风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
布林肯四年的任职总结
江宁知府 2024-10-04 国际领域兴趣达人
2023年G20外长会议期间的布林肯和拉夫罗夫。布林肯以情绪稳定著称，2024年7月的东盟与对话伙伴国外长会议期间，他曾主动与拉夫罗夫握手，给外界诸多遐想。
文章最后，布林肯以一种推卸责任的口吻总结道：
“作为国务卿，我不搞政治，只做政策。从第一天起，拜登总统和哈里斯副总统就做出了一个基本选择——在一个竞争更加激烈的世界中，美国不能单打独斗，我们现在的选择将决定未来实现新愿景或回归一个倒退的时代。”
不难体会，与美国历史上许多大开大合的国务卿不同，布林肯的权力基础相对薄弱，很像是一个外交裱糊匠，他处处小心谨慎，制定了一份《仓促的“大战略”》。
或许等“采菊东篱下”之后，外界将在一些智库场合或回忆录里窥探到一个更加放松自如的布林肯，听他回忆阿富汗撤军、乌克兰危机和中东危机的内幕故事。
美国的复兴战略：为新世界重建领导地位
作者：安东尼·J·布林肯
2024 年 11 月/12 月 2024 年 10 月 1 日
美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯在迪拜向媒体发表讲话，2023 年 12 月美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯在迪拜向媒体发表讲话，2023 年 12 月
一场激烈的竞争正在进行中，以定义国际事务的新时代。少数国家——主要是俄罗斯，与伊朗和朝鲜以及中国结盟——决心改变国际体系的基本原则。虽然他们的治理形式、意识形态、利益和能力各不相同，但这些修正主义大国都希望在国内巩固专制统治，并在国外确立势力范围。他们都希望通过胁迫或武力解决领土争端，并将其他国家的经济和能源依赖武器化。他们都试图削弱美国实力的基础：军事和技术优势、主导货币以及无与伦比的联盟和伙伴关系网络。虽然这些国家不是轴心，政府也明确表示不寻求集团对抗，但这些修正主义大国的选择意味着我们需要采取果断行动来防止这种结果。
当乔·拜登总统和卡马拉·哈里斯副总统上任时，这些修正主义大国已经在积极挑战美国的利益。这些国家认为，美国国内正处于不可逆转的衰落之中，与国外的朋友也产生了分歧。他们看到美国公众对政府失去了信心，美国民主两极分化、瘫痪不堪，美国的外交政策正在破坏华盛顿建立和倡导的联盟、国际机构和规范。
拜登总统和哈里斯副总统奉行复兴战略，将国内竞争力的历史性投资与振兴国外伙伴关系的密集外交活动相结合。他们认为，这一双支柱战略是消除竞争对手对美国正在衰落和缺乏自信的假设的最佳方式。这些假设是危险的，因为它们会导致修正主义者继续破坏美国和大多数国家所追求的自由、开放、安全和繁荣的世界。这是一个各国可以自由选择自己的道路和合作伙伴的世界，全球经济由公平竞争、开放、透明和广泛机会定义。这是一个技术赋予人民权力并加速人类进步的世界。这是一个维护包括《联合国宪章》核心原则在内的国际法、尊重普世人权的世界。这是一个可以不断发展以反映新现实、表达新兴观点和参与者并应对当前和未来共同挑战的世界。
拜登政府的战略使美国今天的地缘政治地位比四年前强得多。但我们的工作尚未完成。美国必须在历届政府中保持坚韧不拔，以动摇修正主义者的假设。它必须做好准备，让修正主义国家深化彼此之间的合作，以弥补差距。它必须保持对朋友的承诺和信任。它必须继续赢得美国人民对美国在世界上严谨领导的力量、目标和价值的信心。
重回游戏
美国的战略适应力在很大程度上取决于其经济竞争力。这就是为什么拜登总统和哈里斯副总统带领国会民主党和共和党通过立法，进行历史性投资，以升级基础设施，支持推动二十一世纪发展的行业和技术，为制造业基础充电，促进研究，并引领全球能源转型。
这些国内投资构成了拜登政府战略的第一大支柱，它们帮助美国工人和企业推动了自 1990 年代以来最强劲的美国经济。美国的 GDP 比排在其后的三个国家的总和还要大。通货膨胀率已降至世界发达经济体中最低水平。失业率在 50 多年来最长的时间内保持在 4% 或以下。家庭财富创下历史新高。尽管太多美国人仍在努力维持生计，物价对许多家庭来说仍然过高，但经济复苏已经大幅减少了贫困和不平等，并将其好处惠及更多人和更多地方。
这些对美国竞争力的投资和美国经济复苏的成功具有强大的吸引力。在国会通过一项法案后，
2022 年，随着《芯片和科学法案》和《通胀削减法案》（有史以来对气候和清洁能源的最大投资）的出台，韩国三星承诺在德克萨斯州投资数百亿美元制造半导体。日本丰田投入数十亿美元在北卡罗来纳州生产电动汽车和电池。全球五大半导体制造商都承诺在美国建立新工厂，投资 3000 亿美元，创造超过 10 万个新的美国就业岗位。
美国现在是世界上最大的外国直接投资接受国。它也是最大的外国直接投资提供者，显示了美国私营部门在扩大全球经济机会方面无与伦比的力量。这些投资不仅使美国工人和社区受益。它们还减少了美国对中国和其他修正主义国家的依赖，并使美国成为那些也希望减少依赖的国家更好的合作伙伴。
虽然一些朋友起初担心拜登政府的国内投资和激励措施会威胁到他们的经济利益，但随着时间的推移，他们已经看到美国的复兴如何能给他们带来好处。它刺激了他们对商品和服务的需求，并催化了他们对芯片、清洁技术和更具弹性的供应链的投资。它还使美国及其盟友能够继续推动技术创新并制定技术标准，这对于维护他们共同的安全、价值观和福利至关重要。
和平伙伴
拜登政府战略的第二个支柱是重振和重新构想美国的关系网络——使华盛顿及其合作伙伴能够汇聚力量，推进共同的世界愿景，并与那些试图破坏它的人进行有力而负责任的竞争。
有力的竞争意味着使用美国权力的所有工具来推进美国的利益。这意味着增强美国的军力态势、军事和情报能力、制裁和出口管制工具以及与盟友和伙伴协商的机制，以便该国能够可靠地阻止——并在必要时防御——侵略。虽然华盛顿并不寻求在升级行动中攀升，但它必须为更大的风险做好准备并加以管理。
与此同时，负责任的竞争意味着保持沟通渠道，防止竞争演变为冲突。这意味着明确表示美国的目标不是政权更迭，即使双方竞争，也必须找到共存的方法。这意味着在符合国家利益的情况下寻找合作的方式。这意味着以有利于朋友安全和繁荣的方式竞争，而不是以牺牲他们为代价。
中国是唯一有意图和手段重塑国际体系的国家。拜登总统早就明确表示，我们将把北京视为美国的“步调挑战”——其最重要的长期战略竞争对手。我们下定决心保护美国最先进的技术；保护美国工人、公司和社区免受不公平经济行为的侵害；抵制中国在国外日益增长的侵略行为和在国内的镇压行为。我们与朋友建立了专门的渠道，分享华盛顿对北京政策和行动所带来的经济和安全风险的评估。尽管如此，我们恢复了两军之间的沟通，并强调与中国的严重分歧不会阻止美国与中国保持牢固的商业关系。我们也不会让中美关系中的摩擦阻碍在对美国人民和世界其他国家都至关重要的优先事项上的合作，例如应对气候变化、阻止合成毒品的流通和防止核扩散。
在俄罗斯问题上，我们对普京总统的复仇目标或“重启”的可能性不抱任何幻想。我们毫不犹豫地对莫斯科的破坏稳定活动采取了有力行动，包括其网络攻击和干涉美国大选。与此同时，我们通过延长《新削减战略武器条约》和启动战略稳定对话，努力减少核危险和战争风险。
在伊朗和朝鲜问题上，我们同样保持清醒的头脑。我们增加了外交压力，加强了美国军方的武力态势，以威慑和制约德黑兰和平壤。特朗普政府单方面和错误地退出伊朗核协议，使德黑兰的核计划摆脱了束缚，破坏了美国及其伙伴的安全。我们向伊朗表明，只要伊朗愿意，就有一条道路可以回到双方遵守协议的轨道上来，同时保持强有力的制裁制度和我们对伊朗的承诺。
伊朗永远不会被允许获得核武器。我们明确表示愿意与朝鲜进行直接谈判，但我们不会屈服于朝鲜的武力威胁或先决条件。
拜登政府承诺以积极而负责任的方式开展竞争，这消除了修正主义者认为美国是维护国际和平与稳定的障碍的借口。这也为美国赢得了盟友的更多信任，同时也建立了更强大的伙伴关系。
我们努力通过四个方式充分发挥这些伙伴关系的潜力。首先，我们重新致力于国家的核心联盟和伙伴关系。拜登总统向北约盟国保证，美国将履行将对一个国家的攻击视为对所有国家的攻击的承诺；重申了美国对日本、韩国和其他亚洲盟友的坚定安全承诺；并恢复了七国集团作为世界先进民主国家指导委员会的作用。
