Jeffrey Sachs 大国政治 Great-Power Politics

杰弗里·萨克斯的大国政治

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/jeffrey-sachss-great-power-politics

这位经济学家讨论了美国对普京和乌克兰战争的误解。

作者：艾萨克·乔蒂纳 2023 年 2 月 27 日

哥伦比亚大学杰弗里·萨克斯 (Jeffrey Sachs) 教授在安理会期间通过视频连线发表讲话，谈到对……杰弗里·萨克斯 (Jeffrey Sachs) 的威胁。

上周，以扶贫和对外援助领域的工作而闻名的哥伦比亚大学经济学家兼教授杰弗里·萨克斯就北溪管道被毁事件向联合国安理会发表了讲话。 萨克斯受俄罗斯邀请发表讲话，但他告诉《纽约客》，“重要的是要注意”他代表自己出席会议，呼吁对这一事件进行调查。 他此前曾暗示美国应对此负责； 到目前为止，还没有证据表明美国、俄罗斯或任何其他国家与此次袭击有关。 这些对于一位经济学家来说是值得注意的言论，并突显了萨克斯近年来在广泛的地缘政治话题上直言不讳的程度，从乌克兰战争（他希望西方立即谈判解决方案）到 中国对维吾尔族人口的镇压（他认为“种族灭绝”一词的使用是错误的）。 他还指责安东尼·福奇（Anthony Fauci）美国公共卫生机构在资助海外研究方面发挥的作用，部分原因是他认为covid-19起源于“美国实验室生物技术”。

对于一个多年来作为美国建制派成员而闻名的人来说，这是一个有趣的章节。 （三十年前，《泰晤士报》称他“可能是世界上最重要的经济学家”，因为他在推动后苏联时代的俄罗斯采用“休克疗法”方面发挥了重要作用。）从那时起，萨克斯为多位联合国秘书长提供了建议，并撰写了 多本书； 他曾与波诺一起旅行，并与阿拉伯联合酋长国等人权记录有争议的政府合作。 他现任联合国可持续发展解决方案网络主席。 2020年，新冠病毒开始在世界范围内传播后不久，我在《纽约客》杂志上与他谈论了这一流行病的经济影响以及特朗普如何处理紧急情况； 最近，他作为嘉宾出现在小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪的播客上，小罗伯特·肯尼迪已成为美国最著名的反疫苗活动家和阴谋论者之一。

我最近再次与萨克斯通电话。 我想和他谈谈他不断变化的观点，以及他最近的一些旅行，例如对匈牙利维克托·欧尔班的访问。 我们的对话内容经过了长度和清晰度的编辑，如下所示。

您是如何对结束乌克兰战争产生兴趣的？

这场战争具有可怕的破坏性和可怕的危险性，它根本不应该发生。 不仅从简单意义上说战争是悲剧，而且从具体意义上说这是一场完全可以避免的战争。 我认为，人们对这场战争的背景了解得越多，就越清楚如何避免这场战争，以及如何结束它。

具体背景是什么？

这场战争反映了美国和俄罗斯之间四分之一个世纪以来日益紧张的局势。 这条道路上有很多地方确实是不明智的。

告诉我您认为错失的一些机会是什么。

其中的关键在于美国战略领导人 1991 年后的愿景，这一点现在已经得到充分讨论，但仍然没有得到很好的理解：我们现在处于一个单极世界，美国几乎可以做任何事情 它想要的，包括在它想要的地方和想要的时间驻扎军队，在它想要的时候、想要的地方加入和退出条约，而不会造成严重后果。 九十年代中期，甚至就北约东扩的第一阶段也存在过相当激烈的争论，许多智者，包括克林顿时期的国防部长比尔·佩里，都认为这是一个可怕的错误； 许多其他人也这样做了。 乔治·凯南（George Kennan），我认为他是智慧的精髓，他认为这将导致新的冷战。

克林顿选择推进北约东扩。 因为第一阶段是在中欧，所以我认为这并不是决定性的，尽管它确实使情况变得更加困难。 然后是塞尔维亚战争和北约部队对塞尔维亚的轰炸。 在我看来，这是一个可怕的错误。 关于这一点，还有很多我们不公开了解的事情。 内部人士告诉我很多很多事情。 我不知道它们是否属实，因为我没有看到档案，但我相信这是一个可怕的错误。 然后是9/11。 普京总统一开始就表示支持美国的努力，但伊拉克战争显然是一个重大打击。

布什继续对北约进行了七次东扩，进展十分紧张，因为涉及到三个波罗的海国家，以及罗马尼亚、保加利亚、斯洛文尼亚和斯洛伐克，而阻力非常非常大。 2008年，布什做出了绝对可怕的决定，推动北约扩大到乌克兰和格鲁吉亚。 从本质上讲，这不仅使我们走上了绝对加强关系的道路，而且使我们走上了这场战争的道路。

然而，战争始于九年前，当时美国参与了 2014 年 2 月推翻乌克兰总统维克托·亚努科维奇的行动——美国在其中发挥了非常积极的作用。 几十年后，当档案被打开时，我们也许才能知道它的全部内容。 我们非常清楚这就是战争实际发生的原因。

当你谈论2008年时，我有点困惑，因为对乌克兰的全面入侵直到14年后的2022年才开始，而乌克兰距离加入北约并没有更近。

2008年，在布加勒斯特举行的北约峰会上，北约表示将扩大规模，将乌克兰和格鲁吉亚纳入其中。 该决定是北约做出的。 这是一次非常有争议的会议，因为大多数欧洲人反对，但美国推动了会议。 在我看来，这很快导致了格鲁吉亚战争。 我认为这就是俄罗斯向格鲁吉亚传达的信息：你不会加入北约。 这也是向乌克兰传达的信息。

