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采访乌克兰武装部队总司令瓦列里·扎卢日尼将军
https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
编辑了我们谈话的要点
2022 年 4 月 24 日，乌克兰基辅：乌克兰武装部队总司令瓦列里·扎卢日尼（左）出席与美国国务卿托尼·布林肯和美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀的面对面会议。 由乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基于 2022 年 4 月 24 日在乌克兰基辅主办。 奥斯汀和布林肯是自俄罗斯入侵以来访问基辅的美国最高级别官员。
（图片来源：© Ukraine Presidency/Ukraine Presi/Planet Pix via ZUMA Press WireZuma / eyevine欲了解更多信息，请联系 eyevinetel：+44 (0) 20 8709 8709 电子邮件：info@eyevine.comwww.eyevine.com
2022 年 12 月 15 日
这些是我们于 2022 年 12 月 3 日采访瓦列里·扎卢日尼 (Valery Zaluzhny) 将军的采访要点。他首先讲述了他对战争的个人看法。 （您还可以阅读我们对乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽伦斯基的采访的编辑摘要。）
Valery Zaluzhny：对于我们、对于军队来说，战争始于 2014 年。对于我个人来说，战争始于 2014 年 7 月。我不知道 2014 年的战争到底是什么。
我读了很多书，我以金牌的身份从所有的学院毕业，我从理论上理解了一切，但我不明白战争的真正含义。 但在八年的战争中，直到2022年，我和像我这样的人都非常清楚这一切。
当大规模侵略开始时，我们所做的不仅是运用我们在 2014 年已经拥有的知识，还有我们从那时起获得的技能和经验。 我们拥有的最重要的经验以及我们几乎像宗教一样实践的经验是，俄罗斯人和任何其他敌人都必须被杀死，只是被杀死，最重要的是，我们不应该害怕这样做。 这就是我们正在做的事情。
2月24日发生的一切只是规模的扩大。 在此之前，我们的战线长403公里，据点232个。 到 2 月 24 日，战线长度已增至 2,500 公里。 我们的力量相对较小，但我们参与了。 当然，我们也明白我们的实力还不够。 我们的任务是分配我们的小部队，以便使用非常规战术来阻止进攻。
经济学人：作为一名指挥官，您有何独特之处？
VZ：苏联军队欢迎并强制执行一个概念：指挥官。 但当指挥官和当领导者是不一样的。 恕我直言，苏罗维金先生（俄罗斯驻乌克兰军队的指挥官），如果你看他，你会发现他是彼得大帝时代的一位普通彼得罗维派指挥官，容我们说，一个德日莫达（果戈理《政府》中的残酷的马丁内特） 检查员”]。
你看着他，明白要么你完成任务，要么你就完蛋了。 我们很早就意识到这是行不通的。 我们在 2014 年尤其意识到了这一点，当时 21 岁的中尉开始指挥 50 多岁和 60 多岁的士兵。 当然，我们有自己的德志莫达，他们试图用拳头和二头肌来维持秩序，但这在乌克兰军队中并不是100%有效……一切都可能是正常的。 保持正常意味着在任何情况下都保持人性——这是最重要的。 保持人性，成为领导者。 变得更聪明，变得更强大，变得更有才华，在这种情况下，尝试管理人员。 这是我信奉的宗教。
更多关于乌克兰日益增长的威胁
• 乌克兰高级士兵管理着一支与俄罗斯不同类型的军队
• 弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基的幕僚长谈如何结束乌克兰战争
• 弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基和他的将军们接受《经济学人》采访
• 俄罗斯的攻势迫在眉睫
TE：这是否意味着您会听取官员的意见并鼓励他们的主动性？
VZ：我信任我的将军们。 自从战争开始以来，我解雇了其中十个人，因为他们无法胜任。 另一人开枪自杀。 我信任希尔斯基（乌克兰陆军司令亚历山大·希尔斯基将军）。 如果他告诉我他需要另一个旅，那就意味着他确实需要另一个旅。 我当然不认为我是这里最聪明的人。 我必须并且确实听取了现场人士的意见。 因为主动权就在那里。
TE：谁是你的军事榜样？
