风萧萧_Frank
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真正促使美国发动伊拉克战争的原因是什么
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/fear-power-and-hubris-bush-and-iraq-war/672759/
恐惧、权力和傲慢的致命结合
作者：Melvyn P. Leffler 2023 年 1 月 23 日
9/11 下午，在五角大楼，大火仍在燃烧，救护车鸣响，国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德从烟雾缭绕的庭院返回他的办公室。 他最亲密的助手、副国务卿斯蒂芬·坎博恩（Stephen Cambone）神秘地记录了国务卿对萨达姆·侯赛因和乌萨马（或乌萨马）·本·拉登的想法：“同时打击 S. H.； 不仅是UBL； 近期目标需求——大规模——扫荡一切——需要这样做才能实现任何有用的目标。”
总统没有同意。 当晚，当乔治·W·布什返回华盛顿时，他主要关心的是安抚全国人民的心、减轻人民的痛苦、激发希望。 当得知基地组织很可能对这次袭击负责时，他没有把重点放在伊拉克。 第二天，在国家安全委员会会议上，拉姆斯菲尔德和国防部副部长保罗·沃尔福威茨主张对萨达姆·侯赛因采取行动。 由于阿富汗没有好的目标，也没有驱逐塔利班的战争计划，国防部官员认为伊拉克可能是展示美国决心和韧性的最佳机会。 他们的论点没有引起在场任何人的共鸣。
然而，第二天晚上，布什总统在白宫战情室外遇到了即将离任的反恐专家理查德·克拉克和其他几名助手。 据克拉克说，总统说：“我希望你尽快回顾一切，一切。 看看萨达姆有没有这么做。 看看他是否有任何联系。” 克拉克承诺他会这样做，但坚称应对此事负责的是基地组织，而不是侯赛因。 然后他对助手们低声说道：“沃尔福威茨找到了他。”
梅尔文·P·莱夫勒即将出版的书《对抗萨达姆·侯赛因》的封面
本文改编自莱弗勒即将出版的新书。
没有真正的证据表明沃尔福威茨确实接触过布什。 总统可能在 9 月 14 日星期五与英国首相托尼·布莱尔的谈话中谈到了袭击伊拉克的问题。但是当沃尔福威茨周末在戴维营再次提出这个问题时，布什明确表示，他认为侯赛因与 9/11，阿富汗是第一要务。他的副总统、国家安全顾问和中央情报局局长都同意。
摘自209年1月/2月号：乔治·W·布什时代
布什入侵伊拉克的决定既不是先入为主的，也不是不可避免的。 这与民主无关，也与石油无关。 这并不是为了纠正1991年美国未能推翻侯赛因的决定，也不是为了对1993年这位独裁者试图刺杀布什的父亲乔治·H·W·布什进行报复。相反，布什和他的顾问们的动机是 他们对美国安全的担忧。 他们迫切希望阻止任何其他可能针对美国人的攻击，并决心阻止侯赛因使用大规模杀伤性武器来制止美国未来在中东行使权力的能力。
布什在经历了数个月的高度焦虑之后才决定入侵伊拉克，在此期间，辛勤工作（尽管有些过分热心）的官员试图解析不完整且不可靠的情报。 他们对伊拉克的过度恐惧与对美国实力的过度关注相匹配。 在 9/11 事件令人震惊地揭露了一个难以想象的脆弱性之后，他们感到国家的信誉正在受到侵蚀，从而感到不安。
在 9/11 事件后第一周布什的重要讲话中，他没有详细讨论伊拉克问题。 当记者问总统是否有什么特别的信息要传达给萨达姆·侯赛因时，布什笼统地说道：“任何窝藏恐怖分子的人都需要害怕美国……向每个国家传达的信息是，将会有一场打击恐怖活动的运动，一场全球性的运动。” ”。 当美军中东司令汤米·弗兰克斯将军建议布什开始针对伊拉克的军事计划时，总统指示他不要这样做。
拉姆斯菲尔德和他的高级顾问仍然更担心伊拉克——国防部副部长道格拉斯·费斯 9 月 18 日写道，这个政权“参与并支持恐怖主义，并以其他方式威胁美国的切身利益”。 但即使他们也不主张全面入侵。 相反，沃尔福威茨倾向于在南部煽动什叶派叛乱，建立飞地或解放区来组织临时政府，并否认侯赛因对该地区石油的控制。 沃尔福威茨告诉我：“如果我们有能力在阿富汗发起抵抗苏联的行动，那么我们本来也有能力在阿拉伯地区发起抵抗。”
布什并非完全不赞同这种做法，但拉姆斯菲尔德和沃尔福威茨都无法说服他将注意力从阿富汗和更广泛的反恐战争上转移。 沃尔福威茨听从了布什的优先事项，最终帮助制定了推翻阿富汗塔利班的战略。 但他、费斯和他们在五角大楼的文职同事并没有放弃伊拉克政权更迭的想法。 侯赛因对 9/11 袭击的幸灾乐祸激怒了他们。 他们确信他是危险的。
直到秋天，布什的注意力才转向伊拉克，当时炭疽孢子通过美国邮件传播，杀死了几名邮政工作人员，并出现在参议院办公楼和处理白宫邮件的设施中。 10 月 18 日，白宫内的传感器向工作人员发出致命毒素的警报； 这是一场虚惊，但却加剧了人们对生物或化学武器袭击的担忧。
布什和他的顾问们对他们自认为对伊拉克的了解感到不安，尽管评估侯赛因的意图和能力很困难。 1998年，伊拉克独裁者驱逐了国际检查员，导致中央情报局无法收集信息。 但分析人士确信，不能相信侯赛因已经销毁了他以前拥有的所有大规模杀伤性武器。 当一名伊拉克叛逃者声称伊拉克已经建立了移动生物武器生产工厂并且现在拥有“超越海湾战争前时代的能力”时，他们的怀疑更加强烈。
摘自 2004 年 1 月/2 月号：间谍、谎言和武器：出了什么问题
总统的中央情报局简报员迈克尔·莫雷尔（Michael Morell）向我坚称，有人重新审视当时现有的证据，仍然会得出结论：侯赛因“拥有化学武器能力，他储存了化学武器，他拥有生物武器生产能力”。 ，他正在重启核计划。 今天你会根据桌子上的内容做出判断。” 但莫雷尔告诉我，摆在桌面上的内容是间接且可疑的，其中大部分来自该政权的伊拉克库尔德人。 莫雷尔承认他应该说：“先生。 总统先生，这就是我们的想法……但你真正需要知道的是，我们对这一判断信心不足，原因如下。” 相反，莫雷尔告诉总统，侯赛因“有一个化学武器计划。 他有生产生物武器的能力。”