乌克兰已经陷入了一场美国大力参与的战争，国家分裂、东西分裂、支持北约和反北约等等。 2005年，维克托·尤先科就任总统； 他[后来]呼吁乌克兰加入北约。 这造成了2008年的巨大紧张局势。然后尤先科被击败，亚努科维奇进来说我们应该保持中立。 我认为，这被视为对致力于北约东扩的美国政策制定者的侮辱。 2013年底，当针对亚努科维奇的抗议活动爆发时，美国趁机在这方面表现得非常积极，并且采取了相当直接的方式，比如说，向那些领导这场所谓运动的人支付了很多钱， 帮助资助一场政变。

那么你认为2014年发生的事情是一场政变吗？

当然，这是一场政变。 2014 年 2 月，武装精良的暴力团体冲进政府大楼，这是一次违宪的夺权行为。[抗议者因亚努科维奇拒绝与欧盟达成贸易协定而愤怒，在试图占领部分地区后被安全部队击毙。 基辅； 此后，亚努科维奇在政治上受到孤立，并在克里姆林宫的协助下逃往俄罗斯。 我通过电子邮件询问萨克斯关于美国所扮演角色的说法的消息来源。他回答说：“众所周知，国家民主基金会和美国非政府组织在乌克兰投入了大量资金来支持独立广场。 我对这笔支出有第一手的了解。” N.E.D. 告诉《纽约客》，它向民间社会团体提供资金，但“不提供资金支持抗议活动。”]

让我回到2008年。我了解布加勒斯特峰会发生的事情。 我的观点是，十四年后乌克兰距离真正加入北约并没有更近。

这是不正确的。 这是不正确的，艾萨克。 完全没有。 事实是，亚努科维奇被推翻后，乌克兰和美国的一系列政府都对乌克兰进行了全副武装，对乌克兰军队进行了高度现代化，投入了数十亿美元的军备，这才使得这一切成为可能。 2022 年 2 月，乌克兰抵御俄罗斯入侵。

你是说一旦国家被入侵？

不不不不。 从2014年开始。这很重要。

你是说克里米亚一旦被入侵？

这也许是您和您的同事需要进行更多调查的事情之一，以调查独立广场周围的事件。 这是推翻一个政府，取代一个呼吁中立的政府——

中立？

是的，亚努科维奇政府。 [亚努科维奇希望与俄罗斯建立更紧密的联盟； 最近有报道称，普京计划在 2022 年入侵后利用亚努科维奇帮助建立傀儡政权。]

我懂了。

这是决定性的事件。 我们每天都被告知，这是战争一周年。 但即使是北约秘书长延斯·斯托尔滕贝格（Jens Stoltenberg），这场战争中最大的强硬派之一，也表示，今年已经是战争的第九个年头了。 这就是事实。 这场战争始于2014年2月。他说，战争是从俄罗斯占领克里米亚开始的。 我认为你至少得把时钟拨回一个月左右。 事情始于亚努科维奇被推翻，美国在其中发挥了非常积极的作用。

你说普京在9/11之后提出帮助美国，但美国对此不屑一顾。

[他们]在阿富汗并没有对此完全不屑一顾。 扭转局势的是入侵伊拉克并推翻萨达姆的新保守主义计划。 我想说，这是 9/11 事件的偶然事件。

当然。 在不同的背景下，普京可以被视为一个独裁者，他曾对车臣的穆斯林残暴，后来又对叙利亚的穆斯林残暴，而美国最不希望的就是与这样的人结盟。 但你似乎在批评美国不想在全球反恐战争中与普京结盟，而你本人就是一位雄辩的批评者。

你有点误会了。 我的观点是，俄罗斯在 9/11 事件后支持美国——它知道这是一个重大冲击，并希望尝试解决这个问题。 我认识许多多年来与普京打交道的欧洲领导人，重要的是要明白，即使在我认为相当令人愤慨的塞尔维亚北约轰炸之后，甚至在我认为具有挑衅性的北约东扩之后，普京 他在两千世纪初是亲欧洲的，与许多欧洲领导人密切交往，并不是我们今天媒体所描绘的疯子。

我想说的是，这不是一种敌对关系，也不是一种失落的关系，尽管在我看来，美国已经开始了一系列我反对的挑衅性举措，而且随着时间的推移，情况变得更糟。 顺便说一句，2011 年，美国决定推翻叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德 (Bashar al-Assad)，而在 2012 年左右的某个时候（我们不知道具体日期），奥巴马总统签署了“梧桐树行动”，该行动指派中央情报局 (CIA) 执行“梧桐树行动”。 与中东其他大国合作推翻阿萨德的任务。

阿萨德是俄罗斯的盟友。 可笑的是，我们经常在媒体上说普京进入了叙利亚，因为人们不明白奥巴马给中情局派了任务。 推翻阿萨德，美国阻止了 2012 年在叙利亚接近实现的和平努力。 我也知道这一点。
您长期以来一直关心世界上的贫困和不幸的人们。 普京向叙利亚的医院和学校投下炸弹，而你却指责美国试图破坏这位杀害数十万本国人民的独裁者。 我真的认为如果你愿意听听自己的话——

艾萨克，艾萨克，你应该认真了解时间和事实，因为你没有。 恕我直言，如果您了解并仔细研究它，我将非常高兴。 因为这确实是又一个美国暗中破坏国家稳定然后走开的案例。 它并不是完全“走开”，而是在多年的破坏之后基本上走开了。 这很重要，因为它会破坏俄罗斯盟友的稳定。 这是它与我们当前的讨论相关的原因之一。 另一个原因是，这是美国的又一秘密行动。

也许我应该用不同的方式来表达这个问题。 过去，当我读到你的文章时，你谈到了美国外交政策的罪恶、全球反恐战争、我们在冷战和伊拉克战争期间通过政变破坏世界各国稳定所扮演的角色，以及美国所造成的破坏。 这在国外引起了轰动，你说话真有激情。 也许是因为你是美国人，你对我们的国家如此批评是件好事。 现在，当你谈论叙利亚或东欧的平民被杀时，你会表现出近乎临床的缺乏热情，而一切似乎都可以追溯到美国作为造成这一切的秘密力量。 不知道这些人的愿望或愿望，不知道东欧人想要加入北约以及他们为什么想要加入北约。 没有意识到所涉及的人权问题。 你认为这是一个公平的批评吗？ 你对此有何反应？

