A Peaceless Peace
By:Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
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Mykhailivka The debate over the so-called 20-point peace plancontinues to rage in Ukraine. Radio and television are reporting on it with seriousness and widespread, deferential concern. Skepticism is widespread at all levels of society, so much so that, in aninterviewwith Fox News on the sidelines of his Mar-a-Lago meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, President Volodymyr Zelensky himselfadmittedthat if put to a referendum that included the possibility of Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas (as desired by Washington) the plan would be rejected.
In reality, even without this unfortunate clause, its current form isdoomed to failurebecause it repeats the gravest errors of the past and advances points that are legally incompatible and practically unmanageable.
Throughout 2024, Trumpclaimedhe could end the Russian invasion of Ukraine in less than 24 hours, without ever explaining how.Once back at the White House, not in a day but in a year, he made it clear that the plan didnt exist and that he would hand the pen to the Russians to draft it.Moscow seized the opportunity, compiling alistof 28 maximalist demands incompatible with international law and unacceptable to Kyiv.
Throughout 2025,the word peace was so overused that it lost its meaning even in perspective, replacing victory, which Zelensky hadusedin his 5-point plan (and 3 classified annexes) until the eve of the American electoral event. To avoid hurting the ego of the new White House occupant, the decision was made to translate the 28 Russian points into prose, creatinga jumble of contradictory clauses and legal and operational inconsistencies that mask the structural risk of reactivating the conflict under the guise of an ambiguous and unenforceable peace.
We have dedicated anarticlethat has received widespread attention to thelegally unsustainable and dangerous nature of binding Ukraine to non-nuclear activity as isclaimedto be enshrined in point 11 of the 20-point peace plan.
Butpoints 1, 2, 5, and 6 also constitute an oxymoron, as does the idea of a free trade area intended to apply to the territories of Ukraine illegally occupied by the Russian Federation (TOT).
In thosepoints, Ukraines territorial sovereignty is confirmed (1), a non-aggression agreement is proposed between it and the Russian Federation (2) and between the latter and Europe (6, except to specify in point 7 that Ukraine will be part of it), with monitoring of the conflict line, and the conditions for a military response and the reinstatement of Western sanctions in the event of a new invasion are dictated (5).
By definition,Ukrainian sovereignty is incompatible with any architecture that normalizes or institutionalizes Russian rule over parts of its territory. Constructinga hybrid of de jure Ukrainian and de facto Russian sovereignty is precisely the kind of ambiguity that breeds disputes, incidents, and war.
A domestic Russian law enshrining non-aggression toward Ukraine or Europe does not constrain clandestine military action, nor does it establish enforcement mechanisms. The experience of the little green men proxy militias, contractors, separatists, and unmarked volunteers should have taught us something.
MoscowsignedtheMinsk I agreements, denying its involvement in the conflict. It described itself as a mediator and blamed local militiasfor violating those agreements. In Ilovaisk, Ukrainian forcesinflictedheavy losses on those separatists. Moscowintervenedwith regular units, encircling the Ukrainians andpromisinga humanitarian corridor, which itviolated, massacring their outgoing columns.
The same pattern wasrepeatedin Debaltseve, which wascapturedby the Russians in February 2015 after the ceasefirestipulatedin theMinsk II agreementscame into effect. It was a symbolic event that demonstrated how monitoring the conflict line is intrinsically insufficient in the absence of guaranteed access and coercive tools. The OSCE SMM, the most robust monitoring instrument everdeployedin Europe, hasdocumentedfor years systematic restrictions on freedom of movement, interference, technical limitations, and the closure of key areas.
Sucha non-aggression agreement can be falsified within 24 hours in a context of gradual, subthreshold escalation across thousands of kilometers of gray zones like todays.
Besides being easily sabotaged, it carriesthe risk that the US will not interveneif the triggering event remains ambiguous or disputed. If the military response depends on the classification of an invasion or attack, Moscows classic strategy is to obscure the attribution, create information fog, and rely on the fact that while Western democracies argue, its troops advance.
Who would classify the event? With what timeframe and evidentiary standards? How can Ukraines territorial integrity be restored without violating agreements that create the perfect incentive for permanent hybrid warfare?
The proposal to establish a free trade area in the TOT assumes unified customs authorities, border control, inspection and compliance capabilities, effective jurisdiction, investment protection, and the absence of hostile powers on the territory.
This isthe exact opposite of the TOT, where Russian control is maintained but Ukrainian sovereignty is preserved, and every economic flow ends up financing the occupation, thereby violating Western non-recognition.
Creating a free trade zone there not only means implicitly recognizing the Russian occupation an unenforceable legal fiction but also clearing illicit trafficking in Europe, fueling endless disputes over property and securities, structural smuggling, and the triangulation of laundered goods between rubles, hryvnias, and euros.
Likewise,the premature lifting of Western sanctions against the Russian Federation would be strategically suicidal, since they remain the EUs primary instrument of coercion and residual deterrent.
In the absence of an active military force,easing the only form of sustained pressure before the full restoration of Ukraines territorial sovereignty and international law means paying in advance for yet another empty promise from Moscow.
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在过去三年里，作为自由撰稿人，我们一直在乌克兰战争的所有前线进行报道，自从大规模
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没有真正和平的和平
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻译：旺财球球
乌克兰前线报道????????