布什和他的高级顾问倾向于认为侯赛因拥有大规模杀伤性武器。 不仅政府中的鹰派如此。 国务卿科林·鲍威尔和国家安全顾问康多莉扎·赖斯认为侯赛因拥有大规模杀伤性武器。 国务院分析师以及中央情报局和国家安全局的同行也是如此。 他们对铝管的用途以及伊拉克获取铀黄饼的看法存在分歧，并且他们意识到，一旦萨达姆政权再次开始研制核武器，侯赛因将需要五到七年的时间来研制核武器。 然而，他们认为他们知道伊拉克拥有生物武器和化学武器，或者可以迅速开发这些武器，而且侯赛因渴望重建核计划。
外国情报合作伙伴对此表示同意。 托尼·布莱尔和他最信任的顾问也有同样的感觉。 没有人告诉布什侯赛因没有大规模杀伤性武器。
侯赛因因制裁和检查人员的存在而受到严重阻碍。 但现在检查人员走了，制裁也消失了。 美国政策制定者面临的难题是，如果制裁制度结束且联合国监察员没有返回，如何遏制侯赛因。 “我并不担心他在 2001 年会做什么，”沃尔福威茨告诉我。 “我担心如果现有的遏制……崩溃的话，他在 2010 年会做什么。”
侯赛因并没有采取太多措施来减轻美国人的恐惧。 他利用自己的石油收入来争取法国、中国和俄罗斯的支持，以结束联合国的制裁。 他没有停止为科威特和沙特阿拉伯的恐怖活动提供支持，其中一些活动针对的是美国援助人员。 关于他在伊拉克境内普遍镇压的报道仍然存在。
阅读：英国对伊拉克战争的清算
与此同时，侯赛因将其不断增长的财政储备投资于加强伊拉克的军工综合体并获取可用于化学和生物武器的材料。 据英国情报机构称，伊拉克人仍在隐瞒有关31,000件化学弹药、4,000吨可用于武器的化学品以及大量可用于生产生物武器的材料的信息。
此类评估整个冬天都在进行。 英国联合情报委员会于 2002 年 2 月总结道：“伊拉克继续推行其大规模杀伤性武器计划。如果尚未这样做，伊拉克可能会在决定实施大规模杀伤性武器计划后的几天内生产出大量的生物战剂，并在几周内生产出大量的化学战剂。” 这样做。”
2001 年秋天，布莱尔写信给布什，“我毫不怀疑我们需要对付萨达姆”。但布莱尔警告说，如果我们“现在就打击伊拉克”，“我们将失去阿拉伯世界、俄罗斯，可能会失去一半的国家”。 欧盟和我担心的是这对巴基斯坦的影响。” 最好是安静地审议并避免公开辩论，“直到我们确切地知道我们想做什么； 以及我们如何做到这一点。” 布什同意了。
拉姆斯菲尔德随后写道：“布什总统认为，与萨达姆外交成功的关键是采取可信的军事行动威胁。 我们希望，将越来越多的美军调往可以攻击伊拉克的位置，这一过程可能会说服伊拉克人结束他们的反抗。” 正如布什第一任期内的副国家安全顾问斯蒂芬·哈德利告诉我的那样：“我们认为这会迫使他……按照国际社会的要求去做，要么摧毁大规模杀伤性武器，要么向我们展示你摧毁了它。 就是这样。 要么去做，要么，如果你已经做到了，那就展示出来，证明它。”
布什希望利用武力威胁恢复检查，并让人们相信伊拉克不拥有大规模杀伤性武器，这些武器可能会落入恐怖分子手中，或在未来被用来敲诈美国。 但他也想用武力威胁将侯赛因赶下台。 他真的不知道这些目标中哪个优先。 他从未清楚地理清这些重叠而又相互冲突的冲动，尽管每一个冲动似乎都变得更加引人注目。
切尼在他的回忆录《我的时代》中写道：“让萨达姆遵守联合国要求的最好方法就是说服他我们会使用武力。” 著名的民主党人并没有表示不同意见。 2002年2月上旬，外交关系委员会民主党主席、参议员约瑟夫·拜登就国务院2003年预算要求举行听证会。 鲍威尔国务卿强调，反恐战争是他的第一要务。 鲍威尔说，有些政权不仅支持恐怖活动，而且还在发展大规模杀伤性武器。 他们“可以向恐怖组织提供必要的资金，利用这些手段来对付我们。”
拜登询问这是否意味着总统正在宣布一项新的先发制人政策，正如外国盟友所认为的那样。 在鲍威尔否认这一指控后，拜登表达了他对大规模杀伤性武器扩散的担忧，特别是在伊拉克。 “我碰巧认为萨达姆必须以某种方式下台，而且很可能需要美国出动武力才能让他下台，”他说。 “在我看来，问题是如何去做，而不是是否做。”
接下来几个月的情报报告并没有缓解布什的焦虑。 令总统感到震惊的是，基地组织正在寻找生物和化学武器的新信息，以及伊拉克拥有并使用这些武器的信息。
2002 年 5 月下旬，分析人士报告说，基地组织成员正在进入巴格达，其中包括高级圣战分子阿布·穆萨卜·扎卡维。 美国国务院情报办公室负责人告诉鲍威尔，“与基地组织有联系的其他人正在巴格达活动，并与同事保持联系，而这些同事可能更直接地参与袭击计划。” 自9/11以来，伊拉克几乎没有基地组织活动，专家们对伊拉克独裁者与奥萨马·本·拉登之间关系的性质也存在分歧。 几乎没有人认为伊拉克与 9/11 事件有任何关系，但是，根据战后参议院的一项调查，“有十多份可靠性各异的报告提到伊拉克或伊拉克国民参与了基地组织获取情报的努力”。 ”化学战和生物战训练。
摘自 2006 年 7 月/8 月号：阿布·穆萨布·扎卡维短暂而暴力的一生
扎卡维是一位著名的恐怖分子，他是一名约旦人，曾在阿富汗作战，会见了本·拉登，并在赫拉特管理着自己的训练营。 他已经因其强硬、激进和野蛮而臭名昭著，他渴望对美国人进行报复。 关于扎卡维在伊拉克存在的报道是在美国政策制定者收到有关伊拉克采购代理在澳大利亚活动的信息之前不久发布的。 据称，该特工正在寻求购买 GPS 软件，以便该政权绘制美国城市地图。 伊拉克独裁者可能正在策划在美国境内发动大规模杀伤性武器袭击吗？
扎卡维还与伊斯兰辅助者组织合作，该组织是一个伊斯兰极端组织，正在与主流库尔德政党争夺伊拉克东北部的控制权。 中央情报局的一个小型小组已渗透到库马尔市附近的地区，并于 7 月报告说，扎卡维已开始试验恐怖分子可以将其放入通风系统的生物和化学制剂。 据一名中央情报局特工称，“他们对生物战和化学战进行了全面研究……他们在驴、兔子、老鼠和其他动物身上进行了大量测试。”
在华盛顿，参谋长联席会议赞成在库尔马尔采取军事行动。 切尼、拉姆斯菲尔德和沃尔福威茨也是如此。 他们不相信，如果没有独裁者的默许，基地组织不会出现在伊拉克——即使是不受侯赛因控制的地区。 当有消息称扎卡维和其他基地组织战士在巴格达时，他们的怀疑更加强烈。 驻伊拉克的中央情报局特工没有看到任何证据表明基地组织特工与侯赛因有联系，但与他们交谈的每个人都相信侯赛因拥有大规模杀伤性武器。