VZ：把头转向左边。 其中有一幅已故的亨纳季·彼得罗维奇·沃罗比约夫（Hennadiy Petrovich Vorobyov）（2009 年至 2014 年乌克兰地面部队司令）的肖像。 他是一个在军队中备受尊敬的人。 为什么我这里有它？ 当我放松的时候，当事情进展顺利的时候，这张照片通常是面朝下躺着的，我不需要看它。 当我对某件事有疑问时，我会直接提出来。 我转身看着它，试图弄清楚亨纳迪·沃罗比约夫在这种情况下会做什么。 这是一个已经成功的人。 这是一个过得很艰难的人，因为他帮助了所有人。 每个人。 他认识武装部队中的每个人，他们的妻子、孩子、侄子等等。
他认识武装部队中的每个人，他们的妻子、孩子、侄子等等。 这对他来说很难，但他扛起了这个沉重的担子。 这就是模型。
TE：照片现在已经放上来了。
VZ：是的。 有很多疑问。
TE：什么样的？
VZ：我们通过多次行动已经认识到，最主要的是不要害怕这个敌人。 它可以战斗，而且必须在今天、此时此地战斗。 决不应该推迟到明天，因为会出现问题。 为了实现这一目标，您需要资源。 就像俄罗斯人一样，当我们计划某件事时，我们必须拥有实现它的资源。 然后，如果你的立场正确并且做出正确的决定，你就可以期待正确的结果。
俄罗斯人长期以来一直在积累资源。 据我推算，他们用了三年半或四年的时间，集中建造了人员、装备、弹药。 我认为他们有三个月的资源来实现他们的目标。 他们耗尽了这些资源，浪费了自己的潜力，却几乎没有取得任何成果，这一事实表明他们的立场选择是错误的。 他们现在必须重新思考如何摆脱这种困境。
他们想占领基辅。 从军事上来说，这是正确的决定——实现他们目标的最简单方法。 我也会这么做的。 我很了解格拉西莫夫（俄罗斯武装部队总司令）（当然不是我个人）。 他已经没有退路了。 他把注意力集中在顿巴斯，以保护他剩下的一切资源。 截至目前，顿巴斯的局势并不轻松。 但从战略上来说，这对俄罗斯军队来说是一个双赢的局面。
因此，他们很可能正在寻找停止[战斗]的方法，并以任何方式暂停：炮击平民，让我们的妻子和孩子冻死。 他们需要它的目的很简单：他们需要时间来收集资源并创造新的潜力，以便他们能够继续实现他们的目标。
但他们同时在做另一项任务，他们正在尽一切可能不让我们重新集结并攻击自己。 这就是为什么你会看到 1,500 公里前线的战斗。 有的地方比较激烈，有的地方不太激烈，但他们限制我们的部队，不让我们重新集结。 当然，他们现在拼命战斗的事实是非常糟糕的。 但这并不能解决战略问题。 它只会削弱乌克兰的武装部队。
这就是为什么，就像第二次世界大战期间一样，我毫不怀疑，很可能在乌拉尔山脉之外的某个地方，他们正在准备新的资源。 他们100%做好了准备。
弹药正在准备中，虽然不是很好的东西，但仍然如此。 这将不再是停火两年后所能拥有的资源。 不会是那样的。 那会很糟糕，战斗潜力会非常非常低，即使他像朱可夫（二战时期的苏联高级指挥官）那样，再征召100万人去扔尸体，也不会带来什么好处。 无论如何想要的结果。
因此，我们面临的下一个问题首先是守住这条线，不要再失去任何阵地。 这很关键。 因为我知道解放它比不放弃它要困难十到十五倍。 所以我们现在的任务就是坚持下去。 我们的任务是在合作伙伴的帮助下非常清楚地监控那里正在发生的事情以及他们正在准备的地方。 这是我们的战略任务。
我们的第二个战略任务是为这场可能在二月份发生的战争做好准备。 能够用生力军和后备军发动战争。 我们的部队现在都在战斗中，他们正在流血。 他们正在流血，只有勇气、英雄主义和指挥官控制局势的能力才让他们团结在一起。
第二个对我们来说非常重要的战略任务是建立储备并为战争做准备，战争可能发生在二月，最好是三月，最坏是一月底。 它可能不是从顿巴斯开始，而是从基辅方向、白俄罗斯方向开始，我也不排除南部方向。
我们已经做了所有的计算——我们需要多少辆坦克、大炮等等。 这是现在大家需要集中精力的事情。 请战壕里的士兵原谅，现在更重要的是集中精力积累资源，以应对明年可能开始的更持久、更激烈的战斗。 我将[今天晚些时候]与米利（美国最高士兵）谈论此事。
我会告诉他它值多少钱，要花多少钱。 如果得不到，我们当然会战斗到底。 但正如一位电影角色所说，“我不保证后果。” 其后果并不难预见。 这是我们必须要做的。
对我们来说还有第三项非常重要的任务，即第三项战略任务，不幸的是，它与第一项任务（坚守阵地和阵地）和第二项任务（积累资源）相关。 这就是导弹防御和防空。 在我个人看来，我不是能源专家，但在我看来，我们正处于边缘。 我们正在微妙地保持平衡。 如果[电网]被摧毁……士兵的妻子和孩子就会开始被冻僵。 这种情况是有可能发生的。 战士们会是什么样的心情，你能想象吗？ 没有水、光、热，还谈什么准备储备继续战斗？
TE：您需要进行另一波动员吗？
VZ：我们已经在这样做了。 我们人手够多，我也能清楚地看到自己有什么。 我已经够了。 我不需要更多的几十万。
我们需要坦克，我们需要 apcs [装甲运兵车]，步兵战车。 我们需要弹药。 请注意，我现在谈论的不是 f-16。
