危机时期，民主制度与专制制度孰优孰劣？

MAX FISHER 2022年7月28日

 

5月，在上海进行大流行封锁期间，骑车经过中国国家主席习近平的海报。 

 

多年来，大学和智库一直在通过公共外交和官方媒体进行着一场辩论：民主和专制，哪个在危机时期表现得更好？

 

毫无疑问，民主制度在个人权利或法治等问题上占据优势。尽管如此，关于哪种制度能更有效地应对重大国家挑战的讨论引起了广泛关注，尤其是考虑到中国震撼世界的崛起，以及西方对政治内斗的不满情绪加深。

现在，气候变化和大流行这两个同时发生的危机正在考验各国政府。许多研究仔细审视了这些政府的表现，结果如下：虽然民主国家在处理这些问题方面的平均表现略好一些，但民主国家和专制国家都没有表现出明显和稳定的优势。

有大量理论研究一种体制或另一种体制的所谓优势，但几乎无助于预测这些危机将如何发展。

 

例如，人们曾经普遍认为，像中国这样的专制国家，因其中央集权和跨越世代的规划，在应对气候变化等挑战时有独特的能力。

但北京方面减少温室气体排放的承诺却受到了政治内斗和短期需要的阻碍，后者正是中国宣传部门口中民主国家的特点。

与此同时，虽然一些民主国家在处理与气候相关的问题方面表现出色，但其他国家却还在挣扎，尤其是美国，本月早些时候，美国再一次因国会陷入僵局，使得又一项气候计划破产。

然后还有大流行。

人们预测，由于民主国家的透明度和对公众舆论的敏感度，它们将能够更好地应对病毒，但实际情况并非如此。也有人宣称，由于专制制度的果断和主动行动的能力，它们将有出类拔萃的表现，这一预测也落空了。许多专制国家并没有做得很好。

多项研究发现，根据超额死亡等指标衡量，这两种制度在管理大流行方面的平均表现大致相同。

民主国家做得稍好一些。但专家强调，这个小差距可能并不反映民主国家有更好的应对能力，而是表明拥有更强大卫生系统的国家更有可能是民主国家。

正如大流行所表明的那样，这两种制度都可以有效地发挥作用，在减缓病毒传播方面表现最好的国家中，既有民主政府，也有专制政府。

任何一个系统都可能失败，比如中国对大流行限制措施的强制执行已经到了压垮自己的经济的地步，或者美国的气候计划在一名参议员的反对下瓦解，这名议员只代表1.5%的人口。

 

那些认为某种制度在某些危机中具有先天优势的理论站不住脚了，但它暗示了另一个教训：对民主和专制主义的普遍威胁可能不是来自彼此，而是来自内部的弱点。

评估两种制度

5月，繁华的首尔江南区。

 

“这是一个非常复杂的问题，部分原因是评估表现的方法有很多，”威克森林大学政治学家贾斯汀·埃萨里在谈到有关哪种制度治理更出色的“大量”研究时说。

这个问题在1990年代变得突出，当时几个亚洲专制国家的经济腾飞，被视为民主模式的新对手。从那时起，经济表现就成了系统运行优劣的判断标准。

两种思想流派出现了。一个流派说，像中国这样的专制政府没有受到选举强加的短期思维或民主进程的低效率影响，可以强行实施更好的政策。

另一个流派认为，民主国家的透明度和问责制带来的是更好的运作和更及时响应民意的治理。这一方的支持者指出，在朝鲜经济崩溃的同时，韩国经济在民主制度下蓬勃发展。

 

从那以后，这两种理论都广泛传播。但两者都经不起持续的审视。

例如，一项针对全球专制经济体的研究发现，平均而言，它们既没有超过也没有落后于民主国家。一些专制国家的经济获得了增长，这与一些民主国家的原因相同：领导人的明智选择、更好的运作机构和其他因素。

这两个系统的运作方式不同，但差异通常会相互抵消。

另一项研究发现，民主国家在抑制衰退方面表现得更好，而以政党为基础的专制体制在促进增长方面表现得更好，但最终证明这些体制的经济表现差不多。

而不同基准的比较却大相径庭。公民的幸福感、婴儿死亡率等健康指标以及公共服务的质量在民主制度下都更好——更不用说自由了，毕竟对自由的保护本来就是民主制度的一个根本诉求。

