风萧萧_Frank
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为什么中国不会和平崛起
https://opencanada.org/why-china-will-not-rise-peaceously/
约翰·米尔斯海默 (John Mearsheimer) 接受采访，了解中国的崛起以及太平洋两岸国家为何应感到担忧。
作者：JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC LÉGARÉ-TREMBLAY / 自由记者，2014 年 2 月 12 日
过去四十年来，中国经济每年增长百分之七到百分之十。 芝加哥大学政治学杰出教授约翰·米尔斯海默担心，人口问题、社会动荡或经济危机最终可能会抑制这种增长，但如果中国确实继续崛起，它也不会平静地崛起。
米尔斯海默教授受蒙特利尔大学国际研究中心（CÉRIUM）邀请发表演讲。 OpenCanada 撰稿人 Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay 和他坐在一起。
莱加雷-特朗布莱：为什么中国不能和平崛起？
米尔斯海默：真正强大的国家喜欢主宰自己的地区，这样自己的后院就不会受到任何威胁。 因此，如果中国确实变得更加强大，我相信它将试图像美国统治西半球那样统治亚洲。 它将试图将美国尽可能远离亚太地区。 它还将试图主宰其邻国。 这并不意味着中国会试图征服所有这些国家，但它将处于“称雄”的位置。
与此同时，美国和中国的邻国不希望中国成为地区霸主，因此将竭尽全力遏制其增长。 这些利益冲突将导致激烈的安全竞争，甚至有可能爆发战争。
还有两个悲观的理由。 一是中国显然是一个修正主义国家：它想要回归台湾； 它要收回钓鱼岛； 它想主宰南海； 它与印度和布坦存在边界争端……这个国家有非常强大的动机利用其军事力量以它认为合适的方式改变现状。
第二个原因是中国的民族主义。 中国人对于过去受过列强的迫害有着非常深刻的感受。 日本在这方面尤其重要，美国也是如此。 这种民族主义在很大程度上是针对他们的。 因此，如果我们将来某个地方发生危机，民族主义可能会助长危机并导致冲突。
与此同时，中国对台湾、钓鱼岛、南海、印度和不丹等邻国的领土争端持什么态度？
如果你看看过去十年中几乎所有涉及中国的危机，就会发现几乎每一场危机都是由中国的一个邻国挑起的。 我认为中国几乎在所有情况下都对挑衅反应过度，但最初的挑衅来自中国的邻国。 我认为这是因为这些邻国有动机制造麻烦并尝试立即解决特定问题，而不是等待20或30年，届时中国肯定会更加强大，并且能够更好地决定最终协议的条款 。
从中国的角度来看，明智的策略是等待。 这就是为什么我认为中国人对过去十年左右出现的各种危机反应过度是愚蠢的。 他们最好缓和自己的言辞，显得不那么好战，等到他们变得足够强大来决定任何协议的条款。
您在《大国政治的悲剧》一书中写道，与中国发生战争的风险将比冷战时期与苏联的战争风险更大。 为什么？
冷战时期，美国和苏联之间爆发战争是极其困难的，因为冲突的中心点在欧洲的中心。 这就是我们所说的中央阵线。 苏联及其盟国拥有大量的装甲师、机械化师和核武器，美国及其盟国也拥有类似的武库。 这意味着作为竞争焦点的欧洲冲突将成为核武器的第三次世界大战。 而且，没有一个头脑清醒的人愿意这样。 这将是灾难性的。 战争越可怕，发生这场战争的可能性就越小。
亚洲的情况非常不同，因为地理位置非常不同。 亚洲没有中央阵线。 当我们谈论潜在的冲突局势时，我们谈论的是围绕台湾、南海或东海小岛屿可能发生的战争。 这些将是小规模战争，而不是核武器的第三次世界大战。 这就是为什么它们更有可能发生。
崛起的中国将采取哪些步骤？
大国所做的事情，首先是试图在其地区建立霸权。 一旦它实现了这一目标，它就开始走向世界舞台并表现得像一个超级大国。 超级大国是一个有能力向世界其他地区投射军事力量的大国，就像今天的美国一样。