第二，我们为美国的联盟和伙伴关系注入了新的目标。我们提升了四方安全对话（与澳大利亚、印度和日本的伙伴关系），并采取具体措施实现自由开放的印度太平洋共同愿景，从加强海上安全到生产安全有效的疫苗。我们成立了美国-欧盟贸易和技术委员会，调动世界上最大的经济伙伴关系来制定新兴技术的全球标准，保护美国和欧洲最敏感的创新。我们提升了美印战略伙伴关系等重要双边关系的雄心，并恢复了区域参与，拜登总统主持了与非洲、拉丁美洲、太平洋岛屿和东南亚领导人的峰会。
我们让北约比以往任何时候都更大、更强大、更团结。
第三，我们以新的方式在各个地区和问题上将美国的盟友和伙伴团结在一起。我们启动了印度-太平洋经济框架，该框架将占世界 GDP 40% 的 14 个国家聚集在一起，以建立更安全的供应链、打击腐败和向清洁能源过渡。我们创建了三边防御伙伴关系 AUKUS，通过该伙伴关系，澳大利亚、英国和美国联手建造核动力潜艇，并深化其科学、技术和工业合作。
第四，我们建立了新的联盟来应对新的挑战。我们团结了各种政府、国际组织、企业和民间社会团体，生产和分发数亿剂免费 COVID-19 疫苗，结束了疫情的急性期，挽救了生命，并加强了世界预防和应对未来卫生紧急情况的能力。我们发起了一个全球联盟，以应对非法合成毒品的祸害，并发起了一项区域性努力，以分担西半球历史性移民挑战的责任。
在建立这些和其他联盟时，拜登政府始终将其他民主国家作为第一站。这就是总统发起民主峰会的原因，该峰会将来自各个地区的民主领导人和改革者聚集在一起。但如果目标是解决美国人民面临的问题，民主国家就不能成为美国的唯一伙伴。例如，人工智能不断演变的机遇和风险需要通过包括非民主国家在内的多个联盟来应对，只要它们愿意为本国公民服务并愿意帮助解决共同的挑战。这就是为什么拜登政府与七国集团的其他国家合作制定了人工智能治理框架，然后带领包括中国在内的 120 多个国家在联合国大会上制定并通过了联合国有史以来第一份关于利用人工智能造福人类的决议。这也是为什么政府制定了一个负责任地开发和使用军事人工智能的框架，并有 50 多个国家签署了该框架。
对修正主义的反应
虽然我们的战略巩固了美国在国内外实力的基础，但我们的治国方略利用这种实力将危机转化为机遇。在拜登政府执政的第一年，我们在加强与盟友和伙伴在战略竞争方法上的协调方面取得了重大进展。盟国首都的对话导致了明显的转变。例如，在为北约制定新战略概念的谈判中，我看到盟国首次高度关注中国对跨大西洋安全和价值观的挑战。在与东亚盟国官员的讨论中，我听到他们正在努力应对北京在南海和台湾海峡的胁迫行为。
普京决定试图将乌克兰从地图上抹去——以及中国决定先为俄罗斯提供掩护，然后助长其侵略——加速了
俄罗斯入侵前，我们采取了一系列准备措施：警告世界莫斯科即将发动侵略，与盟友分享情报，为乌克兰的自卫提供军事支持，并与欧盟、七国集团和其他组织协调，计划立即对俄罗斯实施严厉的经济制裁。美国从阿富汗撤军是必要但艰难的，我们从中吸取了惨痛教训，从应急计划到盟国协调等各方面都吸取了教训，并加以运用。
当普京最终发动全面入侵时，北约迅速调动军队、飞机和舰船作为反应部队的一部分，加强了北约的东翼。欧盟及其成员国向乌克兰提供了大量军事、经济和人道主义援助。美国成立了乌克兰防务联络小组，该小组已发展到 50 多个国家与乌克兰军方合作，以满足紧急需求。而一个由多国组成的广泛联盟实施了有史以来最雄心勃勃的制裁，冻结了俄罗斯一半以上的主权资产。
因为这不仅是对乌克兰的攻击，也是对《联合国宪章》核心的主权和领土完整原则的攻击，普京的战争引发了欧洲以外的恐惧。如果允许普京不受惩罚地继续下去，世界各地的潜在侵略者都会注意到这一点，从而打开冲突的潘多拉魔盒。中国决定援助俄罗斯，凸显了美国在欧洲和亚洲的盟友的命运紧密相连。在此之前，许多欧洲人仍然将中国视为经济伙伴——即使他们越来越担心过度依赖北京。但当北京做出选择时，越来越多的欧洲人将中国视为系统性竞争对手。
2023 年 7 月，北京，中美官员会晤录像 2023 年 7 月，北京，中美官员会晤录像
普京坚持战争的时间越长，俄罗斯就越依赖同胞修正主义者的支持来继续战斗。朝鲜运送了满载武器和弹药的火车，包括数百万发炮弹、弹道导弹和发射器，直接违反了联合国安理会的多项决议。伊朗在俄罗斯建造了一家无人机工厂，并向莫斯科运送了数百枚弹道导弹。中国公司加快了俄罗斯生产武器、弹药和其他物资所需的机器、微电子产品和其他两用物品的供应。
俄罗斯对他们的支持依赖程度越高，修正主义者期望的回报就越多——也得到了回报。普京同意与朝鲜分享俄罗斯先进的武器技术，这加剧了日本和韩国本已严重的威胁。他和朝鲜领导人金正恩重启了冷战时期的一项协议，承诺如果任何一方开战，将向其提供军事援助。俄罗斯增加了对伊朗的军事和技术支持，并加快了与伊朗建立战略伙伴关系的谈判，尽管德黑兰继续为在中东对美国人员和合作伙伴以及红海国际航运进行恐怖袭击的代理人提供武器、训练和资金。俄罗斯和中国的合作几乎扩展到所有领域，两国举行了越来越激进和广泛的军事演习，包括在南海和北极地区。
中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜有着复杂的历史和不同的利益，他们之间的伙伴关系与美国长期以来的联盟架构相去甚远。在他们宣称的友谊和支持的背后，这些国家的关系主要是交易性的，他们的合作需要权衡和风险，随着时间的推移，每个国家都可能发现这些权衡和风险越来越令人厌恶。对于中国来说尤其如此，中国国内的经济健康和国外的地位受到其修正主义伙伴煽动的全球不稳定的威胁。然而，这四个修正主义者都坚定地致力于挑战美国和国际体系的总体目标。这将继续推动他们的合作，特别是在美国和其他国家站出来反对他们的修正主义的时候。
拜登政府对这种日益增长的联盟的回应是加速盟友之间对威胁的共识。我们让北约比以往任何时候都更大、更强大、更团结，尽管芬兰和瑞典长期以来一直不结盟，但北约仍然欢迎他们加入。在本届政府执政之初，30 个北约成员国中有 9 个履行了将其 GDP 的 2% 用于国防的承诺；今年，32 个盟国中至少有 23 个将实现这一目标。
我们深化和现代化了美国在印度太平洋地区的联盟，加强了美国军队的军事部署
通过签署新协议升级从日本到菲律宾再到南太平洋的基地，我们提高了军事实力。我们还找到了将盟友团结在一起的新方法。2023年，拜登总统在戴维营与日本和韩国举行了有史以来第一次三边领导人峰会，三国同意加强合作，以防御来自朝鲜的弹道导弹袭击和网络攻击。今年，他在白宫主持了有史以来第一次与日本和菲律宾的三边峰会，三方承诺深化共同努力，捍卫南海的航行自由。
大融合
可以说，我们实现的最重要的转变不是在地区内部，而是在地区之间。当普京发动入侵时，他认为他可以利用欧洲对俄罗斯天然气、石油和煤炭的依赖来制造分裂，削弱其对乌克兰的支持。但他低估了欧洲国家的决心——以及亚洲盟友帮助他们的意愿。
日本已承诺向乌克兰提供超过 120 亿美元的援助，并于 6 月成为第一个与基辅签署为期十年的双边安全协议的欧洲以外国家。澳大利亚已向乌克兰提供了超过 10 亿美元的军事援助，并加入了在英国培训乌克兰人员的多国联盟。韩国已宣布将考虑向乌克兰提供武器，此外还将提供大量经济和人道主义支持。美国的印度太平洋伙伴正在与欧洲协调，对俄罗斯实施制裁并限制俄罗斯石油价格，从而减少普京可以投入其战争机器的资金数额。
与此同时，中国对俄罗斯的支持——以及美国政府创新地利用情报外交来揭示这种支持的范围——使美国在欧洲的盟友进一步关注北京构成的威胁。普京入侵造成的巨大经济混乱使台海危机可能造成的灾难性后果成为现实，每年大约有一半的世界商业集装箱船要经过台湾海峡。全球 90% 以上的最先进半导体都是在台湾制造的。
拜登政府上任时，欧洲主要伙伴决心从美国获得自主权，同时深化与中国的经济联系。然而，自入侵以来，他们已将大部分经济议程重新调整为“去风险化”中国。2023 年，欧盟通过了《关键原材料法案》，以减少对中国在制造电动汽车和风力涡轮机等产品所需投入方面的依赖。2024 年，欧盟启动了新的举措，以进一步加强其经济安全，包括改进对外国和对外投资的审查、研究安全和出口管制。爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛退出了中国在中东欧的“17+1”投资倡议。意大利退出了中国的“一带一路”倡议。越来越多的欧洲国家，包括法国、德国和英国，已禁止中国科技公司为其关键基础设施提供设备。