布什表示，他将“深思熟虑”地采取行动，只利用最好的情报。 但情报含糊不清，导致评估存在争议、判断相互矛盾、建议不确定。 有时，总统夸大了他所掌握的证据。 2002 年 11 月，布什告诉记者团，侯赛因是一个威胁，“因为他正在与基地组织打交道。” 虽然这有些夸张，但布什确实知道扎卡维曾在巴格达，与基地组织有联系，并且正在试验生物武器和化学武器。 他知道侯赛因支持自杀式爆炸并庆祝他们的“烈士”。
布什选择不授权在库尔马尔采取军事行动。 7月31日，他告诉布莱尔，他还没有决定发动战争，他可能会给伊拉克独裁者再一次机会，让他遵守允许检查和销毁大规模杀伤性武器的承诺。 然而，与此同时，总统指示弗兰克斯将军继续他的战争计划。
尽管布什尚未决定是否要解除伊拉克独裁者的武装或推翻伊拉克独裁者，但他动员了公众和国会支持他的政策。 10 月，众议院以 296 票对 133 票通过了一项授权他使用军事力量的决议，参议院也以 77 票对 23 票的结果批准了一项决议。 华盛顿的政治努力与纽约的外交努力相匹配。 11月8日，联合国安理会通过第1441号决议，要求进行核查，并规定伊拉克政权已经违反了以往的决议。 美国政府认为，这为美国选择采取单边行动提供了理由。
布什实行的是强制外交，希望通过恐吓来达到目的。 “我们给了萨达姆最后一个选择，”他的英国政策伙伴布莱尔在 2011 年解释道。如果侯赛因表现出顽抗，总统的信誉以及美国的信誉将面临风险，在这种情况下，强制外交将不得不结束 军事干预。 然而，该干预的成本尚未计算。
布什确实希望，如果他诉诸军事行动，就会出现一个自由、民主的伊拉克，但他几乎没有花时间讨论将伊拉克的解放转化为其公民更好的生活所需的机构、政策和支出。 在与弗兰克斯将军会面时，布什问道：“我们能赢吗？”
“是的，先生，”弗兰克斯说。
“我们能除掉萨达姆吗？” 总统再次问道。
“是的，长官，”他的将军说道。
总统没有问：“然后呢？”
在入侵变成一场混乱、功能失调的占领并且伊拉克所谓的大规模杀伤性武器没有被发现之后，布什指示他的中央情报局局长乔治·特尼特建立一个名为伊拉克调查组的特别任务，以调查这些致命武器的下落。 该组织的第一任主任戴维·凯 (David Kay) 于 2004 年 1 月 28 日出现在参议院军事委员会面前：“让我开始吧，”他承认，“我们对伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器计划的看法几乎全错了”。 尽管因对伊拉克能力的误读而受到惩罚，但凯并不认为情报分析师在根本威胁问题上误导了政策制定者。 “我认为，随着萨达姆·侯赛因的失踪和倒台，世界变得更加安全。”
阅读：任务蔓延：当一切都是恐怖主义时
2003 年 12 月，美军抓获萨达姆·侯赛因后，该调查小组的第二任负责人查尔斯·杜尔弗 (Charles Duelfer) 监督了对萨达姆·侯赛因的部分审讯。杜尔弗详细阐述了萨达姆·侯赛因的“控制性存在”。 杜尔弗强调说，侯赛因“不是动画片”。 “他以一种黑暗、阴险的方式极其才华横溢，才华横溢”，很像侯赛因最想效仿的领导人约瑟夫·斯大林。 他的愿望很明确：挫败伊朗、击败以色列并主宰该地区。 为了实现这些目标，侯赛因渴望获得大规模杀伤性武器。
这是杜尔弗在 2004 年 9 月提交调查小组最终综合报告时得出的结论。 证据似乎是确凿的：伊拉克没有大规模杀伤性武器库存，也没有任何活跃的计划。 但杜尔弗后来在他的回忆录《捉迷藏：寻找伊拉克的真相》中写道，“很明显，萨达姆遵守联合国裁军限制只是一种策略。” 调查小组确认，侯赛因的首要目标是结束制裁并继续确保大规模杀伤性武器的安全。 “几乎”没有任何伊拉克高级领导人“相信萨达姆已经永远放弃了大规模杀伤性武器。” 侯赛因拒绝了自己被行刑队处决的愿望，于2006年12月30日在监狱中被绞死。
布什最初决定对抗侯赛因，而不是入侵伊拉克。 总统担心另一次袭击可能比 9/11 更可怕。 布什担心，像伊拉克这样的流氓国家可能会与恐怖分子分享世界上最致命的武器，这些恐怖分子迫切希望给美国带来痛苦，刺破美国不可战胜的空气，破坏美国的机构，让美国人怀疑自己自由的价值。
然而，恐惧本身并不能影响总统的战略。 布什对美国实力的信心同样重要。 从他执政伊始，他就致力于扩大美国的军事能力，而美国的军事能力已经远远超过任何其他国家。 2001年利用空中力量、特种部队和新技术将塔利班逐出喀布尔，这增强了他的力量感。 美国的影响力似乎是无限的。 他认为，华盛顿不能被阻止帮助其朋友并保护其利益，特别是在拥有重要原材料和能源储备的地区。 美国有能力这样做，并且需要证明这一点。
狂妄自大加剧了恐惧和权力。 布什坚持认为，所有人都希望按照美国价值观生活——自由地说自己想说的话，自由祈祷。 如果美国推翻了一个残暴的独裁者，美国官员会因为知道他们正在丰富他愚昧的臣民的生活而感到满意。
在恐惧、对美国实力日益增长的信心以及道德感的刺激下，布什拥抱了强制外交。 这一战略很有吸引力，因为布什周围的几乎每个人都相信，侯赛因的反抗不会停止，除非他面对优势武力。 但该战略的实施并没有明确的目标——政权更迭或消除大规模杀伤性武器。
阅读：美国的信誉在伊拉克受到打击
入侵后，当这些武器没有被发现时，布什转向了更具意识形态的话语。 “伊拉克民主的失败，”他警告说，“将会助长世界各地的恐怖分子……成功将传递出这样的消息，从大马士革到德黑兰——自由可以成为每个国家的未来。” 当美国陷入叛乱斗争、伊斯兰原教旨主义兴起时，布什的目标和战略似乎都没有意义。 他的批评者嘲笑他的天真，指责他不诚实，并嘲笑他的民主狂热。
这些批评者低估了布什的品质并误解了他的思想。 布什的失败并不是因为他是一个软弱的领导人、一个天真的理论家或一个善于操纵的骗子。 他始终全面掌控政府的伊拉克政策，并不急于发动战争。 他发动战争不是为了让伊拉克民主，而是为了铲除一名凶残的独裁者，后者打算重新启动他的武器计划，支持自杀任务，并与恐怖组织（即使实际上不是基地组织）建立联系。
