风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
中國總是重新崛起
YouTube：妖魔化中國是對中華文明的不了解 西方政客不懂天下的概念 簡單化地看待中國事務?!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWjhqqctDck&ab_channel=
April 25, 2023, mansion House, city of Londun. The UK government's position on China
Fames Cleverly, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom
我的出發點是認識到中國歷史和文明的深度與複雜性, 以及其對我們自身政策的啟示。中國是為數不多能夠追溯到兩千多年前的文明古國之一。幾個世紀以來，一次又一次內戰或外敵入侵，中國分裂為幾個敵對的王國，但每次動盪之後，中國總是重新崛起。
My starting point is a recognition of the depth and complexity of Chinese history and
civilization and therefore by extension of our own policy China is one of the few countries; which can trace its existence back over two Millennia time and time again down the centuries Civil War or foreign invasions fractured China into rival
kingdoms; but after every period of turmoil China has always reemerged.
历史告诉我们，国内的压制往往会转化为国外的侵略。
And history teaches us that repression at home often translates into aggression abroad.
我们关于中国的立场：外交大臣2023年在伦敦金融城市长官邸的演讲
外交大臣詹姆斯·克莱弗利在伦敦金融城市长官邸发表的讲话中概述了英国政府对中国的立场。
从: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon James Cleverly 发布 25 April 2023
位置: Mansion House, London
提交日期: (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
外交大臣詹姆斯·克莱弗利在伦敦金融城市长官邸发表的讲话中概述了英国政府对中国的立场。 伦敦金融城市长大人，各位阁下，议长先生，各位勋爵，女士们，先生们，感谢各位邀请我今晚在此发言。
根据传统，今天的发言一般要谈及所有的国际时政。 但请原谅我只集中谈论我们面临的几个问题，因为如果不从目前的苏丹危机开始谈起的话，那将是我的失职。
正如大家所料，我参加了内阁紧急状况委员会会议（COBR）和其他会议，讨论了我们如何应对如今的局势。我可以告诉大家，一架载着英国国民的皇家空军飞机今晚已经离开苏丹，飞机将把他们送到安全的地方。我们也将随后派出更多飞机。 从这场危机一开始，我们就一直在计划如何让我们的人民撤离。现在，我们和国际社会对喀土穆停火的呼吁得到了响应，我们就着手执行这些计划，并且优先考虑那些最需要帮助的人，例如家庭、病人和老人。
令我感到鼓舞的是，两派都同意停火72小时，尽管当然我们不能确定停火会持续多久，况且从一个饱受战争创伤的城市撤离本身就很危险。 英国正在与我们世界各地的伙伴密切合作。这次行动之后，我们将尽一切可能，与我们在该地区的朋友们一起合作，确保这场悲剧性冲突得到持久的解决。 当然，苏丹的局势并没有分散我们支持乌克兰抗击俄罗斯侵略的工作。我知道我们七国集团（G7）和世界各地的其他同事们都会同意我们这一工作重点。 虽然当前的紧急事件似乎占据了全部精力，我们也不能忽视最大的长期问题，这一点至关重要。因此，今晚我打算集中谈论一个将界定我们时代的主题，那就是中国，以及英国对中国的政策。
经常有人请我用一个短语来表达对中国的政策，或者用一个词来概括中国，是“威胁”，还是“伙伴”，亦或“对手”。首先我想解释为什么这样做是不可能的、不切实际的，而且最重要的，是不明智的。
中国是少数几个其存在可以追溯到2000多年前的国家之一，可以追溯到公元前221年，当时秦朝统一了中国。 接下来的几个世纪，一次又一次的内战或外国入侵将中国分裂成对立的王国，但在每一段动荡时期之后，中国总是会重新崛起。中国史诗《三国演义》的开篇描述了这一循环： “天下大势，分久必合，合久必分。”
