中国不是谁想遏制就能遏制的

为了维持霸主地位而“遏制”另外一个“崛起”的国家，反过来想想也是够窝囊的，遏制，而不是毫不畏惧，正面面对挑战，以增加自己的竞争力的基础来迎战对手，你强我更强，基本是败象，是畏惧的体现。举例来说，全球化一直是西方英美主流经济学的主要纲领，在过去几年已经倍受西方民族质疑，而今年欧洲美国大肆返回封闭主义，更是接受了自己在自己设立的游戏被击败的现实。

 

“美中关系是21世纪里最为重要的双边关系，”，奥巴马说。中国官方民间也异口同声认为美中关系是世界上最重要的关系，认为美中问题一旦解决，其它一切问题迎刃而解的人几乎是大多数，如日本，日本本身危机意识极强，且好胜观念过重，明明知道个子不够还要坚持（亚洲）第一，有历史的原因，有民族的倔，即使没有美国，日本跟中国的竞争也不会消失，然而中国真正觉得日本是对手的人不多，别的不谈，日本自己够不够人传宗接代都保不了，争啥第一啊？一切皆美国作怪。

美国的思维和行动，潜在的是美国的独霸意识在指导，在理论上这是所谓美国惟我独尊的优越（American Exceptionalism），说白了，跟中国历代皇帝登基一堆文人胡诌无异，当然美国厉害，真的是打遍天下无敌手，值得自豪，不过让大家信这东西，除了几个马屁精，恐怕不容易。就是一旦有了这意识，容人的心态变了，自己实力雄厚也不容易维持，不得不“遏制”。

 

读了读李成最近的一文，李成在国内文革期间长大，1985年来到美国，普林斯顿博士，从此文的说法来看，基本站在美国的方面来思考，正常的。

 

李成 美国布鲁金斯学会约翰•桑顿中国中心主任

 

历任美国总统中，奥巴马是首位上任第一年就访问中国的，那年是2009，李成觉得那是他对中国的重视程度和期待。也许奥巴马觉得中美关系重要，但我觉得还没有，奥巴马当年去中国，是因为中国把美国救了。那是个大家没留意的插曲，我以前也提过，当时美国自己次贷把自己把全世界几乎拉回中世纪，财长保尔森和央行行长伯南克跑到北京，说中国不救市，咱一块儿完蛋，这才有温家宝四万亿，现在美国活过来了，中国成了重灾区，美国打得那个很。奥巴马多次公开表示“21世纪的美国要做什么，是从一个领导者变成一个伙伴”，“美国欢迎中国崛起”，中国人只记得他说的“咱美国还是第一，要永远第一”。

 

奥巴马正式把中国摆在战略对手，估计是克林顿提出”重返亚太“的纲领后，我对此高度评价，认为那是当时世界上唯一的全球策略，是唯一能与中国接纳”全球化“大旗后的方针对抗的，可惜胎在腹中（参见美国内斗的第一个牺牲品？美国。后来尽管奥巴马还是没死心，但没用：《国会山》McConnell: Senate won't take up TPP this year）。李成说奥巴马及其团队一直避免走上一条和中国武力对抗的道路。毕竟，他是因为推动世界无核化而获得诺贝尔和平奖的美国总统，简直是书生之言（客气地说）。

 

习近平的说法是“美中新型大国关系”，“不冲突不对抗、相互尊重、合作共赢”，“共赢”是中国到处打得大旗，有买账的，有占便宜的，美国是明里暗里不信，公开为难。美国中东政策失败，导致奥巴马不得不将注意力西移，离开了亚洲，李成还不信“奥巴马的两个任期采取了两个不同的外交团队，因而对华态度上有所不同：第一任期希拉里做国务卿时期，对亚洲以及中国事务更加积极；而第二任期的国务卿克里更加注重中东事务，而对亚洲事务冷淡，甚至让美中关系处在‘漂流’状态”。

 

很多事态短期内波折起伏，惊险跌出，然而长期开上去很难挽回大局。美国目前比中国强大的多，甚至制度优越性也好得多，但美国内部矛盾太深太大，难以调解。更关键的，遏制是阴招，难成大事。

 

李成就一句话说的实在，“中国不是谁想遏制就能遏制的”。

 

 

《凤凰周刊》

奥巴马时代的美中关系（布鲁金斯学会转载）

2016年08月22日

 

【导语】奥巴马总统任期间，在美中关系上把握住了整体方向。要评判具体原委，还需要从其个人背景、两国国情，以及世界地域政治版图整体的变化等方面去分析。

 

评估奥巴马时代的美中关系，我会想到在西方政界流传的一个著名小故事：有人问周恩来总理，如何评价法国大革命，他回答说，“现在说为时尚早。”在美国总统奥巴马任期将尽之际，我们都站在历史进程的一个节点上，所以要给一个最为中肯的评价和定位，恐怕还有些早。

 

但不可否认的是，从2009年到2016年，奥巴马两个任期内的美中关系，无论是对美中两国还是整个世界格局，都至关重要。就像其本人所评价的，“美中关系是21世纪里最为重要的双边关系。”同时，美中建交44年来，两国史无前例地处在“第一”和“第二”经济大国的关系上，其中既有竞争又有合作。

 

总的来说，奥巴马总统任期间，在美中关系上把握住了整体方向。要评判具体原委，还需要从其个人背景、两国国情，以及世界地域政治版图整体的变化等方面去分析。

 