作为国务卿，我不搞政治；我制定政策。
欧洲和亚洲的朋友也与美国一道采取协调行动，解决中国不公平的贸易行为和制造业产能过剩问题。今年，拜登政府提高了针对中国钢铁和铝、半导体和关键矿产的针对性关税——而不是全面征收关税，从而增加美国家庭的成本——欧盟和加拿大对中国电动汽车征收了关税。我们从本世纪头十年的“中国冲击”中吸取了惨痛的教训，当时北京释放了大量补贴商品，淹没了美国的工业，破坏了美国人的生计，摧毁了美国社区。为了确保历史不会重演，并与中国的扭曲策略竞争，我们正在加大对美国及其盟友的生产能力的投资——并对这些投资实施更大的保护。
在新兴技术方面，美国及其欧洲和亚洲的盟友正在越来越多地合作，以保持他们的集体优势。在我们的敦促下，日本和荷兰与美国一道采取措施，阻止中国获得最先进的半导体及其生产设备。通过量子开发小组，我们召集了九个欧洲和亚洲主要盟友，以加强供应链弹性，并深化研究和商业伙伴关系，该技术的能力甚至超过最强大的超级计算机。
从俄罗斯发动战争的那一刻起，美国的一些
tes 认为，美国对乌克兰的支持会分散应对中国挑战的资源。我们的行动证明了相反的事实：对抗俄罗斯对于实现亚洲和欧洲前所未有的融合至关重要，亚洲和欧洲越来越认为其安全不可分割。这种转变不仅是莫斯科和北京做出的重大决定的结果。它也是美国盟友和合作伙伴做出的重大决定的产物——华盛顿鼓励这些选择，但没有、不会、也不能决定这些选择。
支持乌克兰的全球联盟是我职业生涯中见过的最有力的分担负担的例子。自普京全面入侵以来，美国已向乌克兰提供了 940 亿美元的支持，而欧洲、亚洲和其他合作伙伴已贡献了近 1480 亿美元。通过加强协调、投资和工业基础整合，美国在欧洲和亚洲的盟友的能力仍需大量工作来提升。美国人民期望，美国的安全要求盟友和合作伙伴随着时间的推移承担更多的国防负担。但如今，由于我们建立了盟友的桥梁，美国在这两个重要地区的地位明显增强。事实上，美国的朋友也是如此。
跨地区的修正主义
修正主义者日益增长的自信和结盟所带来的不稳定影响远远超出了欧洲和亚洲。在非洲，俄罗斯派出特工和雇佣兵开采黄金和关键矿产，传播虚假信息，并帮助那些试图推翻民选政府的人。莫斯科非但没有支持结束苏丹战争（世界上最严重的人道主义危机）的外交努力，反而通过武装双方来加剧冲突。伊朗及其代理人利用混乱局面，恢复该地区的非法武器贩运路线，加剧动乱。与此同时，北京避开了莫斯科在非洲的好战行为，同时培养新的依赖关系，并让更多国家背上不可持续的债务。在南美，中国、俄罗斯和伊朗正在向委内瑞拉尼古拉斯·马杜罗的独裁政府提供军事、经济和外交支持，这强化了他坚信其政权不受压力影响的信念。
这种修正主义结盟在中东地区表现得更加激烈。俄罗斯曾支持联合国安理会遏制伊朗核野心的努力；现在，它正在支持伊朗的核计划并为其破坏稳定的活动提供便利。俄罗斯也从以色列的亲密伙伴变成了——在 10 月 7 日的袭击之后——加强了与哈马斯的关系。拜登政府则一直在与中东及其他地区的伙伴不懈合作，以结束加沙的冲突和苦难，找到一种外交解决方案，使以色列人和黎巴嫩人能够在边界两侧安全生活，管理更广泛的地区战争风险，并努力实现该地区（包括以色列和沙特阿拉伯之间）的更大一体化和正常化。
这些努力是相互依存的。如果加沙战争没有结束，没有一条既符合巴勒斯坦人合法愿望又符合以色列安全需要的、有时间限制的、可靠的建国道路，那么正常化就无法推进。但如果这些努力取得成功，正常化将使以色列加入地区安全架构，释放整个地区的经济机会，并孤立伊朗及其代理人。包括阿拉伯国家在内的各国联盟展现了这种一体化的曙光，它们帮助以色列抵御了 4 月份伊朗前所未有的直接攻击。自 10 月 7 日以来，我对该地区的访问证实，只要那里的领导人愿意做出艰难的决定，就有一条通往更大和平与一体化的道路。
尽管我们付出了不懈的努力，但加沙战争对人类造成的后果仍然是毁灭性的。数以万计的巴勒斯坦平民在这场他们没有发起、也无法阻止的冲突中丧生。几乎所有加沙人口都流离失所，绝大多数人营养不良。大约 100 名人质仍留在加沙，他们要么已经被杀害，要么仍然被哈马斯关押在残酷的环境中。所有这些苦难都使我们更加迫切地需要努力结束冲突，防止冲突重演，为该地区的持久和平与安全奠定基础。
提出更强有力的条件
对于许多发展中国家和新兴市场国家来说，过去的大国竞争意味着被迫在与他们日常斗争相去甚远的竞争中选择一方。许多人表示担心，今天的竞争也没有什么不同。有些人担心，美国对国内复兴和战略竞争的关注将以牺牲对他们最重要的问题为代价。华盛顿必须证明
事实恰恰相反。
拜登政府为全球基础设施建设提供资金的努力正是为此而做出的尝试。没有哪个国家希望基础设施项目建设质量低劣、破坏环境、进口或虐待工人、滋生腐败并让政府背负不可持续的债务。然而，这往往是唯一的选择。为了提供更好的选择，美国和其他七国集团国家于 2022 年启动了全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系。该倡议最终将释放 6000 亿美元的私人资本，用于资助高质量、环保的项目，并增强项目所在地社区的能力。美国已经在协调铁路和港口的投资，以连接菲律宾的经济枢纽，并增强对该国的投资。美国还在横跨非洲的一条发展带上进行一系列基础设施投资——将安哥拉的洛比托港与刚果民主共和国和赞比亚连接起来，并最终连接大西洋和印度洋——这将为整个地区的社区创造机会，同时巩固引领清洁能源转型所必需的关键矿物的供应。
美国正与合作伙伴联手建设和扩大数字基础设施，以便各国不必放弃安全和隐私即可获得高速、实惠的互联网连接。华盛顿与澳大利亚、日本、新西兰和台湾合作，投资建设了电缆，将数字接入扩展到太平洋岛屿的 10 万人。它还在亚洲其他地区、非洲和南美洲率先开展了类似的努力。
美国政府还试图使国际机构更具包容性。尽管联合国和其他类似机构可能不完美，但它们的合法性和能力是无可替代的。参与并改革国际秩序是巩固国际秩序、抵御破坏国际秩序行为的最佳方式之一。正因如此，在拜登政府的领导下，美国重新加入了世界卫生组织、联合国人权理事会和联合国教科文组织。这也是为什么美国政府提议扩大联合国安理会，增加两个非洲常任理事国、一个拉丁美洲和加勒比地区常任理事国和一个小岛屿发展中国家的民选席位。除此之外，我们长期以来还提议增加德国、印度和日本的常任理事国席位。这也是为什么我们敦促二十国集团将非洲联盟列为常任理事国，非洲联盟于 2023 年实现了这一目标。2021 年，我们支持国际货币基金组织拨款 6500 亿美元特别提款权，帮助在全球卫生、气候和债务危机重压下苦苦挣扎的贫穷国家。我们还推动世界银行进行改革，允许各国政府在自然灾害和气候冲击后推迟偿还债务，并扩大中等收入国家可获得的可负担融资。在拜登总统的领导下，美国向发展中国家提供的气候资金增加了四倍，以帮助它们实现气候目标，并帮助超过五亿人应对气候变化的影响。
拜登政府一次又一次地证明，美国是其他国家可以依靠的国家，可以帮助它们解决最大的问题。例如，当乌克兰战争加剧全球粮食安全危机时，美国投资了 175 亿美元来解决粮食不安全问题，并动员 100 多个国家采取具体措施应对挑战及其根源。美国在做到这一切的同时，仍然是迄今为止全球最大的救生人道主义援助捐助国。
国内战线
尽管一些美国人支持更大的单边主义和孤立主义，但事实上，拜登政府战略的支柱得到了广泛支持。《芯片和科学法案》以及对乌克兰和台湾的多轮资助在国会获得两党支持。参众两院的民主党和共和党都致力于加强美国的联盟。一次又一次的民意调查显示，大多数美国人认为，有原则、有纪律的美国领导世界至关重要。
巩固这一联盟对于说服盟友和对手至关重要，尽管华盛顿的执政党可以改变，但美国外交政策的支柱不会改变。这将使盟友相信美国值得信赖，会留在他们身边，这反过来会使他们成为美国更可靠的盟友。这将使华盛顿能够继续以强势地位应对其对手，因为他们会知道，美国的力量不仅植根于美国政府的坚定承诺，也植根于美国人民不可动摇的信念。
