectly.
Mao Zedong: The issue of Taiwan is clear, not only will we not touch Taiwan, but also the off-shore islands, for 10, 20 and perhaps 30 years.
N.S. Khrushchev: Taiwan is an inalienable part, a province, of China, and on this principled question we have no disagreements. As for the five Americans, we would resolve it differently. You are saying that you will live without Taiwan for 10, 20, and even 30 years. But here the main issue is about tactics. The Taiwan question creates difficulties not only for the Americans, but also for us. Between us, in a confidential way, we say that we will not fight over Taiwan, but for outside consumption, so to say, we state on the contrary, that in case of an aggravation of the situation because of Taiwan the USSR will defend the PRC. In its turn, the US declare that they will defend Taiwan. Therefore, a kind of pre-war situation emerges.
Mao Zedong: So what should we do then? Should we act as the US says, that is declare the non-use of force in the area of Taiwan and move towards turning this issue into an international issue?
Zhou Enlai: As far as the Taiwan question is concerned, we should draw a clear line between its two aspects: relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are an internal issue, and relations between China and America regarding the Taiwan issue this is the international aspect of this problem.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is clear, and this is how we spoke with Eisenhower, as you could see from the excerpt of the record of my conversation with the President. To be sure, every question has many sides to it. The main issue - what should be put in the beginning [kakoe poloshit nachalo]. A while ago Lenin created the Far Eastern Republic in the Far East of the Soviet Union, and Lenin recognized its [sovereignty]. Keep in mind that this republic was established on the territory of the Soviet Union. It was unbelievable, but Lenin temporarily put up with this. Later, as it ought to be, the Far Eastern Republic merged with the Soviet Union.
We do not have proposals regarding the Taiwan Question, but we would think you ought to look for ways to relax the situation. We, being your allies, knew about the measures you undertook on the Taiwan Question, and today I am hearing for the first time about some of the tenets of your position in this area. Should it be appropriate for us as allies to exchange opinions on all these questions that might involve not only you, but also your friends into events? We could search for ways to promote the relaxation of international tensions without causing damage to the prestige and sovereign rights of the PRC.
Mao Zedong: Our General Staff informed you about our intentions in the Taiwan Question through your chief military adviser whom we asked to relay everything to the USSR Ministry of Defense. I would like to clarify right away that we did not intend to undertake any large-scale military actions in the area of Taiwan, and only wanted to create complications for the United States considering that they got bogged down in Lebanon. And we believe that our campaign was successful.
N.S. Khrushchev: We hold a different opinion on this question.
Mao Zedong: Although we fire at the off-shore islands, we will not make attempts to liberate them. We also think that the United States will not go to war because of the off-shore islands and Taiwan.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, Americans will not go to war because of Taiwan and the off-shore islands. We are familiar with the content of the instructions that were given to [John Foster] Dulles when he went to a meeting with Jiang Jieshi. If you are interested to see this document, we can show it to you. As for the firing at the off-shore islands, if you shoot, then you ought to capture these islands, and if you do not consider necessary capturing these islands, then there is no use in firing. I do not understand this policy of yours. Frankly speaking, I thought you would take the islands and was upset when I learned that you did not take them. Of course, this is your business, but I am speaking about it as an ally.
Mao Zedong: We informed you about our intentions regarding Taiwan a month ahead, before we began shelling the off-shore islands.
N.S. Khrushchev: He reported to us not about your policy on this issue, but about some separate measures. We expressed our position, and now it is your business, whether to agree with us or not. We do not quite understand your policy in international issues. The issues of international policy we must coordinate. You perhaps should think if it is necessary to exchange opinions through the channels of foreign ministries on major political issues where we have no agreement.
Mao Zedong: As I already said, we informed you about our intentions through your General Staff. However, I would like to know what is your opinion on what we ought to do.
N.S. Khrushchev: We stand for relaxation of tensions. We only wanted the people to understand that we stand for peace. It is not worth shelling the islands in order to tease cats.
Mao Zedong: This is our policy. Our relations with Jiang Jieshi and with the Americans are two different things. With the United States we will seek to resolve issues by peaceful means. If the United States does not leave Taiwan, then we will negotiate with them until they go from there. The relationship with Jiang Jieshi is our internal question and we might resolve it not only by peaceful, but also other methods. As far as the creation of the Far Eastern republic is concerned, and also the fact that at some point Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were separated from the Soviet Union, you should keep in mind that in these cases there was no foreign intervention.
N.S. Khrushchev: The issue of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Poland, Georgia, Armenia - this is an issue of a completely different nature. This is an issue of national self-determination. As for the Far Eastern republic, it was part of Russia.
Mao Zedong: The Taiwan Question is very complex.
N.S. Khrushchev: We have a common understanding of the question of Taiwan. At the present time there is only [a difference on] the question of tactics. You always refuse to work out a policy on this question that we could understand. You might think that we interfere into your internal affairs, but we only express our considerations. In this regard I would remark that we do not know what kind of policy you will have on this issue tomorrow.
Mao Zedong: We do not want war with the United States.
N.S. Khrushchev: One should not pose the issue this way. Neither you nor I want war - this is well known. The problem is that not only does the world public opinion not know what you might undertake tomorrow, but also even we, your allies, do not know it.
Mao Zedong: There could be two ways here. The first of them to do what the Americans demand, i.e. to provide a guarantee on the non-use of force regarding Taiwan. The Americans long ago posed the question and told us about it via Eden as early as March 1955. The second way is to draw a clear line between our relations with the United States and the relations with the Jiang-Jieshi-ists. As to the relations with Jiang Jieshi, here any means should be used, since the relations with Jiang Jieshi are our internal matter.
After a one-hour break the exchange of opinions resumed.
Mao Zedong: What should we do?
Zhou Enlai: We should continue.
Mao Zedong: To do what the Americans propose is not too good for us. And the Americans do not want to reciprocate, to do what we want.
N.S. Khrushchev: You are leaving us in an awkward position. You frame the question as if we support the position of Americans, while we stand on our Soviet communist position.
Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should postpone this question indefinitely. Everyone sees that we are not close to the United States and that the United States, not us, send[s] its fleet to our coast.
N.S. Khrushchev: One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin. It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea. We should undertake such steps that would allow the Americans to respond with their steps in the direction of a relaxation of the situation. We should seek ways of relaxing of the situation, to seek ways to ameliorate the situation. You know that when the events in Hungary took place, our hand did not waver to deliver a decisive crack-down on the counterrevolution. Comrade Liu Shaoqi was then with us and we together resolved this question. If it becomes necessary again, then we will carry out one more time our internationalist communist duty, and you should have no doubts about it. We would think that one should work out a whole system, a staircase of measures, and in such a way that people would understand us. After Stalin's death we achieved a lot. I could tell about a number of points on which I disagreed [with Stalin]. What did Stalin leave for us? There were [anti-aircraft] artillery around Moscow that was ready to open fire any moment. We expected an attack at any minute. We succeeded in liquidating such a situation and we are proud of this. Keep in mind that we achieved [the present-day] situation without giving up on any principled positions. We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less - this is not important. I take Lenin's example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat. And until today area a part of the population in the Caucasus are displeased by these measures by Lenin. But I believe that his actions were correct. I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position. We may say that Nehru is a bourgeois statesman. But we know about it. If Nehru leaves, who would be better than him? The Dalai Lama fled from Tibet, he is a bourgeois figure. This issue is also not clear for us. When the events in Hungary took place, then Nehru was against us, and we did not take offense at him, because we did not expect anything from him as a bourgeois statesman. But although he was against it, this did not prevent us from preserving good relations with him. If you let me, I will tell you what a guest should not say the events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled in Tibet, you should have had your intelligence [agencies] there and should have known about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama.
Mao Zedong: Nehru also says that the events in Tibet occurred on our fault. Besides, in the Soviet Union they published a TASS declaration on the issue of conflict with India.
N.S. Khrushchev: Do you really want us to approve of your conflict with India? It would be stupid on our part. The TASS declaration was necessary. You still seem to be able to see some difference between Nehru and me. If we had not issued the TASS declaration, there could have been an impression that there was a united front of socialist countries against Nehru. The TASS declaration turned this issue into one between you and India.
Mao Zedong: Our mistake was that we did not disarm the Dalai Lama right away. But at that time we had no contact with the popular masses of Tibet.