奥巴马避免与中国武力相抗

历任美国总统中，奥巴马是首位上任第一年就访问中国的——可见在金融危机中上任的他，当时对中国的重视程度和期待。同样有意思的是，相比前几任，他也是不多地在担任总统之前从未到过中国的美国总统，无论是他在芝加哥大学法学院任教期间，还是后来做联邦参议员期间都与中国接触不多。所以相比其他人，上任时他对中国的了解着实有限。

 

这样的背景下，奥巴马2009年11月的访华，开启了他第一次对中国的亲身体验。作为律师出身的非洲裔总统，奥巴马非常注重人权问题，他自然也把这些关注带到中国。这次访问中过程曲折，有一些细节让他感到意外。所以对于奥巴马的中国首秀，当时的美国媒体评价较为负面，认为他被中国牵着鼻子走，没有表述美国的价值观念等。一些熟悉对华事务的美国前官员也指出，“来中国前，起码要做足功课。”

 

可以说，奥巴马时代的美中关系，从他本人的角度，是在这样一个“遗憾”中开启的。紧随其后的2009年哥本哈根气候变化会议中，也发生了一些不愉快的插曲。这使得奥巴马对中国产生了一些经验性的见解和较为负面的解读，也改变了他之前有些理想主义式的想像和期待。

 

尽管相比其他总统，奥巴马对中国的了解稍晚，但不可忽视的是，他个人成长经历中的全球化背景在其后来的总统任期中发挥着重要影响：他出生在美国夏威夷，幼年和少年时期在印度尼西亚和夏威夷生活过，青年时期才到美国本土生活。这样一个有着全球化成长背景的总统，对于新型经济体的崛起和世界秩序的种种变化有着清醒的认识。奥巴马多次公开表示：“21世纪的美国要做什么，是从一个领导者变成一个伙伴”，“领导力是有代价的”，“不光要有领导力，还要有相应的实力”，“我们要意识到新兴经济体的崛起和世界格局的变化”。

 

在我看来，战后美国的历任总统中，奥巴马是最不强调“老大”观念的。他强调要融入变化中的世界，而不应该也无法一味狂妄地左右世界，这也是为什么他积极参加七国峰会和二十国峰会的原因。

 

对华关系上，他多次说过“美国欢迎中国崛起”并强调“美中关系是21世纪最为重要的双边关系”。同时，这种全球化的烙印和国内治理多元化的理念，也体现在他第一任期的内阁组成中——有三个亚裔，其中两位华裔。这是史无前例的。而在美中关系空前复杂的现实下，我们常看到，有时美方的一些敌对情绪会随着一些舆论发酵，甚至出现武力回应的呼吁。这需要中方了解一个背景，美国是个权力制衡的国家，不免有人会对中国有敌意或想要教训中国。但我们需要区分这种声音，它们是来自于奥巴马本人么？据我了解，奥巴马及其团队一直避免走上一条和中国武力对抗的道路。毕竟，他是因为推动世界无核化而获得诺贝尔和平奖的美国总统，在他第二任期中他尤其注重减少军备开资。他的很多理念和政策，也都是推动世界向和平方向发展的。

 

2015年9月25日，美国华盛顿，美国总统奥巴马接待来访的中国国家主席习近平与夫人彭丽媛，并陪同他们参观当年林肯在白宫住过的卧室。

 

美中艰难寻求新定位

这八年中，美中关系之间发生的最大变化是，中国在2011年成为美国之后的世界第二大经济体。随着中国以经济实力为基础的不断崛起，美国作为守成国，不免感到敏感而有压力。美中之间也继而在这个变化上去互相适应，寻求平衡。

 

奥巴马上任之初，让美中组成G2（两国集团）的说法在媒体上流行一时。需要注意的是，这不是奥巴马的想法，而是来自美国前官员布热津斯基。当时中方也谨慎处理这个概念，在很多中国人看来，就综合实力而言，当时的中国和美国并不排在一个对等的位置上领导世界。我也不赞同这个提法，如果美中是G2，那么俄罗斯、日本、印度、欧盟等国家又在什么位置呢？这个提法有不合理的排他性。

 

中国方面，中国国家主席习近平上任后在2015年提出了“美中新型大国关系”，从字面上来讲，“不冲突不对抗、相互尊重、合作共赢”是不错的概念，但具体内容还需要进一步完善。比如美方一直质疑“核心利益”的内容以及如何定义大国，其概念和现实的差异等等。

 

相比八年前，如今美中关系的关注点也发生了很多变化，比如不再仅仅围绕两国贸易、人民币汇率、台湾问题、西藏问题等。随着中国在亚洲地区和世界经济中的崛起，南海问题、跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）和东南亚地区问题，以及气候变化、无核化、网络安全、反恐、脱贫等全球性议题也成为两国关系新的组成部分。也正因如此，美中关系变得空前复杂。

 

官方层面上，八年来，美中关系有很多建设性的合作和发展，经济方面，在金融危机之后，中国大量购买美国国债，美中经济空前“绑定”在一条船上，两国扩展经济与战略对话机制、进行中美投资协定（BIT）谈判等；在文化上，美中人文交流机制建立，从“十万强”到“百万强”计划、美国对中国护照实行首次10年免签等。

 

政治上，美中不仅没有表现出直接的意识形态冲突，还渡过了一些敏感的突发政治事件，比如王立军案、斯诺登事件等。习近平上任后，两国元首频繁见面，从国事访问到国际会议会面，各个场合统计下来共有11次。而两国领导人单独访问中，无论是在美国的“习奥庄园会”，还是北京的“瀛台会”，均有丰硕成果。虽然并没强调说建立了友谊或者私交，但在美中和世界形势如此复杂的情况下，两国领导人保持这样的交流，是尤为值得称赞的。

 

