Hugh White 揭露美国低估中国

澳大利亚教授休·怀特揭露美国低估中国

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

在本视频中，休·怀特教授解释了美国为何低估了中国的实力，以及这对未来全球领导力的影响。

在我看来，尤其是在与中国的竞争中，有两个关键的区别。首先，中国比美国以前遇到过的任何同等竞争对手都强大，尤其是作为经济强国，中国更加强大。我确实持有一种传统的观点，即经济实力是国家实力的基础。这并不是说中国不强大，美国也是一个非常强大的国家，但中国相对于美国的实力比自19世纪末美国首次涉足西半球以来的任何国家都要强大。中国的经济规模远远大于美国，现在可能已经是冷战高峰时期苏联相对于美国的两倍，而且很可能还会进一步扩大。如果我们继续低估中国在未来几年的实力，那将是一个真正的错误，就像我们在过去25年里一直低估中国一样。我们今天面临这种困境，是因为我们长期以来低估了中国的力量。我可以说，我们已经我们太长时间高估了美国，理所当然地认为美国是世界上最强大的国家，拥有为所欲为的军事实力。我们反复发现但似乎仍然没有吸取教训的是，尽管美国拥有强大的实力、创造力和所有优点，但它并不像我们想象的那样强大，也不像我们期望的那样强大。这意味着，面对中国的实力和超越中国的野心，美国在亚洲保持领导地位的成本将非常高昂，甚至可能高于冷战时期保持对苏联地位的成本，因为中国现在更强大了。另一方面，美国面临的紧迫性比以前面对同等竞争对手时要低，这是因为在过去，当美国着手击败例如威廉·德国时， 1917年，1941年纳粹德国和日本，以及1948年苏联及之后的战争，在每一次战争中，他们都面临着真正有望主宰整个欧亚大陆的强国。任何主宰整个欧亚大陆的国家都足以威胁到美国在西半球的本土，这提供了一个非常深刻的、根本性的理由，解释了为什么美国应该准备好承担与这些强国对抗的负担和代价。但我认为很难说中国有这样做的前景，因为尽管我对中国相当乐观，但我认为中国拥有某种优势，使其能够主宰欧亚大陆其他国家的可能性非常低，因此，它能够主宰欧亚大陆并在西半球威胁美国本土的可能性非常低，因此，美国拥有意愿、动机和为了在东亚对抗中国，阻止中国成为东亚主要力量，而承担更高的成本和风险，这种可能性很低，因为我不明白为什么美国应该承担这些成本和风险，而且，没有真正的迹象表明他们这样做。华盛顿有些人，包括国务卿和国防部长，都在谈论新冷战或类似的言论，但我认为他们仍然低估了中国。我没有听到他们清楚地认识到，这将有多大。他们没有清晰地阐述一项战略，能够让美国在对抗中国方面获得合理的成功前景。他们没有明确认识到这将花费多少，也没有明确说明为什么美国必须承诺承担这些成本。我甚至还没有提到唐纳德·特朗普，但特朗普是其中的重要组成部分，这不仅仅是因为他自己的政策，还因为他的当选反映了华盛顿特区外交政策精英的态度。而是由美国选民决定，因为最终，在自己的半球对抗像中国这样强大的国家，其规模、成本和风险，都不是马萨诸塞大道上几个智库能决定的，而是由全体美国人民决定。从唐纳德·特朗普的当选，从共和党建制派愿意与他合作，以及从民主党人身上，你都能看到在特朗普时代，民主党试图重新定义自身，而政治立场却鲜有承诺维护美国的领导地位，而美国在亚洲的整个参与模式都依赖于此。鉴于这一切，澳大利亚人必须扪心自问，我们能有多大把握相信美国今天以及未来几十年会承担遏制中国的成本和风险？如果我错了怎么办？如果他们真的决定承诺，我们又能有多大把握相信他们会成功？如果我错了，而他们真的决定承诺，那么我们将看到的是战略竞争的升级，进一步加剧了我们在过去几个月和几年里看到的急剧上升的趋势。现在，华盛顿的每个人，以及澳大利亚的每个人，我想都希望，面对这种情况，中国会……简单地退缩，但我认为这再次低估了中国。决心的天平对中国有利，原因很简单：地理上，我们现在谈论的竞争是在东亚，如果竞争发生在西半球，我不会相信。中国有机会，但在中国后院，决心的平衡受地理因素影响很大，我认为中国先于美国退让的可能性非常低，这意味着如果美国坚持承诺，战争的可能性就会上升，在这种情况下，像台湾这样的问题，战争的可能性相当高。从某种意义上说，引发战争的问题是什么并不重要，重要的是美国和中国将发现自己陷入了一场冲突，而冲突的根本驱动力在于谁是亚洲的主要力量，这是一种非常过时的霸权战争概念。如果发生这种情况，美国不会轻易取胜，事实上，我认为美国很可能根本不会赢，从某种意义上说，它不会输，解放军不会在美国沿着宪法大道前进，但它不会赢，如果不能赢得胜利，如果不能解决，亚洲的旧秩序无论如何都会被摧毁。此外，这场冲突升级为核冲突的可能性很高，而且很有可能演变成一场全面核战争的可能性相当高，所以，如果真是这样，如果我错了，如果美国真的下定决心，那将直接导致亚洲和澳大利亚陷入在我看来非常严重的灾难。无论美国是否下定决心，支持和鼓励当前的美国政策是否符合澳大利亚的安全利益，我们也会这样做。我刚才解释了我们应该做什么，我们将做什么，我不知道。实际上，我们很容易继续像现在这样滑行，而不做出选择。