随着气候和大流行等全球危机变得越来越重要，关于制度的纯粹表现的问题仍然具有现实意义。

 

经受危机考验

2021年9月，超过65万面白旗插在华盛顿国家广场上，以纪念死于新冠的美国人。 

 

这场大流行已经影响了地球上的每个国家，而且它的损失可被量化，这似乎提供了一个绝佳的机会来考验哪种制度的治理更有效。

但卡内基国际和平基金会的雷切尔·克莱因菲尔德的研究，得出了与那些经济研究大致相同的结论。民主国家和专制制度的表现大致相同，一个制度的表现不会持续优于另一个。

 

虽然一些评论员指出，例如，伊朗早期的失败证明专制政府的不透明和腐败将致其毁灭，但另一些人则指出，有很多这样的政府表现出色，例如越南。

有多少面临困境的民主政体，比如美国，就有多少表现良好的民主政体，比如新西兰或台湾，这驳斥了从广义上讲民主制度过于混乱或反应迟钝的理论。

克莱因菲尔德发现，重要的是社会信任或机构能力等因素。并且在培养这些能力时，一种制度并不一定能够持续比另一种做得更好。

另一项研究承认专制统治者也许更有可能对大流行的死亡人数撒谎，该研究检验了超额死亡率——一个难以伪造的指标。他们发现，平均而言，民主国家在遏制大流行病死亡方面比专制政府做得更好——但同样，差距不大，而且可能出于政治制度以外的因素。

政治学家埃萨里还发现，在疫苗接种率方面，民主国家有少许优势，但即使如此，许多民主国家的表现不如专制政府，反之亦然。

 

气候考验

2021年11月，中国大同一个煤矿附近的工人在分拣煤炭。 

 

气候这个长期的、可以说是更大的危机能否带来不同的启示？对美国的许多人来说，专制主义似乎占据了优势，因为北京的领导人已经宣布了一项又一项重大气候政策。

 

但事实证明，一些民主国家在气候问题上同样积极，这表明美国遇到的困难与其说是因为民主本身，不如说是因为美国制度特有的怪异之处。

专制政府可能和任何民主国家一样混乱。以中国广受吹捧的五年计划为例，该计划声称制定长期政策，无需经过立法中讨价还价或内讧的麻烦。

实际上，这些文件读起来不像是立法，更像是一份愿望清单，有时措辞模糊，由中央规划者发送给省级和机构领导，由他们来决定如何实现——如果他们打算实现的话。

中国的习近平主席可以高声宣告温室气体减排目标，但他就算喊破嗓子，也没法保证自己的政府会照办——事实上看起来的确没有。中国各省的领导人和国有企业建造了更多的煤电厂，比世界其他地方加起来还多。

这其中有一部分可能是政策造成了困惑。北京同时要求经济增长和减碳，地方官们只能自己去琢磨该侧重哪一个。但有一些的确是在抗命。

北京一直苦于难以让地方官服务于国家利益。习近平多年来屡次宣称中国要削减钢铁产能，结果第二年个别省份的产出不降反升，导致市场供过于求，对全国产业构成伤害。

有一个著名的例子，北京曾命令各省遏制危及国民健康的水污染。官员们没有关闭污染工厂，只是把他们搬迁到自己的边界地带，于是污染流向了毗邻省份，而全国污染总量却增加了。

在新冠疫情之初，地方领导人向中央隐瞒疫情暴发相关的信息。现在官员们面临着感染清零的压力，于是他们对地方经济进行压制，在全国层面上产生了灾难性的效果。

这些起起落落无疑跟中国的专制模式有关。但有类似体制的国家经常在中国成功的地方遇阻，或在中国遇阻的地方却成功了。

同样，美国的成败得失跟其它民主政体的表现也谈不上一一对应，无论这算是好事还是坏事。

“生活在一个体制下的人自然会去羡慕另一个体制的优势，”埃萨里说，尤其是当世界各地的民主和专制政体都在面对越来越多的内部挑战时。

但他又说，从数据得出的结论支持了一句经常算在前英国领导人温斯顿·丘吉尔头上——这一点可能不足为信——的一句话：“民主是最坏的制度，但其他人类已尝试的制度更坏。”