2013年6月8日，美国加利福尼亚州，中国国家主席习近平同美国总统奥巴马在安纳伯格庄园举行第二场会晤。会晤开始前，两人在风光秀丽的庄园内散步，在轻松的气氛中交谈。这是习近平出任国家主席后的第一次访美之旅。

 

认知误区干扰两国关系

在美中寻求定位的阶段，正如两国一些学者所言，两者处在“信任赤字”阶段，但是信任不是光说就能建立的，更多的是需要相互了解和尊重。过去的八年中，双方在不够了解的情况下，在一些问题上存在诸多误读或者说认知误区。而这些误读和误区，在不同的时间点上，塑造或阻碍着两国关系的发展。

 

“重返亚太”战略是奥巴马第一任期期间，时任国务卿希拉里提出的。提出后，中方反应强烈，以至有不少人认为这是一个专门为遏制中国所制定的外交政策。当然，中国有部分同仁也理解到，这个政策的原意是当时美国从中东地区撤军后，所做的整体性战略转移。而亚洲地区当时经济增长且活跃，朝核问题日趋严重，也最容易发生矛盾冲突，所以美国才会有所调整。

 

而现实层面上，美国接下来也采取很多措施去防范中国，包括美国的利益集团、国防部、军队，在诸如东海防空识别区的建立、南海建岛和网络安全问题上，提出和表现出的一些强硬姿态。需要注意的是，他们的这些主张，有时不完全是为了要把中国怎么样，而是为了获得预算。这也表现在涉及南海议题时，美中两国在舆论上总显得激烈而紧张。

 

从TPP的发展历史来看，这个协议一开始也不是要针对中国，但是后面情况开始发生变化。2016年年初中国建立亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB），奥巴马团队认为中国在制定全球游戏规则，所以加快了对TPP的谈判。应该说TPP是奥巴马在后期所追求的一个政绩，所以在其任期内一定会努力推动。

 

同样的，奥巴马和其团队对中国的经济也存在误解。他认为，双方经贸往来上，现在的中国不像上世纪90年代，会给美国企业很多优惠，中国政府对美方有了很多限制和自我保护主义，因而他判定中国经济不是一个真正意义上的自由市场经济。这个理解是有偏差的。

 

结合中国经济发展的背景来看，90年代中国急需外资和技术，所以才会给外企相应的优惠政策。但在奥巴马执政期间，尤其是近几年，中国经济发展迅速，不仅国有企业发展壮大，很多私营企业也发展迅猛，现在我们看到百度、阿里巴巴、腾讯（BAT）等大的私人IT公司非常活跃；很多企业和领域不再需要外商投资，反而近两年中国企业大批“走出去”，美国也是中国企业非常青睐的投资目的地。这样的背景下，中国的对外经济和贸易政策也有所调整。而外国企业尤其是IT企业觉得在中国发展举步维艰。

 

美中之间一直在谈判，也让中方一直力推的双边贸易协定（BIT）产生诸多难以达成的因素。现在看来，BIT最快应该是和TPP同步，或者有可能在这之后达成——因为在现在的政治气氛下，这个决议很难被美国国会通过。

 

在奥巴马的外交政策中，一些他个人所追求的政绩也引起中方的误读。在他第二任期中，一方面，我们看到他结束了伊拉克战争、阿富汗战争，关闭关塔那摩基地，减少军队开支；另一方面，尤其是第二任期，他正在“化敌为友”，比如与伊朗签署核协议，访问古巴、越南和日本广岛，化解一些历史积怨。以上种种在一些中国人眼中，同样是遏制中国之举。

 

但我想指出的是，客观上，中国不是谁想遏制就能遏制的；主观上，作为一个大国，美国有着自己的战略、理念和行为规范，中国不能把其任何举措都认为是遏制自己。而同样，美国也不应把中国的任何举动都认为是对其发出的挑战。双方不应在陷于猜测对方的阴谋论中走向极端。

 

应关注美中关系的大背景

美中关系是在两者相互塑造和影响中形成的。任何一方的动作，都不能只从一面去理解。比如美日关系的变化。在第一任期期间，奥巴马对美日关系是谨慎的，他要防止日本的右翼政客利用美日同盟来挑衅激怒中国。也就是中国人所认为的，美日联合起来制衡中国。而实际是，美国不愿意被第三国的利益左右美国的对外政策。而现在这个阶段，美日关系迅速提升。但这个变化不仅仅是美方的改变，也要考虑到中国和俄罗斯关系的升温。

 

有中国学者评价称，奥巴马的两个任期采取了两个不同的外交团队，因而对华态度上有所不同：第一任期希拉里做国务卿时期，对亚洲以及中国事务更加积极；而第二任期的国务卿克里更加注重中东事务，而对亚洲事务冷淡，甚至让美中关系处在“漂流”状态。

 

我并不同意这个说法。第二任期中，有很多其他复杂因素影响着美中关系，比如两国之间的内容议题不断增多，包括双边、多边和全球性议题；美国国内没有形成氛围去推动美中关系；或者奥巴马自己的意愿难以达成，等等。

 

而中国方面，从2008年成功举办奥运会，到2011年GDP成为全球第二，近几年更加走向全球化，这些以经济实力增强带来的变化，使得中国更加自信，或者说，在外界看来，曾经一直低调的中国变得咄咄逼人（assertive）。我认为，中方心态的变化没有什么错，对自己国家有信心是好事。但一个国家真正意义上的崛起，是对世界有更多的了解，有更多的换位思考。这样全球比较的视野也有益于知道很多中国本身的问题；对外，才能拥有更多的话语权。

 

相比美中关系眼前一些大小不一的摩擦，我们应建立更多有效的交流和沟通机制，同时也应看到，美中关系走到今天，还有很多大背景的变化：不仅有中国在世界地位上的变化；还有一些新型领域的迅速发展，比如科技不断向前、新媒体迅速成长等，这些有时会超越政府的反应速度以及采纳政策的能力。另外，现在全球经济仍不稳定，世界秩序也在重新洗牌；环境、疾病等问题也在不断挑战全人类。这些问题都在考验着“21世纪最重要的”美中双边关系，我们有太多的理由期待两国领导人和有识之士也将继续在这些问题上努力寻求着合作与共赢。

 

 

《大西洋月刊》

The Free-Time Paradox in America

The rich were meant to have the most leisure time. The working poor were meant to have the least. The opposite is happening. Why?