作为国务卿，我不搞政治；我搞政治冰冷。政策关乎选择。从第一天起，拜登总统和哈里斯副总统就做出了一个根本性的选择，即在一个竞争更加激烈、更易爆发的世界中，美国不能孤军奋战。如果美国想要保护其安全并为本国人民创造机会，就必须与那些对自由、开放、安全和繁荣的世界有利益的人站在一起，并对抗那些威胁这个世界的人。美国在这个决定性十年的后半段做出的选择将决定这一考验时刻是继续复兴还是回归倒退——华盛顿及其盟友能否继续战胜修正主义势力，还是让他们的愿景定义二十一世纪。
America's Strategy of Renewal Rebuilding Leadership for a New World
November/December 2024 October 1, 2024
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaking to media in Dubai, December 2023
A fierce competition is underway to define a new age in international affairs. A small number of countries—principally Russia, with the partnership of Iran and North Korea, as well as China—are determined to alter the foundational principles of the international system. While their forms of governance, ideologies, interests, and capabilities differ, these revisionist powers all want to entrench autocratic rule at home and assert spheres of influence abroad. They all wish to resolve territorial disputes by coercion or force and weaponize other countries’ economic and energy dependence. And they all seek to erode the foundations of the United States’ strength: its military and technological superiority, its dominant currency, and its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. While these countries are not an axis, and the administration has been clear that it does not seek bloc confrontation, choices these revisionist powers are making mean we need to act decisively to prevent that outcome.
When President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris came into office, these revisionist powers were already aggressively challenging U.S. interests. These countries believed that the United States was in irreversible decline at home and divided from its friends abroad. They saw an American public that had lost its faith in government, an American democracy that was polarized and paralyzed, and an American foreign policy that was undermining the very alliances, international institutions, and norms that Washington had built and championed.
President Biden and Vice President Harris pursued a strategy of renewal, pairing historic investments in competitiveness at home with an intensive diplomatic campaign to revitalize partnerships abroad. This twin-pillared strategy, they believed, was the best way to disabuse competitors of their assumptions that the United States was declining and diffident. These were dangerous assumptions, since they would lead the revisionists to continue undermining the free, open, secure, and prosperous world that the United States and most countries seek. It’s a world where countries are free to choose their own paths and partners, and where the global economy is defined by fair competition, openness, transparency, and broad-based opportunity. A world where technology empowers people and accelerates human progress. A world where international law, including the core principles of the UN Charter, is upheld, and universal human rights are respected. A world that can evolve to reflect new realities, give voice to emerging perspectives and players, and meet the shared challenges of the present and future.
The Biden administration’s strategy has put the United States in a much stronger geopolitical position today than it was four years ago. But our work is unfinished. The United States must sustain its fortitude across administrations to shake the revisionists’ assumptions. It must be prepared for the revisionist states to deepen cooperation with one another to try to make up the difference. It must maintain its commitments to and the trust of its friends. And it must continue to earn the American people’s confidence in the power, purpose, and value of disciplined American leadership in the world.
