股市小书生
价值投资
他山之石、可以攻玉（瞎说投资、投机、掏粪与选择，老生常谈类的长篇纯忽悠，不喜慎入）
来源: 瞎问瞎说 于 2016-09-19 20:56:57
下面是我和瞎嫂的讨论结果：人生若想获得最大的人生自由，不在于你占有多少资源，而在于你的人生格局有多大，假如一个人总是拘泥于一城一地的得失，总是尽全力追求局部的最优，其结果往往是痛苦不堪，如果能够设法开拓眼界，不拘泥于眼前的局部得失，始终着眼于大局，人生活会容易很多，自由很多。
借用我们推崇的罗振宇《罗辑思维》节目中的一个说法作为本帖的结束语：人生中的一个个选择总可以有从战略的或者战术的角度去选择，从战术战役的角度看问题就不免拘泥于一城一地的局部得失。从战略的角度去看问题则是不断从一个个旧的平衡走向一个个新的平衡。
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《罗辑思维》也是我比较喜欢的一个节目。
战术 战略
投资股票市场， 总是要面对市场波动的，如何面对是每个投资者的艰巨挑战。下面是一些网络内容，供你参考。
重复一遍，供你参考。
KK 对老巴的一些评论：
Conclusions
So over the past few days, I went through a bunch of Buffett's writings, primarily focused on seeing if he is actually a market timer or not.
My conclusion is that he isn't, really, even though he acts that way at times. Not buying stuff because things don't look interesting is not really timing as he still has much of the BRK portfolio riding on the line; he is not hedging it out or lightening it up etc.
Here are some random bullet points of thoughts that come to mind after going through all of this stuff:
Market Timing
- Right from day one in the partnership, against his dad's and Graham's advice not to get into stocks, he displays independence and disregard for market views, even from people he respects. This is not the beginning of a career of a market timer.
- Throughout the partnership years, he did go back and forth (in weighting) between general issue holdings and workouts leaning more towards workouts when markets were expensive. This is not so much market timing as much as moving assets to where they have the best prospective returns. I think of market timing more as people who get out and sit on cash to wait to get back in, buy puts or put on some other hedge etc.
- He did liquidate the partnership in 1969, right at the top. This was obviously partly because the markets were too high. But on the other hand, he was trying to beat the market by a wide margin and that got harder and harder to do. I don't know if Buffett would have recommended to people to sell stocks just because they are expensive if someone had a portfolio of stocks they liked. He did hold onto his BRK shares and bought more, I think, in the early 70's and never sold a share. He also said that he wanted to slow down, so the unwinding of the partnership was sort of a transition phase for him.
- In his last letter to his partners, he saw potential returns in the stock market of 6%/year. He noted that bonds for the first time offered the same prospective returns as stocks, though. And he did recommend an equity manager (Ruane). This expected return isn't too different than what he said before; early on he saw prospective returns of 5% in stocks and kept running his partnership for many years thereafter.
- Even in BRK (in 1970), he sold all marketable securities with no further plans to buy any in the future. The sale was to fund the purchase of a bank. After the purchase there were other areas to deploy capital, so although market valuation may have been a factor here (no doubt a big one), it may not necessarily be the main driver (Buffett wanted to buy whole businesses more than stocks).
- He bought a bunch of stocks throughout the 1970's responding to the bargain prices. But this isn't really market timing either as he was just responding to market prices that are cheap.
- Note that he was very aware of inflation and it's ill effects on stocks. And yet, he kept buying stocks. This is no action of a market timer. He even went so far as to question the validity of the legal structure of a bond (sort of a Buffett version of "Bonds are Dead" proclamation, I guess). But he kept buying stocks.
- Later in the 1980's, 90's and 00's, he also responds to prices by not buying stocks for lengthy periods. He buys more private businesses, and holds cash and bonds when nothing else is available. But it's interesting to note that cash levels are not held for very long (he always needs to hold some cash) as capital is eventually deployed somewhere.
