笨狼发牢骚
发发牢骚，解解闷，消消愁
【感想】中国人口老化是个大问题。除此之外，作者鲜有新意。中国问题多、问题大，艰难，不一定都能解决，但能解解决。但如果说什么都不会变，那是僵化的判断。
不过，我倒是觉得2030年前中国就不应当想什么跟美国争老大之类的，没戏。以后如何，到时再看。
“AMERICANS have a long history of worrying about their decline”完全是胡邹，比比"Manifest Destiny"，那个是美国主流？
类似的说法多了，参见最近的两篇：又来一“专家”扬言中国必步日后尘；华尔街日报评论：中国面临崩溃。
经济学人杂志：The end is not nigh
No other country is ready to challenge America’s dominant global position
Mar 7th 2015
书：Is the American Century Over? By Joseph Nye. Polity Press; 152 pages; $12.95 and £9.99.
“AMERICANS have a long history of worrying about their decline,” notes Joseph Nye. Puritans in 17th-century Massachusetts lamented a fall from earlier virtue. The Founding Fathers fretted that the republic they had created might dissipate like ancient Rome. Modern scholars are a gloomy lot, too. Michael Lind of the New America Foundation, a think-tank, has written that, with America’s foreign policy in a state of collapse, its economy ailing and its democracy broken, the American century ended last year.
Mr Nye, a veteran observer of global affairs, is more optimistic. He expects that America will still play the central role in the global balance of power in the 2040s. What, after all, is the alternative?
Europe is hardly a plausible challenger. Though its economy and population are larger than America’s, the old continent is stagnating. In 1900 a quarter of the world’s people were European; by 2060 that figure could be just 6%, and a third of them will be over 65.
By 2025 India will be the most populous nation on Earth. It has copious “soft power”—a term Mr Nye coined—in its diaspora and popular culture. But only 63% of Indians are literate, and none of its universities is in the global top 100. India could only eclipse America if it were to form an anti-American alliance with China, reckons Mr Nye, but that is unlikely: Indians are well-disposed towards Washington and highly suspicious of Beijing.
China is the likeliest contender to be the next hyperpower: its army is the world’s largest and its economy will soon be. (In purchasing-power-parity terms, it already is.) But it will be decades before China is as rich or technologically sophisticated as America; indeed, it may never be. By 2030 China will have more elderly dependants than children, which will sap its vitality. It has yet to figure out how to change governments peacefully. And its soft power is feeble for a country of its size. It has few real friends or allies, unless you count North Korea and Zimbabwe.
Hu Jintao, the previous president, tried to increase China’s soft power by setting up “Confucius Institutes” to teach its language and culture. Yet such a strategy is unlikely to win hearts in, say, Manila, when China is bullying the Philippines over islands in the South China Sea. The staging of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing was a soft-power success, but was undercut by the jailing of Liu Xiaobo, a pro-democracy activist, and the resulting empty chair at the ceremony to award him the Nobel peace prize. “Marketing experts call this ‘stepping on your own message’,” says Mr Nye.
Perhaps the greatest threats to American pre-eminence are domestic. As pundits often point out, young American workers score terribly on cross-country comparisons of numeracy, and Americans are disillusioned with their government. Yet even here, Mr Nye sees hope: 82% of Americans say America is the best place in the world to live. It remains a magnet for foreign talent, and could be an even stronger one if it sorted out its immigration policy. A “long Jeffersonian tradition” says that one “should not worry too much about the level of confidence in government”. Americans may grumble constantly about Washington, but the Internal Revenue Service detects no increase in cheating on taxes, and the proportion of Americans who bother to vote has risen since 2000.
“Leadership is not the same as domination,” says Mr Nye; influence matters more than military might. This short, well-argued book offers a powerful rebuttal to America’s premature obituarists.