而早在他们合并成一个政体之前，中国人就创造了他们的语言和文明。他们的文字出现在公元前两千年的商朝。 他们发明的纸、印刷术、火药、指南针改变了整个人类的命运。这些创新是帮助我们理解的关键，理解为什么中国经济在过去22个世纪中，有20个世纪的时间一直是世界最大经济体之一，理解为什么在1820年，中国占全球GDP的三分之一，超过美国、英国和欧洲的总和。
后来灾难一个接一个地袭来，有的是外来侵略造成的，有的来自中国本身。其中最致命的一次是毛泽东时代的饥荒。那次饥荒夺去了数千万人的生命，超过了人类历史上任何一次饥荒。
然而，过去的45年间又发生了一次惊人的逆转。通过释放人民的创业精神，中国实现了全世界有史以来规模最大、速度最快的经济扩张。在这个占世界人口五分之一的国家中，至少有8亿人摆脱了贫困。
这个国家幅员辽阔，几乎与从大西洋到乌拉尔山脉的欧洲大陆一样大。 因此，请原谅我说，没有任何有力的短语或者合理的形容词能够准确地描述这样一个国家，描述与其打交道的任何明智的方法。如果你想通过简明扼要的语句寻找英国的外交政策，恐怕你要失望了。
我的出发点是认识中国历史和文明的深度和复杂性，进而认识我们自己的政策。 我把这一政策建立在一系列前提之上。第一个前提是，无论我们与中国领导人有什么分歧，我都为如此之多的中国人摆脱了贫困而感到高兴。我们并非生活在一个悲惨的零和世界，他们的收益就是我们的收益。一个稳定、繁荣、和平的中国对英国有利，对世界也有利。
展望未来，我拒绝任何必然性的概念。之前没有人预测到中国会从大规模饥荒中迅速崛起，实现相对繁荣，今天也没有人能够确定中国的经济巨轮会无限期地向前滚动。
去年，自1976年毛泽东逝世以来，中国的经济增长首次没有超过世界经济。这意味着中国占全球GDP的份额在2022年保持不变。即使中国在未来十年成为了世界上最大的经济体，它也可能不会保持很长时间，因为中国不断人口总量下降和人口老龄化对未来增长的压力越来越大。
我也不认为中国和美国以及更广泛的西方之间的冲突是不可避免的。
我们不会被迫陷入格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）所谓的“修昔底德陷阱”（Thucydides trap），即一个崛起的大国沿着古代雅典的轨迹前进，与一个老牌超级大国正面碰撞。
我们有能动性；我们有选择；中国也是如此。 我们的任务是塑造未来事件的进程，而不是屈从于宿命论。
我们必须面对一个不可回避的现实：没有中国，任何重大的全球问题，从气候变化到预防疫情，从经济不稳定到核扩散，都无法解决。 放弃与中国对话就等于放弃解决人类最大的问题。
更糟糕的是，等于忽略对我们的安全和繁荣至关重要的显著事实。 如今，世界上最大的健康数据库在中国，世界药品活性成分的最大来源在中国，最大的碳排放源也在中国。
事实上，中国在过去10年排放到大气中的碳比英国自18世纪工业革命以来排放的还要多。 中国如何监管其数据，中国如何开发药物，中国如何进行医学研究，都将对整个人类产生重大影响。中国是否减少碳排放很有可能决定我们的星球是能避免气候变化的最严重破坏，还是遭受巨大灾难。
我们已经付出了代价，知道中国对疫情的处理会如何影响整个世界。因此，毫无疑问，北京方面做出的决定将影响我们的生活。 难道我们不应该为了自己的利益去努力影响这些决定吗？假设我宣布进入某种新冷战，说我们的目标是孤立中国，那么这样说是很清晰、很容易、甚至很令人满意的。清晰、容易、令人满意，但却是错的，因为这将是对我们国家利益的背叛，是对现代世界的刻意误解。
事实上，本届政府将与我们的盟友一样，直接与中国打交道，推进英国的利益，同时坚定不移地捍卫我们的国家安全和价值观。我们预期会有深刻的分歧；我可以向各位保证，与中国打交道不是懦夫能做的事；他们代表了一种无情的专制传统，与我们的传统截然不同。 但我们对子孙后代有义务，我们必须与他们来往，否则我们就没有尽到维护和塑造国际秩序的责任。
逃避这一挑战不是强大的表现，而是软弱的表现。 弗拉基米尔·普京对乌克兰发动猛攻时，他的意图从来不是展示团结一致的西方的力量。但我们的回应表明，当英国、美国、欧洲和我们在世界各地的其他伙伴团结一致时，我们可以应对任何挑战。 我们应该充满信心，我们有与中国进行积极、建设性交往的集体能力，这种交往本身不是目的，而是为了管理风险和取得成果。我们已经取得了成果。 让我给大家举几个例子。在2017年的研究中，英国的研究成果说服中国农业部限制粘菌素（一种用于动物饲料的抗生素）的使用，以此来对抗抗生素耐药性的危险。销售下降了90%，让世界上的每个人都更安全了。
