全球美元面临风险, 下一步如何 布达佩斯全球对话2025

The Global Dollar at Risk—What Comes Next? | Budapest Global Dialogue 2025

Observer Research Foundation 2025年7月7日 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnkYHiTWwsE

全球美元面临风险——下一步如何？| 布达佩斯全球对话2025

观察家研究基金会 2025年7月7日

重塑布雷顿森林体系

曾经以布雷顿森林体系为坚实后盾的全球秩序，如今正处于十字路口。随着新兴经济力量的崛起和全球挑战的增多，这些基础机构必须从根本上为新时代注入新的活力，否则就有可能走向衰落。

现有架构能否适应多极化，还是我们正在见证西方主导的全球经济治理的终结？

下一个全球秩序将建立在包容性合作的基础上，还是建立在新旧大国之间根深蒂固的竞争之上？

世界是否正处于全球美元储备货币重置的边缘？这将对国际金融和美国实力产生何种影响？

演讲嘉宾

菲利普·皮尔金顿，匈牙利国际事务研究所高级研究员，匈牙利

约翰·庞，亚太“一带一路”倡议核心小组高级研究员，马来西亚

主持人

维多利亚·帕诺娃，金砖国家专家委员会主席；高等经济大学副校长；W20 Sherpa项目，俄罗斯
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

大家好，我叫维多利亚·帕诺娃，是今天关于重塑Maritan Boots的会议主持人。今天我们邀请到几位非常有意思的演讲嘉宾，他们知识渊博，可以就以下问题发表一些见解：我们的发展方向；美元的作用；以及布雷顿森林体系中的机构在多大程度上能够适应当前的挑战并实现预期目标。事实上，迄今为止，它们一直未能实现这些目标，我们看到了持续不断的危机。
回溯到20年前，30年前。嗯，所以我们需要一些新的东西。
有一些“砖块”提案。比如，建立一个新的开发银行，建立应急储备安排。还有人谈论可以引入新的金融支付系统来对冲风险，并为世界提供更多替代方案。嗯，但如果能听到我们杰出的演讲嘉宾，谈谈他们对未来发展的愿景，那就太好了。今天，我们邀请到了匈牙利国际事务研究所高级研究员菲利普·皮尔金顿，以及马来西亚亚太地区“一带一路”倡议核心小组高级研究员约翰·庞。欢迎菲利普，第一个问题是你的。那么，你的想法是什么？布雷顿森林体系有多重要？嗯，我们能否继续将美元作为储备货币，作为一个可行的选择？

菲利普·皮尔金顿

我认为现在有相当有力的证据表明，美元作为储备货币的地位不会维持太久。嗯，
我认为现在来看，美元作为储备货币的地位可能很短。美元作为储备货币的地位可能在2030年就终结。嗯，这听起来可能很奇怪，甚至有点极端，但我们已经收到越来越多的信号，尤其是自从特朗普的“解放日”政策，比如关税政策以来。当然，美元作为储备货币地位的下降可以追溯到俄罗斯储备资产被没收。嗯，我想现在每个人都知道这一点，但我认为市场一度处于不确定状态，而“解放日”政策在某种程度上把市场推到了崩溃的边缘。所以，我们看到很多技术指标表明，美元正在失去其储备货币地位。我只说一两个，以便大家有个大概的了解。金价如此之高的原因是各国央行正在大量购买黄金，而这又是因为他们不再购买美元了。另一个指标是，通常情况下，当股市下跌时，美元就会上涨，美国借贷利率也会下降，这被称为金融市场的避险情绪。现在，这种情况已经消失了。已经消失了。嗯，另一个指标，通常情况下，当美国利率高企时，美元就会走强。现在这种情况已经不复存在了。所以，所有这些从金融市场背景来看——我自己也有金融市场背景——都表明，美元市场出现了一些重大问题，或者说，出现了问题。美元市场现在不像以前那样运作了。嗯，有很多传言说，美元的储备货币地位已经终结了。嗯，我的意思是大西洋理事会
就此发表了一些看法。嗯，史蒂文·莫兰，总统经济顾问委员会主席，对储备货币地位的作用提出了质疑。你现在可以在白宫网站上找到相关信息。所以，所有
力量似乎都在推动美元不再成为储备货币。昨天我在彭博社看到一篇报道，称出口商现在正在寻求美元以外的其他货币。所以，这真的越来越成为现实了。嗯，所以我认为这个问题主要出在美国方面。
美国人想如何处理这个问题？嗯，他们已经忽略这个问题一段时间了。我不认为他们完全忽略了这个问题。我认为特朗普政府中的一些人