今天的中国是一个大国，但它在亚洲以外的地区投射力量的能力非常有限。 因此，中国首先要做的就是在亚洲建立地区霸权，这意味着它比所有邻国都强大得多，并有效地将美国赶出亚洲。 一旦做到这一点，它将开始认真考虑在全球范围内投射力量。
您在书中提到，波斯湾和西半球将成为对北京具有特殊战略价值的两个地区。 为什么？
就西半球而言，确保美国必须关注自己的后院符合中国的既得利益。 大多数美国人从来没有想过为什么美国可以自由地在世界各地漫游，插手每个人的事情。 这是因为美国在西半球几乎不面临任何安全威胁。 加拿大、墨西哥、危地马拉、巴西——这些并不是对美国的威胁。 因此，美国可以自由地漫游到世界其他地区。 如果中国人想要停止这种情况，他们就在西半球制造麻烦，这符合他们的既得利益，让美国不得不关注自己的背景，而不太能够关注亚洲。
这也是我们既得利益的原因，即确保亚洲有其他强国能够吸引中国人的注意力，并迫使中国人关注他们，这样北京就不会随意闯入西方国家。 半球。
至于波斯湾，这在很大程度上是因为中国已经从该地区获得了大量石油，并且随着时间的推移，中国将从该地区进口更多石油。 中国人将越来越将该地区视为具有重要战略意义的地区。 他们还希望有能力将石油从海湾运回中国。
当然，美国是一个嫉妒的上帝，它不喜欢中国在波斯湾的影响力，就像它不喜欢苏联在那里的影响力一样。 这就是为什么我认为美国和中国之间将会发生涉及波斯湾的严重安全竞争。
尽管美国制裁，中国仍从伊朗获得大量石油，这种情况不是已经发生了吗？
是的。 我认为我们已经看到了这种竞争的开始。 我还认为，直到最近，美国对伊朗的政策一直是非常愚蠢的，因为我们所做的实际上是将伊朗人推入中国人的怀抱。 如果美国继续对伊朗采取强硬态度，他们就会对寻找盟友有着根深蒂固的兴趣，比如中国，他们已经在波斯湾寻找盟友。 德黑兰和北京之间将会出现利益联姻，但这不符合美国的利益。 这就是为什么美国应该竭尽全力改善与伊朗的关系。
2012年，美国战略重心部分东移，提出“重返亚洲”战略。 您认为这是一个好的战略方法吗？
首先，我认为华盛顿宣布转向亚洲的主要原因不是因为中国。 这是因为我们的亚洲盟友开始认为美国是一个不可靠的伙伴。 对于日本和韩国来说尤其如此。 他们两人都非常担心中国的崛起和朝鲜。 平壤和北京拥有核武器，但韩国和日本没有。 他们依赖美国的核保护伞。 首尔和东京的人们非常密切地关注美国在世界舞台上的表现以及美国决策者认为亚洲有多重要。
如果你是韩国人或日本人，看看美国自9月11日以来的表现，你就会对美国人不太有信心。 他们一直痴迷于中东，而且他们的行为方式非常愚蠢。 所以在日本、韩国，还有新加坡等地，人们都担心美国。 我认为，通过转向亚洲，我们向我们的盟友发出了一个明确的信号：尽管中东发生了一切，我们仍将支持他们。
与此同时，中国应该被视为伙伴还是竞争对手？
美国应该开始制定遏制战略，这就是他们正在做的事情。 顺便说一句，独立于美国之外，我们可以看到中国的邻国开始以前所未有的方式走到一起并相互合作。 例如，你会惊讶地看到过去五年印度和日本之间的军事合作有多大。 我们已经可以看到平衡联盟的各个部分正在就位。 我认为美国现在必须开始保持平衡，同时非常小心，以免引发战争。
到目前为止，奥巴马政府做得非常好。 它没有反应过度，也没有反应不足。 中国距离拥有在亚洲造成重大麻烦的军事实力还有很长的路要走。 因此美国此时不必在军事上做太多的事情。 但慢慢地、稳定地，这些资产将不得不转移到亚洲，而美国将不得不努力组建一个联盟来遏制中国。
本次采访是在蒙特利尔大学国际研究中心 (CÉRIUM) 的赞助下进行的，采访者是该中心的研究员。
Why China Will Not Rise Peacefully
https://opencanada.org/why-china-will-not-rise-peacefully/
An interview with John Mearsheimer about China’s rise and why countries on both sides of the Pacific should be worried.