去年，我们在中国的外交官帮助说服政府修改了一项采购法草案，增加了英国公司竞标国有企业合同的机会。今年，他们获得了价值6亿英镑的许可证，让英国机构可以在中国成立基金管理公司。 英国作为亚洲基础设施投资银行创始成员国的地位也使我们能够影响中国对这一新机构的态度，防止它成为“一带一路”倡议的政治延伸。中国是亚投行的最大股东，该银行总部设在北京，但在俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰的一周内，它冻结了在俄罗斯的每一个项目。
但即使交往能够成功，事实是，像我们这样一个致力于自由和民主的国家，将永远在为了我们的国家利益与中国打交道，与我们对北京滥用权力的憎恶之间纠结。当我们看到专制国家如何对待自己的人民时，我们会想，如果他们有机会，他们会如何对待我们。
历史告诉我们，国内的压制往往会转化为国外的侵略。
因此，我们的政策必须结合两个方面：我们必须在必要的领域与中国交往，同时要坚定地、现实地看待中国的威权主义。 这意味着永远不要动摇一个明确的原则。我们并不期望我们与中国的分歧会很快得到解决，但我们确实期望中国遵守它自愿承担的法律和义务。
因此，作为联合国安理会常任理事国，中国肩负着维护《联合国宪章》的特殊责任。作为《中英联合声明》的缔约国，中国同意保持香港的自由。作为《世界人权宣言》、《禁止酷刑公约》和许多其他国际法文件的签署国，中国接受了一系列义务。 如果中国违反了这些承诺，我们有权说出来，我们有权采取行动，我们也将会这样做。就像中国违反自己的承诺，剥夺香港的自由一样。
这就是为什么我们给了近300万香港人获得英国公民身份的机会。 和平共处必须从尊重基本法律和制度开始，包括遵守保护每个国家不受侵略的《联合国宪章》。这意味着每一个国家：一名中国驻巴黎的外交官不可以、也绝不能、也不会决定主权国家的法律地位。 通过攻击乌克兰，俄罗斯给我们上了一堂关于一个联合国成员国不应该做什么的实物课。普京也践踏了中国自己宣称的不干涉和尊重主权的原则。 当这种情况发生时，一个强大和负责任的国家不能简单地弃权，或靠近侵略者，或援助和怂恿侵略。一个想要在世界秩序顶端获得尊重的国家，应该捍卫自己的原则，履行自己的庄严义务，捍卫作为秩序基础的法律。 这一责任与中国发挥与其规模和历史相称的全球作用的权利是紧密相连的。
像乌克兰这样的主权国家的权利不能仅仅因为根除者享有与中国的“战略伙伴关系”就被根除。 因此，英国对中国的政策有三大支柱。 首先，在北京的行动对我们的人民或我们的繁荣构成威胁的时候，我们将加强我们的国家安全保护。 我们不会对干涉我们的政治体系、技术盗窃或工业破坏保持沉默。我们将做更多的工作来保障学术自由和研究活动。 当与其他目标发生冲突时，我们将始终把国家安全放在第一位。因此，我们正在以最安全的方式建设我们的5G网络，而不是最快或最便宜的方式。
中国领导人定义他们的核心利益，他们这样做也是很自然的。但我们也有核心利益，其中之一就是促进建设我们想要生活的世界，在这样的世界里，各地的人们都有一项普遍的人权，那就是受到有尊严的对待，不受酷刑，不受奴役，不受任意拘留。 这些价值观并没有什么独特的“西方”之处，因为酷刑对任何人造成的伤害都是一样的。
因此，当英国谴责在新疆大规模监禁维吾尔族人时，我希望中国不要相信自己的说辞，相信我们仅仅是在寻求干涉他们的内政。正如我们应该更努力地理解中国一样，我希望中国官员也能够理解，当他们的政府建造一个21世纪版本的古拉格群岛，在这场运动的高潮中关押了100多万人，而这些人往往什么都没做，仅仅是信奉自己的宗教，这也激起了我们内心深处的某些东西。
当联合国发现中国在新疆的镇压可能，我引用联合国的话，“构成国际犯罪，特别是反人类罪”时，我们的憎恶是发自内心的，是全国上下一致认同的。我们不会让新疆发生的事情不了了之或被置之不理。我们不会仅仅因为这些事情发生在国境的另一边，或者因为提出这一点以后可能会被认为是不和谐或不礼貌而忽视它。 第二，英国将深化我们的合作，加强我们与印度—太平洋地区和全世界的朋友和伙伴的联盟。 我们的目标将是加强集体安全，深化商业联系，维护国际法，并在必要时进行平衡和竞争。
因此，我很高兴看到英国将很快成为跨太平洋伙伴关系的第12个成员国，加强我们与快速增长的经济体的贸易联系。 我们已经是东南亚国家联盟对话伙伴中唯一的欧洲国家。我们正在深化与印度的长期伙伴关系。我们正在和日本一起开发下一代飞机。我们与美国一起，帮助澳大利亚在奥库斯（AUKUS）伙伴关系下建造核动力常规武装潜艇。
英国将与我们的朋友一起，努力实现印度—太平洋地区的开放和透明。此时此刻，中国正在进行和平时期历史上最大规模的军事集结。在短短4年的时间里，从2014年至2018年，中国推出的新战舰超过了英国皇家海军整个现役舰队的总吨位。
当我们看到这一切发生的时候，当我们看到新的基地出现在南中国海和其他地方时，我们必然会问自己：这一切是为了什么？为什么中国要进行如此巨大的军事投入？ 如果让我们自己得出结论，审慎的态度要求我们必须做最坏的打算。然而，当然我们有可能事错的：我们可能会过于谨慎和悲观。