N.S. Khrushchev: You have no contact even now with the population of Tibet.
Mao Zedong: We have a different understanding of this issue.
N.S. Khrushchev: Of course, that is why we raised this issue. One could also say the following: both you and we have Koreans who fled from Kim Il Sung. But this does not give us ground to spoil relations with Kim Il Sung, and we remain good friends. As to the escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, if we had been in your place, we would not have let him escape. It would be better if he was in a coffin. And now he is in India, and perhaps will go to the USA. Is this to the advantage of the socialist countries?
Mao Zedong: This is impossible; we could not arrest him then. We could not bar him from leaving, since the border with India is very extended, and he could cross it at any point.
N.S. Khrushchev: It's not a matter of arrest; I am just saying that you were wrong to let him go. If you allow him an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it? We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault.
Mao Zedong: No, this is Nehru's fault.
N.S. Khrushchev: Then the events in Hungary are not our fault, but the fault of the United States of America, if I understand you correctly. Please, look here, we had an army in Hungary, we supported that fool Rakosi - and this is our mistake, not the mistake of the United States.
Mao Zedong: How can you compare Rakosi to the Dalai Lama?
N.S. Khrushchev: If you like, you can to a certain degree.
Mao Zedong: The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them.
N.S. Khrushchev: We know. As you know, Nepal wanted to have a Soviet ambassador, but we did not send there for a long time. You did the same. This is because Nehru did not want that Soviet and Chinese ambassadors were there. This should not come as a surprise - nothing else can be expected from Nehru. But this should not be a grounds for us for breaking off the relations.
Mao Zedong: We also support Nehru, but in the question of Tibet we should crush him.
N.S. Khrushchev: Why did you have to kill people on the border with India?
Mao Zedong: They attacked us first, crossed the border and continued firing for 12 hours.
Zhou Enlai: What data do you trust more, Indian or ours?
N.S. Khrushchev: Although the Hindus attacked first, nobody was killed among the Chinese, and only among the Hindus.
Zhou Enlai: But what we are supposed to do if they attack us first. We cannot fire in the air. The Hindus even crossed the McMahon line. Besides, in the nearest future [Indian] Vice President [Savrepalli] Radhakrishnan comes to China. This is to say that we are undertaking measures to resolve the issue peacefully, by negotiations. In my letter of 9 September to Nehru we provided detailed explanations of all that had occurred between India and us.
N.S. Khrushchev: Comrade Zhou Enlai. You have been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC for many years and know better than me how one can resolve disputed issues without [spilling] blood. In this particular case I do not touch at all the issue of the border, for if the Chinese and the Hindus do not know where the borderline goes between them, it is not for me, a Russian, to meddle. I am only against the methods that have been used.
Zhou Enlai: We did not know until recently about the border incident, and local authorities undertook all the measures there, without authorization from the center. Besides, we are talking here about three disputed regions between China and India. The Hindus were the first to cross the McMahon line and were the first to open fire. No government of China ever recognized the McMahon line. If, for instance, the Finns attacked the borders of the USSR, wouldn't you retaliate?
M.A. Suslov: We do not have claims against the Finnish government.
N.S. Khrushchev: That the center knew nothing about the incident is news to me. I would tell you, what I was against. On 22 June 1941 Germans began their assault against the Soviet Union. Stalin forbade opening fire in response, and the instruction to open fire was sent only after some time. As Stalin explained, it might have been a provocation. Of course, it was Stalin's mistake. He simply got cold feet [on strusil]. But this case is absolutely different.
Zhu De: Hindus crossed the McMahon line that tears away 90 thousand square kilometers from China.
Chen Yi: After the revolt in Tibet there were several anti-Chinese, anti-communist campaigns in India. There were demonstrations against our Embassy in Dehli and the consulate in Calcutta; their participants reviled the leaders of the PRC and shouted anti-Chinese slogans. We did nothing like that, and the Indian Ambassador in the PRC had not the slightest pretext to claim [that we] were unfriendly.
N.S. Khrushchev: Our Soviet representatives abroad had much more fallen on them than yours. Since the establishment of our state not a few of Soviet ambassadors were killed abroad. And in the Soviet Union only a German ambassador was killed in 1918. True, at some point the windows in the embassies of the United States and Federal Republic of Germany were broken, but we organized it ourselves.
Chen Yi: Speaking of the effectiveness of efforts to pull Nehru to our side, our method will be more efficient, and yours is time-serving [opportunism- prisposoblenchestvo].
N.S. Khrushchev: Chen Yi is Minister of Foreign Affairs and he can weigh his words. He did not say it at random. We have existed for 42 years, and for 30 years we existed alone [as a socialist country] and adjusted to nothing, but carried out our principled communist policy.
Chen Yi (in great agitation and hastily): The Chinese people evoked pity for a long time and during many decades lived under oppression of British, American, French and other imperialists. The Soviet comrades should understand this. We are now undertaking certain measures to resolve the conflict with India peacefully, and just one fact testifies to this, that perhaps Vice President of India Radhakrishnan will come to us in mid-October. We also have a certain element of time-serving. You should understand our policy correctly. Our line is firmer and more correct.
N.S. Khrushchev: Look at this lefty. Watch it, comrade Chen Yi, if you turn left, you may end up going to the right. The oak is also firm, but it breaks. I believe that we should leave this issue aside, for we have a different understanding of it.
Zhou Enlai: Comrade Khrushchev, even the Hindus themselves do not know what and how it occurred on the Indo-Chinese border.
Lin Biao: During the war between the Soviet Union and Fascist Germany, the Soviet Army routed the fascists and entered Berlin. This does not mean that the Soviet Union began the war.
N.S. Khrushchev: It is not for me, a lieutenant-general, to teach you, comrade Marshal.
M.A. Suslov: Comrade Lin Biao, you are trying to compare incomparable things. During the Patriotic War millions of people were killed, and here is a trivial incident.
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus did not withdraw their troops from where they had penetrated. We seek peaceful resolution of the conflict and suggested and do suggest to resolve it piece by piece.
N.S. Khrushchev: We agree with all that you are doing. It is what you have done before that we disagree with.
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus conducted large-scale anti- Chinese propaganda for 40 years until this provocation. They were the first to cross the border; they were the first to open fire. Could one still consider under these circum- stances that we actually unleashed this incident?
N.S. Khrushchev: We are communists, and they are like Noah's Ark. You, comrade Zhou Enlai, understand it as well as I do.
M.A. Suslov: Noah's Ark in a sense that they have a pair of every creature.
Peng Zhen (in hasty agitation): Nasser has been abusing without reason the Soviet Union that delivers to him unconditional assistance. Here we should keep in mind the reactionary aspects of the national bourgeoisie. If you, Soviet comrades, can lash out at the national bourgeoisie, why we cannot do the same?
N.S. Khrushchev: Nobody says you cannot lash out - but shooting is not the same as criticism.
Peng Zhen: The McMahon line is a dirty line that was not recognized by any government in China.
N.S. Khrushchev: There are three of us here, and nine of you, and you keep repeating the same line. I think this is to no use. I only wanted to express our position. It is your business to accept it or not.
Mao Zedong: The border conflict with India - this is only a marginal border issue, not a clash between the two governments. Nehru himself is not aware what happened there. As we found out, their patrols crossed the McMahon line. We learned about this much later, after the incident took place. All this was known neither to Nehru, nor even to our military district in Tibet. When Nehru learned that their patrols had crossed the MacMahon line, he issued the instruction for them to withdraw. We also carried out the work towards peaceful resolution of the issue.
N.S. Khrushchev: If this had been done immediately after the skirmish, the conflict would not have taken place. Besides, you failed to inform us for a rather long time about the border incident.
Liu Shaoqi: On 6 September I informed you through comrade [Soviet charge d'affaires in Beijing Sergei F.] Antonov about the situation on the border. Earlier we could not inform you, since we still had not figured it out ourselves.
Zhou Enlai: The TASS announcement was published before you received my letter to Nehru. It was passed to comrade Antonov on the afternoon of 9 September.
M.A. Suslov: It was probably done simultaneously, considering that the time difference between Moscow and Beijing is 5 hours.
A.A. Gromyko: The ambassador of India in the USSR told me that the Chinese letter not only fails to make things calmer, but also actually throws everything back.
M.A. Suslov: At the present moment the temperature has fallen and we can let this issue alone.
