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中美灰犀牛和风险意识——与米歇尔·伍克的问答

(2024-07-17 14:27:56) 下一个

中美灰犀牛和风险意识——与米歇尔·伍克的问答

https://thechinaproject.com/2022/10/21/gray-rhinos-and-risk-awareness-in-china-and-the-u-s-qa-with-michele-wucker/

为什么灰犀牛这一概念——一个巨大而明显的威胁,尽管有些人忽视或忽略——如此吸引中国官员、记者和商人的想象力?我采访了这一概念的发明者,以找出答案。

杰里米·戈德科恩 2022 年 10 月 21 日

2017 年 7 月,《人民日报》头版社论警告说,“防范和化解金融风险”是政府经济政策的一个关键目标。文章提到了两种风险:“黑天鹅”是完全不可预测的风险,以及“灰犀牛”——作家、企业家和战略家米歇尔·伍克在 2013 年达沃斯演讲和随后出版的书中创造了这个词。

从那时起,灰犀牛的概念在中国开始广泛使用,尤其是在政府官员和商业媒体中。习近平本人在 2018 年新年视频问候中,书架上就有一本《灰犀牛》。

几周前,我和伍克在 Zoom 上聊了聊灰犀牛,为什么中国官员和商人如此关注这个概念,以及如何为我们不确定的全球未来做好准备。

这是我们聊天记录的节选,略作编辑。您可以在此处观看 YouTube 上的整个对话。

—Jeremy Goldkorn

Michele,灰犀牛到底是什么?

灰犀牛是一个比喻,表示需要重新审视明显的重大威胁。想想那个向你冲过来的可怕的大东西。你打算怎么做?有些人看到可怕的大东西来了,就会采取行动。其他人则被踩踏,或者躲开,让别人被踩踏。有些人实际上利用了它的力量。

一开始,许多美国人说:“你说我们不关注显而易见的事情是什么意思?我们为什么需要一本关于关注显而易见的事情的书?”因此,我们强调了忽视的部分,说是的,我们确实会忽略显而易见的事情。

许多西方媒体将灰犀牛说成是我们忽视的东西,而实际上已经有了一个术语来形容它,“房间里的大象”。灰犀牛是只有一些人才会忽视的东西。那些没有的人则具有巨大的优势。

让我们谈谈西方和中国媒体对灰犀牛的报道。你有没有注意到讨论这个概念的方式有所不同?

哦,天哪,这太轻描淡写了……这本书于 2016 年在美国出版,正值选举季中期,纽约初选前两周。有很多反对意见。

在中国,这本书于 2017 年初出版,三周内就进行了第三次印刷。今年夏天晚些时候,当《人民日报》头版社论发表时,我收到了来自各地的电子邮件。

《纽约时报》从一开始就给出了正确的定义,但以这些大型、积极进取的国际公司为例——万达、安邦、复星和海航。他们认为灰犀牛是这些公司的代名词:规模大、有政治关系、积极借贷、国际扩张。

我收到很多中国记者的采访请求,要求我谈论各种事情,但他们从来没有问过我关于这些公司的问题。所以,这是一个很大的不同。

当中国政府官员谈论灰犀牛时,像我这样的观察家、商人和银行家应该从中得到什么?

如果中国人把某件事称为灰犀牛,他们会把它看作非常重要、需要处理的事情。他们不想被践踏。他们想处理它。

如果你看看2017年7月的《人民日报》社论,他们谈到了金融风险,包括影子银行和新的理财产品。其中一些是“低风险,高回报”。这不是有史以来最准确的广告。同一天(社论发表),中国的小盘股和科技股下跌了约5%。

仅仅几周后,恒大就重申了减少借款的承诺。然后,我们开始看到很多非常精准的金融风险政策,特别是抵押贷款要求等方面。

第二年春天,我们看到很多 P2P 借贷平台倒闭。经过多年努力应对房地产危机,恒大等公司大约在一年前开始摇摇欲坠。北京正在研究副作用,如何一点一点地管理它。

2017 年秋天,发生了一场大城市火灾,城市安全被说成是一头灰犀牛。同样在 2017 年秋天,中国最高监管机构将房地产称为一头大灰犀牛。但在同一个演讲中,他还谈到了金融监管、金融科技和互联网。正是在那时,政策变化和对金融互联网公司的打击开始实施。

所以,  基本上,当政府谈论灰犀牛时,每个人都应该非常小心,因为如果灰犀牛本身不把你踩踏并把你踩倒在地,中国共产党可能会这样做。

您接触过的中国媒体和中国高层听众怎么样?您去过中国,和很多人交谈过,那么媒体和听众通常会问您什么问题?

