论互相同情的快乐 《道德情操论》（2）

《道德情操论》

Chap. II

Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy

第二章 论互相同情的快乐

1．

But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may
be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men
a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are
we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.
Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain
refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account,
according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and
this pain. Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of
the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices
whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he
is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he
observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their
opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so
instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it
seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such
self-interested consideration. A man is mortified when, after
having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees
that nobody laughs at his jests but himself. On the contrary, the
mirth of the company is highly agreeable to him, and he regards
this correspondence of their sentiments with his own as the
greatest applause.

无论产生同情的原因是什么，也无论同情是如何产生的，最令我们快乐的莫过于看到我们发自内心的情感在别人身上产生共鸣；打击我们最甚的莫过于看到与此相反的情形。有些人喜欢根据自爱之心的某些细腻的表现来推断我们全部的情感。这些人自认为根据自己的原则已经把这种快乐和痛苦的原因说得一清二楚。他们说，人都能意识到自己的软弱，也能意识到需要他人的帮助。看到别人受到自己激情的感染，他就心花怒放，因为他确信能获得别人的帮助；不过看到相反的情况，他就会郁闷悲伤。然而，无论是快乐，还是痛苦的感觉，都会转瞬即逝，而且这种情况经常是在一些无关痛痒的场合发生。于是似乎很明显，快乐与痛苦这两种情感都无法从这种自我感兴趣的考虑中产生。一个人竭尽全力想通过逗趣博得同伴一乐，但环顾四周，发现除他本人之外，再没有别人对他的笑话捧腹时，他就感到很难为情。而相反，同伴的欢乐和他高度合拍的时候，他就把这种情感的合拍看作是最牛的喝彩。


2．

Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the
additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy
with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with
when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other,
no doubt, do in some measure. When we have read a book or poem so
often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by
ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a
companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into
the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him,
but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider
all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they
appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves,
and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus
enlivens our own. On the contrary, we should be vexed if he did not
seem to been entertained with it, and we could no longer take
any pleasure in reading it to him. It is the same case here. The
mirth of the company, no doubt, enlivens our own mirth, and their
silence, no doubt, disappoints us. But though this may contribute
both to the pleasure which we derive from the one, and to the
pain which we feel from the other, it is by no means the sole
cause of either; and this correspondence of the sentiments of
others with our own appears to be a cause of pleasure, and the
want of it a cause of pain, which cannot be accounted for in this
manner. The sympathy, which my friends express with my joy,
might, indeed, give me pleasure by enlivening that joy: but that
which they express with my grief could give me none, if it served
only to enliven that grief. Sympathy, however, enlivens joy and
alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of
satisfaction; and it alleviates grief by insinuating into the
heart almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at that
time capable of receiving.


欢乐与痛苦生成的轨迹大致如此，但仔细想来，他之所以欢乐，似乎并非全然因为从同伴那里博得一乐而感到喜悦倍增，他之所以痛苦，亦非因为未能博得同伴共鸣而感到失望。我们翻来覆去阅读一本书或一首诗，就不再能从独自阅读中发现乐趣，但如果读给同伴听，我们依然可以感到情趣盎然。对于同伴来讲，此书或此诗堪称新颖之至，乐趣充盈。于是我们就会发现对方惊喜莫名，赞不绝口，之所以如此，自然是此书或此诗使然。但是此时此刻，书也好，诗也罢，早已不能再在我们心中泛起任何激情的涟漪。由是观之，在考虑诗书所描述的所有思想时，我们的着眼点与其说集中于我们自己，毋宁说是集中于那位伙伴。我们因为自己对他的愉悦之情感同身受而开心不已。相反，如果同伴看上去并不欣赏这本书或这首诗，我们就会很郁闷，于是就再也不能从对他阅读诗书中获得任何乐趣。这里的情况也相同。同伴的欢乐，毫无疑问，使我们倍加欢乐；同伴的沉默，疑问毫无，使我们失望倍加。不过，虽然这能使我们在一种情况下获得欢乐，而在另一种情况下产生痛苦，但这绝然不是二者产生的唯一原因；他人与我们的情感吻合，看来就是产生快乐的一个原因，而缺乏这种吻合，看来便是产生痛苦的一个原因，虽然如此，但这也不能完全用以解读快乐与痛苦产生的根源。如果朋友对我的快乐产生同情，而这种同情反过来又能使我的快乐加倍，那我就感到很开心；但是如果朋友对我的悲伤产生同情，而这种同情反过来却只能使我的悲伤加剧，我就不能感到开心。然而，同情既能增加快乐，也能缓解悲伤。它为产生满意的情绪提供另一个温床，因而增加快乐；它使彼时彼刻能够接受的愉悦情绪潜入心灵，从而缓解悲伤。

3．

It is to be observed accordingly, that we are still more
anxious to communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our
agreeable passions, that we derive still more satisfaction from
their sympathy with the former than from that with the latter,
and that we are still more shocked by the want of it.

因此可以说：我们更急于向朋友表达不快之情，而不是愉悦之情；我们从他们对前者，而不是对后者的同情中获得更多的满足；我们由于他们缺乏同情之心而受创更重。

4.