Professor Mearsheimer was invited to speak by the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CÉRIUM) at the Université de Montréal. OpenCanada contributor Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay sat down with him there.
Légaré-Tremblay: Why can’t China rise peacefully?
Mearsheimer: Really powerful states like to dominate their region so that there are no threats whatsoever in their own backyard. So, if China does indeed grow more powerful, I believe it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will try to push the United States as far away as possible from the Asia Pacific region. And it will try to dominate its neighbours. This doesn’t mean that China will try to conquer all of them, but it will be in a position where it “rules the roost.”
At the same time, the United States and China’s neighbours, who don’t want China to become a regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to contain its growth. These conflicting interests will lead to an intense security competition, with a real possibility of war.
There are two other reasons to be pessimistic. One is that China is clearly a revisionist power: it wants Taiwan back; it wants the Diaoyu Islands back; it wants to dominate the South China Sea; it has border disputes with India and Butan… This is a country that has very powerful incentives to use its military might to change the status quo in ways that it sees fit.
The second reason is Chinese nationalism. The Chinese have a very profound sense of having been victimized by great powers in the past. Japan is especially important in this regard—and the United States, too. This nationalism is directed in important ways at them. So if we are to have a crisis somewhere down the road, that nationalism could fuel the crisis and lead to conflict.
In the meantime, what is China’s approach regarding those territorial disputes with its neighbors: Taiwan, the Diaoyu islands, the South China Sea, India, and Bhutan?
If you look at almost all of the crises over the past decade that have involved China, almost every one of them has been started by one of China’s neighbours. I think China has overreacted in almost every case to the provocation, but the initial provocation has come from China’s neighbours. I think this is because those neighbours have an incentive to cause trouble and try and resolve particular problems now rather than wait 20 or 30 years, when China will certainly be much more powerful and in a much better position to dictate the terms of a final agreement.
From China’s point of view, the smart strategy is to wait. This is why I think that the Chinese have been foolish to overreact to these various crises that have popped up over the past decade or so. They would be much better off toning down their rhetoric, appearing to be less bellicose, and wait until they get powerful enough to dictate the terms of any agreement.
In your book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, you write that the risk of war with China will be greater than with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Why?
It was extremely difficult to come to a war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War because the central point of conflict was in the heart of Europe. It’s what we call the Central Front. The Soviets and their allies had huge numbers of armoured divisions, mechanized divisions, and nuclear weapons on their side and the United States and its allies had a similar arsenal on their side. It meant that a conflict in Europe, which was the key focus of the competition, would have been World War 3 with nuclear weapons. And, nobody in his right mind wanted that. It would have been catastrophic. The more horrible the war is going to be, the less likely it is that you will have that war.
The situation in Asia is very different, because the geography is very different. There is no Central Front in Asia. And when we talk about potential conflict situations, we’re talking about a possible war over Taiwan, over the South China Sea, or over small islands in the East China Sea. These would be small wars, not World War 3 with nuclear weapons. This is why it is more likely that they will happen.
What steps would a rising China follow?
What a great power does, first of all, is try to establish hegemony in its region. Once it accomplishes that goal, it begins to move out on the world stage and act like a superpower. The superpower is a great power that has the ability to project military might into other regions of the world, like the United States today.