布什成功地实现了这些狭隘的目标。 美国领土上没有发生另一次袭击，他确实消灭了一个残暴、反复无常、危险的暴君。 但他并没有以可接受的成本实现这一目标。 这场战争对伊拉克来说是灾难性的。 在接下来的几年里，超过 20 万伊拉克人因战争、叛乱和内乱而丧生，超过 900 万人（约占战前人口的三分之一）在国内流离失所或逃往国外。
这次干预还给美国造成了几乎没有人预见到的人员、财政、经济和心理损失。 这场战争增强了伊朗在波斯湾的实力，转移了人们对阿富汗境内持续斗争的注意力和资源，分裂了美国的欧洲盟友，并为中国的崛起和俄罗斯的复仇主义提供了更多机会。 这场冲突玷污了美国的声誉并加剧了反美主义。 它加剧了穆斯林的不满情绪，加剧了人们对美国傲慢的看法，使反恐斗争变得复杂，并挫伤了中东阿拉伯人和犹太人对民主与和平的希望。 总统和他的顾问们在卸任时并没有传播自由，而是目睹了世界范围内自由的衰退。
恐惧、权力和傲慢解释了美国在伊拉克发动战争的原因。 如果我们不这么想，通过简化故事并相信只要我们有更诚实的官员、更强大的领导人和更现实的政策制定者，一切都会好起来，我们就是在欺骗自己。 悲剧的发生并不是因为我们的领导人天真、愚蠢、腐败。 当认真负责的官员竭尽全力让美国变得更安全，最终却让事情变得更糟时，悲剧就会发生。 我们需要问为什么会发生这种情况。 我们需要认识到，当恐惧过多、权力过大、傲慢自大以及不够审慎时，就会潜藏着危险。
本文改编自《对抗萨达姆·侯赛因：乔治·W·布什和入侵伊拉克》。
What Really Took America to War in Iraq
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/fear-power-and-hubris-bush-and-iraq-war/672759/
A fatal combination of fear, power, and hubris
At the pentagon on the afternoon of 9/11, as the fires still burned and ambulances blared, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld returned from the smoke-filled courtyard to his office. His closest aide, Undersecretary Stephen Cambone, cryptically recorded the secretary’s thinking about Saddam Hussein and Osama (or Usama) bin Laden: “Hit S. H. @same time; Not only UBL; near term target needs—go massive—sweep it all up—need to do so to hit anything useful.”
The president did not agree. That night, when George W. Bush returned to Washington, his main concern was reassuring the nation, relieving its suffering, and inspiring hope. Informed that al-Qaeda was most likely responsible for the attack, he did not focus on Iraq. The next day, at meetings of the National Security Council, Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz advocated action against Saddam Hussein. With no good targets in Afghanistan and no war plans to dislodge the Taliban, Defense officials thought Iraq might offer the best opportunity to demonstrate American resolve and resilience. Their arguments did not resonate with anyone present.
The following evening, however, President Bush encountered his outgoing counterterrorism expert, Richard Clarke, and several other aides outside the Situation Room in the White House. According to Clarke, the president said, “I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.” Clarke promised he would but insisted that al-Qaeda, not Hussein, was responsible. Then he muttered to his assistants, “Wolfowitz got to him.”
This article is adapted from Leffler’s forthcoming book.