我认为这根本不是一个公平的批评，我想也许你完全没有理解我的观点，那就是我发现有多少无辜者正在死亡和受苦，这是可怕的。 我每天都担心它。 这是一件可怕的事情。 这对我个人来说影响很大，但我相信了解这些事件以便停止战斗至关重要。

我简单说一下叙利亚。 美国破坏了叙利亚的稳定，2012 年初，有可能达成和平协议。 有一个国家阻碍了和平协议的达成。 那是美国。

等等，抱歉，巴沙尔·阿萨德愿意讲和，但美国本质上不会让他这么做？
美国坚持认为巴沙尔·阿萨德必须下台才能实现和平。 谈判的其他参与者表示，政治进程可以结束这一切，但不会从美国支持的政权更迭的第一天开始。 [当在一封电子邮件中被问及美国是唯一反对和平协议的国家这一说法是否有消息来源时，萨克斯告诉《纽约客》

，“我从国际最高消息来源掌握了美国阻止叙利亚和平协议的第一手资料。”]

说到乌克兰，令我感到恐惧的是，即使考虑到我所阐述的作为这场战争前提的多个事实，这场战争本可以在 2021 年底避免。普京总统提出了 表三要求：北约不东扩、克里米亚仍然是俄罗斯的一部分、明斯克二号协议得到执行。 美国拒绝了。
事后看来，你还认为普京在这里是真诚的吗？

我认为人们可以围绕这些要点制定一项可执行的协议。 在这方面，真诚是一个奇怪的想法。 这不是诚意的问题，而是诚意的问题。 问题在于找到一项协议，然后确定执行该协议的方式，当然包括从边境撤军、非军事化、维持和平行动、监测和其他步骤。 因此，正如罗纳德·里根曾经明智地说的那样：“信任，但要核实。” 这不是诚意的问题。 这是了解这场冲突的性质以及如何避免冲突的问题。 2021 年底，我试图对白宫和拜登政府中愿意倾听的人说，北约东扩是一个糟糕的主意。 而且，如果他们回答我，“好吧，杰夫，这不会发生，”我说，“如果这是你的观点，请将其明确并公开，从而避免战争。” 但他们没有。

您如何看待普京去年的言论，即他是新彼得大帝、乌克兰是大俄罗斯的一部分、他提出的俄罗斯帝国观点是战争的原因之一、战争的驱动力之一 对于他来说，用他自己的话说？

是的，我认为你对约翰·米尔斯海默的采访很好地涵盖了这一点，所以我就将其留在那里。 我认为那里描述得很准确。

你的意思是米尔斯海默的观点是正确的？

这不是战争的原因。 这不是战争的动机，而你基本上是——

那么，您对普京明确说出这些话有何看法？

我不喜欢他说这些话，但我认为这不是现在发生的事情的重点。 任何二十五年来日复一日仔细观察此事的人都知道，北约东扩问题已被讨论过成百上千次，出现在各种文件和各种背景中。 所以我认为这有点像西方媒体的游戏。
引用普京的话是一场游戏？

不。我们的工作应该是帮助人们了解正在发生的事情。

今天早上我在《金融时报》上读了一篇长文，这篇文章基本上是在报道，在俄罗斯军事、商界和政治精英中，普京是唯一一个想要这场战争的人。 这是否表明，如果俄罗斯的所有其他参与者都不会真正发动战争，那么北约东扩等结构性原因的因果关系就不大了？ 我同意，冷战后美国对俄罗斯的政策绝对是一个合理的调查点，但有很多错误。 但是，如果普京在俄罗斯大多数其他精英不希望的情况下投下炸弹并试图入侵一个国家，也许这更多是普京本人的问题，不是吗？

我认为这是西方的比喻，我必须说我认为英国《金融时报》对此的报道非常糟糕。 我们应该了解英国媒体。 早在第一次克里米亚战争（即 1853 年至 1856 年）之前，英国媒体就一直仇视俄罗斯。《金融时报》和其他英国媒体一样，正在发挥自己的作用。 这是非常熟悉的，非常典型的，非常修辞性的，我敦促人们不要如此个人化。 我也在《纽约客》上看到了这一点：这几乎被视为一场个人的战争。 这确实是一个严重的误解，而且还会导致非常奇怪的想法。 好吧，如果他走了，那么战争就结束了。 许多奇怪而简单的想法。 这不是一场个人的战争。 这是一场有原因的战争，就像冯·克劳塞维茨所说，这是政治通过其他方式的延续，我们应该尽可能清楚地理解这一点，以便我们现在就可以尽快结束战争，因为人们 每天都在受苦。

我今天也刚读到一篇文章，上面写着：“没关系。 乌克兰会赢。 我们只需要坚持下去。 是的，还会有几十万人死亡，但最终将是一个伟大的胜利。” 这确实让我不寒而栗。 我认为这种论点的天真和残酷是非同寻常的，而且核升级的绝对实质性和真实风险被彻底忽视了。

什么会让你相信你错了？

好吧，如果战争快点结束的话。

我的意思是关于战争的动机。

在我看来，这并不那么有趣。 我认为重点是我们应该尝试谈判。 这就是我的观点。 我们应该尝试谈判。

您最近写道：“和平的基础是明确的。 乌克兰将是一个中立的非北约国家。 克里米亚仍将是俄罗斯黑海海军舰队的所在地，自 1783 年以来一直如此。将为顿巴斯找到切实可行的解决方案，例如领土划分、自治或停战线。 再次，我同意谈判是绝对必要的，但要说“和平的基础是明确的”，然后说可能想加入北约的乌克兰人不应该这样做，而且他们国家的大部分地区现在应该属于北约 俄罗斯——再次，你的写作方式向我表明，你对一个被吞并和入侵的国家缺乏兴趣或情感。 我知道还有更大的地缘政治问题，但你没明白我的意思吗？ 或者这对你来说似乎不公平？