这实际上是系统性的欺骗，告诉美国我们支持他们，同时告诉中国我们不支持。这是澳大利亚目前的政策。我认为，我们能否解决这个问题？我们能否站出来，真正地说“不”，我们不会走这条路。美国正在谈论追随这条路，这将是困难的。由于胆怯和缺乏想象力，我们很容易陷入支持美国。

人们很容易说我们别无选择，因为人们一直在说这完全是错误的。我们确实有选择。我们确实有选择，但我们还没有做出选择，呃，但是，我注意到的是，澳大利亚政府，包括现任政府，迄今为止，还没有不认可美国将中国列为战略竞争对手。我认为，他们还没有这样做，不是因为我刚才提出的某种战略论点，而是因为一个更简单的原因，比如蓬佩奥先生对中国愤怒的恐惧，以及这会对我们的贸易关系造成什么影响。

但我认为这表明，他仍然希望蒙混过关，我认为政治双方都是如此，这让我想起了20世纪30年代，因为如果你看看澳大利亚在20世纪30年代末局势恶化时的做法，澳大利亚仍然……澳大利亚政治领导人认识到，新加坡战略，以及我们对英国的持续依赖，虽然我们如此坚定地致力于此，但……并没有奏效，但我们根本……无法想象做其他任何事情。因此，我们滑向了新加坡的沦陷，这是我们国家历史上最大的灾难。那么，我们应该怎么做呢？有两个可能性：

我们应该回到美国，并告诉他们，我们认为你们目前正在制定的政策不会奏效，但我们可以鼓励他们制定一项行之有效的政策。可以想象，美国会制定一项承认中国日益增长的实力的政策，这种政策在美国愿意付出努力的情况下是可持续的。这将使美国在亚洲的角色与我们过去所见的截然不同，但这对我们来说比美国撤军要好得多，因为美国撤军似乎是最有可能的选择。我认为大约在2012年左右，澳大利亚本可以这样做。嗯，我本来可以去那里，为不同的模式辩护，如果你看看，例如，李显龙今年6月1日在新加坡发表的重要演讲，他就是谈论这种事情，我们可以做到，也许我们应该这样做，但我在这里要告诉你，我认为时机已经过去，我认为成功的机会现在非常低，所以我们应该做什么呢？我们应该做的是，做好准备，如果失败了，我们能做到最好地管理我们的安全，这意味着准备好孤军奋战，非常感谢。

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

In this video, Professor Hugh White explains why the United States has underestimated China’s power and what it means for the future of global leadership.