BACK IN THE GAME
The United States’ strategic fitness rests in large measure on its economic competitiveness. That is why President Biden and Vice President Harris led Democrats and Republicans in Congress in passing legislation to make historic investments to upgrade infrastructure, bolster the industries and technologies that will drive the twenty-first century, recharge the manufacturing base, boost research, and lead the global energy transition.
These domestic investments constituted the first pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy, and they have helped American workers and businesses power the strongest U.S. economy since the 1990s. The United States’ GDP is larger than that of the next three countries combined. Inflation has fallen to some of the lowest levels among the world’s advanced economies. Unemployment has held at or below four percent for the longest stretch in more than 50 years. Household wealth has reached a record high. And while too many Americans are still struggling to make ends meet and prices are still too high for many families, the recovery has slashed poverty and inequality and spread its benefits to more people and more places.
These investments in American competitiveness and the success of the United States’ rebound are powerfully attractive. After Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022—the largest-ever investment in climate and clean energy—South Korea’s Samsung committed tens of billions of dollars to manufacturing semiconductors in Texas. Japan’s Toyota put billions of dollars toward making electric vehicles and batteries in North Carolina. All five of the world’s top semiconductor manufacturers have pledged to build new plants in the United States, investing $300 billion and creating over 100,000 new American jobs.
The United States is now the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment. It is also the largest provider of foreign direct investment, showing the unmatched power of the American private sector to expand economic opportunity around the world. These investments don’t just benefit American workers and communities. They also reduce the United States’ dependencies on China and other revisionists and make the country a better partner to countries that want to reduce their dependencies, too.
While some friends worried at first that the Biden administration’s domestic investments and incentives would threaten their economic interests, with time, they have seen how American renewal can redound in their favor. It has boosted demand for their goods and services and catalyzed their own investments in chips, clean tech, and more resilient supply chains. And it has allowed the United States and its friends to continue driving technological innovation and setting technological standards that are crucial to safeguarding their shared security, values, and welfare.
PARTNERS IN PEACE
The second pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy was to reinvigorate and reimagine the United States’ network of relationships—enabling Washington and its partners to pool their strength in advancing a shared vision for the world and compete vigorously yet responsibly against those seeking to undermine it.