我对中国媒体印象深刻。我收到了关于各种主题的非常有思想的问题,包括一些关于数字数据的问题。硬件提供商和平台提供商之间发生了一场关于谁拥有数据的争斗,显然,很多问题都是关于金融风险的。

关于美国的问题很多。中国人和美国人谈论金融风险的方式有很大的分歧。我经常谈论投机经济与实体经济。中国的记者问我这个问题。

我为一个 C40 金融集团做了一个演讲,中国高层决策者也参加了演讲。我们就金融风险政策、资产泡沫以及如何应对这些泡沫进行了非常详细的讨论。人们非常清楚,很难识别资产泡沫何时破裂。他们意识到,试图减缓其增长并不容易,而中国一直在这样做,以防止未来发生更大的危机。

我们应该在全球经济中留意哪些最大的灰犀牛?

灰犀牛从各个角度看起来都不一样,但有三个相互关联的问题已经持续了一段时间。一是金融脆弱性,包括这些资产泡沫。二是气候变化,以及它对金融体系和其他一切的潜在影响。第三是不平等,这是其中一些金融政策的结果,与气候变化密切相关:造成最少影响的人遭受的损失最大。

短期内,我非常担心美国的政治和社会局势及其对美国经济、进而对全球经济和地缘政治紧张局势的影响。美国局势可能产生的多米诺骨牌效应是我关注的焦点。

你为《金融时报》写了一篇文章,说美国是中国最大的金融风险。我想这和你所说的有关吧?

几年前,我去过中国几次,当时人们更关心金融风险,以及高度金融化的经济吸走实体经济资金的后果。如果公司或投资者能在二级市场(被央行吹大的股票市场和金融市场)快速赚钱,他们就会把钱投在那里,而不是投到创造就业机会但增长速度可能更慢的实体企业。这是一个大问题。

在我写完那篇文章后不久,《华尔街日报》援引北京高级官员的话称,美国,尤其是最近的减税措施,对中国来说是一头巨大的灰犀牛。他们开始调整利率,并非常担心美国经济变化对中国的影响。这与美国形成鲜明对比,美国似乎无法完成任务。

在我看来,习近平的统治性质可以被认为是一头灰犀牛。习近平身边的所有人都显然无法告诉他坏消息或说不。

你认为中国存在风险吗?我同意,中国似乎比美国更能掌控财务规划,但说到政治,我不知道,也许灰犀牛这个词不太合适。

我认为有很多挑战。你可以把它看作是灰犀牛的撞击。我喜欢英语。这就是一群犀牛的代名词。我认为中国和美国的政治挑战截然不同。我们的挑战是完成任何事情,避免选出疯子担任公职。我们的政治灰犀牛确实非常严重。

在中国,我对习近平的核心圈子之类的事情没有特别的了解,但从他们接受灰犀牛概念的方式来看,很多事情都得到了解决。

你最近的一本书名为《你承担的风险:驾驭不确定世界的新艺术和科学》。

他们实际上在中国以《灰犀牛 2》的名义推销它……

续集?

它确实是续集。它来自中国和其他地方的对话。人们说的一句话是“哦,中国人非常厌恶风险”,我讨厌这个词。我开始用 a 字来称呼它。

“厌恶风险”的整个问题都是一个问题。在所有情况都一样的情况下,有些人可能会冒更少的风险,但很少有情况是所有情况都一样的。

书中有一些针对大学生的研究,这是一个有限的圈子,但也有一些

研究中,一些中国受试者和一些美国受试者被问及一个金融风险问题,所有受试者都提前表示,他们认为美国人会做出风险更大的选择。结果发现,他们的选择非常非常相似。

中国人的风险意识更强。他们能更快地识别事物,也更加关注。当你察觉到风险并采取行动时,风险本身就会发生变化。我们现在在中国看到了很多这样的情况。他们会考虑风险,而且比美国人更有可能采取行动。他们认为所谓的风险更大的选择比美国人的风险要小。

在北京,我数不清有多少次人们说:“哦,我父母想买一套公寓。”我告诉他们这是一个泡沫,而且太贵了。他们说:“哦,不,政府不会让任何坏事发生。”我认为个人行动和集体行动的意识非常重要。人们宁愿和其他人一起犯错,也不愿独自做正确的事情。

在中国,人们希望政府做出决定。它可以快速做出决策,它可以做美国这个疯狂、功能失调的民主国家无法做到的事情。

杰里米·戈德科恩在中国工作了 20 年,担任编辑和企业家。他是《中国计划》的主编,也是 Sinica Podcast 的联合创始人。

Gray rhinos and risk awareness in China and the U.S. — Q&A with Michele Wucker

https://thechinaproject.com/2022/10/21/gray-rhinos-and-risk-awareness-in-china-and-the-u-s-qa-with-michele-wucker/

Why did the concept of the gray rhino — a big, obvious threat some people nonetheless ignore or neglect — so capture the imagination of Chinese officials and journalists and businesspeople? I spoke to the inventor of the concept to find out.