- This is an important distinction to make: Buffett will insist on bargain or reasonable prices and a margin of safety to buy a stock, but that is not required to hold a stock. For permanent holdings, he would not think of selling even if it got substantially overvalued. Most market timers will sell or get out when prices are no longer attractive or reasonable (and wait in cash. It's not market timing to get out of something priced reasonably to buy something cheaper). I think this is an important point and one reason why Buffett has done so well over the years. Like he says, what if something you like gets fully valued and you sell? Then what do you buy? You will have to buy something just as good at a lower price. And if you don't?
- Buffett would not have his record if he sold out of stocks every time he thought the market or even his holdings was fully priced. He did regret not selling Coke, but if he sold Coke during the Great Bubble, what other things could he have sold that wouldn't have been good idea?
- He did say markets were too expensive in 1999 and warned people against expecting 20%+ returns over time. But this was also not an alarm bell that a crash was coming. I think he would still have advised people to own an index for the long term as he said he still expected returns over time of 6%/year. If you sell stocks, then what do you buy? He is not one to tell you to wait for a correction and get in cheaper later. At most, he will tell you to gradually buy in over time so as not to put everything in at the very top which would make you feel like an idiot.
- And he did say Buy American in 2008. This was sort of a market call, but more a warning to people who were rushing out of stocks in panic. Also, it was based on sentiment and pricing; he warned people that there is no correlation between economic outlook and stock prices.
Macro