It seems to me in particular that the in the case of the contest with China there are two key differences the first is that China is stronger than any of the peer competitors would be peer competitors that the United States has ever faced before it's stronger as an economic power in particular and I do take an old-fashioned view that economic weight is the foundation of national power that is not to say that China that America isn't strong too it's a very strong country but China is stronger relative to the United States than any country has ever been since the United States
first poked its nose out of the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 19th century its economy is far far bigger probably already now twice as big as the Soviet Union's was relative to America's at the height of the Cold War and is likely to grow much bigger still we would make a real mistake to keep on underestimating China's power for the
next few years as we have done so consistently for the last 25 years we face this predicament today because we've underestimated China's power for so long and I might say we've overestimated the United States for too
long taken it for granted that the
United States is by definition the
world's strongest state by definition
has military power to do whatever it
likes what we've discovered repeatedly
but still don't seem to have learned
from is that the United States for all
its strength and power and creativity
and all the good things about it is not
the power we thought it was and the
power we hoped it would be and what that
means is that the cost to the United
States of preserving its leadership in
Asia in the face of China's power and
ambition to overtake it is going to be
very high it will be co comparable to
and perhaps higher than the cost of
preserving its position vis the Soviet
Union during the cold war because China
is stronger now the other side of the coin is that
the imperatives to the United States are
lower than than they were in previous
enterprises when it confronted um peer
competitors and that's because in the
past when the United States has set out
to defeat for example Wilhham Germany in
1917 or the Nazis and the Japanese in
1941 or the Soviets in 19 48 and onwards
they confronted in each of those
episodes powers which had a real
prospect of dominating the whole of the
Eurasian land mass and any country that dominates the
whole of the Eurasian land mass is
easily going to be strong enough to
threaten the United States at home in
the Western Hemisphere that provided a
very deep fun foundational reason why
the why the United States should be
prepared to bear the burdens and pay the
cost of confronting those very powerful
states but I think it's hard to argue
that China has a prospect of doing that
because although I am pretty bullish
about China I think the chances of China
having a kind of preponderance that
would allow it to dominate the other
countries in Eurasia are very low
therefore the chance of it being able to
dominate Eurasia and threaten the United
States at home in the Western Hemisphere
are very low and therefore the chance of
the United States having the will the
motive the purpose to pay those higher
costs and risks in order to confront
China in East Asia to prevent China
becoming the primary power in East Asia
is pretty low because I just don't see
why the United States should commit
itself to those costs and risks and
moreover there's no real sign that they
are there are people in Washington including
the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense who talk of a new cold war or
language like it but I think they still
underestimate China i don't hear from
them a clear understanding of how big
that will be a clear articulation of a
strategy that would deliver America a
reasonable pro prospect of success in
confronting China no clear recognitions of how much that
will cost and no clear statement of why the
United States has to commit itself to
paying those costs and I haven't even mentioned
Donald Trump but Trump is an important part of
this not because not just because of his
own policies but because of what his
election tells us about the attitude not
of the foreign policy elites in Washington DC but of American voters
because in the end a national effort on
the scale and cost and risk required to
confront a country as powerful as China
in its own hemisphere is not something
that can be decided by a few people in
think tanks up and down Massachusetts
Avenue it needs to be decided by the
American people as a whole and what you
see from the election of Donald Trump
what you see from the willingness of the
Republican establishment to go along
with him and what you see on the
Democrat side of politics as the
Democrats try to redefine themselves in
the Trump era is very little commitment
if any to preserving the US leadership
role upon which this whole model of
American engagement in Asia depends in
the light of all this Australians have
to ask themselves how confident can we
be that America today and in the decades
to come will commit to the costs and
risks of containing China and what if I'm