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中国欲组反美联盟，领导新国际秩序  2021年3月30日

面对疫情，专制比民主更有优势？  2020年4月3日

 

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Max Fisher是一名驻纽约的国际新闻记者和专栏作家，曾在世界各地报道冲突、外交、社会变革和其他主题。他撰写的“解析”专栏探讨重大世界事件背后的想法和背景。欢迎在Twitter和Facebook上关注他。

With Crisis Everywhere, Do Democracies Have an Edge?

https://cn.nytimes.com/usa/20220728/democracies-authoritarian-governments/

The challenges of pandemic and climate change are being closely studied, but have done little so far to settle the eternal debate over whether authoritarian governments or democracies fare better in hard times.

 By Max Fisher  July 26, 2022

Riding past a poster of President Xi Jinping of China during a pandemic lockdown in Shanghai in May.

 

A debate has long raged at universities and think tanks, through public diplomacy and state media outlets: Does democracy or an authoritarian system perform better in times of crisis?

There is no doubt as to democracy’s advantage on matters like individual rights or rule of law. Still, discussions about which system is more effective in addressing major national challenges draw heavy attention, especially given China’s world-shaking rise and deepening frustration in the West over political infighting.

Now, two simultaneous crises — climate change and the pandemic — are putting governments to the test. Their performances are being scrutinized in a number of studies, with this result: While democracies do perform slightly better on average in dealing with these problems, neither democracy nor an authoritarian system has shown a clear and consistent edge.

Sweeping theories for the supposed advantages of one system or the other have been of little help in predicting how these crises would play out.

 

 

It was once widely held, for instance, that authoritarian nations like China would, because of their centralized authority and generational timelines for plans, be uniquely equipped to tackle challenges like climate change.

But Beijing’s pledges for reducing greenhouse gasses have been thwarted by political infighting and short-term imperatives of just the sort that China’s propagandists say are characteristic of democracies.

At the same time, while some democracies have excelled in dealing with climate-related matters, others have struggled, particularly the United States, which earlier this month saw yet another climate plan collapse amid congressional gridlock.

And then there is the pandemic.

Predictions that democracies’ transparency and sensitivity to public opinion would make them better equipped to handle the virus have fared poorly. So have declarations that authoritarian systems would excel because of their ability to move decisively and proactively; many did not.

Multiple studies have found that both systems have, on average, performed roughly the same in managing the pandemic, as measured by metrics like excess deaths.

 

 

Democracies have done slightly better. But experts stress that this small gap may not reflect that democracies are better equipped, but rather that countries with, for example, stronger health systems may be likelier to be democratic.

Either system can function effectively, as the pandemic has shown, with individual democracies and authoritarian governments alike among the world’s best performers on slowing the virus’s spread.

And either system can falter, as with China’s pushing pandemic restrictions to the point of cratering its own economy, or the United States’ climate plans collapsing under the opposition of a senator who represents one half of one percent of the population.

This undermines theories that either system wields an innate advantage in certain crises, but it hints at another lesson: The prevailing threats to democracy and authoritarianism alike might not come from one another, but from weaknesses within.

 

 

Assessing the Systems

 

 

 

 

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The prosperous Gangnam district in Seoul in May.Credit...Anthony Wallace/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“This is an incredibly complicated question, in part because there are so many different ways to assess performance,” Justin Esarey, a Wake Forest University political scientist, said of the “vast” number of studies into which political system governs better.

That question gained prominence in the 1990s as several Asian autocracies, their economies booming, presented what was taken as a new rival to the democratic model. Ever since, economic performance has been seen as the benchmark for which system runs better.

Two schools of thought emerged. One said that authoritarian governments like China, freed of the short-term thinking imposed by elections or the petty inefficiencies of the democratic process, could force through better policy.

The other said democracies’ transparency and accountability produce better-run and more responsive governance. Proponents pointed to South Korea’s economy booming under democracy just as North Korea’s collapsed.

Both theories have circulated ever since. But neither consistently holds up to scrutiny.

One study of authoritarian economies worldwide, for instance, found that they, on average, neither exceeded nor lagged democracies. Those that grew did so for the same reason that some democracies did: smart choices by leaders, better-run institutions and other factors.