Competing vigorously means using all the instruments of U.S. power to advance U.S. interests. It means enhancing the United States’ force posture, military and intelligence capabilities, sanctions and export control tools, and mechanisms for consulting with allies and partners so that the country can credibly deter—and, if necessary, defend against—aggression. While Washington doesn’t seek to climb up the ladder of escalatory actions, it must prepare for and manage greater risk.
Competing responsibly, meanwhile, means maintaining channels of communication to prevent competition from veering into conflict. It means making clear that the United States’ goal is not regime change and that even as both sides compete, they must find ways to coexist. It means looking for ways to cooperate when it serves the national interest. And it means competing in ways that benefit the security and prosperity of friends, instead of coming at their expense.
China is the only country with the intent and the means to reshape the international system. President Biden made clear early on that we would treat Beijing as the United States’ “pacing challenge”—its most consequential long-term strategic competitor. We undertook determined efforts to protect the United States’ most advanced technologies; defend American workers, companies, and communities from unfair economic practices; and push back against China’s growing aggression abroad and repression at home. We set up dedicated channels with friends to share Washington’s assessment of the economic and security risks posed by Beijing’s policies and actions. We nevertheless resumed military-to-military communication and underscored that serious disagreements with China wouldn’t prevent the United States from maintaining strong commercial relations with the country. Nor would we allow friction in U.S.-Chinese relations to preclude cooperation on priorities that matter to the American people and the rest of the world, such as dealing with climate change, stopping the flow of synthetic drugs, and preventing nuclear proliferation.
On Russia, we had no illusions about President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist aims or the possibility of a “reset.” We did not hesitate to act forcefully against Moscow’s destabilizing activities, including its cyberattacks and interference in U.S. elections. At the same time, we worked to reduce nuclear danger and the risk of war by extending the New START treaty and launching a strategic stability dialogue.
We were similarly clear-eyed when it came to Iran and North Korea. We increased diplomatic pressure and strengthened the U.S. military’s force posture to deter and constrain Tehran and Pyongyang. The Trump administration’s unilateral and misguided exit from the Iran nuclear deal freed Tehran’s nuclear program from its confinement, undermining the security of the United States and its partners. We demonstrated to Iran that there was a path back to a mutual return to compliance—if Iran was willing to take it—while maintaining a robust sanctions regime and our commitment that Iran will never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon. And we made clear our willingness to engage in direct talks with North Korea, but also that we would not submit to its saber rattling or its preconditions.
The Biden administration’s commitment to compete vigorously yet responsibly along these lines took away the revisionists’ pretext that the United States was the obstacle to maintaining international peace and stability. It also earned the United States greater trust from its friends—and, along with it, stronger partnerships.
We worked to realize the full potential of these partnerships in four ways. First, we recommitted to the country’s core alliances and partnerships. President Biden reassured NATO allies that the United States would honor its pledge to treat an attack on one as an attack on all; reaffirmed the country’s ironclad security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other allies in Asia; and restored the G-7 to its role as the steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies.
Second, we infused U.S. alliances and partnerships with new purpose. We elevated the Quad—the partnership with Australia, India, and Japan—and took concrete steps to realize a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, from enhancing maritime security to manufacturing safe, effective vaccines. We launched the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, marshaling the world’s biggest economic partnership to shape global standards for emerging technologies and protect the United States’ and Europe’s most sensitive innovations. We raised the ambition of critical bilateral relationships, such as the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, and revived regional engagement, with President Biden hosting summits with leaders from Africa, Latin America, the Pacific Islands, and Southeast Asia.
We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever.
Third, we knit together U.S. allies and partners in new ways across regions and issues. We launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which brings together 14 countries representing 40 percent of the world’s GDP to build more secure supply chains, combat corruption, and transition to clean energy. We created AUKUS, a trilateral defense partnership through which Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have teamed up to build nuclear-powered submarines and deepen their scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation.
Fourth, we built new coalitions to address new challenges. We rallied a variety of governments, international organizations, businesses, and civil society groups to manufacture and distribute hundreds of millions of free COVID-19 vaccines, end the acute phase of the pandemic, save lives, and strengthen the world’s capacity to prevent and respond to future health emergencies. We launched a global coalition to address the scourge of illicit synthetic drugs and a regionwide effort to share responsibility for the historic migration challenges in the Western Hemisphere.
In building these and other coalitions, the Biden administration has always made fellow democracies its first port of call. It’s why the president launched the Summit for Democracy, bringing together democratic leaders and reformers from every region. But if the goal is to solve the problems facing the American people, democracies can’t be the United States’ only partners. The evolving opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence, for example, need to be addressed through multiple coalitions that include nondemocracies, so long as they want to deliver for their citizens and are willing to help solve shared challenges. That is why the Biden administration worked with the rest of the G-7 to develop governance frameworks for AI and then led more than 120 countries—including China—in the UN General Assembly to craft and pass the first-ever UN resolution on leveraging AI for good. And it’s why the administration crafted a framework for the responsible development and use of military AI that more than 50 countries have signed on to.
REACTING TO REVISIONISM
While our strategy shored up the foundations of the United States’ strength at home and abroad, our statecraft capitalized on that strength to turn a crisis into opportunity. In the Biden administration’s first year, we made significant progress in deepening alignment with allies and partners on our approach to strategic competition. Conversations in allied capitals led to a palpable shift. For example, in negotiations to shape a new strategic concept for NATO, I saw that allies were, for the first time, intensely focused on the challenge China posed to transatlantic security and values. In my discussions with officials from allied countries in East Asia, I heard them grappling with how to respond to Beijing’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Putin’s decision to try to wipe Ukraine off the map—along with China’s decision first to provide Russia with cover and then fuel its aggression—accelerated the convergence of views among Asian and European countries about the seriousness of the threat and the collective action required to address it. Before Russia’s invasion, we took a number of steps to prepare: warning the world of Moscow’s impending aggression, sharing intelligence with allies, sending military support for Ukraine’s self-defense, and coordinating with the EU, the G-7, and others to plan immediate and severe economic sanctions on Russia. We learned hard lessons during the necessary but difficult U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, lessons about everything from contingency planning to allied coordination, and we applied them.
When Putin ultimately launched his full-scale invasion, NATO swiftly moved troops, aircraft, and ships as part of its Response Force, reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank. The EU and its member states surged military, economic, and humanitarian aid into Ukraine. The United States created the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which grew to more than 50 countries working with the Ukrainian military to fill urgent needs. And a broad coalition of countries imposed the most ambitious sanctions ever, freezing more than half of Russia’s sovereign assets.