让我这样说吧。 首先，停止北约东扩并不是一种让步。 对于美国来说，这既是必要的，也是谨慎的。 对于美国来说，这是一个糟糕的想法。

您认为东欧国家为什么想加入北约？

我可以理解为什么他们想成为北约的一部分，但我无法理解为什么美国会认为将北约推入乌克兰、格鲁吉亚是安全和谨慎的。 这完全是鲁莽的。 克里米亚和顿巴斯问题是在美国参与针对亚努科维奇的政变后出现的，因为在此之前俄罗斯并没有占领克里米亚。 亚努科维奇与俄罗斯谈判的是一份长期租约，以便俄罗斯海军基地位于塞瓦斯托波尔，并且至少会保留到2042年，并有续约的选择。 在顿巴斯，关于自治和语言的激烈争论持续了二十年，但没有什么比战争更好的了。

您对美国外交政策中一些最糟糕的方面提出了非常雄辩的批评。 我们以伊拉克战争为例。 你描述了俄罗斯在过去十二年中所做的一切——轰炸叙利亚平民、轰炸乌克兰平民、吞并克里米亚、支持乌克兰东部的分裂分子——本质上都是强加给他们的。 如果人们这样描述伊拉克战争，并免除美国的责任，那会让我感到畏缩。 你提到的俄罗斯的每一个行动都被描述为美国行为的结果。

再说一次，我认为你真的误解了我，错误地描述了我。 让我描述一下我对美国政策的看法，以及我希望《纽约客》的读者出于各种原因真正欣赏的内容，因为我一直是世界各地的经济顾问，而且我认识世界各地的领导人 几十年来，世界各地都有知名的领导人。 我见过很多，我想传达的是美国外交政策的一些非常基本的东西，那就是它是毁灭性地基于谎言和秘密行动，而我一直看到这些谎言。

科林·鲍威尔发表联合国证词的那天晚上，我碰巧参加了一个脱口秀节目。 有六名小组成员。 他们绕着桌子转了一圈，最后终于来到了我身边。 我说：“这是谎言。 这显然是谎言。”确实如此。 这不仅仅是错误的情报；而是错误的情报。 这是为战争辩护而编造的谎言。 后来我偶然知道了美国在叙利亚的谎言。 你一直在谈论普京在叙利亚轰炸人民； 美国既挑起了这场灾难，又阻止了这场灾难的结束。 我知道。

好的。 人们的想法——

恰恰相反，我告诉人们，我们的叙述正在导致死亡人数不断上升，并使我们走上核毁灭之路。

我知道，但你也在谈论人们被“激怒”而屠杀平民。

美国向阿萨德反对派武装了推翻阿萨德的指令。 那是一场战争。

他是一个屠杀自己人民的独裁者。 你知道吗？

不，不？

我对叙利亚的了解比你了解的多得多，因为我对 2011 年春天以来发生的日常事件了解很多，我敦促你认真地看待这一点，艾萨克。

好的。 让我们继续与维克多·欧尔班（Viktor Orbán）的会面，他是一个更快乐的话题。 你们讨论了什么？

我们讨论了乌克兰战争。

你为什么去看他？

我应邀到匈牙利国家银行演讲，礼节性拜会了行长。

正如一个人所做的那样。

如果您自 1989 年起就认识他，您就会知道。是的。

您如何看待他目前的规则？

我们讨论了乌克兰战争，我相信他的观点是正确的，这场战争应该通过谈判结束。

我懂了。 您一般如何看待他的统治？

这是我们讨论的，我非常同意他的立场。

我再问一次就可以了。 我很好奇你对维克托·欧尔班的总体看法。

我知道。 你可以问第一百次，但我们讨论了乌克兰战争。

好的。 所以，你对此感到不舒服。 你只是盯着镜头； 你没兴趣谈论这个。 准确吗？

别玩游戏，艾萨克。 让我们谈谈我们同意讨论的主题。

我从未同意只谈论任何特定主题。

我们到了最后了吗？ 你必须离开吗？
如果我们不打算继续尝试更深入地了解如何摆脱这场战争，我就必须离开。

嗯，你说你与欧尔班交谈是因为你认为他对战争有正确的想法。 更具体地说，您认为这些想法是什么？

我们的想法是，我们需要通过谈判解决这场战争。

你认为他真诚地想要这样吗？

但愿如此。

您在给我的一封电子邮件中提到，您认为中国可以在结束这场战争方面发挥重要作用。 那将如何发挥作用呢？

中国、印度、巴西、南非、印度尼西亚以及其他一些非这场战争当事方但与乌克兰、俄罗斯和其他国家有正常关系的大国都表示应该结束这场战争 通过谈判。 在我看来，这很重要。 这些国家是人类的重要组成部分，也是全球舞台的重要组成部分。 我认为，中方一直所说的各方安全利益应得到尊重，也是乌克兰主权和安全需要得到保护的基础。 与此同时，北约不应该扩大，因为这会威胁到俄罗斯的安全。 在我看来，这就是正确理解我们在实现和平过程中面临的结构性挑战。
你因几年前所说或所写的有关中国的一些事情而受到批评。 你说，“中国对新疆的镇压与2001年9月11日袭击后美国进军中东和中亚的动机基本相同：制止激进伊斯兰组织的恐怖主义。” 您还认为这就是中国建立集中营的目的吗？

这是一个多么可笑的问题措辞。 这篇文章讲的是一件事：新疆发生了种族灭绝吗？ 我指出，美国政府没有提供任何证据。

我只是好奇你是否认为——

联合国应该进行调查，但我认为我们可能已经到了这个时候了，因为这是关于乌克兰的，我认为我们应该继续关注这一点。 这是世界面临的关键问题。 我认为对此还有更多要说的，如果您对此有疑问，我很乐意回答。