Mao Zedong (peevishly): The temperature has fallen thanks to your announcement?
M.A. Suslov: Not only, but also thanks to the decision of your parliament.
Liu Shaoqi: On 6 September I passed a message to you via comrade Antonov that within a week [we] would deliver retaliation to the Hindus.
M.A. Suslov: The decision of your parliament was considerably softer than your Note.
Peng Zhen: The delegates of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Deputies asked me how one should understand the TASS announcement, was it that the senior brother, without finding out what was right and who was wrong, gave a beating to the PRC and India.
Wang Jiaxiang: But the first who began to fire were the Hindus, not us.
N.S. Khrushchev: Yes, they began to shoot and they themselves fell dead. Our duty is to share with you our considerations on the incident, for nobody besides us would tell you about it.
Zhou Enlai: There could be disputes and unresolved issues between the CCP and the CPSU, but for the outside consumption we always underline unity with the Soviet Union.
Lin Biao: The Hindus began to shoot first and they fired for 12 hours, until they spent all their ammunition. There could be a different approach to this issue, one might admit, but the facts are facts: 1) the Hindus were the first to cross the border; 2) the Hindus were the first to open fire; 3) the Hindus sustained fire during 12 hours. In this situation there might be two approaches to the issue: 1) the Hindus crossed the border and we have to beat retreat; 2) the Hindus cross the border and we offer a rebuff.
Mao Zedong: The rebuff was delivered on the decision of local military organs.
Lin Biao: There was no command from the top.
Mao Zedong: We could not keep the Dalai Lama, for the border with India is very extended and he could cross it at any point.
M.A. Suslov: You should have known in advance about his intentions and plots.
Mao Zedong: We wanted to delay the transformation of Tibet by four years.
N.S. Khrushchev: And that was your mistake.
Mao Zedong: The decision to delay the transformations was taken earlier, after the Dalai Lama visited India [in early 1959]. We could not launch an offensive without a pretext. And this time we had a good excuse and we struck. This is, probably, what you cannot grasp. You will see for yourselves later that the McMahon line with India will be maintained, and the border conflict with India will end.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is good. But the issue is not about the line. We know nothing about this line and we do not even want to know.
Mao Zedong: The border issue with India will be decided through negotiations.
N.S. Khrushchev: We welcome this
intention.
Zhou Enlai: On 22 January you suggested to Nehru to conduct talks on the border issues. Then he disagreed with this. Today he agrees.
Mao Zedong: You attached to us two labels - the conflict with India was our fault, and that the escape of the Dalai Lama was also our error. We, in turn, attached to you one label time-servers. Please accept it.
N.S. Khrushchev: We do not accept it. We take a principled communist line.
Mao Zedong: The TASS announcement made all imperialists happy.
M.A. Suslov: Precisely on the contrary. This announcement and our recent measures promoted the relaxation of the situation. The imperialists would have been happy, had the relations between India and China been spoiled. We have the information that Americans approached Nehru and offered him their services regarding the conflict between India and China. Our steps cooled the hot expectations of the reactionaries.
Lin Biao: The whole issue is about who was first to shoot, not who was killed.
Zhou Enlai: It follows from your reasoning that, if burglars break into your house and you beat them up, then you are guilty.
N.S. Khrushchev: Why may you criticize us, and the senior brother may not censure you. At one meeting with cde. Yudin you, comrade Mao Zedong, very sharply criticized the CPSU, and we accepted this criticism. Moreover, you left the session at the 8 th Congress of the CCP during the speech of comrade [Anastas] Mikoyan. This was a demonstrative gesture, and Mikoyan could have left also.
In fact, I can also pack my suitcases and leave, but I am not doing it. When the events in Hungary took place, comrade Zhou Enlai came to us and lectured us. He blamed us both for Bessarabia and for the Baltic countries. We received this lesson. It turns out that you may censure us, and we may not. There are even some members of the CC CPSU Presidium back home who say the following: there is a formula iothe socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union,lo but in reality one lacks even respect for observations of the CPSU. Aren't you talking to us too haughtily?
Mao Zedong: We expressed our observations to you in a confidential manner. And you this time expressed them in the same order. This is good. This will serve the right cause. But when you took a public stand (I have in mind the TASS announcement) this was not good.
A.A. Gromyko: The TASS announcement did nothing to push India away from the People's Republic of China (reads an excerpt).
Peng Zhen: We also must speak out. The Hindus were really the first ones to cross the border, to start shooting, they continued shooting for 12 hours. Comrade Mao Zedong has just said that nobody knew precisely what actually occurred on the Sino-Indian border.
N.S. Khrushchev: You do not tolerate objections, you believe you are orthodox, and this is where our haughtiness reveals itself. Chen Yi attached to us a label, and it is a political label. What ground does he have to do this?
Chen Yi: The TASS announcement was in support of India, in support of the bourgeoisie.
N.S. Khrushchev: You want to subjugate us to yourselves, but nothing will come out of it, we are also a party and we have our own way, and we are not time- servers towards anybody.
Mao Zedong: And what is then our way?
N.S. Khrushchev: We always believed and believe that you and we take one road and we regard you as our best friends.
Mao Zedong: I cannot understand what constitutes our mistake? Kerensky and Trotsky also escaped from you.
N.S. Khrushchev: The Dalai Lama escaped, and you are not guilty? Well, there were also similar mistakes and facts on our side. True, when we allowed Kerensky to escape from the USSR, it was our mistake, but one should keep in mind that this happened literally in the first days of the revolution. Lenin freed on parole generals Krasnov and Kaledin. As for Trotsky, it was Stalin who expelled him. Nehru may go over to the USA. He is among our fellow- travelers who go with us when it is to their advantage. When we delivered assistance to Nasser, we knew that he might turn against us. We gave him credits for construction of the high-altitude Aswan dam. This is tactics. Had we not given him this credit, Nasser would have ended up in America's embrace.
Mao Zedong: You only see our “threatening gestures,” and fail to see the other side our struggle to pull Nehru over to our side.
N.S. Khrushchev: We are not confident that Nasser will hold out with us for long. There is only a very fine thread connecting us and it can break off at any moment.
Chen Yi: I am outraged by your declaration that “the aggravation of relationship with India was our fault.”
N.S. Khrushchev: I am also outraged by your declaration that we are time-servers. We should support Nehru, to help him stay in power.
Mao Zedong: The events in Tibet and the border conflict - these are temporary developments. Better that we end here the discussion of these issues. Could we assess the relationship between us as follows, that on the whole we are united, and some differences do not stand in the way of our friendship?
N.S. Khrushchev: We took and do take this view.
Mao Zedong: I would like to introduce a clarification - I never attended the session at the 8th Congress when comrade Mikoyan spoke. I would like to speak to Mikoyan personally.
N.S. Khrushchev: You skipped that session precisely because Mikoyan spoke there. Zhou Enlai once delivered to us a fair lecture. He is a good lecturer, but I disagree with the content of his lecture.
Liu Shaoqi: We never told anybody about our disagreements, not to even any fraternal party.
N.S. Khrushchev: This is good, this is correct. You gave us the first lesson, we heard you, and you must now listen to us. Take back your political accusations; otherwise we spoil relations between our parties. We are your friends and speak the truth. We never acted as time- servers with regard to anybody, even our friends.
Chen Yi: But you also lay two political accusations at our door, by saying that both the aggravations of relations with India and the escape of Dalai Lama were our fault. I believe that you are still acting as time-servers.
N.S. Khrushchev: These are completely different matters. I drew your attention only to specific oversights and never hurled at you principled political accusations, and you put forth precisely a political accusation. If you consider us time-servers, comrade Chen Yi, then do not offer me your hand. I will not accept it.
Chen Yi: Neither will I. I must tell you I am not afraid of your fury.
N.S. Khrushchev: You should not spit from the height of your Marshal title. You do not have enough spit. We cannot be intimidated. What a pretty situation we have: on one side, you use the formula headed by the Soviet Union, on the other hand, you do not let me say a word. What kind of equality we can talk about? That is why we raised the question at the 21st Congress of the CPSU about the repeal of the formula the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. We do not want any Party to stand at the head. All communist parties are equal and independent. Otherwise one is in a false situation.
Mao Zedong (in a conciliatory manner): Chen Yi speaks about particulars, and you should not generalize.