Because it was an attack not just on Ukraine but also on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity at the heart of the UN Charter, Putin’s war stoked fears beyond Europe. If Putin had been allowed to proceed with impunity, would-be aggressors everywhere would have taken note, opening a Pandora’s box of conflict. China’s decision to aid Russia underscored the degree to which the fates of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia were tied together. Until that point, many in Europe continued to see China primarily as an economic partner—even if they were increasingly wary of relying too much on Beijing. But when Beijing made its choice, more and more Europeans saw China as a systemic rival.
Footage of a meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials, Beijing, July 2023
The longer Putin pressed on with his war, the more Russia relied on the support of its fellow revisionists to stay in the fight. North Korea delivered trainloads of weapons and ammunition, including millions of artillery rounds and ballistic missiles and launchers, in direct violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Iran built a drone factory in Russia and sent Moscow hundreds of ballistic missiles. And Chinese companies quickened their supply of the machines, microelectronics, and other dual-use items Russia needed to churn out weapons, munitions, and other materiel.
The more dependent Russia became on their support, the more the revisionists expected—and got—in return. Putin agreed to share Russia’s advanced weapons technology with North Korea, exacerbating an already grave threat to Japan and South Korea. He and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un revived a Cold War–era pact pledging to provide military aid if either one went to war. Russia increased military and technical support to Iran and accelerated negotiation of a strategic partnership with the country, even as Tehran continued to arm, train, and fund proxies who carried out terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East and international shipping in the Red Sea. Russia and China’s cooperation has expanded across nearly every domain, and the two countries have staged increasingly aggressive and wide-ranging military exercises, including in the South China Sea and the Arctic.
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have complicated histories and divergent interests, and their partnerships with one another do not come close to the United States’ long-standing alliance architecture. Underneath their grand claims of friendship and support, these countries’ relationships are largely transactional, and their cooperation entails tradeoffs and risks that each may find more distasteful over time. That’s especially true for China, whose economic health at home and standing abroad are threatened by the global instability fomented by its revisionist partners. And yet all four revisionists share an abiding commitment to the overarching objective of challenging the United States and the international system. That will continue to drive their cooperation, especially as the United States and other countries stand up to their revisionism.
The Biden administration’s answer to this growing alignment has been to accelerate convergence among allies about the threat. We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, with the alliance welcoming in Finland and Sweden despite their long history of nonalignment. At the start of the administration, nine of 30 NATO members were meeting their commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense; this year, at least 23 of 32 allies will meet that mark.
We have deepened and modernized U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, strengthening the U.S. military’s force posture and capabilities by signing new agreements to upgrade bases from Japan to the Philippines to the South Pacific. And we have found new ways to weave allies together. In 2023, President Biden held the first-ever trilateral Leaders’ Summit with Japan and South Korea at Camp David, where the three countries agreed to increase cooperation to defend against ballistic missile attacks and cyberattacks from North Korea. This year, he hosted the first-ever trilateral summit with Japan and the Philippines at the White House, where the three parties committed to deepening joint efforts to defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
THE GREAT CONVERGENCE
Arguably the most consequential shift we achieved has not been within regions but across them. When he launched his invasion, Putin thought he could use Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, oil, and coal to sow division and weaken its support for Ukraine. But he underestimated the resolve of European countries—and the willingness of allies in Asia to help them.
Japan has committed more than $12 billion in assistance to Ukraine, and in June, it became the first country outside Europe to sign a ten-year bilateral security agreement with Kyiv. Australia has provided more than $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine and is part of a multinational coalition training Ukrainian personnel in the United Kingdom. South Korea has declared that it will consider supplying weapons to Ukraine, in addition to the considerable economic and humanitarian support it is already providing. The United States’ Indo-Pacific partners are coordinating with Europe to levy sanctions on Russia and cap the price of Russian oil, shrinking the amount of money Putin can funnel into his war machine.
Meanwhile, China’s support for Russia—and the administration’s innovative use of intelligence diplomacy to reveal the breadth of that support—has further focused U.S. allies in Europe on the threat posed by Beijing. The massive economic disruption caused by Putin’s invasion has made real the catastrophic consequences that would result from a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, through which roughly half of the world’s commercial container ships pass every year. More than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors are manufactured in Taiwan.
When the Biden administration came into office, key European partners were determined to gain autonomy from the United States while deepening economic ties with China. Since the invasion, however, they have reoriented much of their economic agenda around “de-risking” from China. In 2023, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act to reduce its dependence on China for the inputs required to manufacture products such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. In 2024, the EU launched new initiatives to further bolster its economic security, including improvements to its screening of foreign and outbound investments, research security, and export controls. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pulled out of China’s “17+1” investment initiative in central and eastern Europe. Italy left China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And a growing number of European countries, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have banned Chinese tech companies from providing equipment for their critical infrastructure.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy.
Friends in both Europe and Asia have also joined the United States in taking coordinated action to address China’s unfair trade practices and manufacturing overcapacity. This year, the Biden administration raised targeted tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum, semiconductors, and critical minerals—as opposed to sweeping tariffs across the board that raise costs for American families—and the European Union and Canada imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. We learned hard lessons from the “China shock” of the first decade of this century, when Beijing unleashed a flood of subsidized goods that drowned American industries, wrecked Americans’ livelihoods, and devastated American communities. To make sure history doesn’t repeat itself and to compete with China’s distortionary tactics, we are investing more in the productive capacity of the United States and its friends—and putting in place greater protections around those investments.
When it comes to emerging technologies, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia are increasingly working together to maintain their collective edge. At our urging, Japan and the Netherlands joined the United States in taking measures to prevent China from gaining access to the most advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to produce them. Through the Quantum Development Group, we assembled nine leading European and Asian allies to strengthen supply chain resilience and deepen research and commercial partnerships in a technology with capabilities that exceed even the most powerful supercomputers.
From the moment Russia launched its war, some in the United States argued that U.S. support for Ukraine would divert resources from the challenge of China. Our actions have proved the opposite: standing up to Russia has been crucial to bringing about unprecedented convergence between Asia and Europe, which increasingly see their security as indivisible. This shift is a consequence not only of fateful decisions made by Moscow and Beijing. It is also a product of fateful decisions made by U.S. allies and partners—choices that Washington encouraged but did not, would not, and could not dictate.
The global coalition supporting Ukraine is the most powerful example of burden sharing I’ve seen in my career. While the United States has provided $94 billion in support for Ukraine since Putin’s full-scale invasion, European, Asian, and other partners have contributed nearly $148 billion. Significant work remains to boost the capabilities of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia through a combination of greater coordination, investment, and industrial base integration. The American people expect and U.S. security demands that allies and partners shoulder more of the burden for their own defense over time. But the United States is in a demonstrably stronger position in both consequential regions today because of the bridge of allies we have built. And so, for that matter, are America’s friends.