China today is a great power, but it has very little power projection capability outside of Asia. So what China will try to do first is to establish regional hegemony in Asia, which means getting to the point where it is much more powerful than all of its neighbours and where it has effectively pushed the United States out of Asia. Once it has done that, it will begin to think about projecting power in a serious way all around the globe.
In your book, you mention that the Persian Gulf and the Western Hemisphere will be two regions of a peculiar strategic value to Beijing. Why?
Regarding the Western hemisphere, China has a vested interest in making sure that the United States has to focus on its own backyard. Most Americans never think about the reason why the United States is free to roam all over the world, sticking its nose in everybody’s business. This is because the United States faces virtually no security threats in the Western Hemisphere. Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil – These are not threats to the United States. The United States is thus free to roam into other regions of the world. If the Chinese want this to stop, they have a vested interest in causing trouble in the Western Hemisphere, so that the United States has to focus on its background and is less able to pay attention to Asia.
This is the same reason we have a vested interest in making sure that there are other powers in Asia that can attract the attention of the Chinese, and force the Chinese to pay attention to them, so that Beijing is not free to roam into the Western Hemisphere.
As for the Persian Gulf, this is in large part because China already gets a large amount of oil from that region and will import even more oil from there over time. The Chinese will view that region more and more as a strategically important area. They will also want to have the capability to move that oil from the Gulf back to China.
The United States, of course, is a jealous god, and it does not like the idea of Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf any more than it liked the idea of Soviet influence there. This is why I think there will be a serious security competition between the United States and China involving the Persian Gulf.
Isn’t that already happening with Iran, from which China gets a lot of oil despite U.S. sanctions?
Yes. I think we have seen the beginnings of that rivalry. I also think that up until recently, American policy towards Iran has been remarkably foolish, because what we are doing in effect is driving the Iranians into the arms of the Chinese. If the United States continues to play hardball with the Iranians, they will have a deep-seated interest in trying to find allies, such as the Chinese, who are already looking for allies in the Persian Gulf. There would then be a marriage of interest between Tehran and Beijing and that would not be in America’s interest. This is why the United States should go to great lengths to improve its relations with Iran.
The United States has partly shifted its strategic focus eastward in 2012 by adopting the “Pivot to Asia.” In your opinion, is that a good strategic approach?
First, I think that the principal reason Washington enunciated the pivot to Asia is not because of China. It is because our allies in Asia have come to think that the United States is an unreliable partner. This is especially true with regard to Japan and South Korea. Both of them are very worried about the rise of China and about North Korea. Pyongyang and Beijing have nuclear weapons, but South Korea and Japan do not. They depend on the American nuclear umbrella. People in Seoul and Tokyo pay very careful attention to how America behaves on the world stage and how important American policy-makers seem to think Asia is.
If you are South Korean or Japanese and you look at how the United States has behaved since September 11th, you cannot be very confident in the Americans. They have been obsessed with the Middle East and they have behaved in remarkably foolish ways. So in Japan, in South Korea, and in places like Singapore as well, people are worried about the United States. I think that with the pivot to Asia, we were sending a clear signal to our allies that despite all that’s happened in the Middle East, we will be there for them.
In the meantime, should China be treated as a partner or a rival?
The United States should start to build up a containment strategy and this is what they are doing. By the way, independent of the United States, we can see that China’s neighbours are beginning to come together and co-operate with each other in ways they have not in the past. You would be surprised to see how much military cooperation has developed between India and Japan for instance over the past five years. We can already see the pieces of the balancing coalition moving into place. And I think it is imperative that the United States starts to balance now while being very careful that it does not precipitate a war.
So far, the Obama administration has done very well. It has not overreacted and it has not under reacted. China is still a long way off from having the military might to cause significant trouble in Asia. Therefore the United States does not have to do too much militarily at this point in time. But slowly, steadily, the assets are going to have to be shifted to Asia and the United States is going to have to work to put together an alliance to contain China.
This interview was conducted under the auspices of the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM), of which the interviewer is a fellow.