- So, yeah, Buffett had crude oil, silver and foreign currency positions. He is short long-dated index puts and he was watching crude oil prices when investing in ConocoPhillips. But these were never really going to drive (or destroy) value at BRK. Who knows what else there have been that we don't know about!
- The important thing to remember is that he didn't "tilt" his portfolio over the years according to his macro views. Most of these things were overlay positions at low cost that had little impact on BRK's other businesses. The way other typical funds would 'play' these macro themes (and hurt themselves) would be to 'tilt' portfolios to be exposed to these various factors (buy exporters to play weak dollar etc.). Individuals would buy bear funds or FX ETF's (funded by selling some stocks or other holdings which is very capital inefficient).
- He never let his macro views get in the way of BRK's main businesses; they had very little impact on BRK's other businesses and stockholdings.
- If he was wrong, BRK shareholders would have hardly noticed. Funds with the same view as Buffett that hedged out their equity exposure or bought puts most likely noticed some impact on their returns (if the manager was wrong). Again, the folks at DRCVX (see here) had the same view as Buffett with respect to the U.S. dollar but had very different investment results over the years.
网络转贴：
我为什么不做波段和板块轮动？
有朋友很不解的问我“如果判断到了市场的拐点变化，为啥不做波段或者版块轮动，来实现利润最大化呢？”
没错，我就是不做波段，不玩版块轮动，哪怕我似乎猜对了下一阶段行情的演变，依然如此。
为什么呢？原因如下：
第一，长期来看根本得不偿失。
我觉得做过一阵子波段以及板块轮动，有一定历练的人，恐怕都会承认一个现实：在波段（或抓轮动）这个事儿上，你曾经有过多么英明的操作，就一定也曾经出现过同样愚蠢的决定。长期来看，英明与愚蠢的比率不会相差太多（这还是说的比较客气的），而还要在这个基础上确保英明的时候一定是大仓位，愚蠢的时候一定是小仓位，这种盈利模式的难度是不言而喻的。
请注意，这里的“愚蠢的决定”可未必指的是亏钱。很多次我的波段或者版块切换都当时看起来挺聪明的，但往往再过些日子后回过头去看当时的行为就无比愚蠢了（比如波段本身成功，但是卖出后大牛股再也买不回来了；或者换到别的版块个股上确实赚钱了，但若干月、年后回头一看，当初骑过的笨驴早已飞上九重天了）。
就一次来结算，很容易让人信服“波段才是王道”，因为确实高抛低吸成功了啊，差价那是实实在在的啊。但很多个“短期的正确”恰恰会导致一个“长期的错误”----对这一点醒悟的早晚，实际上已经是对长期的投资绩效能否成功的一个重要的散户分水岭。
第二，我赚钱的主要方式是什么，投资回报的驱动是什么，这个无比清楚：是企业经营的结果。
即便波段操作，版块轮动确实是条路子，是某些人的康庄大道，那条路也不是我要走的。人，总要学会取舍，总要知道一个真理：这个世界的便宜不能让我一个人都占上。试图拥有一切，只会失去更多。将股票投资作为拥有了一部分的生意来看待，虽然辛苦，但是又很踏实。虽然可能短期慢一点，但是长期来看回报又极其惊人。