REVISIONISM ACROSS REGIONS
The destabilizing effects of the revisionists’ growing assertiveness and alignment go well beyond Europe and Asia. In Africa, Russia has unleashed its agents and mercenaries to extract gold and critical minerals, spread disinformation, and aid those trying to overthrow democratically elected governments. Rather than support diplomatic efforts to end the war in Sudan—the world’s worst humanitarian crisis—Moscow is fueling the conflict by arming both sides. Iran and its proxies have taken advantage of the chaos to revive illicit arms trafficking routes in the region and exacerbate unrest. Beijing, meanwhile, has averted its gaze from Moscow’s belligerence in Africa while fostering new dependencies and saddling more countries with unsustainable debt. In South America, China, Russia, and Iran are providing military, economic, and diplomatic support to Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government in Venezuela, reinforcing his conviction that his regime is impervious to pressure.
The revisionist alignment is playing out even more intensely in the Middle East. Russia once supported UN Security Council efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions; now, it is enabling Iran’s nuclear program and facilitating its destabilizing activities. Russia has also gone from being a close partner of Israel to—after the October 7 attack—strengthening its ties with Hamas. The Biden administration, for its part, has been working tirelessly with partners in the Middle East and beyond to end the conflict and suffering in Gaza, find a diplomatic solution that enables Israelis and Lebanese to live in safety on both sides of the border, manage the risk of a wider regional war, and work toward greater integration and normalization in the region, including between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
These efforts are interdependent. Without an end to the war in Gaza and a time-bound, credible path to statehood that addresses the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations and Israel’s security needs, normalization cannot move forward. But if these efforts succeed, normalization would join Israel to a regional security architecture, unlock economic opportunities across the region, and isolate Iran and its proxies. Glimmers of such integration were on display in the coalition of countries, including Arab states, that helped Israel defend itself against an unprecedented direct attack from Iran in April. My visits to the region since October 7
have affirmed that there is a path toward greater peace and integration—if leaders there are willing to take hard decisions.
Relentless as our efforts are, the human consequences of the war in Gaza continue to be devastating. Tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed in a conflict they did not start and cannot stop. Virtually the entire population of Gaza has been displaced, and the vast majority is suffering from malnutrition. Around 100 hostages remain in Gaza, either already killed or still being held in brutal conditions by Hamas. All this suffering adds even greater urgency to our efforts to end the conflict, prevent it from being repeated, and lay the foundation for lasting peace and security in the region.
MAKING A STRONGER OFFER
For many developing and emerging-market countries, great-power competition in the past meant being told to pick a side in a contest that felt far removed from their daily struggles. Many have expressed concern that today’s rivalry is no different. And some worry that the United States’ focus on domestic renewal and strategic competition will come at the expense of the issues that matter most to them. Washington must demonstrate that the opposite is true.
The Biden administration’s work to fund infrastructure across the world is an attempt to do just that. No country wants infrastructure projects that are poorly built and environmentally destructive, that import or abuse workers, or that foster corruption and burden the government with unsustainable debt. Yet too often, that has been the only option. To offer a better choice, the United States and other G-7 countries launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment in 2022. The initiative will eventually unlock $600 billion in private capital to fund projects that are high quality and environmentally sound and empower the communities where they are built. Already, the United States is coordinating investments in railroads and ports to connect the Philippines’ economic hubs and turbocharge investment in the country. And it is making a series of infrastructure investments in a band of development that crosses Africa—connecting Angola’s port of Lobito to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and ultimately linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans—which will create opportunities for communities throughout the region while shoring up the supply of critical minerals crucial to leading the clean energy transition.
The United States is teaming up with partners to build and broaden digital infrastructure so that countries don’t have to give up their security and privacy to gain high-speed, affordable Internet connections. Working with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, Washington has invested in cables that will extend digital access to 100,000 people across the Pacific Islands. And it has spearheaded similar efforts elsewhere in Asia, as well as Africa and South America.
The administration has also sought to make international institutions more inclusive. Imperfect as the United Nations and other such bodies may be, there is no substitute for their legitimacy and capabilities. Participating in and reforming them is one of the best ways to buttress the international order against efforts to tear it down. That is why under the Biden administration, the United States rejoined the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and UNESCO. It’s also why the administration has proposed expanding the UN Security Council by adding two permanent members from Africa, one permanent member from Latin America and the Caribbean, and an elected seat for small island developing countries. This is in addition to the permanent seats we have long proposed for Germany, India, and Japan. And it’s why we pressed for the G-20 to add the African Union as a permanent member, which it did in 2023. In 2021, we supported the International Monetary Fund’s allocation of $650 billion in Special Drawing Rights to help poor countries struggling under the weight of global health, climate, and debt crises. We also pushed for reforms at the World Bank that will allow governments to defer debt payments after natural disasters and climate shocks and will expand the affordable financing available to middle-income countries. Under President Biden, the United States has quadrupled climate financing to developing nations to help them meet their climate targets and helped more than half a billion people manage the effects of climate change.
Time and again, the Biden administration has demonstrated that the United States is the country others can rely on to help solve their biggest problems. When the war in Ukraine exacerbated the global food security crisis, for example, the United States invested $17.5 billion to tackle food insecurity and rallied more than 100 countries to take concrete steps to address the challenge and its root causes. It did all this while continuing to be the largest donor, by far, of lifesaving humanitarian aid around the world.
THE HOME FRONT
Although some Americans favor greater unilateralism and isolationism, there is in fact broad support for the pillars of the Biden administration’s strategy. The CHIPS and Science Act and multiple rounds of funding for Ukraine and Taiwan passed in Congress with bipartisan support. Democrats and Republicans in both houses are committed to strengthening U.S. alliances. And in poll after poll, most Americans see principled and disciplined U.S. leadership in the world as vital.
Cementing this alignment is crucial to convincing allies and rivals alike that although the party in power in Washington can change, the pillars of U.S. foreign policy will not. That will give allies the confidence that the United States can be trusted to stay by their side, which in turn will make them more reliable allies for the United States. And it will allow Washington to continue to meet its rivals from a position of strength, since they will know that American power is rooted not only in the firm commitments of the U.S. government but also in the unshakable convictions of the American people.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy. And policy is about choices. From day one, President Biden and Vice President Harris made a foundational choice that in a more competitive and combustible world, the United States cannot go it alone. If America wants to protect its security and create opportunities for its people, it must stand with those who have a stake in a free, open, secure, and prosperous world and stand up to those who threaten that world. The choices the United States makes in the second half of this decisive decade will determine whether this moment of testing remains a time of renewal or returns to a time of regression—whether Washington and its allies can continue to outcompete the forces of revisionism or allow their vision to define the twenty-first century.