How are the unfortunate relieved when they have found out a
person to whom they can communicate the cause of their sorrow?
Upon his sympathy they seem to disburthen themselves of a part of
their distress: he is not improperly said to share it with them.
He not only feels a sorrow of the same kind with that which they
feel, but as if he had derived a part of it to himself, what he
feels seems to alleviate the weight of what they feel. Yet by
relating their misfortunes they in some measure renew their
grief. They awaken in their memory the remembrance of those
circumstances which occasioned their affliction. Their tears
accordingly flow faster than before, and they are apt to abandon
themselves to all the weakness of sorrow. They take pleasure,
however, in all this, and, it is evident, are sensibly relieved
by it; because the sweetness of his sympathy more than
compensates the bitterness of that sorrow, which, in order to
excite this sympathy, they had thus enlivened and renewed. The
cruelest insult, on the contrary, which can be offered to the
unfortunate, is to appear to make light of their calamities. To
seem not to be affected with the joy of our companions is but
want of politeness; but not to wear a serious countenance when
they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity.

不幸者发现一个能与之倾诉悲伤原因的人，他们该是何等地如释重负啊！有他的同情，他们就似乎能减轻自己的悲痛：说此人能与他们分担痛苦未必欠妥。对于他们的悲伤，他不仅能够感受到，而且还觉得似乎已经部分地加以分担，他所能感受到的悲情，似乎能够减轻他们所感受的重负。然而，倾诉不幸在某种程度上反而会使悲伤死灰复燃。他们会重新忆及已往使自己备受煎熬的环境。他们因此会加快从前泪水的流速，从而极易浸沉于哪怕是极度微弱的悲伤之中。不过他们会从所有这些当中获得快乐，而且显然会因此感到明显的慰藉；因为获得同情所产生的美好感觉，会对悲伤所引起的痛苦加以补偿，至于这些悲伤，则是因为他们要去激发同情之心，而被重新赋予生机，进而卷土重来的。与之相反，不幸者大祸临头之际，却遭他人熟视无睹，置若罔闻，这似乎就是对他们极度残忍的戕害。面对同伴的快乐而心如古井，无动于衷，这似乎只是失礼而已；然而当他们倾诉衷肠，备述遭际时，我们却依然故我，毫不动容，这实在是货真价实的丧尽天良，毫无人性。

5.

Love is an agreeable; resentment, a disagreeable passion; and
accordingly we are not half so anxious that our friends should
adopt our friendships, as that they should enter into our
resentments. We can forgive them though they seem to be little
affected with the favours which we may have received, but lose
all patience if they seem indifferent about the injuries which
may have been done to us: nor are we half so angry with them for
not entering into our gratitude, as for not sympathizing with our
resentment. They can easily avoid being friends to our friends,
but can hardly avoid being enemies to those with whom we are at
variance. We seldom resent their being at enmity with the first,
though upon that account we may sometimes affect to make an
awkward quarrel with them; but we quarrel with them in good
earnest if they live in friendship with the last. The agreeable
passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart
without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions
of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing
consolation of sympathy.

爱是一种愉悦的激情，恨是一种郁闷的激情。我们渴望朋友与自己共享友情，我们同样也渴望朋友与自己同仇敌忾。我们春风得意，他们漠然处之，我们会原谅他们；我们水深火热，他们若无其事，我们会忍无可忍。同样，我们感恩戴德，他们置之不理，我们会怒火中烧；我们恨之入骨，他们置若罔闻，我们会五内俱焚。对于他们来讲，避免成为我们朋友的朋友，简直易如反掌；但避免成为我们敌人的敌人，则几乎不可能。他们与朋友反目失和，我们很少抱怨，虽然有时我们也为此与他们小有口角。但如果他们与敌人和睦相处，我们就会与他们舌战到底，难解难分。爱与欢乐的激情，无须添加额外的乐趣，就能使人由衷地感到心满意足，受益匪浅。悲伤与怨恨引发的痛苦，亟需同情之心加以治愈。


6.

As the person who is principally interested in any event is
pleased with our sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we,
too, seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with him,
and to be hurt when we are unable to do so. We run not only to
congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted;
and the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in
all the passions of his heart we can entirely sympathize with,
seems to do more than compensate the painfulness of that sorrow
with which the view of his situation affects us. On the contrary,it is always disagreeable to feel that we cannot sympathize with him, and instead of being pleased with this exemption from sympathetic pain, it hurts us to find that we cannot share his uneasiness. If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness. It gives us the spleen, on the other hand, to see another too happy or too much elevated, as we call
it, with any little piece of good fortune. We are disobliged even
with his joy; and, because we cannot go along with it, call it
levity and folly. We are even put out of humour if our companion
laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it deserves; that
is, than we feel that we ourselves could laugh at it.

对什么事都非常感兴趣的人，会因为我们的同情而感到高兴，会因为无人同情而感到伤心，因此当我们能够同情他的时候，我们自己似乎也十分高兴，而不能这样做的时候，我们也会感到伤心。我们不仅乐于祝贺因成功而春风得意者，也乐于安慰因落败而愁肠寸断者，与一个激情满怀而我们又完全能够同情的人谈话，就会感到快乐，而这种快乐似乎远不止于能够解除因目睹其情况而产生的悲伤与痛苦。相反，我们感到无法同情他时就总是郁闷不已。我们不会因为免除同情心导致的痛苦而高兴，只会因为发现自己不能分担他的不快而感到痛心。我们听到一个人因为自己的不幸而嚎啕大哭时，如果我们认为这种不幸一旦落到我们头上，并不会对我们产生如此巨大的作用，那我们就会因为他的悲伤而感到震惊；因为我们无法进入这个角色，因此就将这种行为称之为胆怯与懦弱。另一方面，看到别人因为交了点小运就十分高兴，甚至心花怒放，我们就不屑一顾。我们甚至对他的快乐心生怨怒；因为我们对此无法苟同，便称之为轻浮与愚笨。对于一个本不值得为之长时间哈哈大笑的笑话，如果我们感觉自己根本不会为之发笑，然而同伴却笑得超过分寸， 我们甚至会怒火中烧。