英国和我们的盟友准备公开我们在印度太平洋地区的存在。我也敦促中国同样公开其军事扩张背后的原则和意图，因为透明肯定符合所有人的利益，秘密只会增加悲剧性误判的风险。 这让我引入台湾的话题。英国的长期立场是，我们希望看到海峡两岸的分歧得到和平解决。因为每年大约有一半的世界集装箱船通过这些重要的水域，它们装载着运往欧洲和世界遥远角落的货物。蓬勃发展的、民主的台湾，也是全球供应链中至关重要的一环，尤其是对先进半导体而言。
据《日经亚洲》报道，海峡两岸的战争不仅将是一场人类悲剧，还将摧毁价值2.6万亿美元的世界贸易。没有一个国家能够独善其身。距离将无法保护全球经济免受这场灾难性打击，尤其是中国。想到随之而来的人类和经济的毁灭，我不寒而栗。因此，任何一方都不能采取单方面行动来改变现状，这一点至关重要。 我们政策的第三个支柱是与中国进行直接的双边和多边交往，以保持和创造开放、建设性和稳定的关系，反映中国的全球重要性。 我们相信积极的贸易和投资关系，同时避免对关键供应链的依赖。
我们希望英国公司与中国开展业务，就像目前美国、东盟、澳大利亚和欧盟公司所做那样。我们将支持他们努力使条款对双方可行，推动公平的竞争环境和更公平的竞争。 我们也希望继续受益于中国的投资，但我们不希望中国共产党的长臂伸向我们国家的中枢神经系统。
在过去，我们未能总是做到在开放和安全之间取得完美的平衡。现在，我们正在获得适当的法律权力来保护我们必须保护的东西，同时尽可能地开放。 最重要的是，我们需要具备应对这一挑战的适当技能，因此我们将政府各部门对有关应对中国能力的资金增加了一倍；我们已经拨出资源在北京建造一个新的英国大使馆，我决心与中国政府达成协议，推进这项工作。
因此，我们对中国的做法必须结合所有这些方面，保护我们的国家安全，与我们的朋友结盟，在利益趋同的领域与中国交往和贸易，避免片面的标语制定政策，并始终坚持英国所珍视的普世价值观。 我坚信没有什么是不可避免的：未来是由我们来塑造的，依我拙见，我深信，我们现在如何应对这一挑战将有助于定义现代世界。
Our position on China: Foreign Secretary's 2023 Mansion House speech
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-position-on-china-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary?
Speaking at Mansion House in the City of London, the Foreign Secretary James Cleverly outlined the UK government's position on China.
From: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon James Cleverly Published 25 April 2023
Location: Mansion House, London
Delivered on: (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)
My Lord Mayor, Your Excellencies, Mr Speaker, lords, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak with you this evening and whilst it is traditional in this speech to cover the full breadth of world affairs.
You will I hope forgive me for focusing on a smaller number of issues which confront us because it would be remiss of me not to begin with the current crisis in Sudan.
As you would expect I’ve been in COBR meetings and other meetings on our response to the situation today. I can inform you that a Royal Air Force flight has now left Sudan, carrying British nationals to safety this evening, and more will follow.