 

"Every time I see it, that number blows my mind.”

 

 

Erik Hurst, an economist at the University of Chicago, was delivering a speech at the Booth School of Business this June about the rise in leisure among young men who didn’t go to college. He told students that one “staggering” statistic stood above the rest. "In 2015, 22 percent of lower-skilled men [those without a college degree] aged 21 to 30 had not worked at all during the prior twelve months,” he said.

 

"Think about that for a second,” he went on. Twentysomething male high-school grads used to be the most dependable working cohort in America. Today one in five are now essentially idle. The employment rate of this group has fallen 10 percentage points just this century, and it has triggered a cultural, economic, and social decline. "These younger, lower-skilled men are now less likely to work, less likely to marry, and more likely to live with parents or close relatives,” he said.

 

So, what are are these young, non-working men doing with their time? Three quarters of their additional leisure time is spent with video games, Hurst’s research has shown. And these young men are happy—or, at least, they self-report higher satisfaction than this age group used to, even when its employment rate was 10 percentage points higher.

 

It is a relief to know that one can be poor, young, and unemployed, and yet fairly content with life; indeed, one of the hallmarks of a decent society is that it can make even poverty bearable. But the long-term prospects of these men may be even bleaker than their present. As Hurst and others have emphasized, these young men have disconnected from both the labor market and the dating pool. They are on track to grow up without spouses, families, or a work history. They may grow up to be rudderless middle-aged men, hovering around the poverty line, trapped in the narcotic undertow of cheap entertainment while the labor market fails to present them with adequate working opportunities.

 

But when I tweeted Hurst’s speech this week, many people had a surprising and different take: That it was sad to think that a life of leisure should be so scary in the first place. After all, this was the future today’s workers were promised—a paradise of downtime for rich and poor, alike.

 

In the classic 1930 essay “Economic Possibility of Our Grandchildren,” the economist John Maynard Keynes forecast a future governed by a different set of expectations. The 21st century’s work week would last just 15 hours, he said, and the chief social challenge of the future would be the difficulty of managing leisure and abundance.

 

“For the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem,” Keynes wrote, “how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well."

 

The same idea was echoed in a 1957 book review for The New York Times, in which the writer Erik Barnouw predicted that, as work became easier and more machine-based, people would look to leisure to give their lives meaning.

 

The increasingly automatic nature of many jobs, coupled with the shortening work week, seem to be creating parallel tensions, which lead an increasing number of workers to look not to work but to leisure for satisfaction, meaning, expression … Today's leisure occupations are no longer regarded merely as time fillers; the must, in the opinion of both social worker and psychiatrist, also perform to some extent as emotional buffers.

 

But 60 years later, it seems more true to say that it is not leisure that defines the lives of so many rich Americans. It is work.

 

Elite men in the U.S. are the world’s chief workaholics. They work longer hours than poorer men in the U.S. and rich men in other advanced countries. In the last generation, they have reduced their leisure time by more than any other demographic. As the economist Robert Frank wrote, “building wealth to them is a creative process, and the closest thing they have to fun.”

 

Here is the conundrum: Writers and economists from half a century ago and longer anticipated that the future would buy more leisure time for wealthy workers in America. Instead, it just bought them more work. Meanwhile, overall leisure has increased, but it’s the less-skilled poor who are soaking up all the free time, even though they would have the most to gain from working. Why?

 

Here are three theories.

 

1. The availability of attractive work for poor men (especially black men) is falling, as the availability of cheap entertainment is rising.

 

The most impressive technological developments since 1970 have been “channeled into a narrow sphere of human activity having to do with entertainment, communications, and the collection and processing of information,” the economist Robert Gordon wrote in his book The Rise and Fall of American Growth. As with any industry visited by the productivity gods, entertainment and its sub-kingdoms of music, TV, movies, games, and text (including news, books, and articles) have become cheap and plentiful.

 

Meanwhile, the labor force has erected several barriers for young non-college men, both overt—like the Great Recession and the decades-long demise of manufacturing jobs—and insidious. As the sociologist William Julius Wilson and the economist Larry Katz have both told me, the labor market’s fastest growing jobs are not historically masculine or particularly brawny. Rather they prize softer skills, as in retail, education, or patient-intensive health care, like nursing. In the 20th century, these jobs were filled by women, and they are still seen as feminine by many men who would simply rather not do them. Black men also face resistance among retail employers, who assume that potential customers will regard them as threatening.

 

And so, at the very moment that the labor market obliterated manufacturing jobs and shifted toward more soft-skill service jobs, diversion became a vastly discounted experience that could provide a moment’s joy at home. As a result, entertainment has become an inferior good, where the young and poor work less and play more.

 

2. Social forces cultivate a conspicuous industriousness (even workaholism) among affluent college graduates.

 

The first theory doesn’t do anything to explain why rich American men work so much harder than they used to, even though they are richer. That’s odd, since the point of earning money is ostensibly to afford things that make you happy, like free time.