经济团队明白这一点。史蒂文·莫兰确实明白这一点。我认为斯科特·贝桑特也明白这个问题，而且我认为国务院里也有一些人明白这个问题，但他们还没有决定如何解决这个问题。在我看来，除非很快出现重大变化，否则他们有两个选择：要么让美元根据市场情况调整，这实际上可能会非常剧烈，并且可能对美国经济产生重大影响；要么采取更谨慎的管理方式。我认为这就是某种新型布拉顿木材系统的问题所在。但这或许只是提出了问题，而不是暂时解决问题。

主持人

好的。谢谢你，菲利普。约翰，现在轮到你了。嗯，菲利普提到，迄今为止，其中一个关键影响是关于他们对俄罗斯的制裁，以及它是如何运作的，以及允许使用美元。但我们知道，事实上，这给世界许多国家敲响了警钟，因为他们明白，这很容易被用在他们身上。所以，这不是共同利益。它可能被用作武器，这是一个问题。但嗯，我们从历史中知道，一系列问题逐渐引发了他们对美元使用本身的担忧，菲利普提到，特朗普政府的某些部门对此表示理解。所以，我们可能正处于他们的接受阶段，但美国政府会对此做出多大反应呢？嗯，我们知道特朗普对此非常严格，但背后的历史是什么？因为这是一个长期存在的问题，而且不仅仅是最近发生的事件，才导致了美元问题的出现。

约翰·庞

非常感谢，这当然不是一个突然出现的现象。我们现在的美元体系建立在国际秩序体系之上，它几乎是该国际秩序的基础，而随着该秩序的瓦解，美元体系也在瓦解。嗯，例如在亚洲，人们非常熟悉1997年、1998年金融危机，当时的危机就是由于对美元的依赖而爆发的。它终结了一系列国家的非凡增长期，事实上，这些国家至今仍未从中恢复过来。你知道，这些危机有着长期的影响。呃，我说的是像印度尼西亚、马来西亚、泰国这样的国家。所以，那场危机在那里被铭记，以至于外界并没有低估它。所以，我认为，人们非常强烈地意识到美元体系的局限性，以及这种情况不可能永远持续下去。我认为，真正出乎意料的是，该体系几乎是自我毁灭，诉诸扣押俄罗斯的储备，以及将Swift货币系统武器化。由此可见，这不仅仅是美元所依赖的国际秩序（单极秩序）结构终结的问题，更是一场管理能力和信誉的危机。
所以，这确实令人震惊，我认为这加速了美元的下跌。我不确定我们当中是否有人预料到，此刻坐在这里，谈论美元体系和美元储备货币地位的终结，还有10到20年的时间。但我们现在处于这种奇怪的、不确定的状态，因为人们在美元体系中投入了太多，并且非常依赖美元周边资本市场的深度，对吧？全球贸易就是建立在这个基础上的，而美元拥有无与伦比的深度和流动性。
所以，你知道人们喜欢说，别无选择，但事实并非如此。尽管你知道，具体的和平谈判举措，以及我们尚未建立的实体，都很重要，但你知道人们看不到前进的道路。我认为菲利普当然会和我们讨论一项提案，这项提案确实有着深厚的智识渊博，东盟人士确实会谈论马来西亚、中国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚等国的货币贸易。所以，这正在发生，但系统性的解决方案还有很长的路要走。所以我们对下一步该怎么做感到左右为难。是的，非常正确。