Wang Jiaxiang: The whole matter is about wrong translation. Chen Yi did not speak of time-serving as some kind of doctrine.
N.S. Khrushchev: We shot down not only one American plane and always said that they crash by themselves. This you cannot brand as time-serving.
M.A. Suslov: Now you are moving toward negotiations between you and India. This is good.
A.A. Gromyko: Is there a need that the PRC makes a declaration that would promote a relaxation in the situation? I am making a reservation that I am saying this without a preliminary exchange of opinions with cde. Khrushchev.
Zhou Enlai: There is no need to make such a declaration. We informed the Hindus that Vice President Radhakrishnan might come to us at his convenience in the period from 15 October until 1 December.
N.S. Khrushchev: I would also like to express an idea that has materialized just now with regard to the question of the visit of the Vice President. Would there be no bewilderment, if it were the Vice President, and not the President and Prime Minister [i.e., Nehru], to come to the PRC?
Zhou Enlai: The Hindus themselves offered the candidacy of Radhakrishnan. The President and Prime Minister of India sent us best wishes on the 10th anniversary of the PRC. In reply to the address we will remind them again about the invitation of Radhakrishnan to come to the PRC.
Mao Zedong: "Pravda" published only an abridged version of Zhou Enlai's letter to Nehru, and the TASS announcement was published in full. Perhaps we now stop discussing this issue and shift to Laos?
N.S. Khrushchev: Good, let us do this, but I have not a slightest interest in this matter, for this is a very insignificant matter, and there is much noise around it. Today Ho Chi Minh came to see us and had a conversation with us about Laos. I sent him to you, for you should be more concerned with this. During the events in Hungary and Poland cdes. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai came to us. Cde. Liu Shaoqi and I held different, sometimes diametrically opposed positions. During several days we could not work out a common opinion. Our positions shifted, but then we reached agreement and resolved the matter well.
Mao Zedong: We are against an escalation of fire in Laos.
N.S. Khrushchev: We are also against it.
Liu Shaoqi: The Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has a plan to expand the struggle in Laos. Ho Chi Minh is against this plan, against an expansion of military activities. We support his stand.
N.S. Khrushchev: We should not expand military actions in Laos, for in this case the Americans will come. Then they will stand on the border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will certainly undertake provocations against the DRV. Therefore, they will be located in the immediate vicinity of the DRV, while we are removed quite substantially from the DRV. If the situation gets complicated there, the Americans could very quickly crush the DRV and we would not have time to undertake anything. In our opinion, we should advise the Vietnamese comrades not to expand military actions in Laos.
Mao Zedong: Here we are in a complete agreement with you. We are in general against not only expansion of military actions in Laos, but also for preservation of the status quo in the area of Taiwan. I would like to repeat that in August 1958, when we began shelling the off-shore islands Jimmen [Quemoy] and Matsu, we did not intend at all to undertake any kind of large-scale military actions there.
Present at the conversation were Provisional Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in the PRC, S.F. Antonov, Attaché of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, R.Sh. Kudashev, and from the Chinese side interpreters Yan Min Fu and Li Yue Zhen. The conversation was recorder by S.F Antonov and R.Sh. Kudashev.
Signature: S. Antonov, 3 October 1959