 

But perhaps that’s just it: Rich, ambitious Americans are already spending more time on what makes them fulfilled, but that thing turned out to be work. Work, in this construction, is a compound noun, composed of the job itself, the psychic benefits of accumulating money, the pursuit of status, and the ability to afford the many expensive enrichments of an upper-class lifestyle.

 

In a widely shared essay in the Wall Street Journal last week, Hilary Potkewitz hailed 4 a.m. as "the most productive hour." She quoted entrepreneurs, lawyers, career coaches, and cofounders praising the spiritual sanctity of the pre-dawn hours. As one psychiatrist told her, "when you have peace and quiet and you’re not concerned with people trying to get your attention, you’re dramatically more effective."

 

Keynes envisioned a life with a little less work and a little more leisure, not a social competition to see who could maximize their pre-dawn productivity. But a 2016 essay about why Americans should sleep less to be more productive appeals specifically to a readership that considers downtime a worthy sacrifice upon the altar of productivity.

 

While some of the hardest-working rich Americans certainly love their jobs, it’s also likely that America’s secular religion of industriousness is a kind of pluralistic ignorance. That is, rich people work long hours because they are matching the behavior of similarly rich and ambitious people—e.g.: “he went to Bowdoin and Duke Law just like me, so if he stays in the office for 13 hours on Wednesday, I should too”—even though many participants in this pageant of workaholism would secretly prefer to work less and sleep at least until the sun is up.

 

3. Leisure is getting “leaky.”

 

Here is a third theory that applies equally to all income brackets: Thanks to smartphones and computers, leisure activity is leaking into work, and work, too, is leaking into leisure.

 

The radio set used to be a living room fixture. In order to listen to the radio, it was necessary to be at home. Then the car radio liberated the radio from the living room, and the television set replaced its corner of the living room. Then the smartphone liberated video from the television screen and put it on a mobile device that fit in people’s pockets.

 

Now somebody can listen to music, watch video, and read—while checking on social media feeds that can act as the cumulative equivalent of newspapers, magazines, and phone calls with friends—on their phone, while at work. Meanwhile, these same mobile instruments of leisure are also instruments of professional connectivity: When a boss knows that each of her workers have smartphones, she knows that they can all read her email on a Saturday morning (sent, naturally, at 4:01 a.m.).

 

My job fits snugly into this category. Writing is a leaky affair, where the boundaries between work and leisure are always porous. When I open Twitter, or watch the news on a Sunday morning, am I panning for golden nuggets of insight, taking a mental-health break, or something in between? It’s difficult to say; sometimes, I don’t even know. A novel that I read can become an article’s lede. A history book on my desk can inspire a column. Because the scope of non-fiction journalism is boundless, every moment of my downtime could theoretically surface an idea or stray comment that becomes a story. As a result, my weekdays feel more like weekends (and my weekends feel more like weekdays) than a 20h-century reporter’s.

 

Keynes got a lot wrong in 1930. He did not envision the rich working more, he did not foresee so many young men in poverty giving up on work, and he could not see the allure of cheap and personalized entertainment. But he accurately forecast the difficulty of a wealthy class transitioning to a more leisurely lifestyle. "The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all of us along with them into the lap of economic abundance,” Keynes wrote. “But it will be those peoples, who can keep alive, and cultivate into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes.”

 

 

 

 

美军越战越胖

据反动网站《反媒体AntiMedia》盘点（The US War on Terror Has Cost $5 Trillion and Increased Terrorism by 6,500%），美国籠括在“反恐战”（The War Against Terror）至今除了造成世界无数地区的动乱，死人无数（包括美国出手的，奥巴马是“无人机恐怖大队长”），难民遍野外，自己的费用已达5万亿美元（$5 trillions）。当然这不是美国政府的数据，多处于经济社会学家将各方费用综合估计后得到的评估，如包括退伍军人医疗养老的费用。

 

大选之际，淳朴（Donald Trump）还要“大幅增加军费”，克林顿（Hillary Clinton）也不会含糊，至于国债也高达19万亿（>100%总产值），无人过问。而另一方面，国内教育焦头烂额，除了教师工会成了腐败范例外，民众政客拒绝投资：

 

（原图高分解度）

 

这是没完没了的纠纷内斗。

 

不过尽管美国军费在世界上是独占鳌头，美军设备训练也越来越高超、领前（F22，F35之类），美国大兵却是越来越胖。据《军事时报》报道，美军的肥胖率随着两伊战争一块儿涨，跟花费有一比：

 

 

大概钱多了，吃的也痛快了。

 

唉，难题多，这也成了小事一桩了。

 

 

Beipanjiang Bridge, possible the #tallest bridge in the world, has a vertical distance of 569.66 meters in Guizhou pic.twitter.com/JEdl8nUFj2

— China Xinhua News (@XHNews) September 12, 2016

 

 

 

China to World: We Don’t Need Your Factories Anymore
Chinese manufacturers once bought high-tech materials from overseas firms. Rising expertise means they now shop locally, altering global trade

ZHUHAI, China— Judah Huang works deep in the global supply chain at a Chinese company that makes nonstick coatings for cookie sheets, frying pans and grills sold in stores such as Wal-Mart.

Until a few years ago, the pans and griddles were made in China, but most of the materials that went into them were not. Mr. Huang imported most of the resins, pigments and pastes for his coatings from multinational suppliers such as Dow Chemical Co. of the U.S. and Eckart Effect Pigments of Germany.