主持人：例如，在休息时间，各国货币的使用率已经达到了90%，这很有意思。您还提到了国际货币基金组织、世界银行等国际组织领导层的胜任能力。我还记得，在2008年、2009年金融危机期间，人们又一次提出了“我们该如何继续前进？为什么领导层只能由一部分国家承担，而其他国家却无法承担？”的想法。当时人们对此抱怨不已。您十年前就告诉我们，其他国家不能被视为领导层的候选人，因为我们自己也遇到了问题，而你们更了解情况，所以你们可以指导我们。而如今，或者说在2008年，他们却说我们

问题主要在于我们，所以只有我们才能决定，领导力问题仍然存在，因此，
整个机构的问题在于，因为它们是这个问题的根本原因。那么，它们可以改变吗？我们是否需要新的机构？或者这些机构如何适应？这仅仅是领导力的问题，还是更系统性的问题？我知道你有一些
有趣的建议，也许你也可以为我们阐述一下。

菲利普·皮尔金顿
是的，我认为这两件事是相关的。嗯，所以我们需要在这里稍微回顾一下历史。布雷顿森林体系建立于1944年，二战结束时。当时，英国和美国代表约翰·凯恩斯和哈里·德克斯特·怀特在新罕布什尔州的布雷顿森林进行了谈判。凯恩斯希望建立一个多边体系。事实上，有趣的是，这个多边体系最终可能会包括苏联，但事实并非如此。英国也希望建立一个多边体系，因为他们因为战争而负债累累。美国人想要一个以美元为基础的体系，而我们最终也建立了这个体系。凯恩斯当时警告他们，这是一个错误，一旦美国经济停止贸易顺差，他们就会后悔当初没有把美元作为储备货币。事实证明，凯恩斯是对的。到了70年代，他们不得不放弃金本位。嗯，我们进入了一个奇怪的法定货币时代，这导致了美国的去工业化和经济空心化。嗯，基本上这就是史蒂文·莫兰在那场备受争议的演讲中所说的内容。嗯，这就是这些机构的历史。国际货币基金组织和世界银行实际上是按照凯恩斯的计划设计的。嗯，但在最后一刻，他们把多边安排换成了美元安排。所以理论上，这些机构可以围绕某种多边体系进行改革。凯恩斯也指出，我读过44号文件，卡尼斯也指出，如果想要建立区域合作伙伴，就像砖块一样，那完全没问题。他实际上,设想过类似的方案，我认为当时欧洲人, 甚至可能拥有自己的银行机构，与国际货币基金组织（IMF）挂钩，或者作为IMF的合作伙伴，诸如此类。所以，存在着无数种不同的关系，嗯，你可以说说，但目前有两个问题，一个是制度问题，一个是政治问题。所以，我认为你提出的制度问题是，这些机构
现在还值得信赖吗？IMF 还值得信赖吗？或者世界银行还值得信赖吗？他们已经失去了对世界的信任。嗯，我认为过去几年IMF的表现其实还不错。我认为，它一直在喊冤，实际上，相当客观。我通常不维护IMF的政策，但我认为，在过去几年里，尽管经济一片混乱，但它一直相当清醒，没有试图操纵数据或类似的事情。这或许可以缓解我们面临的一些紧张局势。所以，我想说，这反映了一些事实，正如他们所说的，这些机构不得不承认一些错误。嗯，但最终，如果他们想这样做，他们能否获得足够的信任？或者对IMF。你可以建立一个完全不同的机构。但无论如何，我建议首先尝试利用IMF。这个银行或多边银行的提案实际上利用了IMF已有的某种机制，例如特别提款权。所以，把它融入到架构中并不难。我个人认为，应该重新利用这些机构，但如果它们对发展中国家失去了足够多的信任，那么就必须进行谈判。但政治问题才是真正的问题，为了做出这个决定，我认为，实际上必须在中美两国之间进行双边谈判，因为两国是造成巨大贸易失衡的经济体，也是必须进行主要调整的两个经济体。其他国家可以顺势而为。所以，这是一个重要的政治问题。你能说服特朗普政府或未来的政府吗？你能说服中国接受这个想法吗？因为这些经济体必须进行调整。呃，