TE：俄罗斯军队是否已经适应了himars（美国制造的多管火箭发射器）？
VZ：是的。 他们已经到达了希玛无法到达的距离。 而且我们还没有任何更远距离的东西。
TE：我们能谈谈防空吗？
VZ：现在我们的比率是0.76。 俄罗斯人在计划攻击时使用的是 0.76 的功效系数。 这意味着他们发射了 100 枚导弹，而不是 76 枚。其中 24 枚成功击中目标。 两枚导弹对发电站有何作用？ 两年内不会起作用。 所以必须要建立起来。
北约专家知道一切，绝对一切，直到最后的细节。 计算已经完成，感谢上帝，一切都在继续。 我们已经拥有一些 nasam（挪威-美国防空系统）。 还不够，但是有一些。 iris-t [德国防空系统] 已经投入使用。 还不够，但是有一些。 他们只需要加强。 我们需要几十个。
TE：你的盟友是否以任何方式阻止你向克里米亚推进？
VZ：我无法回答他们是否有所保留的问题。 我简单陈述一下事实。 为了到达克里米亚边境，截至今天，我们需要前往梅利托波尔 84 公里的距离。 顺便说一句，这对我们来说已经足够了，因为梅利托波尔将为我们提供对陆地走廊的全面火力控制，因为从梅利托波尔我们已经可以使用相同的希马尔等向克里米亚地峡开火。 我为什么要对你说这些？ 因为这可以追溯到我之前关于资源的观点。 我可以根据手头的任务计算出需要什么样的资源来构建战斗能力。
我们正在谈论第一次世界大战的规模……这是安东尼·拉达金（英国最高士兵）告诉我的。 当我告诉他英国军队在第一次世界大战中发射了 100 万发炮弹时，他告诉我：“我们将失去欧洲。 如果你发射那么多炮弹，我们就没有活计了。” 当他们说“给你五万颗炮弹”时，数钱的人都晕倒了。 最大的问题是他们真的没有。
有了这种资源，我无法开展新的大型行动，尽管我们现在正在开展一项行动。 它正在路上，但你还没有看到它。 我们使用的贝壳少了很多。
我知道我能打败这个敌人。 但我需要资源。 我需要 300 辆坦克、600-700 辆步兵战车、500 门榴弹炮。 然后，我认为 2 月 23 日的到来是完全现实的。 但我不能用两个旅做到这一点。 我得到了我得到的，但比我需要的要少。 现在还不是像曼纳海姆吸引芬兰士兵那样吸引乌克兰士兵的时候。 我们可以而且应该占领更多的领土。
TE：您如何看待俄罗斯的动员？
VZ：俄罗斯的动员已经奏效。 并不是说他们的问题如此严重以至于这些人不会战斗。 他们会的。 沙皇告诉他们去打仗，他们就去打仗。 我研究过两次车臣战争的历史，都是一样的。 他们的装备可能不是那么好，但他们仍然给我们带来了问题。 我们估计他们有120万-150万人的后备力量……俄罗斯人正在准备大约20万生力军。 我毫不怀疑他们会在基辅再次尝试。
An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s armed forces
https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
Edited highlights of our conversation
These are edited highlights of our interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, on December 3rd 2022. He began with his personal view of the war. (You can also read edited highlights of our interview with Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine.)
Valery Zaluzhny: For us, for the military, the war began in 2014. For me personally in July 2014. And I had no idea what war really was in 2014.
I had read a lot of books, I had graduated from all the academies with a gold medal, I understood everything theoretically, but I did not understand what war really meant. But in eight years of war, until 2022, both I and people like me understood it all perfectly well.