我们已经讨论了四十五分钟。 我只是想问你这个。

不不不。 如果我们到了最后，那就好了。 没关系。

我想以最后一个问题作为结束。 你觉得自己有什么改变吗？ 我在小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪的播客上听你谈论你读他的书是多么兴奋，我想，这还是我读了二十年的杰夫·萨克斯的书吗？

我想说的是：三十四年前，我受到戈尔巴乔夫总统关于和平世界和欧洲共同家园的愿景的启发。 我仍然相信这是我们的目标。 我相信这是我们应该努力的方向。 我相信我们仍然可以实现这一目标，而实现这一目标的第一步就是立即在谈判桌上结束这场战争。 我相信，其基础是美国的谨慎态度和俄罗斯撤军以及北约不会向乌克兰扩张的协议。 这是问题的关键，我相信欧洲共同家园的愿景对于我们的福祉和生存仍然至关重要，从这个意义上说，三十多年来我一直受到这个想法的启发 。

Jeffrey Sachs's Great-Power Politics

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/jeffrey-sachss-great-power-politics

The economist discusses what the U.S. gets wrong about Putin and the war in Ukraine. 

 

By  Isaac Chotiner February 27, 2023

Jeffrey Sachs in a video-link appearance before the United Nations Security Council.

Last week, Jeffrey Sachs, the economist and professor at Columbia known for his work in the fields of poverty alleviation and foreign aid, delivered remarks to the United Nations Security Council about the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Sachs, who was invited to speak by Russia—but who told The New Yorker that it was “important to note” that he was there on his own behalf—called for an investigation of the incident. He has previously suggested that the United States was responsible; so far, no evidence linking the U.S., Russia, or any other nation to the attack has emerged. These were notable remarks for an economist to make, and highlight the degree to which, in recent years, Sachs has become outspoken on a broad sweep of geopolitical topics, from the war in Ukraine (he wants the West to negotiate a solution immediately) to China's repression of the Uyghur population (he thinks the use of the term "genocide" is mistaken). He has also blamed Anthony Fauci for the role played by the U.S. public-health apparatus in funding research abroad, in part because he thinks covid-19 originated in "U.S. lab biotechnology.”

It's an interesting chapter for a man who was best known, for many years, as a member of the American establishment. (Thirty years ago, the Times called him “probably the most important economist in the world,” for his role in pushing post-Soviet Russia to adopt “shock therapy.”) Since then, Sachs has advised multiple U.N. Secretaries-General and written multiple books; he has travelled with Bono, and worked with governments with controversial records on human rights, such as the United Arab Emirates. He is currently the president of the U.N. Sustainable Development Solutions Network. In 2020, shortly after covid began spreading across the world, I talked to him for The New Yorker about the pandemic’s economic impact and how Trump was handling the emergency; more recently, he appeared as a guest on the podcast of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., who has become one of the most prominent anti-vaccine activists and conspiracy theorists in the country.

I recently spoke by phone again with Sachs. I wanted to talk with him about his evolving views, and some of his recent travels, such as a visit with Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, is below.

How did you get interested in wanting to end the war in Ukraine?

The war is horribly destructive and horribly dangerous, and it should never have happened. Not just in the simple sense that wars are tragedies but in the specific sense that this was an utterly avoidable war. I think that the more one knows about the background to this war, the more it is clear how it could have been avoided, and also how it can end.

What specifically about the background?

This is a war that reflects rising tensions between the United States and Russia now for a quarter century. There have been many points on that path that were truly ill-advised.

Tell me what you think some of the missed opportunities were.

The key to this, which is now well discussed, but still not well understood, is the post-1991 vision of strategic leaders in the United States: that we are now in a unipolar world, and that the United States can do pretty much whatever it wants, and that includes basing the military where it wants and when it wants, entering and exiting treaties when it wants and where it wants, without serious consequence. In the mid-nineties, there was a quite ferocious debate over even the first phase of nato enlargement, where many wise people, including Bill Perry, our Defense Secretary at the time under Clinton, thought that this was a dreadful mistake; many others did, too. And George Kennan, whom I regard as the essence of wisdom, thought that it would lead to a new Cold War.

Clinton chose to move ahead with nato enlargement. Because that first phase was in Central Europe, I don’t think it was decisive, although it definitely made the situation more difficult. And then came the war over Serbia and the bombing of Serbia by nato forces. This was, in my opinion, a dreadful mistake. And there’s lots that we don’t know publicly about this. I’ve been told many, many things by insiders. I don’t know whether they’re true or not, because I don’t see the archives, but I believe that this was a dreadful mistake. Then came 9/11. President Putin offered support for the U.S. efforts at the beginning, but the Iraq war was clearly a major, major blow.

Bush continued with seven more nato enlargements, getting close and hot under the collar, because they involved the three Baltic states, along with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia, and the pushback was very, very hard. In 2008 came the absolutely dreadful decision by Bush to push for nato enlargement to Ukraine and to Georgia. That was, in essence, what set us not just on a path of absolutely hardening relations but on a path to this war.

The war began, however, nine years ago, with the U.S. participation in the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych, in February, 2014—the very active U.S. role in that. We’ll only perhaps know the full extent of it when the archives are opened, decades from now. We know enough that this was why the war actually occurred.

I’m a little confused when you talk about 2008, because the full-scale invasion of Ukraine didn’t start until 2022, fourteen years later, and Ukraine was no closer to getting into nato.

In 2008, at the nato summit in Bucharest, nato said that it would enlarge to include Ukraine and Georgia. The decision was made by nato. It was a very contentious meeting, because most of the Europeans objected, but the United States pushed it through. And this led, in my view, to the war in Georgia very soon afterward. I think that was Russia’s message to Georgia: you’re not going to join nato. And that was a message for Ukraine as well.