主持人：那么，您设想的改革后的机构新体系是什么样的？

菲利普·皮尔金顿：

我只是在重新讨论凯恩斯关于多边货币体系的旧观点，这实际上可以追溯到最初的布雷顿森林体系，每个人从1945年起就经历过。

1971年。中国人喜欢固定汇率制度，实际上，我稍微跟中国人提了一下。他们喜欢这个想法。固定汇率制度，管理固定。所以，如果出现贸易失衡，货币实际上会被迫调整。这种情况一直持续到1971年。我们以前也经历过。它非常有效。嗯，而且基本上，它会有很多补充措施。你不会再依赖美元了。所以，国家之间会有某种谈判程序。举个例子，现在美国和中国。美国对中国存在巨额贸易逆差。嗯，有两种方法可以消除这种逆差，但最明显的一种是允许美元贬值，或者通过谈判让美元贬值。这已经在发生了。美元正在贬值。所以市场无论如何都在调整。但银行体系会通过引入内向投资（例如，对美国的外国直接投资）来补充。所以，它就像胡萝卜加大棒的政策一样。银行体系既鼓励对逆差国的投资，也强制实施调整，但其根本目的是消除任何显著规模的贸易失衡。约翰，你如何看待这个想法？你认为作为东盟成员国，马来西亚，它会走多远？我认为，你知道，世界上大多数其他国家，尤其是发展中国家，只要有一个解决方案，就对它持怀疑态度。所以，很明显，现有的体系是不可持续的。它正在自身重压下崩溃。如果不采取任何措施，我们实际上将任由崩溃来决定接下来会发生什么，情况可能会变得非常糟糕。嗯，即使在最好的 情况下，我认为有些人认为某种多货币体系即将出现，但肯定是某种国际货币联盟，
如果我们能就此达成一致，我认为会得到强有力的支持。只是你知道，从务实的角度看，我们需要看到很多事情， 美国的情况会变得更糟，才会有政治意愿来达成这一目标，而现实情况可能会给我们提供这样的机会。非常感谢，我们参加了菲利普·皮林顿和约翰·庞的这次关于重新构想布雷顿森林体系的会议，希望它不会崩溃，我们能够提出他们的新想法，也希望我们能更多地听取专家的意见。非常感谢。

The Global Dollar at Risk—What Comes Next? | Budapest Global Dialogue 2025

Observer Research Foundation 2025年7月7日 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnkYHiTWwsE

Reimagining Bretton Woods

The global order, once firmly anchored by the Bretton Woods framework, is now at a crossroads. As new economic powers rise and global challenges multiply, these foundational institutions must be fundamentally revitalised for a new era, or risk sliding into obsolescence.

Can the existing architecture adapt to multipolarity, or are we witnessing the end of Western-led global economic governance?

Will the next global order be built on inclusive cooperation or entrenched competition between old and new powers?

Is the world on the cusp of a global dollar reserve-currency reset? What are the implications on international finance and American power?