米哈伊利夫卡关于所谓20点和平计划的争论在乌克兰依然激烈。广播和电视对此进行了严肃而广泛的报道，引发了普遍的关注。社会各阶层对和平计划的怀疑情绪相当普遍，以至于在与美国方面唐纳德川普在海湖庄园会晤期间接受福克斯新闻采访时，泽伦斯基总统本人承认如果进行一项包括乌克兰从顿巴斯撤出的可能性（正如华盛顿所希望的）的公投，该计划将会被拒绝。
实际上，即使没有这一不幸条款，该计划当前的形式也注定要失败，因为它重复了过去最严重的错误，并提出了在法律上不兼容且在实践中无法管理的要点。
（图：我的小侄子在乌克兰利沃夫展出的乌克兰技术设备残骸中玩耍????????版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在整个2024年，特朗普声称他可以在不到24小时内结束俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵，却从未解释具体如何实现。一旦回到白宫，不是在一天而是在一年之内，所有人都明白了他并没有什么计划，并准备将笔交到俄罗斯人手里，让他们来起草（计划）。莫斯科借机起草了一份包含28项国际法不容且基辅无法接受的极端要求。
在整个2025年，和平一词被过度使用，以至于它甚至在远景中也失去了意义，取而代之的是胜利，而泽伦斯基在美国选举前夕，他的5点计划（以及3个机密附录）中使用的正是这个词。为了不伤害新任白宫负责人的自尊，决策者决定将这28个俄罗斯要求翻译成法律文书，形成了一堆矛盾的条款以及法律和操作上的不一致，掩盖了在模糊和不可执行的和平之名下重新激活冲突的结构性风险。
我们发表了一篇广受关注的文章，专门探讨了将乌克兰绑定于无核状态的法律不可持续性和危险性这一观点据称被写入20项和平计划中的第11点。
但第1、2、5和6条同样构成了自相矛盾的悖论，像是针对适用于被俄罗斯联邦非法占领的乌克兰领土（TOT）的自由贸易区的设想。
在这些条款中，确认了乌克兰的领土主权（1），提出了乌克兰与俄罗斯联邦之间（2）及其俄罗斯与欧洲之间（6，除了在第7点中说明乌克兰将成为其中一部分）的不侵略协议，并规定了对冲突线的监控、以及在新入侵发生时军事响应和恢复西方制裁的条件（5）。
根据定义，乌克兰的主权与任何使俄罗斯对乌部分领土的统治正常化或制度化的架构都是不相容的。构建一个法律上是乌克兰的、事实上是俄罗斯的混合主权体，正是造成争端、事故和战争的模糊性。
一项明确规定不侵略乌克兰或欧洲的俄罗斯国内法律并不限制秘密军事行动，也没有建立执行机制。小绿人的经验代理民兵、承包商、分裂分子和无标记志愿者的经历应该教会我们一些东西。
莫斯科签署了明斯克第一协议，否认其参与到冲突中。它自称为调解者，并将违反这些协议的责任归咎于地方武装。在伊洛瓦伊斯克，乌克兰军队对这些分裂分子造成了重大损失。莫斯科派出常规部队介入进行干预，包围了乌克兰人，并承诺提供人道走廊，但随后违反了这一承诺，屠杀了他们撤出的队伍。
在德巴尔采夫，同样的模式重现。俄罗斯在2015年2月夺取了该地区，当时明斯克第二协议规定的停火已经生效。这是一个象征性事件，表明在缺乏有保障的进入和强制手段的情况下，监控冲突线本质上是完全不够的。欧洲历史上最强大的监控工具欧安组织特派团（OSCE SMM）多年来记录了（俄）对自由通行的系统性限制、干扰、技术限制和关键区域的封闭。
这样的不侵略协议可以在24小时内被篡改，特别是在当今这样的数千公里灰色地带的渐进、临界状态升级的背景下。
除了容易被破坏外，这样的协议还存在一个风险，即如果触发事件模糊或存在争议，美国可能不会介入干预。如果军事响应取决于对入侵或攻击的界定，莫斯科的经典策略就是模糊归因，制造信息迷雾，并依赖西方民主国家相互争论的事实，借机其军队就得以推进。
谁来对事件进行界定？采用什么时间框架和证据标准？在不违反协议的情况下，如何恢复乌克兰的领土完整，而这些协议又为永久的混合战争创造了完美的激励？
（图：我站在被俄罗斯联邦摧毁的乌克兰捷尔诺波尔的一处民用基础设施内版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在被俄罗斯联邦非法占领的乌克兰地区建立自由贸易区的提议，假设有统一的海关管理、边界控制、检查和合规能力、有效的管辖权、投资保护，以及在该地区不存在敌对势力。
这与TOT的情况完全相反，在那里俄方控制仍然存在，但乌克兰的主权收法律保护，每一笔经济活动最终都资助了占领方，因而违反了西方的不承认政策。
在那里创建一个自由贸易区不仅意味着隐含地承认俄罗斯的占领这是一种无法执行的法律幻影还意味着清理欧洲的非法贩运，助长了无休止的财产和证券争议、结构性走私以及在卢布、格里夫纳和欧元之间洗钱货物的三角交易。
（图：另一个被俄罗斯联邦摧毁的乌克兰民用基础设施版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
同样，西方过早解除对俄罗斯联邦的制裁将是战略自杀，因为这些制裁仍然是欧盟主要的施压工具和剩余威慑手段。
在没有有效军事力量的情况下，在乌克兰完全恢复领土主权及国际法完全恢复之前，放松唯一的持续施压方式，意味着提前为莫斯科的又一个空头承诺付出代价。
（图：撰写本文前，我在乌克兰顿巴斯地区乌兹诺瓦的照片版权所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