R. Kudashev, 3 October 1959
DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Khrushchev and Mao discuss current political situations in Tibet, India, Indochina and Taiwan.
CREATORS
KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEEVICH, 1894-1971
中国在诈唬，别被她懵了
谁也说不清习近平那套历史决定论，“时与势在我们一边”，通过陈一新之口说的“‘东升西降’是趋势，国际格局发展态势对我有利”，是他心里这么想的，还只是为了给自己一尊“舵手”地位护航，但这种高级红机会已经弄得大家心里痒痒的，“反美斗士”陈平迫不及待跑到德州来体验美国的“衰落”，好向党汇报。
【5】Xi Maps Out China’s Post-Covid Ascent - The New York Times
【6】China Plays Up Ascendancy Over West as It Sets Economic Path - WSJ
【】让西方崩溃的来了：建立国际秩序只能照抄中国|中国模式影响世界 (xilu.com)
【7】中国“反美斗士”陈平在美豪宅被曝光 本人回应 | www.wenxuecity.com
【】US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain - Nikkei Asia
【8】China Is Not Ten Feet Tall (foreignaffairs.com)
【1】深刻认识“时与势在我们一边”-新华网 (xinhuanet.com)
【3】“东升西降”：习近平的后疫情时代中国崛起蓝图 - 纽约时报中文网
【4】新发展阶段新在哪里？陈一新从八个方面进行阐释——楚雄市长安网
《布鲁金斯研究院》的何瑞恩说他浏览中国的大内宣、大外宣【8】，都晕了：
【8】大家都说，中国崛起不可阻挡，马上就会超越摇摇欲坠的美国，中国已经成为全球经济增长的最大引擎、最大的贸易国和最大的外国投资目的地；中国刚刚签了和亚洲和欧洲的主要贸易投资协定， “一带一路”这个21世纪最大的发展项目在世界的每个角落的影响也越来越大；中国还输出了监控系统，建立在5G通信网络中的高技术，说不定能利用网络窃取敏感信息，同时还能塑造海外政治话语；中国正利用其经济和政治砝码，转化为军事力量，利用军民融合发展尖端能力，并欺负其邻国，包括美国的盟友和澳大利亚、印度和台湾等伙伴。而在国内，它从香港到新疆，到处都在无情地打压，几乎不担心美国和其他民主政府的批评。
不过不论何瑞恩用什么言辞，“专制制度总是擅长展示自己的优势”，美国衰落的图像比比皆是，真是用不着瞎编：
【8】起义者冲击美国国会大厦和美国公民在德克萨斯州停电期间排队取水的画面，是 "西方民主 "衰败的证据。他们（大内宣大外宣）庆祝中国成功 “打败”"COVID-19并重新开放，而美国和其他西方国家仍在努力阻止病毒的传播。中国国家主席习近平去年秋天在中共五中全会上的讲话中宣布：时与势在我们一边。”
The 'Longer Telegram' About China Is Fatally Misplaced (foreignpolicy.com)
The Pentagon, First, Last, and Always (pogo.org)
这些让全世界膛目结舌的事件不会因为何瑞恩贬义地引用中国媒体之口就成了谣言了。不过他说“专制制度擅长掩盖自己的弱点”，那就是有几分真的，只是谁不掩盖自己的弱点？美国不？那美国外长刚刚出来说要“扭转民主衰落的趋势”，只是为了帮别人？
“中国缺陷多了，美中关系中美国强大的多”。中国有什么弱点？
【8】中国人口老化，面临未富先老，经济基础恶化，阻碍经济增长。
中国教育程的提高、城市化程度以及技术升级本来可以提高生产力，但近来生产力却提高不起来。
中国的基建已经不能带动经济增长，反而导致债务不断上升，最终成为负担，阻碍产业升级
仅在过去十年，中国的债务就增加了一倍多，从2008年占GDP的141%上升到2019年的300%以上。不断膨胀的债务将使中国更难像韩国和台湾在类似发展水平下那样，买通从低端制造业到高附加值生产的阶梯。
随着习近平专制，政治体制越来越僵化，地方政策实验的空间在缩小，大家不敢说真话。
国际上中国形象越来越差，越来越孤立。
中国的边境环境很恶劣，接壤的国家太多，还有纠纷。
中国军队只有在近海作战的能力，缺乏世界霸主的
在粮食和能源安全方面，中国也很脆弱，中国缺乏足够的可耕地来养活其人口，一半的石油从中东进口。在冲突中，中国的海军能力不足以防止中国被切断重要供应。
何瑞恩和美国主流一样觉得美国近几年日益强硬，是中国惹的，“中国领导人在追求野心的过程中越来越急躁激进”，而且因为中国特色社会主义没有吸引力了，更加煽起民族主义之风。这种观点在美国很常见，因为美国觉得世界有一个美国建立的秩序，好的很，可中国不服，不服就闹事，所以“责任全在中国”。这种出发点的是非，就不说了，但把责任推到中国那边还不是何瑞恩要说的，他要说的是，咱们美国这么厉害，别让一个中国乱了自己的阵脚，坏了大事。
一乱了阵脚，那策略就会出现失误，如上届政府的贸易战：“中国的报复给美国造成了大量伤害：贸易赤字上升，美国农民受损，还得花280亿美元去收买，除此之外还丢失了24万个岗位”，有必要吗？看看咱美国：
【8】美国经济规模仍比中国大7万亿美元（大四成）
美国享有能源和粮食安全，相对健康的人口结构，世界上最好的高等教育体系，并拥有世界储备货币
绝对和平的边界和有利的地理环境
一个有效分配资本的经济，吸引着世界上最聪明的思想家和最好的想法
一个透明和可预测的法律体系和一个旨在刺激自我修正的政治体系
这一切，中国都没有。
奇怪，如果这只是大内宣大外宣这么说，他急什么？急，是因为这种说法根本不是如他所说大部分来自中国舆论，而是在美国本土也很有市场，为什么？一个最直接的原因是有人觉得夸大好，也许是军工思维，敌人越可怕越好，也肯能是真心的，觉得美国危险了，也可能“夸大中国威胁将鼓励这个问题的政治武器化，中国将成为野心勃勃的政客诋毁对手软弱的工具”，当然也可能是美国不允许挑战者，赶不上美国，但有威胁也不行，不允许，那么把对手夸大就是为了集中力量在其羽毛未丰之前将之摧毁，没什么情面可讲的。
而这些盟友和伙伴几乎都不认同华盛顿关于中国是生存威胁的观点
像何瑞恩一类较为冷静的搞国际关系的，觉得习近平自己那么多笨拙，等着习近平自己
何瑞恩要说的，是美国的优越性，美国要自信，自信就能自强，自强则无敌于天下，“这才是美国真正的实力，中国无法将其夺走”。
我觉得这怪怪的，因为这也习近平的说法。
从他轻描淡写的口气，这只是政策失误，而不是美国要遏制中国。
专制制度擅长展示自己的优势，掩盖自己的弱点。但华盛顿的政策制定者必须能够区分北京所展示的形象和它所面对的现实。中国是世界上第二强大的国家，也是美国几十年来面对的最强大的竞争对手。但与此同时，尽管有许多明显的缺陷，美国仍然是美中关系中更强大的力量--它有充分的理由认为它可以保持这种状态。对于美国面临的所有障碍，中国面临的障碍要大得多。
在冷战期间，国防部长詹姆斯-施莱辛格（James Schlesinger）曾告诫人们要警惕 "十英尺高的综合症"：美国决策者倾向于将他们的苏联竞争对手视为实力强大、智力超群的高大人物。今天，类似的综合症已经在美国扎根，其危害不仅仅是分析上的。专注于中国的实力而不考虑其弱点，会造成焦虑。焦虑会滋生不安全感。不安全感导致过度反应，而过度反应又会产生错误的决策，损害美国自身的竞争力。看清中国是正确制定中国政策的第一步。
中非共和国的误判问题
中国对美国的外交政策构成了几十年来最直接的考验。自冷战以来，还没有一个国家同时在世界多个地区认真地争夺美国的领导权。中国的军事实力、经济实力和全球野心的结合，使中国面临的挑战与冷战时期的苏联不同，也更加复杂。
近年来，北京已将其修正主义的野心昭然若揭。它寻求调整国际体系中的权力分配、亚洲的安全秩序、国际机构的作用和权限、不受审查的信息跨境自由流动以及现有国际秩序的自由性。它希望自己的列宁主义政治模式和国家主导的经济模式被接受和尊重。它已经发出信号，它不会接受对其领土边界概念或其国内事务管理的任何挑战。它还宣布了一个国家目标，即成为从人工智能到电动汽车等越来越多先进技术的世界领导者。
但是，很难说中国会走一条直线式的道路来实现其目标。为了准确衡量中国对美国利益构成的挑战，必须在评估北京的优势的同时评估其弱点。习近平和他的顾问们与世界上几乎所有其他国家一样，面临着一系列严峻的挑战。