那有没有可能波段操作与企业基本面合二为一呢？这当然是个“很聪明”的想法。但想到这点的“聪明人”恐怕实在太多了。我们不讨论为啥很难，我们只问一个问题：那些能够将企业分析做到一定深度的成功的投资者，是傻子吗？显然不是。那么这些被证明的市场的优秀因子，为何普遍都不去做这个“是个聪明人就会想到”的游戏呢？----对这一点想没想透，实际上成为了能否实现优秀的长期投资绩效的第二个散户分水岭。
第三，对于市场偏好的转变这种客观存在，不做短期行为也可以有不错的应对方式。
比如在持仓组合上不要过于集中在1,2个非常具有相关性的行业区间上，在持有的过程中，根据市场价格与企业价值偏离的程度进行一定程度的持仓调整等等，都是可行的（但不是必须的）。当认同第二条的时候，实际上这第三条只不过是个优化而已，是某种熨平波动幅度的对冲措施而已，做得好当然很好，实在懒得做，并不会对结果有太大的影响。
最后还是强调，这里的“波段，版块轮换”指的是短期操作，以及一种投资上的原则。宽泛点儿来看，价值投资也是某种意义上的大波段，但显然并不可同日而语。而投资的原则性，则是更突出主旨和核心，但并不一定如雷池般不可逾越半步，更不是某种牛角尖式的强迫症----就像不酗酒是个原则，但并不代表极少的特殊时刻可以多喝两杯一样。
从一句有哲理的话看投资精髓
(2011-01-17 08:23:42)
仔细想想，确实是很富有哲理的一句话。
首先有道理的地方在于，这句话没有将价值投资极端化偏激化，比如“好公司高于一切”或者“只在熊市底部买入”。而是综合涉及到了时机，估值以及标的选择3个主要的方面。
其次，这句话对于这3个要素的关系排列的非常有层次。从句式分析，最终指向的是“绝对正确的目标”。这完全符合“将投资视作一笔生意”这一价值投资的最首要的原则。当然，“绝对正确”是永远不可能做到的，但是为了说明选股的苛刻性，将选股的高标准以“绝对正确”来进行强调和与前2个要素进行强化，我个人认为是符合逻辑的，这也完全符合格雷厄姆“投资最大的危险不是为一个好企业支付了高的价格，而是在市场的景气时期买入了素质低劣的企业”的论断。另一方面，选股与估值不同，更加的具有“科学性”的一面，无论是竞争优势分析，还是财务分析，其实都是很专业的学科了。这也符合“更接近可以绝对正确”的定位（只是无限接近，而不可能完全达到）。
对于时机和价格，这句话的定义也非常有道理。市场的波动是客观事实，这就像我们大多数时候无法精确捕捉和预测到这种波动一样，也是客观事实。前一个客观事实告诉我们，利用市场的愚蠢是可行的；而后一个客观事实又告诉我们，试图经常性甚至日常性的来捕捉这种波动又是不可行的。所以，反映到投资哲学上，就是买入的时间只需要是在“相对正确”就可以了（卖出其实也一样），而不可能做到“顶和底”以及“每一次”这种级别的绝对正确。所谓的相对正确的时间，从整体的角度可以理解为“长期来看明显处于系统性的低谷期（但未必是底部）时”，作为个股的相对正确时间则可以理解为“长期来看其明显处于内在价值未被正确识别而导致的市场暂时性的冷落时，或者是长期竞争优势牢靠的企业由于受到短期的利空打击的时期”。
用“大致正确”对应“买入价格”即是模糊的正确远胜精确的错误的精髓，也是估值的艺术性所决定的。毫无疑问，这里的“大致”指的是相对于企业内在价值而言。格雷厄姆说过：精确的指出企业内在价值是多少是完全不可能的。依据一个合理的假设得到对企业价值估计的一个范围区间就很不错了。比如巴菲特当年对中石油的投资，只用了很短的时间判断“这个企业起码值1000亿，而现在是明显低估的”。
在买入价格这个问题上，大多数人会犯2个极端性的错误：要么试图精确到买入就涨的大底部，要么根本忽略安全边际而随心所欲---要理解到“谈好公司的时候不忽略合理的价格”与“谈安全边际的时候不忽略好公司的溢价特性”，何其难！巴菲特说过“你没有必要等到最低价才去买，只要低于你所认定的价值就可以了”。如果我们能在买入时，本着“先进行严密而合理的假设和推理”的原则为先（没有这个先决条件，请不要谈什么价格，什么价格都是错误的，本质上就是赌博），并且遵循“低于我所认定价值”的“大致正确”来买入，那么我想就可以免除大多数的迷茫了。
如果，我们能不偏激的将“时机，价格，目标”3个要素协调考虑（而不是一谈时机就拿伟大的公司来搪塞，一谈高价值的企业就以任何价格买入都是对的来壮胆。这种用费雪的话来挑战格雷厄姆，再用格雷厄姆的话来挑战林奇，然后再用林奇的话挑战巴菲特的游戏，只适合大专辩论赛，而不是投资），并本着“相对正确，大致正确，绝对正确”的相互关系和级次和判断权重来予以执行。那么，当我们的一个投资组合中的所有持仓，都是本着这样的原则来构建的，那么，成功的投资还会是一种“浮云”吗？
“赚钱”靠刻苦“财富”靠高度
我以前很爱用一个“将军和排长”的比喻来说明投资思维模式的重要性。