There is no real evidence that Wolfowitz did get to Bush. The president may have talked about attacking Iraq in a conversation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Friday, September 14. But when Wolfowitz raised the issue again at Camp David over the weekend, Bush made it clear that he did not think Hussein was linked to 9/11, and that Afghanistan was priority No. 1. His vice president, national security advisers, and CIA director were all in agreement.
From the January/February 209 issue: The George W. Bush years
Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was neither preconceived nor inevitable. It wasn’t about democracy, and it wasn’t about oil. It wasn’t about rectifying the decision of 1991, when the United States failed to overthrow Hussein, nor was it about getting even for the dictator’s attempt to assassinate Bush’s father, George H. W. Bush, in 1993. Rather, Bush and his advisers were motivated by their concerns with U.S. security. They urgently wanted to thwart any other possible attack on Americans, and they were determined to foreclose Hussein’s ability to use weapons of mass destruction to check the future exercise of American power in the Middle East.
Bush resolved to invade Iraq only after many months of high anxiety, a period in which hard-working, if overzealous, officials tried to parse intelligence that was incomplete and unreliable. Their excessive fear of Iraq was matched by an excessive preoccupation with American power. And they were unnerved, after 9/11’s shocking revelation of an unimagined vulnerability, by a sense that the nation’s credibility was eroding.
In bush’s key speeches during the first week after 9/11, he did not dwell on Iraq. When reporters asked the president if he had a special message for Saddam Hussein, Bush spoke generically: “Anybody who harbors terrorists needs to fear the United States … The message to every country is, there will be a campaign against terrorist activity, a worldwide campaign.” When General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, suggested to Bush that they begin military planning against Iraq, the president instructed him not to.
Rumsfeld and his top advisers remained more concerned about Iraq—a regime, wrote Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith on September 18, “that engages in and supports terrorism and otherwise threatens US vital interests.” But even they weren’t advocating a full-scale invasion. Instead, Wolfowitz favored seeding a Shia rebellion in the south, establishing an enclave or a liberation zone for organizing a provisional government, and denying Hussein control over the region’s oil. “If we’re capable of mounting an Afghan resistance against the Soviets,” Wolfowitz told me, “we could have been capable of mounting an Arab resistance.”