Ukraine was already in a battle in which the United States was heavily participating, between a divided country, east and west divisions, pro- and anti-nato divisions, and so forth. In 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became President; he [later] called for Ukraine to join nato. This created the big tensions that led to 2008. And then Yushchenko was defeated and Yanukovych came in saying we should have neutrality. And that, I believe, was viewed as an affront to the U.S. policymakers who were intent on nato enlargement. In late 2013, when protests against Yanukovych broke out, the U.S. took the occasion to play extremely actively in this and in ways that were rather direct, let us say—paying a lot of money to those who were leading this so-called movement and helping to finance what became a coup.

So you think what happened in 2014 was a coup?

It was a coup, of course. It was an unconstitutional seizure of power when very violent groups, well armed, stormed the government buildings in February, 2014. [Protesters, angered by Yanukovych’s rejection of a trade agreement with the European Union, were killed by security forces after trying to occupy parts of Kyiv; afterward, Yanukovych was isolated politically and fled to Russia with the assistance of the Kremlin. I asked Sachs over e-mail for a source for his claim about the role played by the U.S. He responded, “It is public knowledge that the National Endowment for Democracy and US NGOs spent heavily in Ukraine to support the Maidan. I have first-hand knowledge of that spending.” The N.E.D. told The New Yorker that it provides funding to civil-society groups but “does not provide funding to support protests.”]

Let me just go back to 2008. I understand what happened at the Bucharest summit. My point is that fourteen years later Ukraine was no closer to actually joining nato.

That’s not correct. That’s not correct, Isaac. At all. The fact of the matter is that, after the overthrow of Yanukovych, a series of governments in both Ukraine and the U.S. have heavily armed Ukraine, heavily modernized Ukraine’s Army, poured in many billions of dollars of armaments, and this is what made it possible for Ukraine to resist the Russian invasion in February, 2022.

You’re saying once the country was invaded?

No, no, no, no. Starting in 2014. This is important.

Once Crimea had been invaded, you are saying?

This is perhaps one of the things that needs more investigation by the likes of you and your colleagues, to look into the events around the Maidan. This was an overthrow of a government that replaced a government that was calling for neutrality—

Neutrality?

Yes, the Yanukovych government. [Yanukovych wanted a closer alliance with Russia; it was recently reported that Putin planned to use Yanukovych to help install a puppet regime after the 2022 invasion.]

I see.

And this is the decisive event. We are told every day that this is the first anniversary of the war. But even the secretary-general of nato, Jens Stoltenberg, who was one of the biggest hard-liners on this war, says this is the ninth year of the war. That is the fact. This war started in February, 2014. He says it started with Russia’s seizure of Crimea. I think you have to dial the clock back about a month, at least. It started with the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, in which the United States played a very active role.

You said that Putin offered to help the U.S. after 9/11, and the U.S. kind of shrugged it off.

[They did not] quite shrug it off in Afghanistan. What turned things was the neocon project to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam. That was incidental to 9/11, I’d say.

Of course. In a different context, Putin could be seen as a dictator who had been brutal with Muslims in Chechnya and was later brutal with Muslims in Syria, and the last thing that America should want is to ally with such a person. But you seem to be criticizing the United States for not wanting to ally with Putin in the global war on terror, of which you yourself have been a very eloquent critic.

You kind of misunderstood. My point was that Russia was supportive of the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11—it understood that this was a major shock and wanted to try to address this. I know many European leaders who have dealt with Putin extensively over the years, and it’s important to understand that, even after the Serbian nato bombing, which I regard as rather outrageous, and even after the nato enlargement, which I regard as provocative, Putin was pro-European in the early two-thousands, was dealing closely with many European leaders, and was not the madman that is portrayed today in our media.

What I’m suggesting is that this was not an antagonistic relationship, or a lost relationship, even though, in my opinion, the U.S. had already begun a series of provocative steps that I oppose, which became worse over time. Incidentally, in 2011, the United States decided to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, in Syria, and sometime around 2012—we don’t know the exact dates—President Obama signed Operation Timber Sycamore, which assigned the C.I.A. the task of working with the other powers in the Middle East to overthrow Assad.

Assad was an ally of Russia. We often say, ridiculously, in our media that Putin entered Syria, because people don’t understand that Obama tasked the C.I.A. with overthrowing Assad, and the U.S. blocked the peace attempts that were very close to coming to fruition in 2012 in Syria. I know this, also.

You’re someone who has cared about poverty and less-fortunate people in the world for a very long time. Putin dropped bombs on hospitals and schools in Syria, and you’re blaming the United States for trying to destabilize a dictator who killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. I really think if you would listen to yourself—

Isaac, Isaac, you should seriously understand the timing and the facts, because you don’t. With all respect, I would be delighted if you learned something about that and looked into it carefully. Because it really is just another case where the U.S. secretly destabilized a country and walked away afterward. It’s not quite “walked away,” but basically walked away, after many years of destruction. This is relevant because it entailed destabilizing an ally of Russia. That’s one reason that it’s pertinent for our current discussion. Another reason is that it’s another case of covert operations by the United States.

Maybe I should phrase the question in a different way. In the past, when I’ve read your writing on the sins of American foreign policy, the global war on terror, our role in destabilizing countries all over the world with coups during the Cold War and the war in Iraq, and the devastation that this has caused abroad, you speak with real passion. Maybe it’s because you’re an American, and it’s good that you’re so critical of our country. Now, when you’re talking about civilians being killed in Syria or in Eastern Europe, you have this almost clinical lack of passion, and everything seems to just trace back to the United States being the secret power causing it. There’s no sense of these people’s wishes or desires, there’s no sense of Eastern Europeans wanting to join nato and why they might want that. There’s no sense of the human-rights issues involved. Do you think that’s a fair critique? And how do you respond to it?