All we did when the large-scale aggression started was to implement not only our knowledge, which we already had in 2014, but also the skills and the experience we have gained since then. And the most important experience we had and the one which we have practised almost like a religion is that Russians and any other enemies must be killed, just killed, and most importantly, we should not be afraid to do it. And this is what we are doing.
All that happened on February 24th was an increase in scale. Before then we had a front of 403km and 232 strongpoints. And by February 24th that front grew to 2,500 km. And we were a relatively small force, but we engaged. Naturally, we understood that we were not strong enough. Our task was to distribute our smaller forces in such a way as to use unconventional tactics to stop the onslaught.
The Economist: What distinguishes you as a commander?
VZ: The Soviet Army welcomed and enforced one concept: the commander. But being a commander and being a leader is not the same. With all due respect to Mr Surovikin [the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine], if you look at him, he is an ordinary Petrovite commander from Peter the Great’s time, shall we say, a derzhimorda [a brutal martinet in Gogol’s “The Government Inspector”].
You look at him and understand that either you complete the task or you’re fucked. And we had long realised that this does not work. And we had particularly realised this in 2014, when 21-year-old lieutenants came to command men who were in their 50s and 60s. Of course we had our own derzhimordas who tried to keep order with their fists and biceps, but it does not work 100% in the Ukrainian army… It is always possible to be normal. To be normal means to remain human in any situation—that is the most important thing. To remain human, to become a leader. To be smarter, to be stronger, to be more talented and in that case try to manage people. That is a religion I practised.
TE: Does this mean that you listen to your officers and encourage their initiative?
VZ: I trust my generals. Since the start of the war I fired ten of them because they were not up to it. Another one shot himself. I trust Syrsky [General Oleksandr Syrsky, commander of Ukraine’s land forces]. If he tells me he needs another brigade, it means that he really needs another brigade. I certainly don’t think I am the smartest one here. I must and do listen to those who are in the field. Because the initiative is there.
TE: Who is your military role model?
VZ: Turn your head to the left. There is a portrait of the late Hennadiy Petrovich Vorobyov [commander of Ukraine’s ground forces from 2009 to 2014]. He was a man who was enormously respected in the army. Why do I have it here? When I am at ease, when things are going well, this picture is usually lying face down, I don’t need to look at it. When I have doubts about something, I put it up straight. I turn around and look at it, trying to figure out what Hennadiy Vorobyov would do in this situation. This is a man who has been successful. This is a man who had a hard time, because he helped everyone. Everyone. He knew everyone in the Armed Forces, their wives, their children, their nephews and so on. It was hard for him, but he took that heavy burden and carried it. That’s the model.
VZ: Yes. There are a lot of doubts.
TE: What kind?
VZ: We have already realised through a number of operations that the main thing is not to be afraid of this enemy. It can be fought, it must be fought today, here and now. And in no way should that be postponed until tomorrow, because there will be problems. In order to achieve this, you need resources. Just like the Russians, when we are planning something we must have the resources to do it. Then, if your position is correct and you make the right decisions, you can expect the right result.
The Russians have been garnering their resources for a long time. According to my calculations it must have been three and a half or four years that they built them up intensively: people, equipment, ammunition. I think they had three months’ worth of resources to achieve their goals. The fact that they have exhausted these resources and wasted their potential without achieving practically any result, shows that their position was chosen incorrectly. They now have to think again about how to get out of this situation.
They wanted to take Kyiv. Militarily this was the right decision—the easiest way to achieve their goal. I would have done the same. I know Gerasimov [the head of Russia’s armed forces] well (not personally, of course). There was no way out for him. He concentrated on Donbas to preserve whatever resources he had left. As of today, the situation in Donbas is not easy. But strategically it is a no-win situation for the Russian army.
So most likely they are looking for ways to stop [fighting] and get a pause by any means: shelling civilians, leaving our wives and children to freeze to death. They need it for one simple purpose: they need time to gather resources and create new potential so they can continue to fulfil their goals.
But they are working on another task in parallel, they are doing everything possible not to let us regroup and strike ourselves. This is why you are seeing battles along the 1,500km frontline. In some places more intense, in some places less intense, but they are constraining our troops in order not to allow us to regroup. The fact that they are fighting hard now is very bad, of course. But it is not a solution to the strategic problem. It simply wears down the armed forces of Ukraine.
That’s why, just as during the second world war, I have no doubt about it, it is most likely that somewhere beyond the Urals, they are preparing new resources. They are 100% being prepared.