在排长看来，每一步的后退都是失败，每一步的推进都是胜利。而在将军看来，一城一池的得失都是次要的，重要的是战役级目标的最终达成和总体战局上的可控。高度的不同，对于结果认知和行为指导的差别何等的巨大。这就像我们今天在市场上面临的局面一样。
我们可能无法完全脱离开市场，但一定应该高度警惕“埋头苦干”带来的短视。如果仅仅是为了“赚点儿钱”，那么无所谓，刻苦努力也可以搞定。但如果目标是“财富自由”，那么没有一定的思维高度可能是很难做到的。
所谓的高度并非指张口闭口的“宏观经济，国际格局”，而是能否跳出眼前的“现状”来思考一些更具有前瞻性的东西。而要想看得远必然需要站得高，比如我们在看待财富问题的时候，是以人生整体规划的角度来思考的，还是仅仅是1年2年这种零碎计划？
就像现在投资面临的局面。经济前景一片模糊，房地产泡沫的影响无法预料，民营企业的生存处境艰难等等，似乎到处都让人心惊肉跳。但如果从一个人生财富规划的角度来看，什么才是最该让我们心惊肉跳的？答案也许是：一次次的漠视这个世界给我们的机会，却从未敢真正追求和坚持过一次。
巴菲特在2008年10月的《纽约时报》中如此说：“我无法预计股市的短期波动，对于股票在1个月或1年内的涨跌我不敢妄言。但有一种可能，即在市场恢复信心或经济复苏前，股市会上涨，而且可能是大涨。因此，如果你想等到知更鸟报春，那春天就快结束了。
自2010年10月市场各主要版块和指数先后见顶以来，整个市场已经下跌了整整1年，中小板综、医药等指数的跌幅高达35%-40%，沪深300和上证50更是自09年11月就提前见顶并至今下跌37—42%。目前大盘股的估值普遍只有10倍左右，中小板及医药中确定性较高的优秀成长股估值也大幅挤掉了水分。经济的前景当然具有不确定性，但这种风险是否已经有很大程度的提前反映了呢？
既然都是普通人，在市场一片萧条之际的恐慌和胡思乱想其实都是正常反映。不同的是，有些人可以在此时依然保持理性，试着去想想“更大的局”。有时候，就是这么“高一点点”往往就是很多事情的分水岭。当我们看待一个问题的时候，可以试着让自己的思想飘出体外，上到空中再来俯视，这个时候思路往往更加客观。高度，不仅仅是从更长远的战略的角度来审视问题为切入点，也包括了对事物发展客观规律的理解，比如：中国整体上处于一个什么发展水平？在可见的未来社会经济发展的趋势大概率的是什么？这一趋势反映到投资层面必然带来的影响是什么？具体投资的成败又主要取决于什么？等等。
当然，机会不是说把握就能把握得住的，就像上面那几个问题，如果现在再来思考会不会有点儿晚呢？机会只垂青在没有机会的日子里默默的积累自己，提高自己把握机会能力的人。识别什么是好的企业、大量的阅读和思考、耐心的等待，这一切看不见的努力，总有一天会以看得见的形式表现出来，不是吗？
无论是在证券投资行业，还是实业领域。我们可以仔细的观察那些成功者，大多不仅仅是努力而已。努力是优秀的品质，但仅有努力距离成功还远远不够。很多“产业疯子”的行为之所以不被理解，实际上是因为他们的视野高度远超一般人的世界。没有思维和视野的高度，就不可能有远大的抱负，自然也就很难有强大的坚持或压力之下的重大抉择。人生的很多不同，是否就是因为这些而渐行渐远的呢？
在08年很多人惊呼要是1664买入就好了，在2009年很多人遗憾没有早点儿意识到大消费企业的机会，在2010年很多人抱怨好的公司为什么总是那么贵...而到2012年，2013年...2015年的时候，你是愿意继续做一个抱怨的人，还是愿意自豪的说一声“我曾做了一次正确的决定”呢？
对长期价值投资的一些碎片性总结
长线本身绝对不是价值投资，但价值投资基本上肯定是长线。
长线投资目标选择中最重要的指标是什么？答案是，成长的确定性。
长线投资者既是风险厌恶者，又是最贪婪的猎人。
最坚定的长线投资者恰恰以前都曾是短线投机的老战士。
长线投资要懂得选择，却更需要懂得放弃。
如果你买入的时候正好别人都在不屑一顾，恭喜你，你有可能获得了一个长线投资的安全气囊。
长线投资讲究的是不过多关注股票的K线，但你如果以为买入后就是睡大觉等着苹果掉下来砸到脑袋，那么误会就大了。
长线投资坚持起来最困难的是前2年，95%的人是在这个过程中下车的。
一个正确的长线投资永远比你想象的还要艰难，而回报却又总是比你想象的还要惊人。
越早开始长期投资越有利，晚1年悟道，你原本的10倍股也许只剩下5倍了。
短线投机的人最爱问“是多少？”，长线价值投资的人总是问“为什么？”
短线投机的人有听不完的消息和传闻，长线价值投资人有看不完的报告和资料。
遇到大利空，短线投机者惊慌失措，长线价值投资者眉开眼笑。
短线投机者买入后期望立刻涨1倍，长线投资者期望买入后再跌30%。
07年一群人错误的理解了长期价值投资，哭了08一整年。09年同样的一群人再次错误的理解了长期价值投资，也许这次要后悔一生。
