风萧萧_Frank
以文会友
Spotlight Ukraine
Munich Security Index 2023
Astonishingly, only six percent of Ukrainians feel unprepared to take on Russia’s invasion, and even during a winter marked by blackouts and shortages they feel more prepared to face the risk of energy supply disruption than any G7 public. Ukraine’s Western orientation is also unequivocal. The vast majority of Ukrainians want to live in a world shaped by European and, to a lesser extent, US rules (Figure 1.16). Russian and Chinese visions of order have virtually no purchase in Ukraine.
令人惊讶的是，只有 6% 的乌克兰人认为没有准备好应对俄罗斯的入侵，即使在以停电和短缺为标志的冬季，他们也比任何 G7 公众都更愿意面对能源供应中断的风险。 乌克兰的西方取向也很明确。 绝大多数乌克兰人希望生活在一个由欧洲规则塑造的世界中，在较小程度上由美国规则塑造（图 1.16）。 俄罗斯和中国的秩序愿景在乌克兰几乎没有任何意义。
In striking contrast to some Western policy-makers, whose concerns about further military escalation appear to hamstring more determined support, Ukrainians have not been intimidated by Russian threats. As devastating as the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against a city or on the battlefield would be, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians say they would still refuse to surrender if it occurred (Figure 1.17).
与一些西方决策者形成鲜明对比的是，他们对军事进一步升级的担忧似乎阻碍了更坚定的支持，乌克兰人并没有被俄罗斯的威胁吓倒。 与在城市或战场上使用战术核武器一样具有毁灭性，绝大多数乌克兰人表示，如果发生这种情况，他们仍然会拒绝投降（图 1.17）。
Moreover, nothing short of a complete Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, suffices for most Ukrainians as acceptable conditions for a ceasefire (Figure 1.18). Even a Russian withdrawal from previously occupied areas would be unacceptable for the majority of Ukrainians if it does not also include Crimea. Premature peace negotiations, calls for which are particularly vocal in some Western capitals, would thus likely meet fierce resistance among the Ukrainian population.
此外，对于大多数乌克兰人来说，只要俄罗斯完全撤出乌克兰领土（包括克里米亚）就足以作为停火的可接受条件（图 1.18）。 如果不包括克里米亚，即使俄罗斯从先前占领的地区撤军，对于大多数乌克兰人来说也是不可接受的。 因此，过早的和平谈判在一些西方国家的首都呼声特别高，很可能会遭到乌克兰民众的强烈抵制。
The transatlantic partners also need to start planning for how to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security from Russian attacks. Ukrainian citizens are deeply aware of the lasting threat Putin's Russia poses and overwhelmingly believe that they require Western security guarantees (Figure 1.19). What these could look like is still unclear. But most Ukrainians believe that they will need permanent arms supplies from the West. A clear majority also fears that outside of NATO, Ukraine will never be secure, which is corroborated by the fact that Ukrainians place much less faith in the EU to protect them than in NATO.
跨大西洋合作伙伴还需要开始规划如何确保乌克兰的长期安全免受俄罗斯袭击。 乌克兰公民深刻意识到普京的俄罗斯构成的持久威胁，并且绝大多数人认为他们需要西方的安全保障（图 1.19）。 这些可能是什么样子仍不清楚。 但大多数乌克兰人认为，他们将需要来自西方的永久性武器供应。 绝大多数人还担心，在北约之外，乌克兰永远不会安全，乌克兰人对欧盟保护他们的信心远低于对北约的信心，这一事实证实了这一点。
These patterns are also reflected in Ukrainians’ evaluation of other countries’ responses to the war (Figure 1.20). Those polled judge all G7 countries, as well as Turkey, unequivocally positively. But there are meaningful differences among them – unsurprising given the variation in material support provided, messaging, and urgency with which countries responded to the war. The UK tops the ranking, closely followed by the US, and Canada, while Western European states trail the Anglophone countries by around 30 percentage points. Meanwhile, Ukrainians perceive China and India to have responded particularly badly, but all actors from the “Global South” score negatively in the ranking.
这些模式也反映在乌克兰人对其他国家对战争反应的评价中（图 1.20）。 接受调查的人对所有 G7 国家以及土耳其都给予明确的正面评价。 但它们之间存在有意义的差异——考虑到提供的物质支持、信息传递和各国对战争的反应紧迫性的差异，这不足为奇。 英国位居榜首，紧随其后的是美国和加拿大，而西欧国家落后英语国家约 30 个百分点。 与此同时，乌克兰人认为中国和印度的反应特别糟糕，但来自“南半球”的所有参与者在排名中的得分都是负数。