Ammunition is being prepared, not very good stuff, but still. It won’t be the same resources as it could have been in two years of ceasefire. It will not be like that. It will be lousy, and combat potential will be very, very low, even if he enlists a million more people in the army to throw bodies, like Zhukov [a senior Soviet commander during the second world war] did, it will not bring the desired result anyway.
So the next problem that we have is, first of all, to hold this line and not lose any more ground. It’s crucial. Because I know that it is ten to 15 times harder to liberate it than not to surrender it. So our task now is to hold on. Our task is to monitor very clearly with the help of our partners what is going on there, where they are getting ready. This is our strategic task.
The second, very important strategic task for us is to create reserves and prepare for the war, which may take place in February, at best in March, and at worst at the end of January. It may start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, in the direction of Belarus, I do not rule out the southern direction as well.
We have made all the calculations—how many tanks, artillery we need and so on and so on. This is what everyone needs to concentrate on right now. May the soldiers in the trenches forgive me, it’s more important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles that may begin next year. I’ll be talking to Milley [America’s top soldier] about this [later today].
I will tell him how much it is worth, how much it costs. If we don’t get it, of course we will fight to the end. But as a movie character said, “I don’t vouch for the consequences.” The consequences are not hard to foresee. This is what we have to do.
There is also a third, very important task for us, a third strategic task, which, unfortunately, is connected with the first (holding the lines and positions) and with the second (accumulating resources). This is missile defence and air defence. In my personal opinion, I am not an energy expert but it seems to me we are on the edge. We are balancing on a fine line. And if [the power grid] is destroyed…that is when soldiers’ wives and children start freezing. And such a scenario is possible. What kind of mood the fighters will be in, can you imagine? Without water, light and heat, can we talk about preparing reserves to keep fighting?
TE: Do you need to conduct another wave of mobilisation?
VZ: We are already conducting it as it is. We have enough people, and I can clearly see what I have. I have enough. I don’t need hundreds of thousands more.
We need tanks, we need apcs [armoured personnel carriers], infantry fighting vehicles. And we need ammunition. Please note, I’m not talking about f-16s right now.
TE: Have the Russian forces adapted to himars [American-made multiple rocket launchers]?
VZ: Yes. They’ve gone to a distance the himars can’t reach. And we haven’t got anything longer-range.
TE: Can we talk about air defence?
VZ: Now we have a ratio of 0.76. Russians are using this 0.76 coefficient of efficacy when they plan their attacks. This means that instead of 76 missiles, they launch 100. And 24 get through and reach their target. And what do two missiles do to a power station? It won’t work for two years. So it has to be built up.
nato specialists know everything, absolutely everything, down to the last detail. Calculations are done and thank God it all has moved on. We already have some nasams [Norwegian-American air-defence systems]. Not enough, but some. iris-t [a German air-defence system] are already in use. Not enough, but some. They just need to be ramped up. We need dozens of those.
TE: Are your allies holding you back in any way from advancing on Crimea?
VZ: I can’t answer the question of whether they are holding back or not. I will simply state the facts. In order to reach the borders of Crimea, as of today we need to cover a distance of 84km to Melitopol. By the way, this is enough for us, because Melitopol would give us a full fire control of the land corridor, because from Melitopol we can already fire at the Crimean Isthmus, with the very same himars and so on. Why am I saying this to you? Because it goes back to my earlier point about resources. I can calculate, based on the task at hand, what kind of resource is needed to build combat capability.
We are talking about the scale of World War One…that is what Antony Radakin [Britain’s top soldier] told me. When I told him that the British Army fired a million shells in World War One, I was told, “We will lose Europe. We will have nothing to live on if you fire that many shells.” When they say, “You get 50,000 shells”, the people who count the money faint. The biggest problem is that they really don’t have it.
With this kind of resources I can’t conduct new big operations, even though we are working on one right now. It is on the way, but you don’t see it yet. We use a lot fewer shells.
I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 ifvs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23rd. But I can’t do it with two brigades. I get what I get, but it is less than what I need. It is not yet time to appeal to Ukrainian soldiers in the way that Mannerheim appealed to Finnish soldiers. We can and should take a lot more territory.
TE: What do you make of Russia’s mobilisation?
VZ: Russian mobilisation has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not fight. They will. A tsar tells them to go to war, and they go to war. I’ve studied the history of the two Chechen wars—it was the same. They may not be that well equipped, but they still present a problem for us. We estimate that they have a reserve of 1.2m-1.5m people… The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops. I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv. ■
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