Now, in a shift that is echoing throughout China’s vast manufacturing sector, he is buying more than 70% of those things from local suppliers.

“All these raw materials, now somebody in China makes it,” says Mr. Huang, chief technical manager of GMM Non-Stick Coatings, which has a factory in this city near Macau.

China, long the world’s factory floor, is taking control of a bigger portion of the world’s supply chains as well, causing a shift in global trade patterns by buying less from abroad.

The No. 2 economy after the U.S. pulls in huge volumes of raw materials and components, from aluminum to microchips, which it fashions into finished products such as iPhones and George Foreman grills for sale around the world. Those supply flows turbocharged global trade for years and made China one of the top export destinations.

GMM technicians discuss nonstick coatings the company makes for cookie sheets, frying pans and grills sold in stores such Wal-Mart. Photo: Chao Deng/The Wall Street Journal

Now those flows are shrinking, which is pummeling China’s trading partners, slowing global growth and providing further ammunition for politicians including Donald Trump who question the benefits of global trade.

Exports to China, which had risen nearly every year since 1990, fell 14% last year, the largest annual drop since the 1960s. They are down another 8.2% this year, through September. The decline helped shave 0.3 percentage point off world trade growth last year, and is a big reason that growth is expected to slow to 1.7% this year from the 5% a year it has averaged over the last two decades.

China’s trade surplus with the U.S. hit a record last year, largely because China is buying less and because global commodity prices fell.

Some of that decrease is the result of economic slowdown and a glut of goods—in China and globally. But China also is increasingly turning inward for its manufacturing needs, pushing to substitute local inputs for foreign, especially in plum, high-margin areas such as semiconductors and machinery.

That is disturbing for many global manufacturers, which have ceded low-end production to Chinese rivals but are banking on staying ahead in higher-end goods and ingredients that feature more advanced technology.

“The very high end is still not there,” says Ka Lok Cheung, head of operations in Zhuhai for Germany’s Eckart, noting that local rivals still have trouble maintaining consistent quality in some hard-to-make pigments. “But for many things, they’re really catching up.”

How Chinese Manufacturers Are Changing Global Trade Flows

Chinese manufacturers are buying more raw materials and components from domestic suppliers, taking a chunk out of imports from multinational companies. The push to use local inputs for manufacturing is spreading to higher-tech items and contributing to slower global trade growth.

 

The value of components and materials imported by China for use in other products fell 15% last year from the prior year, the largest annual decline since the global financial crisis, and it dropped another 14% in the first nine months of this year, according to Wind Info, a Chinese data provider that uses official Chinese customs figures.

Part of that decline is because Chinese exporters have been using less of those imports in their goods, data from an International Monetary Fund study suggests. The proportion of foreign-made inputs in Chinese exports has been shrinking by an average 1.6 percentage points a year over the past decade, and last year fell to 19.6%, from more than 40% in the mid-1990s, according to Chinese trade data.

Woodridge, Ill.-based Wilton Brands, which makes baking pans in China that use GMM’s nonstick coating, previously used steel from Japan or South Korea because Chinese steel had too many flaws, says James Hill, executive vice president of global operations. With improvements in Chinese steel, the factories now buy locally, which means that almost all of the pan, including the ingredients for the coating, is now produced in China, he says.

For low-end products, especially in sectors that have suffered from overcapacity, China’s Ministry of Commerce has levied antidumping tariffs against companies such as Dow Chemical and Eastman Chemical Co. that it views as undermining local industry by unloading goods in the country at too cheap a price.

Dow Chemical declined to comment on the tariffs but said it has sold the business that was affected and focused on higher-end chemicals. Those now account for more than 95% of its revenue in China, says Peter Wong, the company’s president for Asia Pacific. Eastman declined to comment.

China’s GMM Non-Stick Coatings has begun buying more materials from domestic rather than multinational suppliers. Workers at its factory in Zhuhai, China. Photo: Vincent Yu/Associated Press

To build domestic capabilities on the high end, the Chinese government last year announced a plan to raise the domestic content of core components and key materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025. It has been spending large amounts on research and development: $213 billion last year, or 2.1% of gross domestic product, according to state media reports. In June it pledged more money for “technological innovation.”

Biotechnology, aerospace and other high-tech-related exports to China fell 5% this year through September, compared with the same period last year, according to Wind Info, extending a two-year decline.

In specialty or higher-end chemicals—GMM’s industry—the amount China imports from the U.S. fell 8% in the first seven months of this year.

GMM was founded nearly a decade ago by U.S. chemical-industry veteran Ravin Gandhi and his Hong Kong business partner Raymond Chung, one of a wave of manufacturers attracted by China’s huge, cheap labor force and growing network of factories. GMM’s plant produces 20 metric tons of coatings each day, enough to stick-proof around 600,000 cooking pans or 200,000 electric grills.

For years, GMM acquired more than half of its raw materials from chemical giants such as DuPont Co. and Dow Chemical, with which DuPont is merging. It imported all of its two most important types of ingredients—silicone resins and aluminum paste, tricky, high-margin chemicals that Chinese suppliers weren’t able to make. GMM’s purchases in China tended to be lower-end ingredients such as solvents, which were easy to make and dangerous to ship.

The global recession and demand slowdown that started in 2008 pummeled chemical sales and worsened a supply glut. Chinese chemical factory utilization rates dropped sharply between 2008 and 2014, a sign of slack in the industry. China’s chemical makers, whose profits were getting squeezed by overcapacity and falling prices of cheaper ingredients, accelerated their push into higher-value areas.