Bush was not entirely unsympathetic to this approach, but neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz could persuade him to divert his attention from Afghanistan and the broader War on Terror. Wolfowitz deferred to Bush’s priority, ultimately helping devise the strategy that toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan. But he, Feith, and their civilian colleagues at the Pentagon did not relinquish the idea of regime change in Iraq. They were incensed by Hussein’s gloating over the 9/11 attack. And they were convinced that he was dangerous.
Bush’s attention did not gravitate to Iraq until the fall, after anthrax spores circulated through the U.S. mail, killing several postal workers, and turned up in a Senate office building and at a facility handling White House mail. On October 18, sensors inside the White House alerted staff to the presence of a deadly toxin; it was a false alarm, but one that intensified worries about an attack with biological or chemical weapons.
Bush and his advisers were troubled by what they thought they knew about Iraq, though assessing Hussein’s intentions and capabilities was difficult. The Iraqi dictator had expelled international inspectors in 1998, leaving the CIA unable to collect information. But analysts were convinced that Hussein could not be trusted to have destroyed all of the weapons of mass destruction he’d previously possessed. Their suspicions were reinforced when an Iraqi defector claimed that Iraq had established mobile biological-weapons-production plants and now possessed “capabilities surpassing the pre–Gulf War era.”
From the January/February 2004 issue: Spies, lies, and weapons: what went wrong
Michael Morell, the president’s CIA briefer, insisted to me that someone reexamining the available evidence at the time would still conclude that Hussein “had a chemical-weapons capability, that he had chemical weapons stockpiled, that he had a biological-weapons-production capability, and he was restarting a nuclear program. Today you would come to that judgment based on what was on that table.” But what was on the table, Morell told me, was circumstantial and suspect, much of it coming from Iraqi Kurdish foes of the regime. Morell acknowledged that he should have said, “Mr. President, here is what we think … But what you really need to know is that we have low confidence in that judgment and here is why.” Instead, Morell was telling the president that Hussein “had a chemical-weapons program. He’s got a biological-weapons-production capability.”
Bush and his top advisers were predisposed to think that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. This was true not only of the hawks in the administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice believed that Hussein possessed WMDs. So did State Department analysts and their counterparts in the CIA and at the National Security Agency. They disagreed about the purpose of aluminum tubes and about Iraq’s acquisition of uranium yellowcake, and they were aware that Hussein would need five to seven years to develop a nuclear weapon once the regime began working on it again. Nevertheless, they thought they knew that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons, or could develop them quickly, and that Hussein aspired to reconstitute a nuclear program.
Foreign-intelligence partners concurred. Tony Blair and his most trusted advisers felt the same way. Nobody told Bush that Hussein did not have WMDs.
Hussein had been seriously hampered by sanctions and the presence of inspectors. But now the inspectors were gone, and the sanctions were disappearing. The conundrum facing U.S. policy makers was how to contain Hussein if the sanctions regime ended and if United Nations monitors did not return. “I wasn’t worried about what he would do in 2001,” Wolfowitz told me. “I was worried about what he would do in 2010 if the existing containment … collapsed.”
Hussein was not doing much to allay American fears. He was using his oil revenues to leverage support from France, China, and Russia to end UN sanctions. He had not ceased providing support for terrorist activity in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, some of which targeted American aid workers. And reports of his pervasive repressions inside Iraq persisted.
Read: Britain’s Iraq war reckoning
At the same time, Hussein was investing his growing financial reserves in strengthening Iraq’s military-industrial complex and acquiring materials that could be used for chemical and biological weapons. According to British intelligence, the Iraqis were still concealing information about 31,000 chemical munitions, 4,000 tons of chemicals that could be used for weapons, and large quantities of material that could be employed for the production of biological weapons.
Such assessments held through the winter. “Iraq continues to pursue its WMD programmes,” concluded the British Joint Intelligence Committee in February 2002. “If it has not already done so, Iraq could produce significant quantities of biological warfare agents within days and chemical warfare agents within weeks of a decision to do so.”
“I have no doubt we need to deal with Saddam,” Blair had written to Bush in the fall of 2001. But if we “hit Iraq now,” Blair had warned, “we would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact on Pakistan.” Far better to deliberate quietly and avoid public debate “until we know exactly what we want to do; and how we can do it.” Bush agreed.
“President bush believed,” Rumsfeld subsequently wrote, “that the key to successful diplomacy with Saddam was a credible threat of military action. We hoped that the process of moving an increasing number of American forces into a position where they could attack Iraq might convince the Iraqis to end their defiance.” As Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser during Bush’s first term, told me: “We thought it would coerce him … to do what the international community asked, which is either destroy the WMD or show us that you destroyed it. That was it. Either do it or, if you’ve already done it, show it, prove it.”
Bush wanted to use the threat of force to resume inspections and gain confidence that Iraq did not possess WMDs that might fall into the hands of terrorists or be used to blackmail the U.S. in the future. But he also wanted to use the threat of force to remove Hussein from power. He did not really know which of these goals had priority. He never clearly sorted out these overlapping yet conflicting impulses, even as each seemed to become more compelling.