From the onset of this crisis, we’ve been planning how to get our people out. And now that our and international calls for a ceasefire in Khartoum have been heeded, we are putting those plans into effect, giving priority to those in greatest need: family groups, the sick, and the elderly.
I’m encouraged that both factions have called a 72-hour ceasefire, though of course we cannot be sure for how long it will hold, and any evacuation from a battle-scarred city is inherently dangerous.
Britain is working hand-in-glove with our partners across the world. And after this operation, we will do everything possible – alongside our friends in the region – to secure a lasting settlement for this tragic conflict.
And of course the situation in Sudan does not distract us from our work to support Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression, and I know that my G7 colleagues and other colleagues around the world will agree on our focus on that.
Even when the emergencies of the day are seemingly all-consuming, it is vital never to lose sight of the biggest long-term questions. So tonight I propose to focus on a subject that will define our epoch, and that is China and the UK’s policy towards it.
I’m often asked to express that policy in a single phrase, or to sum up China itself in one word, whether ‘threat’, or ‘partner’, or ‘adversary’. And I want to start by explaining why that is impossible, impractical and – most importantly – unwise.
China is one of the few countries which can trace its existence back over 2 millennia, to 221BC, when it was united by the Qin Dynasty.
Time and time again down the centuries, civil war or foreign invasions fractured China into rival kingdoms, but after every period of turmoil, China has always re-emerged. The opening line of the Chinese epic ‘Romance of the Three Kingdoms’ describes this cycle:
Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce.
And long before they coalesced into one polity, the Chinese people created their language and their civilisation. Their written characters appeared in the Shang Dynasty in the second millennium BC.