Around 2012, salespeople from Chinese chemical makers started showing up at GMM with five-gallon buckets of resins and higher-end pigments that cost much less than their imported counterparts and passed the rigorous quality standards required by regulators such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, says GMM’s Chicago-based CEO Mr. Gandhi. GMM’s customers were pressing for cheaper prices and a wider variety of colors and features, such as smoother pan surfaces.

GMM started shifting purchases to local firms. Until last year, GMM bought silicone-based fluids for its coatings from Dow Corning. In 2015, it shifted much of its business to a local Chinese supplier.

Because domestic suppliers are 10% to 20% less expensive than foreign ones, says Mr. Huang, who previously worked for a German industrial-coatings company, the shift has been a “game-changer” for GMM. It has cut the cost of finished coatings by 10% from 2012, raising the company’s profit as much as 15% and allowed price reductions for customers. More than 70% of GMM’s 200 vendors are now based locally, compared with 40% five years ago, Mr. Gandhi says.

Dow Corning declined to comment.

One local producer whose chemicals GMM now uses is Fujian Kuncai Material Technology Co. Ltd., a maker of shiny pigments and aluminum paste based in Fuqing. After initially plying its wares to small industrial paint shops in China’s southern manufacturing zone, it increased investment in new products, set up a big R&D center in China and started working with Chinese universities to hone its technological edge. A year and a half ago, it formed a joint venture with a Netherlands-based distributor to sell its China-made pigments in Europe.

GMM now buys blue, silver-white, gray and copper-colored pigments from Fujian Kuncai rather than import them, says Mr. Huang. The pigments cost as much as a quarter less than the cost of an equivalent import, he says.

Around 10 miles from GMM’s Zhuhai factory, at the headquarters of German pigment maker Eckart’s main China unit, Mr. Cheung, the operations chief, says competition with local manufacturers is getting more intense.

“They really want to chase us,” he says. “They see the market demand is increasing for this better product.”

Eckart sells aluminum pastes to GMM. Five years ago, GMM imported those pastes from Eckart’s German facilities; now it uses pastes Eckart recently started making for less in Zhuhai. While Eckart still makes those pastes from raw materials it imports from its German and U.S. facilities, it is looking to purchase more locally as well, Mr. Cheung says.

For its part, Dow Corning, a subsidiary of Midland, Mich.-based Dow Chemical, is fighting back with lower-priced offerings that are only sold in China, says Dow Corning’s Greater China President Jeroen Bloemhard.

The company is looking for more opportunities to source domestically, particularly as it vies to supply China’s domestic market. “Fundamentally, there will be a preference to buy locally if it is actually possible,” he says.

 

《经济学人杂志》

 

Xi Jinping is a strongman. That does not mean he gets his way
Changing China is tough, even for a man with Xi’s powers

BY NIGHT the fires of Tangshan burn and the air stinks. In this city in the northern province of Hebei, more than 100,000 people work in factories making steel and many more in firms serving the industry. “Save energy and cut emissions,” reads a red slogan outside one plant, heavy machinery roaring within. Earlier this year China’s president, Xi Jinping, ordered the steel business to cut production. Small and inefficient mills like this one were supposed to close and larger ones to shut down some furnaces. Yet many still operate around the clock. Their city is close to Beijing, virtually on Mr Xi’s doorstep, but the steel bosses openly flout his orders.

Nearly four years into his rule, Mr Xi is commonly described as the most powerful Chinese leader in decades. He has taken charge of all the most important portfolios, cultivated a huge personal following and purged his opponents. Bypassing ministries, he rules through informal “leading small groups”, heading so many of them that foreign commentators have labelled him “chairman of everything”. Rumours fly (without evidence) that Mr Xi may even try to extend his powers beyond the normally allotted ten years. Given his seeming strength, it would be logical to suppose that he could do almost anything he pleases. The toiling mills of Tangshan, however, suggest how hard the president often finds it to persuade local officials to carry out his wishes. Mr Xi may be chairman of everything, and he may well be stronger than any leader since Deng Xiaoping. But in a country so vast, diverse and with so many entrenched interests, he often seems to be master of nothing. 

Mr Xi spars with crusty generals, powerful bureaucracies and large state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government. But an even greater impediment to his power is an age-old one: local authority. This is reflected in a popular saying that refers to the compound in Beijing where China’s leaders live and work: “Policies do not go beyond Zhongnanhai.”

Xi’s out of control

As the Communist Party prepares to hold a five-yearly congress late next year at which sweeping leadership changes will be announced, Mr Xi is fighting on two broad fronts. One is with rivals in Beijing who want the reshuffle to favour their own cronies. The other is with footdraggers in the provinces who want to do their own thing, regardless of who wins in the capital. It is with the wider country in mind that Mr Xi is now focusing on what he calls “party building”, ie, instilling loyalty and discipline into the party’s myriad cells. This will be a theme at an annual four-day meeting of 350 or so of the party’s most senior members that is due to begin on October 24th. In July Mr Xi warned starkly what a slackening of discipline could mean: “Our party will sooner or later lose its qualifications to govern and will unavoidably be consigned to history.”

China is eminently capable of getting things done, even in the face of considerable NIMBYist resistance. Its thousands of miles of high-speed rail and its mushrooming cities testify to that. But because its leaders are afraid to delegate power, they can give their attention only to a limited range of priorities. Many government schemes, particularly ones that are tricky, pricey or unpalatable to local politicians, go largely unheeded.

Strikingly, Mr Xi even sometimes fails to implement policies that he has declared to be a priority. He reportedly said that he had the capacity to tackle only one big economic issue this year, and that was to trim the bloated steel and coal industries. As a result, in February, the government revealed plans to cut steel capacity by 100m-150m tonnes in the next five years and surplus capacity in coal production by 500m tonnes. To give his edict extra prominence, officials took the rare step of inviting foreign journalists to Zhongnanhai to quiz a deputy finance minister on it.