考虑到中国看似不可阻挡的经济崛起。实际上，中期内的挑战是巨大的。中国面临着未富先老的风险，成为一个白发苍苍的社会，经济基本面恶化，阻碍了经济增长。劳动年龄人口已经在萎缩，到2050年，中国将从现在的每个退休人员有8个工人，变成每个退休人员有2个工人。此外，它已经挤掉了大部分生产力的大幅提升，而这些提升是随着人口受教育程度的提高、城市化程度的提高以及采用技术提高制造效率而带来的。中国已经没有生产性的地方来投资基础设施，而不断上升的债务水平将使其增长道路进一步复杂化。仅在过去十年，中国的债务就增加了一倍多，从2008年占GDP的141%上升到2019年的300%以上。不断膨胀的债务将使中国更难像韩国和台湾在类似发展水平下那样，买通从低端制造业到高附加值生产的阶梯。
与此同时，随着权力更加集中在习近平身边，政治体制也越来越僵化。曾经以技术官僚能力著称的中国共产党，正以列宁主义的僵化而更加出名。随着更多的决定权集中在北京，地方政策实验的空间似乎正在缩小。体制的自上而下性质也使得官员们更难重新审视过去的决定或向高层报告坏消息。这种动态可能是导致武汉爆发COVID-19疫情的早期反应缓慢的原因。虽然中国政府领导层在缓解极端贫困方面取得了显著的成果，但在打击对其权威的挑战方面也变得越来越焦虑和不妥协。北京在包括但不限于新疆在内的中国周边地区强加其意志的僵化风气可能会带来未来的问题。在外部，中国的野心面临着巨大的障碍。北京在国内的压制、在国外的强硬态度以及对冠状病毒大流行初期关键细节的隐瞒，都导致对中国的负面看法不断上升。根据皮尤2020年10月的民调，在不同的国家，对中国的不利看法已经达到了历史高点。未来几年，中国政府还可能在其大规模的海外计划中遇到越来越多的预算限制，因为它要应对经济降温和老龄化社会不断增长的需求。
从战略角度看，在可预见的未来，中国的军事力量在向周边地区投射武力的能力上可能仍将受到相对限制，更不用说在全球范围内将力量投射与政治和经济影响力结合起来了--这是一个超级大国的定义特征。中国面临着独特的地理环境挑战。它与14个国家接壤，其中4个国家有核武，5个国家与北京有尚未解决的领土争端。这些国家包括老龄化但富裕的日本、崛起的民族主义的印度、复兴主义的俄罗斯、技术强大的韩国以及充满活力和决心的越南。所有这些国家都有抵制从属于中国或其利益的民族特性。而美国在中国周边国家的基地和准入协议的支持下，在该地区保持着持续的前沿军事部署。
在粮食和能源安全方面，中国也很脆弱。它缺乏足够的可耕地来养活其人口，并且大约一半的石油从中东进口。在冲突中，中国的海军能力不足以防止中国被切断重要供应。中国政府正在努力解决这一弱点，但没有快速或简单的解决方案。
自信的理由
华盛顿两党近年来对中国采取强硬态度，首先是受到北京的推动。中国领导人在追求野心的过程中变得更加急躁激进，并且越来越倾向于民族主义，尤其是在意识形态和经济表现已经成为社会凝聚力越来越小的情况下。但华盛顿的转变，很大程度上也是由于对中国实力的恐慌感越来越强，导致美国的不安全感阵阵袭来。
这种恐慌不太可能被证明是建设性的：惊慌失措地专注于贬低中国的实力，有可能导致美国对增强自身实力这一更本质的任务关注太少。任何试图利用中国威胁来刺激国内改革或克服国内分歧的做法都可能弊大于利。在国内，夸大中国威胁将鼓励这个问题的政治武器化，中国将成为野心勃勃的政客诋毁对手软弱的工具。在国外，这种做法将扩大与盟友和伙伴的分歧，而这些盟友和伙伴几乎都不认同华盛顿关于中国是生存威胁的观点。而且，这很可能会鼓励那些为了伤害中国而最终对美国造成同等或更大伤害的政策--包括在对美国人至关重要的问题上排除与北京的协调。
特朗普政府的贸易政策为这种动态提供了明确的证明。对中国进口商品征收关税被当作一种工具，以迫使中国对美国对不公平贸易做法的担忧屈服。事实上，这些政策在迫使中国进行预期的经济变革方面收效甚微，它们引发了中国的报复，给美国造成了大量伤害：贸易赤字上升，美国农民遭受损失，导致280亿美元的救助，以及估计24.5万个工作岗位被取消。
美国有充分的理由对其与中国竞争的能力充满信心。美国经济规模仍比中国大7万亿美元。美国享有能源和粮食安全，相对健康的人口结构，世界上最好的高等教育体系，并拥有世界储备货币。它得益于和平的边界和有利的地理环境。它拥有一个有效分配资本的经济，传统上是世界上最聪明的思想家和最好的想法的海绵。它有一个透明和可预测的法律体系和一个旨在刺激自我修正的政治体系。而中国却不具备这些特质。
自信应该促进对中国崛起的稳定、耐心和明智的反应--一种能够吸引国内外广泛支持的反应。这种方法的某些内容将需要站出来反对中国挑战美国利益和价值观的行动，甚至同时推动北京为应对跨国挑战的努力做出更多贡献，例如建立全球疾病监测网络和全球经济去碳化。与此同时，美国的政策制定者将需要接受这样的观点：正如库尔特-坎贝尔和杰克-沙利文（分别现为白宫亚洲协调员和国家安全顾问）在2019年在这些版面上所论述的那样，共存意味着接受竞争是一个需要管理的条件，而不是一个需要解决的问题。最重要的是，正如乔治-凯南在冷战初期所说的那样，美国将需要 "衡量自己的最佳传统，并证明自己作为一个伟大的国家值得保留"。
美国越是能够恢复信心，相信自己是世界上为迎接21世纪挑战准备得最好的国家，就越能把注意力集中在最重要的地方：不是拖累中国，而是加强自己。为了有效地与中国竞争，华盛顿将需要专注于增强美国的国内活力、国际威望以及无与伦比的全球联盟和伙伴关系网络。这些才是美国实力的真正关键，中国无法将其夺走。
2/ The piece warns that exaggerating China's strengths without accounting for its vulnerabilities generates anxiety. Anxiety breeds insecurity. Insecurity leads to overreaction, and overreaction produces bad decisions that undermine the United States’ own competitiveness.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) March 3, 2021
了解中国对中美关系及其国际环境急剧变化的评价和反应，从来没有像现在这样重要。鉴于其不断扩大的经济范围和日益增长的战略分量，中国的行动现在直接影响着美国和世界各地的生活。然而，在某些方面，要看清楚是什么假设和决定在指导中国改变对美国和世界的态度，已经变得更加困难。在最近美国关于中国野心的许多辩论中，热度大于光亮。COVID-19导致的旅行限制，使与中国官员进行非正式面对面交流和对中国社会进行第一手观察的机会都被剥夺了，而这些机会往往是洞察北京政策时代潮流的最丰富来源之一。而在这种真空中，许多美国学者开始更多地依赖对中国官方和半官方文本的解读来得出关于中国战略方向的结论。
我曾在美国驻北京大使馆和白宫国家安全委员会（NSC）任职，这使我对从中国公开的声明和报告中推断中国的战略设计抱有谦逊的态度。然而，通过50多个小时与中国官员和学者的Zoom对话、对中国官员讲话和中国专家评论的回顾，以及十多年来就这些问题与中国高级官员的交流，我确实相信可以对中国在不断变化的国际环境中不断发展的做法得出一些初步的看法。
我分析的出发点是观察中国外交政策在过去两年中走了多远。前奥巴马政府国家安全委员会(NSC)亚洲高级主任埃文-梅德罗斯(Evan Medeiros)在2019年3月为《中国领导力观察》(China Leadership Monitor)撰文指出，"中国[对特朗普总统公开的敌视中国战略]的反应远比对抗性更谨慎--有时甚至是和解性的。北京主要专注于限制下行风险，并在有限的范围内探索上行收益的机会。"[1]梅德罗斯总结道："2018年，一种模式变得非常清晰：面对美国的对抗性言论和行动，中国与众多美国人保持实质性接触，发表非常谨慎的公开声明，并主张通过谈判解决问题。校准和分寸在驱动中国的游戏规则，远远超过了反对、孤立和回击的策略。"
对中国对美国的这种评价取向基本保持到2020年1月，当时双方完成了 "第一阶段 "贸易协定的谈判。在随后的几周里，双边动态发生了急剧变化。 面对COVID-19失控蔓延造成的人道主义和经济损失，特朗普总统从吹捧习近平是他的朋友，转而将中国标榜为他的敌人，也是许多美国人感到痛苦的根源。而中国在很大程度上也做出了回应，将其宣传大炮指向美国对公共卫生危机的反应以及由此产生的一连串社会、经济和政治问题。
在随后的几个月里，出现了一种针锋相对的模式，例如，在对待双方记者的问题上，在关闭领事馆的问题上，在对双方参与COVID-19的来源进行指责的问题上，以及在对两国高层人士的制裁上。北京开始镜像美国的经济施压工具箱。与美国一样，中国也制定了出口管制、国家安全投资审查、与政策有关的签证制裁以及法律和行政法规中的域外条款等方面的法律法规。
北京在国内外的行动也变得不那么克制。中国当局在新疆推进了一场残酷的镇压运动，加强了对香港的控制，粉碎了全国各地的异议，45年来首次与印度军队发生致命冲突，惩罚那些在敏感问题上挑战中国偏好的叙事的国家和个人，并尖锐地批评西方民主国家的表现。这些行动代表着与最近在2019年春天就可以观察到的外交政策注重校准和谨慎的重大差异。
中国对美国的评价
中国的官员和专家似乎普遍认为，美国在国际体系中的力量相对于中国正在下降。许多中国专家认为，美国对其相对衰落的焦虑促使其自发地努力破坏中国的崛起。