Their inventions – paper, printing, gunpowder, the compass – these things transformed the fortunes of the whole of humanity. These innovations are the key to understanding why China’s economy was among the biggest in the world for 20 of the last 22 centuries, and why China, in 1820, comprised a third of global GDP – more than America, the UK and Europe combined.
Then calamities struck, one after another; some caused by foreign aggression; others coming from within China itself. The deadliest of which was Mao’s famine, which claimed tens of millions of lives, more than any other famine in human history.
Yet the last 45 years have seen another astonishing reversal. By releasing the enterprising genius of its people, China has achieved the biggest and fastest economic expansion the world has ever known. No less than 800 million people have lifted themselves out of poverty, in a nation that encompasses a fifth of all humanity, and a vast area almost as large as continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
So forgive me when I say that no punchy catchphrase or plausible adjective can do justice to such a country or to any sensible approach towards it. If you are looking for British foreign policy by soundbite, I’m afraid you will be disappointed.
My starting point is a recognition of the depth and complexity of Chinese history and civilisation, and therefore, by extension, of our own policy.
And I rest that policy on a series of premises, the first of which is that whatever our differences with China’s leaders, I rejoice in the fact that so many Chinese people have escaped poverty. We do not live in a miserable zero-sum world: their gain is our gain. A stable, prosperous and peaceful China is good for Britain and good for the world.
Looking ahead, I reject any notion of inevitability. No-one predicted China’s rapid rise from mass starvation to relative prosperity, and today no-one can be sure that China’s economic juggernaut will roll on indefinitely.
Last year, for the first time since Mao’s death in 1976, China’s economy grew no faster than the world economy, meaning that China’s share of global GDP stayed constant in 2022. And even if China does become the world’s largest economy in the coming decade, it may not hold that place for long, as a declining and ageing population weighs ever more heavily on future growth.
Nor do I see anything inevitable about conflict between China and the United States and the wider West. We are not compelled to be prisoners of what Graham Allison called the ‘Thucydides trap’, whereby a rising power follows the trajectory of ancient Athens, and collides head-on with an established superpower.
We have agency; we have choices; and so do our Chinese counterparts.
Our task is to shape the course of future events, not succumb to fatalism. And we must face the inescapable reality that no significant global problem – from climate change to pandemic prevention, from economic instability to nuclear proliferation – can be solved without China.
To give up on dialogue with China would be to give up on addressing humanity’s greatest problems. Even worse, we would be ignoring salient facts, vital to our safety and our prosperity.
As I speak, the biggest repository of health data in the world is in China. The biggest source of active ingredients for the world’s pharmaceuticals is in China. And the biggest source of carbon emissions is also in China. Indeed, China has pumped more carbon into the atmosphere in the last 10 years than this country has since the dawn of the industrial revolution in the 18th century.
How China regulates its data, how China develops its pharmaceuticals, how China conducts medical research, will be of seminal importance to the whole of humanity. And whether or not China cuts its carbon emissions will probably make the difference between our planet avoiding the worst ravages of climate change, or suffering catastrophe.
We have already learned to our cost how China’s handling of a pandemic can affect the entire world. So have no doubt: decisions taken in Beijing are going to affect our lives.
Do we not owe it to ourselves to strive to influence those decisions in our own interests? It would be clear and easy – and perhaps even satisfying – for me to declare some kind of new Cold War and say that our goal is to isolate China. It would be clear, it would be easy, it would be satisfying – and it would be wrong, because it would be a betrayal of our national interest and a wilful misunderstanding of the modern world.
Indeed, this government will advance British interests directly with China, alongside our allies, while steadfastly defending our national security and our values. And we can expect profound disagreements; dealing with China I can assure you, is not for the fainthearted; they represent a ruthless authoritarian tradition utterly at odds with our own.
But we have an obligation to future generations to engage because otherwise we would be failing in our duty to sustain – and shape – the international order. Shirking that challenge would be a sign not of strength but of weakness.