“The best way to get Saddam to come into compliance with UN demands,” wrote Cheney in his memoir, In My Time, “was to convince him we would use force.” Prominent Democrats did not disagree. In early February 2002, Senator Joseph Biden, the Democratic chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, held hearings dealing with the State Department’s request for the 2003 budget. Secretary Powell emphasized that the War on Terror was his No. 1 priority. There were regimes, Powell said, that not only supported terror but were developing WMDs. They “could provide the wherewithal to terrorist organizations to use these sorts of things against us.”
Biden asked whether this meant that the president was announcing a new policy of preemption, as foreign allies thought he was doing. After Powell denied this allegation, Biden proclaimed his own fears about the proliferation of WMDs, especially in Iraq. “I happen to be one that thinks that one way or another Saddam has got to go and it is likely to be required to have U.S. force to have him go,” he said. “The question is how to do it, in my view, not if to do it.”
Intelligence reports over the following months did not ease Bush’s anxieties. What alarmed the president was new information that al-Qaeda was seeking biological and chemical weapons, alongside the knowledge that Iraq had had them and used them.
In late May 2002, analysts reported that al-Qaeda operatives were moving into Baghdad, including the high-ranking jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. “Other individuals associated with al-Qaida,” the head of the State Department’s intelligence office informed Powell, “are operating in Baghdad and are in contact with colleagues who, in turn, may be more directly involved in attack planning.” Since 9/11, there had been little al-Qaeda activity in Iraq, and experts disagreed about the nature of the relationship between the Iraqi dictator and Osama bin Laden. Hardly anyone thought Iraq had anything to do with 9/11, but, according to a postwar Senate investigation, there were “a dozen or so reports of varying reliability mentioning the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-Qa’ida’s efforts to obtain” chemical- and biological-warfare training.
From the July/August 2006 issue: The short, violent life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Al-Zarqawi was a known terrorist, a Jordanian who had fought in Afghanistan, met with bin Laden, and managed his own training camps in Herat. Already notorious for his toughness, radicalism, and barbarity, he lusted to wreak revenge on Americans. Reports of al-Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq came shortly before U.S. policy makers received information about an Iraqi procurement agent’s activity in Australia. Allegedly, this agent was seeking to buy GPS software that would allow the regime to map American cities. Might the Iraqi dictator be plotting a WMD attack inside the United States?
Al-Zarqawi was also collaborating with Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist extremist group that was battling a mainline Kurdish party for control of northeastern Iraq. A small CIA team had infiltrated the region near the city of Khurmal and reported in July that al-Zarqawi had begun experimenting with biological and chemical agents that terrorists could put in ventilation systems. According to one of the CIA agents, “they were full-bore on biological and chemical warfare … They were doing a lot of testing on donkeys, rabbits, mice, and other animals.”
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored military action in Khurmal. So did Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. They did not believe that al-Qaeda would be in Iraq—even a part not controlled by Hussein—without the dictator’s acquiescence. Their suspicions grew when information placed al-Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda fighters in Baghdad. The CIA agents in Iraq saw no evidence that the al-Qaeda operatives were linked to Hussein, but everyone they spoke with believed that Hussein had WMDs.
Bush said he would act with “deliberation,” employing only the best intelligence. But the intelligence was murky, leading to contentious assessments, conflicting judgments, and uncertain recommendations. Sometimes, the president overstated the evidence he had. Hussein’s a threat, Bush told the press corps in November 2002, “because he is dealing with al-Qaeda.” Although this was an exaggeration, Bush did know that al-Zarqawi had been in Baghdad, had links to al-Qaeda, and was experimenting with biological and chemical weapons. And he knew that Hussein supported suicide bombings and celebrated their “martyrs.”
Bush chose not to authorize military action in Khurmal. On July 31, he told Blair that he had not yet decided on war—that he might give the Iraqi dictator one more chance to abide by his promises to allow inspections and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, however, the president instructed General Franks to proceed with his war planning.
Although Bush had not resolved whether he meant to disarm or depose the Iraqi dictator, he mobilized public and congressional support for his policies. In October, the House approved a resolution authorizing him to use military force, by a vote of 296–133, and the Senate did the same, 77–23. The political effort in Washington was matched by a diplomatic one in New York. On November 8, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which demanded inspections and stipulated that the Iraqi regime was already in breach of past resolutions. In the administration’s view, this provided justification for the U.S. to take unilateral action if it chose to do so.
Bush was practicing coercive diplomacy, hoping to achieve his goals through intimidation. “We were giving Saddam one final choice,” his British partner in this policy, Blair, explained in 2011. If Hussein proved recalcitrant, the president’s credibility—and America’s—would be at risk, in which case coercive diplomacy would have to end with a military intervention. The costs of that intervention, however, had not been calculated.
Bush did want a free, democratic Iraq to emerge if he resorted to military action, but he had spent little time discussing the institutions, policies, and expenditures that would be required to translate the liberation of Iraq into a better life for its citizens. In a meeting with General Franks, Bush asked, “Can we win?”
“Yes, sir,” said Franks.
“Can we get rid of Saddam?” the president asked again.
“Yes, sir,” said his general.
The president did not ask, “What then?”