Yet, as the smoky streets of Tangshan show, the president’s stentorian words do not always translate into local deeds. Since February, steel output has risen nationwide every month year-on-year (see chart). By the end of July producers had cut less than half of the capacity they were supposed to. Custeel, an industry body, says this includes many facilities that had already been mothballed. The central government admits that only four provinces have made substantial progress out of the 22 for which it has published results. Only one of the four, Jiangsu, is among the big steel-producers.

Local businesses often pay more heed to the market than to mandates. Some larger mills relit their burners as global steel prices rose. Local governments have their eye on their revenues, too. Hebei produces nearly a quarter of China’s steel. In places like Tangshan the steel industry contributes substantially to tax revenues. Local banks risk writing off large loans if mills have to shut. At one, Tangshan Baotai, workers live on-site in low, grey housing. Those who lose their job lose their home as well. Local governments fear that lay-offs could fuel unrest.

People desperate to get on China’s property ladder may wish that their plenipotentiary president could do better. Mr Xi was clearly behind measures announced this month aimed at holding down soaring house prices in the biggest cities. But this effort seems as doomed as previous ones, partly because local governments delight in the market’s surge. Selling land is a big source of their income; big cities control a very limited supply of it, because of tight restrictions on their expansion.

The weakness of Mr Xi in the face of local power has been evident even in his efforts to curb tobacco use (his wife, Peng Liyuan, is an “anti-smoking ambassador”). In 2015 he backed a stringent ban on smoking in indoor public places in Beijing. Yet a recent draft of a law to enforce this nationwide offers a big loophole: smokers would still be able to use designated indoor areas. The interests of tobacco-producing areas may explain why. In Yunnan province in the south-west, tobacco accounts for over half the tax take, compared with 7.5% of government revenue in China overall.

Policies that lack the president’s personal endorsement are all the more likely to stall. For example, there has been little progress in reforming hospitals, despite widespread anger at doctors who boost their incomes by prescribing expensive drugs that patients have to pay for. Local officials reckon this gouging is preferable to paying doctors better wages from government funds.

Despite outcries, too, over appalling lapses in food safety, and high-level promises to improve it, enforcement has not been markedly strengthened. Provincial agencies do not have the will, capacity or financial incentive to regulate the food chain. Officials in Beijing privately admit that localities cannot afford to carry through a nationwide plan for reducing soil pollution that was announced in May.

The problem is partly one of the party’s own making. Since the late 1970s the central government has deliberately delegated much decision-making to lower levels of government, encouraging local officials to launch pilot projects and spread good practice. This has helped the economy become agile and adaptable. But it has also made top-down government more difficult, sometimes to the detriment of reform. China’s political system displays “fragmented authoritarianism”, as Kenneth Lieberthal of the Brookings Institution calls it.

Raising the red lanterns

Market forces, rather than political ones, increasingly dominate government decision-making beyond the capital—as long as social stability is not compromised. And with the flourishing of private enterprise, and the collapse of many state-owned firms, the party’s once omnipresent and all-powerful cells have atrophied and weakened. So Mr Xi wants to put politics back in command. In a private speech he gave only a month after taking power in 2012, he railed that the Soviet Union had collapsed because nobody in the party had been “man enough to stand up and resist”; he noted that Russia’s corrupt security services had “left the party disarmed”. He evidently saw signs of similar laxness taking hold in China.

Mr Xi’s fierce campaign against corruption has been aimed at tightening his grip and strengthening the party’s discipline (as well as settling scores with enemies). Hundreds of thousands of officials have been punished for graft. At the same time, Mr Xi has tried to instil a sense of accountability among local officials. The country’s latest five-year plan (a quaint reminder of the days when the central leadership pulled more levers) for the first time makes local officials personally liable for causing environmental damage, even if it is discovered only after they have left office. The government now threatens to punish civil servants who ignore court rulings or fail to observe party policies.

But it is hard to legislate for loyalty. The party’s discipline-enforcement agency said this month that party leadership had “weakened” in four provincial-level areas, implying that this had continued even after the agency had read them the riot act. The errant regions include the municipality of Tianjin near the capital. Jin Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing said in a recent lecture that Mr Xi was facing widespread “soft resistance” among local elites. Instead of openly opposing him they were practising “inaction” instead. Mr Jin concluded that all policies were “empty”.

The fight against corruption may have scared officials, but even fear is no match for bureaucratic inertia. Next week’s gathering of party leaders is unlikely to help much. Xinhua, a state news agency, says they will adopt measures to improve the party’s ability at “self-cleansing, self-consummating, self-innovating and self-enhancing”. That does not sound like much of a game-changer.

At least the meeting may help Mr Xi strengthen his position in Zhongnanhai. It will launch preparations for next year’s congress, after which five of the seven members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee are due to retire, along with one-third of the Politburo’s other 18 members. The Politburo’s current make-up was largely decided by Mr Xi’s predecessors. This will be his chance to stack it with his allies.

There will be much speculation about which one of them, if any, will succeed him. Some analysts believe he has no successor in mind, and interpret his willingness to flout party convention as a sign of Mr Xi’s self-confidence. Yet it may be that he does not want to start grooming an heir (in China, this tends to begin very early). If so, that could suggest something else: that neither at the centre nor in the provinces does Mr Xi feel strong enough. Therefore he cannot trust anyone else with what he calls his “Chinese dream” of the country’s “great revival”.