I don’t think it’s a fair critique at all, and I think maybe you’re missing my point completely, which is that I find it horrendous how many innocent people are dying and suffering. I worry about it every day. It’s a horrible thing. It weighs very heavily on me personally, but I believe that understanding these events so that the fighting can stop is of paramount importance.

Let me just say a word about Syria. The United States destabilized Syria and, in early 2012, there was the possibility of a peace agreement. One country stood in the way of the peace agreement. That was the United States.

Wait, sorry, Bashar al-Assad was willing to make peace, but the U.S. would not let him, essentially?

The U.S. insisted that Bashar al-Assad must go for there to be peace. The other participants in the negotiation said that a political process could end this, but not starting on the first day with U.S.-backed regime change. [When asked in an e-mail whether he had a source for the claim that the U.S. was the lone country opposing a peace agreement, Sachs told The New Yorker, “I have first-hand knowledge of the US blocking the peace agreement in Syria from the highest international sources.”]

When it comes to Ukraine, what is so horrifying for me is that this war, even considering the multiple facts I’ve laid out that were the predicate to this war, could have been avoided at the end of 2021. President Putin put on the table three demands: no nato enlargement, Crimea remaining part of Russia, and the Minsk II agreements being implemented. The United States refused.

Do you still think, in hindsight, that Putin was being sincere here?

I think that one could have created an enforceable agreement around those points. Sincerity is a strange idea in this. It’s not a matter of sincerity; it’s a matter of finding an agreement and then the modalities to enforce the agreement, including, of course, withdrawal of forces from borders, demilitarization, peacekeeping operations, monitors, other steps. So, as Ronald Reagan used to wisely say, “Trust, but verify.” This isn’t a matter of sincerity. This is a matter of understanding the nature of this conflict and how it could have been avoided. I tried at the end of 2021 to say to whomever would listen in the White House and in the Biden Administration that nato enlargement was a terrible idea. And, if they responded to me, “Well, Jeff, it’s not going to happen,” I said, “If that’s your view, make it explicit and public and thereby avoid the war.” But they didn’t.

What have you made of Putin’s rhetoric in the last year that he’s the new Peter the Great, that Ukraine is part of a Greater Russia, the Russian imperial perspective that he’s put forward as one cause of the war, one of the driving forces of it for him, in his own words?

Yeah, I think your interview with John Mearsheimer covers that well, so I’ll just leave it there. I think it’s accurately described there.

You mean Mearsheimer’s view is accurate?

That was not the cause of the war. This is not the motivation of the war, and you’re basically—

What do you make of Putin saying these things explicitly, then?

I don’t like when he says these things, but I don’t think this is the point of what’s happening right now. Anybody that has watched this carefully—day in, day out—for twenty-five years knows that the number of times nato enlargement has been discussed is in the hundreds or the thousands, and in all sorts of documents and in all sorts of contexts. So I think it’s a little bit of a game of the Western media.

To quote Putin is a game?

No. The job should be to help people understand what’s happening.

I was reading a long article in the Financial Times this morning, and the piece was essentially reporting that, among the Russian military, business, and political élite, Putin was pretty alone in wanting this war. Does that suggest that maybe structural reasons, such as nato enlargement, were less causal—if all these other actors in Russia would not have actually carried out the war? I agree that American policy toward Russia after the Cold War is absolutely a legitimate point of inquiry, with many errors. But, if Putin is dropping bombs and trying to invade a country when most of the other élites in Russia don’t want that, maybe it’s more about Putin himself, no?

I think that this is the Western trope, and I must say I think that the Financial Times’ coverage has been very poor on this. We should understand the British media. The British media have been Russophobic since well before the first Crimean war, which was 1853 to 1856. The Financial Times is playing its role, as is the rest of the British media. It’s very familiar, it’s very typical, it’s very rhetorical, and I would urge people not to so personalize this. I see it in The New Yorker, too: this is viewed almost as a war of one person. This is really a serious misunderstanding, and it also can lead to very strange ideas. Well, if he goes, then the war’s over. Many strange and simplistic ideas. This is not a war of one person. This is a war that has reasons and, like von Clausewitz said, it is a continuation of politics by other means, and we should understand that as clearly as possible, so that we can end the war now, as fast as possible, because people are suffering every day.

I also just read something today that said, “It’s fine. Ukraine’s going to win. We just need to hold on. Yes, there will be a few hundred thousand more deaths, but in the end it will be a great triumph.” That truly makes me shudder. I think the naïveté and cruelty of that argument are extraordinary, and the absolutely substantial and real risk of nuclear escalation is profoundly overlooked.

What would convince you that you were wrong?

Well, if the war ends quickly.

About the motivation for the war, I mean.

It’s not so interesting, in my view. What I believe to be the point is that we should try negotiating. That’s my point. We should try negotiating.

You recently wrote, “The basis for peace is clear. Ukraine would be a neutral non-Nato country. Crimea would remain home to Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, as it has been since 1783. A practical solution would be found for the Donbas, such as a territorial division, autonomy, or an armistice line.” Again, I agree that negotiation is absolutely necessary, but to say that “the basis for peace is clear” and then to say that Ukrainians who may want to join nato should not be able to, and that chunks of their country should now belong to Russia—again, the way you write suggests to me a certain lack of interest or emotion about a country being annexed and invaded. I understand that there are also larger geopolitical issues, but do you not see the point I’m making? Or does that seem unfair to you?

Let me put it this way. First, stopping nato enlargement is not a concession. It’s both a necessity and a matter of prudence for the United States. It was a terrible idea, period, for the U.S.

Why do you think countries in Eastern Europe want to be part of nato?

I can understand why they would want to be part of nato, but I cannot understand why the United States would think it’s safe and prudent to push nato into Ukraine, into Georgia. It’s completely reckless. The questions of Crimea and the Donbas arose after the U.S. participation in the coup against Yanukovych, because before that Russia wasn’t taking Crimea. What Yanukovych was negotiating with Russia was a long-term lease so that the Russian naval base would be in Sevastopol, and it would be there until at least 2042, with options for renewal. In the Donbas, there was an ongoing twenty-year heavy debate about autonomy and about languages, but there was nothing like war.