After the invasion turned into a chaotic, dysfunctional occupation and Iraq’s alleged WMDs were not found, Bush instructed his director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to establish a special mission named the Iraq Survey Group to investigate what had happened to these deadly armaments. The group’s first director, David Kay, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004: “Let me begin,” he admitted, “by saying that we were almost all wrong” about Iraqi WMD programs. Though chastened by the misreading of Iraqi capabilities, Kay did not think that intelligence analysts had misled policy makers about the fundamental threat. “I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and removal of Saddam Hussein.”
Read: Mission creep: when everything is terrorism
The survey group’s second chief, Charles Duelfer, oversaw part of the interrogation of Saddam Hussein after U.S. forces captured him in December 2003. Duelfer dwelled on Hussein’s “controlling presence.” Hussein “was not a cartoon,” Duelfer emphasized. “He was catastrophically brilliant and extremely talented in a black, insidious way,” much like Joseph Stalin, the leader whom Hussein most wanted to emulate. And his aspirations were clear: to thwart Iran, defeat Israel, and dominate the region. To achieve these goals, Hussein yearned to acquire WMDs.
That was Duelfer’s conclusion when, in September 2004, he delivered the final, comprehensive report of the survey group. The evidence appeared conclusive: Iraq did not have WMD stockpiles, nor any active programs. But “it was very clear,” Duelfer later wrote in his memoir, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq, “that Saddam complied with UN disarmament restrictions only as a tactic.” Hussein’s overriding objectives, the survey group affirmed, were to bring sanctions to an end and to move ahead with securing WMDs. “Virtually” no senior Iraqi leader “believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.” Denied his desire to be executed by firing squad, Hussein was hanged in prison on December 30, 2006.
Bush decided, initially, to confront Hussein—not invade Iraq. The president feared another attack, one perhaps even more dire than 9/11. Rogue states like Iraq, Bush worried, might share the world’s deadliest weapons with terrorists who desperately wanted to inflict pain on America, puncture its air of invincibility, undermine its institutions, and make Americans doubt the value of their freedoms.
Yet fear alone did not shape the president’s strategy. Bush’s faith in American might was equally important. From the outset of his administration, he aimed to expand American military capabilities, which already far exceeded those of any other nation. The use of airpower, special forces, and new technologies to expel the Taliban from Kabul in 2001 reinforced his sense of strength. America’s reach appeared to have no bounds. Washington, he felt, must not be dissuaded from helping its friends and protecting its interests, especially in regions harboring crucial raw materials and energy reserves. The U.S. had the power to do so and needed to demonstrate it.
Fear and power were reinforced by hubris. Bush insisted that all people wanted to live by American values—to be free to say what they pleased and pray as they wished. If the United States overthrew a brutal dictator, American officials could take satisfaction in knowing that they were enriching the lives of his benighted subjects.
Spurred by fear, growing confidence in American power, and a sense of moral virtue, Bush embraced coercive diplomacy. The strategy was appealing because almost everyone surrounding Bush believed that Hussein’s defiance would not cease until he was confronted by superior force. But the strategy was adopted without a clear goal—regime change or WMD elimination.
Read: America’s credibility is taking a hit in Iraq
When, after the invasion, those weapons were not found, Bush shifted to a more ideological discourse. “The failure of Iraq democracy,” he warned, “would embolden terrorists around the world … Success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran—that freedom can be the future of every nation.” When the U.S. got locked in an insurrectionary struggle and Islamic fundamentalism surged, neither Bush’s goals nor his strategy appeared to make sense. His critics mocked his naivete, accused him of dishonesty, and ridiculed his democratic zealotry.
These critics underestimated Bush’s qualities and misconstrued his thinking. Bush failed not because he was a weak leader, a naive ideologue, or a manipulative liar. He was always fully in charge of the administration’s Iraq policy, and he did not rush to war. He went to war not to make Iraq democratic but to remove a murderous dictator who intended to restart his weapons programs, supported suicide missions, and cultivated links with terrorist groups (even if not, actually, al-Qaeda).
In those narrow aims, Bush succeeded. Another attack on American soil did not occur and he did eliminate a brutal, erratic, and dangerous tyrant. But he did not achieve that at an acceptable cost. The war proved catastrophic for Iraq. Over the ensuing years, more than 200,000 Iraqis perished as a result of the war, insurrection, and civic strife, and more than 9 million people—about a third of the prewar population—were internally displaced or fled abroad.
The intervention also exacted a human, financial, economic, and psychological toll on the United States that hardly anyone had foreseen. The war enhanced Iranian power in the Persian Gulf, diverted attention and resources from the ongoing struggle inside Afghanistan, divided America’s European allies, and provided additional opportunity for China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism. The conflict besmirched America’s reputation and heightened anti-Americanism. It fueled the sense of grievance among Muslims, accentuated perceptions of American arrogance, complicated the struggle against terrorism, and dampened hopes for democracy and peace among Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Rather than having spread liberty, the president and his advisers left office witnessing the worldwide recession of freedom.
Fear, power, and hubris explain America’s march to war in Iraq. By thinking otherwise, by simplifying the story and believing that all would be well if we only had more honest officials, stronger leaders, and more realistic policy makers, we delude ourselves. Tragedy occurs not because our leaders are naive, stupid, and corrupt. Tragedy occurs when earnest and responsible officials try their best to make America safer and end up making things much worse. We need to ask why this happens. We need to appreciate the dangers that lurk when there is too much fear, too much power, too much hubris—and insufficient prudence.
This article is adapted from Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq.