wrong how sure can we be that they will
succeed if they if I'm wrong and they do
decide to commit because if I'm wrong if
America really is committed then what
we'll see is escalating strategic
rivalry further steps up the trend the
very sharply rising trend that we've
seen in the last few months and years
now everyone in Washington and everyone
in Australia I guess would hope that
that in the face of that China would
simply back off but I think that
underestimates China again the balance
of resolve favors China for the simple
geographical reason that the contest
we're talking about is one in East Asia
if the contest was in the Western
Hemisphere I wouldn't give China a
chance but in China's backyard where the
balance of resolves is so strongly
shaped by geography I think the chances
of China backing off before America does
are very low that means if America
sticks to the to the commitment the
chance of war goes up it's quite high in
this scenario over an issue like Taiwan
in a sense what it doesn't really matter
what the issue that starts it is what's
important is is that the US and China
will find themselves fighting a conflict
whose essential driver is the question
as to which of them is the primary power
in Asia a very old-fashioned conception
of a hegmonic war if that happens America will not win
easily in fact I think the chances are
America will not win at all it won't
lose in a sense the PLA is not going to
march down the constitution constitution
avenue in the United States but but it
will not win and in and in failing to win in
failing to resolve the old order in Asia
will be destroyed anyway moreover the
chance of that conflict escalating to a
nuclear conflict is quite
high and the chance of that becoming a
full-scale nuclear exchange is quite
high so if so if I'm wrong if America is
committed that leads Asia and Australia
directly to what looks to me like a very
serious catastrophe in neither case
whether America's committed or it isn't
are Australia's security interests
served by supporting and encouraging
current US policy so will we anyway i've just
explained what we should do what will we
do i don't know actually it's it's very easy for us to keep
trying to slide along as we're doing at
the moment without making a choice on
this being actually systemically
duplicitous telling the United States
that we are supporting them and telling
the Chinese that we're not that is
Australia's policy today i think whether we can resolve that
whether we can come out and actually say
no we're not going to go down this path
the United States is is is talking about
following is going to be hard it's very
easy to slide into supporting the United
States through timidity and a lack of
imagination it's easy to say we have no
choice as people keep on saying that's
simply wrong we do have a choice we do
have a choice we haven't yet made that choice yet uh
and the but but what it what is notable
to me is that Australian government so
far including the present government
have not have have so far failed to
endorse the American designation of
China as a strategic rival they haven't
done so yet not I think because of a
kind of strategic argument I've just
unfolded but for the simpler reason
going back to Mr pompeo of fear of China's anger and what
it would mean for our trade
relationships but I think what that
shows is he's still hoping to muddle
through and I think this is true of both
sides of politics and that does remind
me of the 1930s because if you look at
what Australia did as things darkened in
the in the late 1930s australia still
Australian political leaders recognized
that the Singapore strategy the
continuing dependence on the United
Kingdom to which we are so heavily
committed was not working but we simply
couldn't imagine doing anything else and
so we slid into the fall of Singapore
and the biggest catastrophe in our
national history so what should we
do well two possibilities one is that we
should go back to the United States and
say we don't think the policy you're
working on at the moment is going to
work but we can encourage them to
develop one that will and it is possible
to imagine a US policy which recognized China's growing
power which was sustainable at an effort
at a level of effort the United States
is prepared to commit it would be a very
different US role in Asia than one we've
seen in the past but it would be much
better for us than than the United
States withdrawing which seems to be the
most likely alternative i think there
was a time around about 2012 when Australia could have done that
could have gone out there and argued for
that different model and if you look at
for example what Lee Shenlong was
talking about his big speech in
Singapore on the 1 of June this year
that was the kind of thing he was
talking about and we could we could do
that and maybe we should but I'm here to
tell you I think the time has passed i
think the chances of that succeeding is
now very low so what should we do
instead prepare for how best we can
manage our security if that fails which
means prepare to stand alone thank you
very much