 

 

The two systems operate differently, but the differences often cancel one another out.

Another study found democracies somewhat better at curbing recessions, and party-based authoritarian systems a bit better at boosting growth, but ultimately the systems’ economic performance proved comparable.

This is hardly true of every benchmark. Citizens’ happiness, health measures like infant mortality, and the quality of public services are all better under democracy — not to mention the liberties whose protection is, after all, part of the point of democracy.

And questions of sheer performance have remained relevant as global crises like climate and the pandemic have taken on growing importance.

Tested by Crisis

 

 

 

 

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More than 650,000 white flags were planted on the National Mall in Washington, in September 2021, to commemorate the Americans who had died from Covid-19.Credit...Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

The pandemic would seem to provide the perfect opportunity to test which system can govern more effectively because it has affected every country on earth and its toll is quantifiable.

 

 

But research by Rachel Kleinfeld of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reached much the same conclusion as those economic studies. Democracies and authoritarian systems are roughly as likely to do well or poorly, with neither consistently outperforming the other.

While some commentators pointed to, say, Iran’s early failures as proof that authoritarian governments’ secrecy and corruption would doom them, others pointed to how many other such governments, like Vietnam, excelled.

And for every democracy that struggled, like the United States, another, like New Zealand or Taiwan, performed well, undercutting theories that democracy, taken broadly, was too messy or slow to respond.

What mattered, Dr. Kleinfeld found, were factors like social trust or institutional competency. And neither system is necessarily and consistently better at cultivating those.

Another study, acknowledging that authoritarian rulers might be more likely to lie about the pandemic’s toll, examined a hard-to-falsify metric called excess mortality. They found that on average, democracies fared better at curbing pandemic deaths than did authoritarian governments — but, again, the gap was slight, and possibly explained by factors other than political system.

Dr. Esarey, the political scientist, also found a slight advantage for democracies when it came to vaccination rates, but given that, many democracies underperformed authoritarian governments and vice versa.

The Climate Test

Could climate, a longer-term and arguably larger crisis, shed a different light?

To many in the United States, authoritarianism might seem to hold the advantage, as Beijing’s leaders have announced one dramatic climate policy after another.

But some democracies have proved similarly aggressive on climate, suggesting that American struggles are less because of democracy itself than quirks specific to the U.S. system.

And authoritarian governments can be just as messy as any democracy. Take China’s much-touted five-year-plans, which claim to set long-term policy without the fuss of legislative horse-trading or infighting.

In reality, the documents can read less like legislation than a wish list, and sometimes a vague one, sent from central planners to provincial and agency leaders who decide on their own how to pursue those decrees, if they do so at all.

China’s president, Xi Jinping, can announce greenhouse gas reductions until he is blue in the face, but he might not be able to count on his own government’s complying — which it seemingly has not. China’s provincial leaders and its state-run enterprises built more new coal plants than have the rest of the countries of the world combined.

Some of this may be policy confusion. Beijing has demanded economic growth as well as carbon reductions, leaving local officials to figure out which to emphasize. But some may also be defiance.

Beijing has long struggled to compel local officials to serve the national good. For many years, Mr. Xi announced China’s intention to reduce its steel production, only for output to rise the next year as individual provinces increased production, glutting the market and hurting the industry nationally.

In one infamous example, Beijing ordered provincial leaders to curb the water pollution that was then imperiling the nation’s health. Rather than cutting down on polluting factories, officials instead moved them to their borders, so that pollution, which increased nationwide, flowed into the next province.

Early in the pandemic, local leaders withheld information about the outbreak from central planners. And now that officials face pressure to keep infection numbers near zero, they are suppressing local economies to devastating nationwide effect.

These ups and downs are certainly linked to China’s autocratic model. But countries with similar systems have often struggled where China succeeded, or succeeded where it struggled.

Likewise, American successes and setbacks have hardly paralleled the performance of other democracies, for better or worse.

“It’s natural for the people living under one system to envy the advantages of the other,” Dr. Esarey said, particularly when both democracies and authoritarian systems face growing internal challenges worldwide.

The data, he added, instead supports a conclusion sometimes attributed, perhaps apocryphally, to Winston Churchill, the former British leader: “Democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”