Jeremy Goldkorn  October 21, 2022

front-page People’s Daily editorial in July 2017 warned that “preventing and resolving financial risks” was a key goal of the government’s economic policy. The article mentioned two types of risks: “black swans” (黑天鹅 hēi tiān’é), which are risks that are completely unpredictable, and “gray rhinoceroses” (灰犀牛 huī xīniú), a term coined by writer, entrepreneur, and strategist Michele Wucker in a 2013 Davos speech and subsequent book.

Since then, the gray rhino concept has come into common use in China, particularly among government officials and in the business press. Xí Jìnpíng 习近平 himself, in his New Year’s video greeting of 2018, had a copy of The Gray Rhino on his bookshelf.

A few weeks ago, I had a Zoom chat with Wucker about gray rhinos, why officials and businesspeople in China are so drawn to the concept, and ways of preparing for our uncertain global future.

This is an abridged, lightly edited excerpt of the transcript of our chat. You can watch the whole conversation on YouTube here.

—Jeremy Goldkorn


Michele, what exactly is a gray rhino?

The gray rhino is a metaphor for the need to take a fresh look at big, obvious threats. Think about the big, scary thing charging at you. What are you going to do? Some people see the big, scary thing coming and do something about it. Other people get trampled, or get out of the way and let somebody else get trampled. Some actually harness the strength of it.

At the beginning, many Americans said, “What do you mean we don’t pay attention to obvious things? Why do we need a book about paying attention to obvious things?” And so, we emphasized the neglect part saying, yes, we actually do miss obvious things.

A lot of the Western press talk about gray rhinos as only the things that we neglect when there’s actually already a term for that, “the elephant in the room.” The gray rhino is something that only some people neglect. Those who don’t have a huge advantage.

Let’s talk about Western and Chinese media coverage of the gray rhino. Have you noticed differences between the way the concept is discussed?

Oh, my, that would be the understatement of… The book came out in the U.S. in 2016, in the middle of the election season, two weeks before the New York primary. There was a lot of pushback.

In China, the book came out in early 2017 and within three weeks it had gone into its third printing. Later in the summer when the front-page editorial came out in the People’s Daily, I got emails from all over the place.

The New York Times got the definition right from the beginning but used these big, aggressive international companies as examples — Wanda, Anbang, Fosun, and HNA. They decided that gray rhinos were synonymous with these companies: big, politically connected, aggressively borrowing, expanding internationally.

I get a lot of requests from Chinese reporters to talk about all sorts of things but they’ve never once asked me about these companies. So, that’s one big difference.

When Chinese government officials talk about gray rhinos, what should observers like me, and businesspeople, and bankers take away from it?

If the Chinese are talking about something as a gray rhino, they see it as something that is very important that needs to be dealt with. They don’t want to get trampled. They want to deal with it.

If you look at that People’s Daily editorial from July 2017, they talked about financial risks, which include shadow banking, and new wealth management products. Some of those were “lower risk, higher return.” It wasn’t the most accurate advertising ever. The same day [the editorial was published], small cap and tech stocks in China dropped by roughly 5%.

Just a couple of weeks later, Evergrande repeated its pledge to reduce its borrowing. Then, we started to see a lot of very surgical financial risk policies, particularly around mortgage requirements, things like that.

The next spring, we saw a lot of peer-to-peer lending platforms go under. After years of effort to address the real estate crisis, Evergrande and others started teetering about a year ago. Beijing was looking at the side effects, how to manage it bit by bit.

In fall of 2017, there was a big urban fire and urban safety was talked up as a gray rhino. Also in fall 2017, China’s top regulator mentioned real estate as a big gray rhino. But in that same speech, he also talked about financial regulation, fintech, and the internet. That was when policy changes and crackdowns on financial internet companies got into gear.

So basically when the government talks about gray rhinos, everybody should be very careful because, if the gray rhino itself doesn’t run you over and stampede you into the ground, the Chinese Communist Party probably will.

How about the Chinese media and high-level Chinese audiences that you’ve interacted with? You go to China and speak to a lot of people, so what are the typical questions you get from the media and audiences?