Speakers

Philip Pilkington, Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Hungary

John Pang,  Senior Fellow, Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific,Malaysia

Moderator

Victoria Panova, Head, BRICS Expert Council; Vice Rector, HSE University; W20 Sherpa, Russia
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Hello, my name is Victoria Panova and uh
I'm the moderator for today's session on
reimagining maritan boots. Uh we're
hosting today a very interesting set of
speakers who are very knowledgeable and
also could shed some light on uh where
we are going, what is the role of the
dollar, how much the current
Brettonwoods institutions
would be able to adapt to current
challenges and live up to the
expectations which they failed
consistently in fact so far and we saw
it with a numerous crisis uh ongoing.
going take it 20 years back, 30 years
back. Um, so we need something new.
There are some bricks proposals. There
is a uh bricks created new development
bank uh contingent reserve arrangements.
there are talks of their uh new
financial payment system that could be
introduced in order to hedge some risks
and um offer more alternatives to to the
world. Uh but it would be really good to
hear from our prominent speakers on what
is their vision of where do we go. So
today with us we have uh Philip
Pilkington, senior research fellow at
the Hungarian Institute of International
Affairs and John Pang, senior fellow of the Bel
and Road Initiative Caucus of Forasia
Pacific Malaysia. Welcome and Philillip
the question first question is yours. So
what's your idea? How relevant is Breton
Woods? Uh, can we continue just with the
dollar as a reserve currency as a viable
option?

Philip Pilkington

I think there's pretty strong evidence
now that the dollar is not going to be
the reserve currency for very long. Um,
I think the time horizon on it is
actually probably quite short now.
Potentially the end of the reserve
currency by maybe 2030. Um that might
sound quite strange, maybe quite
extreme, but we've got we've got
increasing signals of this, especially
since um Trump's liberation day policies
as tariff policies. Of course, the um
fall of the dollar as the reserve
currency goes back to the seizure of the
Russian reserve assets. Um I think
everyone knows that now, but the uh I
think the markets were in limbo for a
little bit and liberation day kind of
pushed the markets over the edge. And so
we're seeing a lot of technical tech
technical indicators um that the dollar
is losing its status as a reserve
currency. I'll just say one or two just
so people have a sense. The reason the
gold price is so high is because central
banks are buying up gold and that's
because they're not buying dollars
anymore. Another indicator is that um
usually when equity markets go down, US
dollar goes up and US borrowing rates go
down and that's called the flight to
safety in financial markets. That's
gone. That's gone. Um, another indicator
that's gone is usually when interest
rates are high in the US, the dollar
strengthens. Not anymore. So, all these
things from a financial markets
background, I have a financial markets
background myself, um, indicate that
something
has gone significantly uh, wrong or it's
uh, in in US dollar markets. They're
just not operating as they used to. Um,
there's plenty of murmurss that the US
dollar reserve currency status is
finished. both um I mean the Atlantic
Council put out something on it. Uh
Steven Moran who was the chief of um the
head of the chair uh chairperson of
economic adviserss to the president uh
has question the role of the reserve uh
status. You can find it on the white
house website now. So all the all the
forces seem to be militating that um
that the US dollar is not going to be
the reserve status. There's one more I
saw on Bloomberg yesterday, a report
that exporters were asking for
alternative currencies rather than the
dollar now. So, it's really getting it's
getting real. Um, and so the question I
think is mainly on the American side.
What do the Americans want to do with
this? Um, they've ignored it now for
some time. I wouldn't say they've
completely ignored it. I think some
people on the Trump economic team
understand it. Steven Moran does
understand it. I think Scott Bessant
understands the problem as well and I
think there's some people at the state
department as well who understand the
problem but um they haven't made a
decision on what to do about it and to
my mind unless something significant
changes soon uh they have two choices
they can either let the US dollar adjust
by the market which will be could be
quite uh violent actually and it could
have major ramifications for the United
States economy or they can take a more
ma managed approach and I think That's
where um that's where the question of
some sort of new Bratton wood system
comes in. But perhaps that kind of
raises the the issue rather than
tackling it for the moment. 