Vladimir Putin never intended to demonstrate the power of a united West when he launched his onslaught against Ukraine. But our response shows that when Britain and America and Europe and our other partners across the world stand united, we are a match for anything.
We should have every confidence in our collective ability to engage robustly and also constructively with China, not as an end in itself, but to manage risks and produce results. And we have achieved results.
Let me give you some examples. In 2017 research, British research, convinced the Chinese agriculture ministry to act against the danger of antibiotic resistance by restricting colistin, an antibiotic used in animal feed. Sales fell by 90%, making everyone in the world safer.
Last year, our diplomats in China helped to persuade the authorities to amend a draft procurement law, improving the chances of UK companies bidding for contracts from state-owned enterprises. This year, they secured licences worth £600 million for UK institutions to launch fund management companies in China.
Britain’s position as a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has also allowed us to influence China’s approach towards this new institution, preventing it from becoming a politicised extension of the Belt and Road Initiative. China is the biggest shareholder of this Bank, the Bank is headquartered in Beijing, and yet within a week of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it froze every single project in Russia.
But even though engagement can succeed, the truth is that a country like ours, devoted to liberty and democracy, will always be torn between our national interest in dealing with China and our abhorrence of Beijing’s abuses. When we see how authoritarian states treat their own people, we wonder what they would do to us if they had the chance. And history teaches us that repression at home often translates into aggression abroad.
So our policy has to combine 2 currents: we must engage with China where necessary and be unflinchingly realistic about its authoritarianism.
And that means never wavering from one clear principle. We do not expect our disagreements with China to be swiftly overcome, but we do expect China to observe the laws and obligations that it has freely entered in to.
So, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has shouldered a special responsibility to uphold the UN Charter. As a party to the Joint Declaration, China has agreed to preserve Hong Kong’s freedom. As a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Convention Against Torture and many other instruments of international law, China has accepted an array of obligations.
And if China breaks them, we are entitled to say so, and we are entitled to act – and we will – as we did when China dismantled the freedoms of Hong Kong, violating its own pledge, which is why we gave nearly 3 million of Hong Kong’s people a path to British citizenship.
Peaceful co-existence has to begin with respecting fundamental laws and institutions, including the UN Charter, which protects every country against invasion. And that means every country: a Chinese diplomat in Paris cannot, and must not, and will not, decide the legal status of sovereign countries.
By attacking Ukraine, Russia has provided an object lesson in how a UN member state should not behave. And Putin has also trampled upon China’s own stated principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty.
A powerful and responsible nation cannot simply abstain when this happens, or draw closer to the aggressor, or aid and abet that aggression. A country that wants a respected place at the apex of the world order should stand up for its own principles, and keep its solemn obligations, obligations to defend the laws at the very foundation of that order.
This responsibility goes hand-in-hand with China’s right to play a global role commensurate with its size and its history. And the rights of a sovereign nation like Ukraine cannot be eradicated just because the eradicator enjoys a ‘strategic partnership’ with China.
So, British policy towards China has 3 pillars.
First, we will strengthen our national security protections wherever Beijing’s actions pose a threat to our people or our prosperity.
We are not going to be silent about interference in our political system, or technology theft, or industrial sabotage. We will do more to safeguard academic freedom and research.
And when there are tensions with other objectives, we will always put our national security first. Hence we are building our 5G network in the most secure way, not the fastest or the cheapest way.
China’s leaders define their core interests – and it’s natural that they do. But we have core interests too, and one of them is to promote the kind of world that we want to live in, where people everywhere have a universal human right to be treated with dignity, free from torture, free from slavery, free from arbitrary detention.
And there is nothing uniquely ‘Western’ about these values: torture hurts just as much whoever it is inflicted upon.