You’ve been a very eloquent critic of some of the worst aspects of American foreign policy. Let’s take the Iraq War as one example. You’ve described everything Russia has done during the past twelve years—bombing civilians in Syria, bombing civilians in Ukraine, annexing Crimea, supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine—as essentially forced on them. If people described the Iraq War that way, by removing responsibility from the United States, it would make me cringe. Every Russian action you’ve mentioned is just described as the result of American behavior.

Again, I think you’re really misunderstanding and mischaracterizing me. Let me describe what I’m saying about American policy, what I would like the readers of The New Yorker to really appreciate for a variety of reasons, because I’ve been an adviser economically all over the world, and I know leaders all over the world and have known leaders all over the world for many decades. I’ve seen a lot, and what I’m trying to convey is something very basic about American foreign policy, and that is that it is devastatingly based on lies and covert actions, and I see those lies all the time.

I happened to be on a talk show the night that Colin Powell presented the U.N. testimony. There were six panelists. They went around the table, and they finally came to me. I said, “It’s lies. It’s clearly lies,” which it was. It wasn’t just wrong intelligence; it was lies cooked up to justify a war. Then I happened to know about the lies of the U.S. in Syria. You keep talking about Putin bombing people in Syria; the United States both provoked the disaster and stopped it from ending. I know that.

O.K. The idea that people—

Quite the contrary, I am telling people that the narrative that we have is leading to an escalation of deaths, and it’s putting us on a path to nuclear devastation.

I know, but you’re also talking about people being “provoked” into slaughtering civilians.

The United States armed the opposition to Assad with the instruction to overthrow Assad. That’s a war.

He was a dictator who was slaughtering his own people. Are you aware of that?

No. No?

I’m aware of a lot more than you are aware of about Syria, because I know a great deal about the day-to-day events from the spring of 2011 onward, and I urge you to look at that, Isaac, seriously.

O.K. Let’s move on to your meeting with Viktor Orbán, a happier subject. What did you guys discuss?

We discussed the Ukraine War.

Why did you go see him?

I was invited to the National Bank of Hungary to give a talk, and I paid a courtesy call on the President.

As one does.

You do if you have known him since 1989. Yes.

What do you make of his current rule?

We discussed the war in Ukraine, and I believe that he has the right point that this war should end with negotiations.

I see. What do you make of his rule, generally?

This is what we discussed, and I very much agreed with his position.

I’ll just ask one more time. I’m curious what you think of Viktor Orbán, generally.

I know. You can ask a hundredth time, but we discussed the war in Ukraine.

O.K. So, you don’t feel comfortable weighing in on that. You’re just staring at the camera; you’re not interested in talking about that. Is that accurate?

Don’t play games, Isaac. Let’s talk about the subjects that we agreed to talk about.

I never agreed to only talk about any specific subjects.

Are we at the end? Do you have to leave?

I have to leave if we’re not going to continue to try to understand more deeply how to get out of this war.

Well, you said that you talked to Orbán because you thought that he had the right ideas about the war. More specifically, what do you think those ideas are?

The ideas are that we need a negotiated settlement of this war.

And you think he sincerely wants that?

I hope so.

You mentioned in an e-mail to me that you thought China could play an important role in maybe bringing an end to this war. How would that function?

China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and a number of other major countries that are not party to this war and have normal relations with Ukraine, with Russia, and with other countries are saying that there should be an end to this war through negotiation. This is important, in my view. These countries constitute a significant part of humanity and a significant part of the global scene. What China has said all along, that the security interests of all parties should be respected, in my view, is a basis for saying that Ukraine’s sovereignty and security need to be protected. And, at the same time, nato should not enlarge, because that threatens the security of Russia. That, to my mind, is understanding properly the structural challenge that we face in reaching peace.

You’ve been criticized for some of the things that you’ve said or written about China a couple of years ago. You said, “The Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang [had] essentially the same motivation as America’s foray to the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 11, 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.” Do you still feel that’s the purpose of China having concentration camps?

What a ridiculous phrasing of a question. The article was about one thing: was there a genocide in Xinjiang? I pointed out that the U.S. government had provided no evidence for that.

I am just curious if you think—

And that there should be a U.N. investigation, but I think we probably reached the end of the time, because this is about Ukraine, and I think we should keep the focus on that. This is the key issue that the world faces. I think there’s more to say about that, and if you had questions about that, I’d be happy to answer them.

We’ve been talking about it for forty-five minutes. I just wanted to ask you that.

No, no, no. If we're at the end, it's fine. It's fine.

I would just end with one final question. Do you feel that you’ve changed in any way? I was listening to you on Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.,’s podcast talking about how excited you were to read his book, and I thought, Is this the same Jeff Sachs I’ve been reading for twenty years?

I’ll say the following: Thirty-four years ago, I was inspired by President Gorbachev’s vision of a peaceful world and of a common European home. I still believe that is our goal. I believe it is what we should be working toward. I believe that we could still achieve that goal, and the first step to achieving that goal would be ending this war at the negotiating table immediately. And I believe the basis for that would be prudence by the United States and withdrawal of troops by Russia with the agreement that nato will not expand to Ukraine. This is the crux of the matter, and I believe that the vision of a common European home is still vital for our well-being and our survival, and, in this sense, I’ve been inspired by that idea for more than three decades.

More New Yorker Conversations

• The Zen wisdom of Sarah Silverman.

• Ken Jennings has some questions about death.

• Tinx explains why we’re dating all wrong.

• Leslie Marmon Silko saw it coming.

• Tom Hanks on the rewards and “vicious reality” of making movies.

• Harvey Karp knows how to make babies happy.

Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the principal contributor to Q. & A., a series of interviews with public figures in politics, media, books, business, technology, and more.