例如，中国国务委员兼外交部长王毅在2021年1月2日接受新华社年终采访时，就对这一观点进行了表述。在反思上一年的中美关系时，王毅总结道。
近年来，中美关系遇到了前所未有的困难。从根本上说，这归根结底是美国政策制定者对中国的严重误解。一些人把中国视为所谓的最大威胁，他们基于这种错误认识的中国政策根本就是错误的。已经发生的事情证明，美国企图打压中国，发动新的冷战，不仅严重损害了两国人民的利益，而且给世界造成了严重的混乱。.中国的对美政策是一贯的、稳定的[3]。
换句话说，王健林提出了北京对关系下滑的模板式解释--这是美国的错。
有越来越少的中国官员或专家仍然愿意（至少是明显地）质疑这种对中美关系下滑的解释。北京大学国际与战略研究所所长王缉思是少数几个这样做的人之一，尽管很微妙。在2021年1月的一篇专栏文章中，王缉思认为："我们在国内和世界上的行动在很大程度上决定了美国对我们的态度。我相信，在历史关头，中国而非美国能够扭转中美关系的颓势，尽管这一立场可能值得商榷"[4]。
不过，在中国国内，有一个问题似乎确实存在意见趋同的地方，那就是对美国从特朗普到拜登的对华战略取向将有连续性的预期。即使中国专家承认，拜登政府可能会采取更细微的语气和更专业的处理问题的方法，但他们预计美国对华对抗的根源将不会改变。
反映这一观点，中国最高领导人顾问、中国当代国际关系研究院院长袁鹏评价说："美国的分裂和两极分化的政治将限制拜登的活动空间，迫使他把更多精力放在国内的挑战上。...拜登的首要任务是统一美国。.......美国将在许多年内消耗在应对自身的结构性挑战上。"[5]北京大学的王季思也有类似的结论："在拜登的领导下，美国的对华政策将继续保持不变"[6]。
北京似乎正在准备与一个正在衰落但仍然危险的美国进行长期斗争。私下里，据一位消息灵通的政策顾问透露，中国领导层已经重新评估了长期趋势，并得出结论，不能再把国家计划建立在对与美国关系总体稳定的预期上了[7]，部分原因是，中国领导人拉开了推进 "双循环 "经济战略的计划。习近平主席在推出这一战略时解释说："只有自力更生，发展国内市场，理顺内部循环，才能不顾外界的敌意，实现充满活力的增长和发展"[8]。
中国的发言人和中国官方国家媒体都试图让公众对与美国的长期斗争抱有期望。政治局委员、国内安全主管郭声琨等主要安全官员都警告说，与美国进行长期斗争的可能性很大。
中国对国际体系的评价
中国领导人现在经常用 "百年未有之大变局 "来形容他们对当前国际体系流动性的评价。这些变化往往以一种矛盾的形式出现，对中国来说既是风险也是机遇。
一边是 "百年不遇的深刻变化"，一边是中国面临的危险挑战。政治局委员、最高外交官杨洁篪将挑战定格为："世界经济遭受重创。...疫情对国际贸易、投资、消费和其他经济活动产生了巨大的影响。......该大流行病还加剧了社会分裂、种族冲突和政治对抗。......国际安全风险增多。"[10]从另一个角度看，杨振宁认为："国际秩序的改革加快了。中华人民共和国率先在全球范围内控制疫情，在实现全面复工复产的过程中，各方对中国的期待和依赖增加"[11]。
因此，尽管人们期待着与美国进行一场旷日持久的斗争，但认为中国在国际体系中是一个越来越重要的角色的观点似乎在中国国内越来越受到欢迎。至少从表面上看，中国领导人在评估对中国有利的全球趋势时已经变得自得其乐。10月，习近平在五中全会上对干部们说，"时间和势头都在我们这边。"[12]同样，中央政法委--中国国内安全的最高监督机构--秘书长陈一鑫在1月15日的一次学习会上说，"中国的崛起是（当今世界的）一个重大变量......东方的崛起和西方的衰落已经成为一种趋势；国际格局的变化对我们有利。"[13]。
中国的战略目标
辨别北京的中长期战略目标已成为西方关于中国问题的讨论中最激烈的争论之一。主张将中国视为一个恶毒的大国，试图将其愿景和价值观强加给世界其他国家的人，近些年来，主要是由于中国在国内外的野蛮行为而变得更加胆大妄为。中国在新疆和香港践踏公民权利的行为，破坏了中国以外认为中国将以良性方式追求国家野心的论点。
从我的角度来看，北京认为自己正在沿着一个连续的过程进步，从而使中国恢复为亚洲的核心行为体和世界舞台上的主导力量，一个有更大能力塑造规则、规范和制度以满足其偏好的国家。中国领导人一直明确表示，他们希望自己的政治和经济模式得到尊重。 中国外交政策的一贯特点是推动对其 "核心利益 "的尊重。
中国的外交政策实践者解释说，中国的对外关系应该支持其国家目标，特别是其可持续发展的目标。 这些目标包括实现国家的 "十四五 "规划、2035计划，以及到2049年中华人民共和国成立100周年时成为繁荣、富强、先进国家的第二个百年目标[17]。
近年来，中国的主要声音也更愿意阐述中国的全球野心。例如，政治局委员杨洁篪曾撰文指出，中国的外交政策要为 "民族复兴奠定基础，为我们引领世界大变革、塑造外部环境提供重要保障"（着重号为后加）[18]。
北京认识到，要实现其长期目标，必须首先克服近期的障碍。其中一个潜在的障碍是形成反对中国倡议、阻挠中国崛起的盟友集团。随着乔-拜登当选总统，这种担忧变得更加紧迫，因为拜登一直强调要与盟友和合作伙伴协调，以回击中国的关切行为。
实现目标的战略
尽管由于没有任何公开的明确的政府战略文件，因此很难断言中国将采用什么战略来推进其目标，但根据行为模式识别、高级官员的声明以及中国专家和政策顾问的评论，可以合理地做出一些初步判断。近年来，三条战略路线已经显现出来。
1. 保持一个无敌意的外部环境
北京中期战略的主要特点似乎是寻求降低与美国紧张关系的温度，加强与邻国的关系，深化与俄罗斯的关系，并鼓励欧盟继续走向战略自主。北京认为这些努力对于打破它所认为的华盛顿对中国的包围战略至关重要。中国领导人还认为，为了保持对国内问题的关注--包括反贫困、反污染和反腐运动--的主要关注，保持外部问题不受影响是很重要的，因为公众对中国表现的看法最终将建立在这些问题上。
在中美关系上，中国外交部发言人一直在呼吁中美关系的 "更好的天使 "带领中美关系摆脱对抗性的对立，[19]国务委员兼外交部长王毅一直在推动与美国 "和平共处、合作共赢"，[20]与此同时，北京没有表示愿意缓和对新疆、香港、西藏、人权或台湾的态度。北京不愿意重新调整对最容易激化美中紧张关系的问题的态度，实际上预示着整体关系的任何广泛改善。充其量，美中两国将能够控制紧张局势，降低最近相互指责的温度。
在地区事务方面，中国完成区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP）标志着中国加强与邻国关系的努力迈出了重要一步。该贸易集团占全球GDP和全球人口的近30%.[21]RCEP将中国定位在全球经济最具活力的地区的世界最大贸易集团的核心位置，从而确保中国将保持在区域价值链中的核心地位，而不是被孤立于这些价值链之外。
即使在贸易之外，中国还专门制定了一项区域战略，该战略反映了该地区领导人的最高利益和关切。王外长制定了2021年中国-东盟议程，重点是击败COVID-19；促进经济复苏；推进减贫、防灾救灾、气候变化和环境保护。 [22]王外长这样做，似乎是基于这样一种认识：亚洲许多领导人将经济发展和改善社会状况放在首位。地区领导人对安全问题并非无动于衷，但他们认识到，经济不稳定对他们掌握权力的威胁比武装冲突的风险更为直接。
在俄罗斯问题上，中国表现出持续的兴趣，希望在整体关系上陡然上升。近年来，北京和莫斯科在包括技术和军事合作在内的全方位关系中日益密切。外交部长王毅现在宣称两国站在 "并肩对抗强权政治 "的立场上，支持对方的核心利益，互为 "战略锚 "和 "全球伙伴"[23] 。
北京还一直鼓励欧盟追求战略自主，包括抵制华盛顿要求布鲁塞尔加入反对中国的跨大西洋阵线的恳求。北京这种鼓励布鲁塞尔在世界舞台上规划自己的道路，多年来一直是领导人层面沟通的主要内容。外交部长王毅在2021年1月2日的年终记者采访中对这样的信息传递进行了精辟的阐述，他恳请中国和欧盟致力于 "团结合作而非集团政治"，"超越制度差异而非沿意识形态划线"[24]。
北京希望阻止跨大西洋对华政策趋同的愿望似乎在2020年12月30日中欧全面投资协定谈判结束时发挥了作用。在经历了7年35轮谈判后，乔-拜登即将上任似乎为北京做出新的让步提供了动力，有助于让协议走过终点线。
在华盛顿组建联盟在具体问题上与中国对抗的努力与北京的反集团战略之间的这场较量中，北京似乎并没有将成功视为理所当然，至少在向外国受众传递信息方面是如此。习近平1月25日在达沃斯世界经济论坛上用讲话警告，试图建立一个民主国家联盟来对抗中国的危险。习近平警告说："在世界舞台上组建小集团或发动新的冷战......只会把世界推向分裂，甚至对抗。" 他强调："历史和现实一再提醒我们，如果我们走上对抗的道路--无论是冷战、热战、贸易战还是科技战，所有国家的利益和人民的福祉都会受到损害。"[25]。
2. 减少对美国的依赖，同时增加世界对中国的依赖。
面对被切断或被限制进入美国供应链的前景，中国领导人近年来加紧推动经济关系多元化和加强自给自足。他们还采取了一些政策，鼓励其他国家在自身经济发展上更加依赖中国。
