古风解读中国的宏观经济投资规模

【古风按】最近一段时间以来，国内外的众多主流财经传媒一直在叫嚣：中国的宏观投资规模太大了，这种财经政策的失误会导致产能过剩，直接带来中国经济的硬着陆。可是，中国的执政核心好像并没有听懂这些“善意的警告”，依然我行我素。好不怪哉！英国《经济学人》杂志的这篇文章就把这里面的猫腻给揭露出来了。原来，中国根本就没有所谓的宏观投资规模过大的问题，所有的这些误读都在宏观经济的数据解读当中。当然，这也说明中国的执政核心对中国经济的理解与驾驭能力的确很高超，广大的网友确实不需要过度操心了。

更有三个重点值得大家注意：

①中国的人均累积投资规模其实还不到美国1930年水平的四分之一，以后还有很长的发展道路要走（潜台词：中国目前的国力才刚刚踏上快速上升期的初级阶段，其后中国的国力还将得到极其巨大的壮大）；

②中国政府通报的GDP数据中，第三产业（特别是国民的消费）数额被大幅度地低估了，即使按照保守的估计，中国的实际GDP比公布的数值至少多出10%以上（潜台词：中美间的国力差距其实比表面的幻象要小得多，所以5年内中国超越美国成为世界第一大经济体是完全不成问题的了）；

③中国劳动生产率的提高速度是世界上最快的（潜台词：中国根本就不会遭受西方国家将要经历的所谓老龄化问题，因为中国目前还处在人浮于事的劳动生产率较低状态，人口的老龄化不仅不会制约中国国力的发展，而且会大力促进中国的产业升级与劳动生产率的进一步提升，逐渐消化掉人浮于事的低效率现象，更加彻底地释放出国民的劳动创造力。相比之下，西方列强们的劳动生产率已经接近顶峰，以后只会出现两种恶果：其一，就业人口的劳动生产率会继续提升，可是劳动人口的失业率会进一步大幅攀升；其二，西方国家也要开始实行通过多人干一份活的人浮于事的方式来降低劳动生产率，从而达到降低失业率与建设和谐稳定社会的目的。不论是哪一种选择，西方列强必将踏上衰退之路，而中国却会持续地高速发展）。

请继续参阅下面的相关资讯：

古风评说中国GDP超美
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201201/19892.html

一张图就能显现：美元的霸主地位就快丢失啦！
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201203/5551.html

古风解读美国未来的经济与股市行情
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201203/21036.html

古风解读西方主要列强未来的国运
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201203/25721.html

古风解读美国奥式全民健保的末日
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201204/496.html

古风解读土耳其总理最近为何访华
http://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/46947/201204/12953.html

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http://www.economist.com/node/21552555

Capital controversy: China’s “overinvestment” problem may be greatly overstated
from The Economist, 14 April 2012

The IMF says so. Academics and Western governments agree. China invests too much. It is an article of faith that China needs to rebalance its economy by investing less and consuming more. Otherwise, it is argued, diminishing returns on capital will cramp future growth; or, worse still, massive overcapacity will cause a slump in investment, bringing the economy crashing down. So where exactly is all this excessive investment?

Most people point to the rapid growth in China’s capital spending and its unusually high share of GDP. Fixed-asset investment (the most widely cited figure, because it is reported monthly) has grown at a breathtaking annual rate of 26% over the past seven years. Yet these numbers are misleading. They are not adjusted for inflation and they include purchases of existing assets, such as land, that are inflated by the rising value of land and property. A more reliable measure, and the one used in other countries, is real fixed-capital formation, which is measured on a value-added basis like GDP. This has increased by a less alarming annual average of 12% over the past seven years, not that much faster than the 11% growth rate in GDP in that period.

The level of fixed-capital formation does look unusually high, at an estimated 48% of GDP in 2011 (see left-hand chart). By comparison, the ratio peaked at just under 40% in Japan and South Korea. In most developed countries it is now around 20% or less. But an annual investment-to-GDP ratio does not actually reveal whether there has been too much investment. To determine that you need to look at the size of the total capital stock—the value of all past investment, adjusted for depreciation. Qu Hongbin, chief China economist at HSBC, estimates that China’s capital stock per person is less than 8% of America’s and 17% of South Korea’s (see right-hand chart). Another study, by Andrew Batson and Janet Zhang at GK Dragonomics, a Beijing-based research firm, finds that China still has less than one-quarter as much capital per person as America had achieved in 1930, when it was at roughly the same level of development as China today.

Some claim that a rise in the ratio of China’s capital stock to GDP is evidence that new investment is becoming less efficient: a given increase in capital leads to a smaller increase in GDP. But a rising capital-output ratio is perfectly normal when a poor country shifts from agriculture to more capital-intensive industry. GK Dragonomics estimates that China’s ratio of 2.4 in 2010 is well within the range of 2 to 3 seen in most countries.

Another yardstick is the return on capital, which should be falling if there is huge spare capacity. Yet average industrial profit margins and the rate of return on capital of listed firms have been fairly steady over the past decade after adjusting for the cycle. Although many firms, particularly state-owned ones, benefit from cheap loans, the average real cost of borrowing across the whole economy is much higher, so this distortion is more likely to lead to a misallocation of investment than to excess overall investment. The growth rate in China’s “total factor productivity” (TFP), a measure of the efficiency with which both labour and capital are used, has also been one of the fastest in the world.

TFP growth has probably fallen in the past few years, but that largely reflects a spurt in infrastructure investments, which deliver modest immediate gains but will boost productivity over the next 20 or 30 years. Although sceptics dismiss many of these projects as white elephants, a report by BCA Research suggests that the country’s infrastructure is still lagging behind demand. The total length of railway track has increased by 50% since 1995, for example, but passenger numbers have doubled and freight traffic has increased by 150%. China has around 6% of the world’s total railway network, yet carries 24% of global freight volumes. And despite all the new property construction in recent years, there is still an overall shortage of housing in China. Roughly one-third of urban residents live in poor-quality collective housing. This means that many more houses need to be built. Again, the problem is misallocation of investment rather than oversupply. There is huge unsatisfied demand from people who cannot afford to buy at current prices, while a rising number of richer households own more than one home, often as an investment.

Flawed figures?

China’s rising investment and falling consumption as a share of GDP are commonly portrayed as an economic anomaly. Yet this pattern is normal in a rapidly industrialising country. In a traditional agricultural economy farmers consume most of their income, but once industrialisation gets under way a rising share of national income goes to owners of capital, who invest it in factories and the like. Investment rises as a share of GDP, and consumption falls. During their peak periods of industrialisation, South Korea and Japan saw an even sharper rise in investment relative to GDP than China has seen over the past 20 years.

As for that oddly high level in its investment-to-GDP ratio, one explanation is that China’s statistical system (set up when it was a command economy) is better at recording investment than consumer spending. Many think consumption (especially of services) is undermeasured as a share of GDP, and hence that investment is overstated. A report by Morgan Stanley suggests that China’s true investment-to-GDP ratio may be up to ten percentage points lower than officially reported (ie, 38% rather than 48%).

Given China’s rapid growth, cheap loans and the big role played by state-owned banks, it is inevitable that capital has been wasted in some industries. But the evidence suggests that China has not seriously overinvested. That does not mean rebalancing is unnecessary. Under China’s capital-heavy model of growth, owners of capital have been getting much richer than workers. The main reason for shifting from capital-intensive production to the more labour-intensive, consumer-friendly sort is not to sustain economic growth, but to reduce inequality. Workers could then enjoy more of the rewards of China’s past investment.