So when Britain condemns the mass incarceration of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, I hope our Chinese counterparts do not believe their own rhetoric that we are merely seeking to interfere in their domestic affairs. Just as we should try harder to understand China, I hope that Chinese officials will understand that when their government builds a 21st century version of the gulag archipelago, locking up over a million people at the height of this campaign, often for doing nothing more than observing their religion, this stirs something deep within us.
When the United Nations finds that China’s repression in Xinjiang may – and I quote – “constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity”, our revulsion is heartfelt and shared unanimously across our country and beyond. We are not going to let what is happened in Xinjiang drop or be brushed aside. We cannot ignore this simply because this is happening on the other side of a frontier, or that to raise it might be considered unharmonious or impolite.
Second, the UK will deepen our cooperation and strengthen our alignment with our friends and partners in the Indo-Pacific and across the world.
Our aim will be to bolster collective security, deepen commercial links, uphold international law, and balance and compete where necessary. So I’m delighted that Britain will soon be the 12th member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, reinforcing our trading ties with rapidly growing economies.
Already we are the only European country to be a Dialogue Partner of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. We are deepening our long-term partnership with India. And we are developing the next generation of our aircraft alongside Japan. And we’ve joined the United States to help Australia to build nuclear-powered conventionally-armed submarines under the AUKUS partnership.
Together with our friends, the UK will strive for openness and transparency in the Indo-Pacific. At this moment, China is carrying out the biggest military build-up in peacetime history. In a period of just 4 years – between 2014 and 2018 – China launched new warships exceeding the combined tonnage of the Royal Navy’s entire active fleet.
And as we see this happening; as we watch new bases appearing in the South China Sea and beyond, we are bound to ask ourselves: what is it all for? Why is China making this colossal military investment?
And if we are left to draw our own conclusions, prudence dictates that we must assume the worst. And yet of course we could be wrong: it is possible that we will be too cautious and too pessimistic.
The UK and our allies are prepared to be open about our presence in the Indo-Pacific. And I urge China to be equally open about the doctrine and intent behind its military expansion, because transparency is surely in everyone’s interests and secrecy can only increase the risk of tragic miscalculation.
Which brings me to Taiwan. Britain’s longstanding position is that we want to see a peaceful settlement of the differences across the Strait. Because about half of the world’s container ships pass through these vital waters every year, laden with goods bound for Europe and the far corners of the world. Taiwan is a thriving democracy and a crucial link in global supply chains, particularly for advanced semi-conductors.
A war across the Strait would not only be a human tragedy, it would destroy world trade worth $2.6 trillion, according to Nikkei Asia. No country could shield itself from the repercussions. Distance would offer no protection from this catastrophic blow to the global economy – and least China’s most of all. I shudder to contemplate the human and financial ruin that would follow. So it’s essential that no party takes unilateral action to change the status quo.
And the third pillar of our policy is to engage directly with China, bilaterally and multilaterally, to preserve and create open, constructive and stable relations, reflecting China’s global importance.
We believe in a positive trade and investment relationship, whilst avoiding dependencies in critical supply chains. We want British companies to do business with China – just as American, ASEAN, Australian and EU companies currently do – and we will support their efforts to make the terms work for both sides, pushing for a level playing field and fairer competition.
We have an interest in continuing to benefit from Chinese investment, but we don’t want the long arm of the Chinese Communist Party reaching towards the central nervous system of our country. And in the past, we haven’t always struck the perfect balance between openness and security. Now we are gaining the right legal powers to safeguard what we must and be open where we can.
Above all, we need to be properly skilled for the challenge, so we are doubling our funding for China capabilities across government; we’ve allocated the resources to build a new British Embassy in Beijing, I’m determined to reach agreement with China’s government so this can proceed.
So our approach to China must combine all of these currents, protecting our national security, aligning with our friends, engaging and trading with China where our interests converge, avoiding policy by soundbite, and always standing up for the universal values which Britain holds dear.
I fervently believe there are no inevitabilities: the future is ours to shape, in the humble knowledge that how we respond to this challenge now will help define the modern world.
Thank you.
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