I’m impressed by the Chinese media. I get really thoughtful questions on all sorts of topics, including some of the first about digital data. There was a fight between a hardware provider and a platform provider over who owned the data and a lot of questions were asked about financial risk, obviously.

There are a lot of questions about the U.S. There’s a huge disconnect between the way people talk about financial risk in China and in the U.S. I talk a lot about the speculative versus the real economy. Reporters in China ask me about that.

I did a presentation for a C40 financial group with top Chinese policy-makers. And we had a very detailed conversation about financial risk policies, about asset bubbles, and about how to deal with them. People are very aware that it’s not easy to recognize when an asset bubble is about to pop. They realize that it’s not easy to try to slow its growth, which is what China has been doing to prevent a much bigger crisis down the road.

What are the top gray rhinos we should be looking out for in the global economy?

Gray rhinos look different from every perspective, but three interrelated issues have been going on for a while. One is financial fragility, which includes these asset bubbles. Then there’s climate change, and its potential impacts on the financial system and on everything else. And, third is inequality, which results from some of these financial policies, and is closely related to climate change: The people who caused the least are suffering the most.

In the short-term, I’m very concerned about the political and social situation in the United States and its impact on the U.S. economy, and in turn, on the global economy, and in turn on geopolitical tensions. The domino effect that the U.S. situation can create is at the center of my mind.

You wrote an article for the Financial Times on the U.S. being China’s biggest financial risk. I assume that’s connected to what you are talking about?

I wrote that a few years ago after several trips to China, where people were much more concerned with financial risk, and the consequences of a highly-financialized economy sucking money away from the real economy. If companies or investors can make a quick buck in secondary markets — stock markets and financial markets that are being inflated by central banks — they’re going to put their money there instead of into real businesses that create jobs but are probably going to grow more slowly. That’s a big problem.

Shortly after I wrote that piece, senior officials in Beijing were quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that the U.S., and in particular, recent tax cuts, was a big gray rhino for China. They started adjusting interest rates and were really concerned about the impact of the changes in the U.S. economy on China. in huge contrast to the United States where we can’t seem to get things done.

It seems to me the nature of Xi Jinping’s rule could be thought of as a gray rhino. There’s clearly an inability of all the people around Xi Jinping to tell him bad news or say no.

Do you see risks in China? I agree that there appears to be a much steadier hand on the financial planning tiller than there is in the United States, but when it comes to politics, I don’t know, maybe gray rhino is not the right word.

I think that there are lots of challenges. You could think about it as a crash of gray rhinos. I love the English language. That’s the word for a group of rhinos. I think that the political challenges in China and the U.S. are quite different. Our challenges are getting anything done and avoiding electing crazy people to public office. Our political gray rhinos are really very serious.

In China, I don’t have any particular insights into Xi Jinping’s inner circle and things like that, but from the way they’ve embraced the gray rhino concept, a lot of things get addressed.

Your most recent book is called You Are What You Risk: The New Art and Science of Navigating an Uncertain World.

They’ve actually marketed it as Gray Rhino 2 in China…

A sequel?

And it is very much a sequel. It came out of the conversations in China and elsewhere. And one of the things people are saying is “Oh, Chinese people are very risk averse,” a word I hate. The a-word, I’ve started to call it.

The whole question of “risk averse” is a problem. Somebody may take fewer risks, all things being the same, but there’s rarely a circumstance where all things are the same.

In the book, there’s some research with college students, which is a limited circle, but there were some Chinese and some American subjects in the study. They were given a financial risk question and all the participants, ahead of time, said that they thought that the Americans would take the riskier choice. As it turned out, they made very, very similar choices.

Chinese people are more risk aware. They recognize things faster and they pay more attention. As you perceive the risk and do something about it, the risk itself changes. We’re seeing a lot of that in China right now. They think about it and they’re more likely to act than Americans are. They perceived the so-called riskier option to be less risky than the Americans did.

In Beijing, I can’t count the number of times people have said, “Oh, my parents want to buy an apartment.” I tell them that it’s a bubble and way too expensive. And they say, “Oh, no, the government won’t let anything bad happen.” I think the sense of personal agency and collective agency is really important. People would rather be wrong with everybody else than right alone.

In China, people expect the government to make decisions. It can make decisions fast, and it can do things that this crazy dysfunctional democracy in the United States can’t do.

 

Jeremy Goldkorn worked in China for 20 years as an editor and entrepreneur. He is editor-in-chief of The China Project, and co-founder of the Sinica PodcastRead more

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