中国的 "双循环战略 "旨在通过国内的生产、销售和消费循环，以及单独的货物和服务对外贸易循环，减少对外国供应商的依赖。从北京的角度来看，这一做法的早期成果让人有理由感到乐观。2020年，世界变得更加依赖中国的增长。根据穆迪分析公司的预测，经通货膨胀调整后，中国经济预计将占全球国内生产总值的16.8%，是世界上任何国家中最多的。"中国预计将在2020年打破历史记录，成为历史上任何国家经常账户最大的盈余国。"[27]中国还在2020年成为最大的外国直接投资接受国，从而取代了美国作为最大的外国资本磁石的习惯角色。
中国的经济增长和生活水平的提高刺激了对商品以及汽车、奢侈品和其他部门的外部需求。这种需求使得专门从事这些行业的贸易伙伴更加依赖对中国的出口来实现未来增长。这种态势，加上最近分别与东盟和欧盟完成的贸易和投资协定，重新调整了中国的贸易模式。2020年，东盟集团成为中国第一大贸易伙伴，欧盟升至第二位，美国降至第三位。
与此同时，中国正着手积极推动高科技领域的自给自足。习近平认可的这一指示得到了中国各级政府和党的机构的拥护。中共颇具影响力的中央政策研究室主任蒋金泉最近将技术自给自足视为克服美国阻碍中国科技发展的努力的关键。
北京一直在拨出令人瞠目结舌的资金，推动中国走上技术独立之路。无论是在国内半导体开发、[30]下一代技术基础设施、[31]人工智能、[32]生物技术、航空航天，还是其他一系列先进技术领域，中国政府都制定了雄心勃勃的计划，要成为全球的领跑者。在这些领域，中国的技术孵化战略结合了封闭的国内市场、对国内国家冠军的大规模补贴、积极的知识产权收购、对硅谷和其他地方的公司进行战略投资，以及网络和其他无情的工业间谍手段。
3. 扩大华人在海外的影响范围
近年来，中国当局更加积极主动地寻求将其影响力扩展到其他国家。作为中央政府加强中国话语权任务的一部分，中国实体对海外媒体平台进行了大量投资[33]，北京试图在海外将自己塑造成一个非革命大国、全球公共产品的贡献者、地缘政治欺凌的反对者以及地区和全球稳定的维护者。 34]在北京更喜欢的讲述中，中国是一个仁慈的崛起大国，站在科学和理性的一边，引领全球努力击退COVID-19的蔓延，应对气候变化的影响。作为这种努力的一部分，中国媒体也掀起了一波评论浪潮，颂扬中国治理模式的优点和西方民主政府的缺点，例如在遏制COVID-19扩散、实现经济增长、维护社会稳定等方面。
中国官员和中国媒体在回应被认为是对中国国际形象的侮辱时，采用了越来越尖锐的语言。中国外交部常务副部长乐玉成为这种做法辩解说，中国 "不能屈服于敌对反华势力的肆意打压，自然要反击。关于'狼性战士外交'的批评，是'中国威胁论'的另一个版本，也是另一个'言论陷阱'，目的是让中国放弃，绝不反击。"乐玉成说。中国的外交始终没有任何懦弱和顺从，坚定不移地维护国家利益和尊严"[35]。
有关中国使用胁迫性、腐败性或隐蔽性工具干预他国国内政治决策的报道也越来越多。"一带一路 "倡议的核心是要增强中国在全球许多国家的影响力，中国也试图利用其在基础设施建设方面的专长来推动这一倡议。
北京还一直在惩罚那些宣扬挑战中国偏好的观点的国家和外国个人。例如，北京对澳大利亚进行经济处罚的理由部分是基于澳大利亚政府呼吁对COVID-19的起源进行独立评估，以及澳大利亚一家智库发布的关于新疆问题的报告，北京认为这些报告令人反感。类似的故事也适用于中国宣布对28名前特朗普政府官员进行制裁，因为他们主张或执行北京反对的政策[37]。
与此同时，北京一直在扩大其国内安全机构的海外任务，包括通过引渡条约、中外安全机构之间的机构合作关系、新的法律规定，[38]以及向外国政府出口高科技监控工具等方式来扩大其海外任务。 39]在这样做的过程中，北京似乎在寻求推进三个相互关联的目标。首先是对任何主张挑战广义的中国利益的观点或政策的个人，无论是中国人还是外国人，都要产生寒蝉效应。北京希望建立这样一种印象，尤其是在其侨民群体中，即没有任何个人是中国执法部门无法触及的。第二，北京越来越需要加强保护中国公民和海外商业利益的能力。第三，中国政府希望鼓励更多的国家模仿或借鉴中国应对安全挑战的做法。各国越是接受中国的做法和/或中国的监控技术，北京就越有可能为自己的国内安全模式在海外获得合法性[40] 。
中国的战略会成功吗？
中国的中期战略能否使中国克服阻碍实现国家雄心的障碍，仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。中国的战略选择不是在真空中做出的。中国的行动往往会引起国内或国外的反应。
例如，中国对企业部门的控制越来越严，似乎加强了对创新的控制。这就提出了一个根本性的问题，即一个要求遵守和遵循计划的制度是否能够允许非正统和边界测试的思维，而这种思维是下一代创新的命脉。这种限制可能部分解释了为什么中国一些最具创造力的头脑，如视频会议服务Zoom和芯片制造商Nvidia的创始人，以及许多世界领先的人工智能研究人员都选择在中国以外的地方追求他们的目标。
在中国炫目的经济增长数字之下，也有一些关于经济长期健康状况的闪光警告信号。其中一个指标是生产力--或者说每个工人和单位资本的产出--的增长在下降。根据国际货币基金组织的数据，中国经济的生产率只有世界上表现最好的经济体（如美国、日本或德国）的30%.[41]而随着中国人口老龄化对社会服务资源的需求增加，这将给政府继续用政府支出和国有部门投资支撑经济增长的能力带来压力。
中国还面临着追求技术自给自足作为一项政策目标是否可以实现或是否切实可行的问题。如果不能获得先进的光刻技术和其他半导体制造的关键外部投入，中国将很难生产出尖端芯片，而这些都是中国实现其技术雄心的必要投入。北京与其他先进大国的关系越是对立，其实现技术自立的努力就越是渺茫。
同样，中国的国内政策也未能赢得生活在中国边境地区的中国人的支持。越来越多的例子表明，蒙古族、维吾尔族、藏族和其他民族对北京侵入他们的生活并试图强加给他们文化上的一致性感到不满。 香港也是如此。 北京越是紧缩，在中国的内围地区和世界许多地方，对中国的负面态度似乎越是强硬。 美国政府已经将中国在新疆的行为定性为种族灭绝行为。
此外，中国宣称的雄心壮志和坚定不移的努力，是要在越来越多的高科技领域成为世界领袖，并围绕这些技术推行反映北京非自由主义倾向的规则和规范，这在西方世界许多地方引起了不安。对此，伦敦提议成立由主要大国（七国集团+澳大利亚、韩国、印度）组成的D-10，以集中资源和调整政策，加速民主社会新技术的发展。
同样的道理，中国的民族主义外交越是声势浩大，许多西方国家对中国的内政外交政策趋势线就越是惊恐。中国在海外利益的扩大，将要求中国有更大的存在。已经，随着解放军海军在其周边以外变得更加活跃，其他大国之间的协调水平也随之提高。这一趋势可以在印度洋看到，在印度洋，中国海军的活动相应增加，同时志同道合的大国（即 "四方"、澳大利亚、印度、日本、美国）之间的安全协调也在增加。
也许出于上述一些原因，一些中国专家一直在敦促人们清醒地评价中国在国际体系中的地位。例如，人民大学学者、政府顾问时殷弘最近提醒说：
中国填补特朗普政府放弃美国原有的 "全球领导角色 "所造成的真空的机会是有限的，事实上也比许多国内外人士预测的要小。中国的 "软实力 "在世界上的吸引力，中国可利用的资源和经验相当有限，中国将遇到的国内和国际障碍，包括冠状病毒大流行所造成的复杂性，都相当大[46]。
时殷弘等专家似乎在警告，不要预设中国将继续沿着线性轨道无限期地朝着其国家雄心的方向上升。中国以外的分析家在预测中国未来的道路时，同样应该保持一定程度的谦虚。从毛泽东的动荡到邓小平的改革开放，从天安门惨案到两位数的经济增长，从低调的外交政策到在世界舞台上的大胆自信，中国近几十年来的道路经历了一系列的转变。这些转变在很大程度上是由中国的战略目标、对外部环境的评估和国内需求之间的动态互动所推动的。这种外力与内力之间的动态互动在习近平时期并没有结束。展望未来，继续研究这些力量对中国政策决策的相互影响，将值得进一步深入评价。
2/ and recognizes the need to overcome obstacles in pursuit of its ambitions.
— Ryan Hass (@ryanl_hass) March 2, 2021
To do so, Beijing aims to (1) maintain a non-hostile external environment in order to focus on domestic priorities; (2) reduce dependence on US and increase rest of the world’s dependence on China…
开始
美国越是能够恢复信心，相信自己是世界上为迎接21世纪挑战准备得最好的国家，就越能把注意力集中在最重要的地方：不是拖累中国，而是加强自己。为了有效地与中国竞争，华盛顿将需要专注于增强美国的国内活力、国际威望以及无与伦比的全球联盟和伙伴关系网络。这些才是美国实力的真正关键，中国无法将其夺走。