Moderator

Okay. Thank you, Philillip. John, now to you. Uh
Philip has mentioned that one of the key
ramifications so far was about their you
know sanctions against Russia and how it
swift was used and uh the allowance to
use dollar. But we know and in fact this
was a wakeup call for many countries
around the world because they understood
this could be applied to them easily. So
it's not a common good. It could be used
as a weapon and it's a problem. But uh
we know from history that
there was a gradual um set of problems
that were bringing up their issue of the
use of dollar as such and uh Philip
mentioned that there is understanding in
their in in some part of administration
of Trump. So we are living in their of
age of acceptance probably but how much
uh US administration would be uh
reacting to that and uh we know Trump
was quite rigorous about that but so
what's the history behind that because
it's a long-term prog uh problem and
it's not just about the recent events
that brought the problem of dollar on
site it it certainly 

John Pang

thank you very much it certainly isn't n't a uh phenomenon
that just popped up. It's um the dollar
system as as we have it is based on
a system of international order and it's
almost the basis of that international
order and it's coming apart as that
order is coming apart. Um but um in Asia
for example uh in in uh people are very
familiar with what happened in the
1997, 98 uh crisis as a result of dependency on
the dollar. It put an end to an
extraordinary period of growth for a an
entire set of countries that in in fact
have not recovered from that. you know
these crises have long-term consequences. Uh I'm talking about
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand. So that crisis is remembered
there to an extent that it's not it's
underestimated outside. So there's I think very strong
awareness of the limitations of the
dollar system and that this can't go on
forever. I think what was what's been
quite unexpected is the almost the
self-sabotage of the of the system, the
resort to the seizure of uh Russian uh
reserves, the weaponization of Swift.
There you see that it's not just a
problem of the end of the structure the
international order the uniolar order
underlying the dollar but a crisis of
competence in the management and
credibility in the management of this.
So uh that has been quite quite shocking
and I think it's accelerated the
decline. I'm not sure any of us expected
to be sitting here right at this point
talking about 10 to 20 year to the end
of the dollar system the dollar's
reserve currency status but here we are in um ne nevertheless
we're in this strange we're in this
limbo state because people have invested
so to speak so much in the dollar system
and depend so much on the depth of the
capital markets around around the
dollar, right? Global trade is based on
this and the dollar has an unmatched uh
depth and uh and uh liquidity.
So there's no you know people like to
say there's no alternative to this where
is it uh despite you know particular
peacemeal moves um in in bricks and
these are important we haven't set up
that you know people don't see a path
forward and I think of course Philip is
going to talk to us about a a proposal
and indeed is a proposal with a great
intellectual pedigree um in ASEAN people
do talk about Malaysia China for
example, Malaysia, Indonesia about own
currency trade. So that's that's that's
on but a systemic solution is some way
um away. So we're in a kind of uh limbo
about where we go next. Yeah, very
right. 

Moderator

In breaks for example, national
currencies used reached 90% already and
this is uh quite interesting. You also
mentioned the competence of the
leadership of international
organizations like IMF, like World Bank
and I remember uh back in um uh 2008
2009 during the crisis when there was a
renewed wave of like how should we go
on? So why there should be leadership
just from one set of countries and it's
not open to the rest. uh the idea and
and people were complaining. You were
telling us 10 years before that other
countries cannot be seen as candidates
for leadership because we had problems
and you knew better so you could direct
us. Nowadays or 2008 they were saying we
have the problem primarily so only we
can decide on that and the leadership
problem still stays there and as such
the whole problem of institutions
because they are underlying for uh you
know for this problem. So could they be
altered at all? How uh or do we need new
institutions or could those adapt just
is it just question of leadership or
it's more systemic and I know you had
some interesting proposals maybe you
also could lay it down for us. 

Philip Pilkington
Yeah, I think the two things are related. Um so
there need we need to go into a tiny bit
of history here. when the when the
Bretonwoods systems were being set up in
1944 at the end of World War II um they
were negotiated at Bretonwoods in New
Hampshire um by John Mayor Kanes and
Harry Dexter White the British and the
American delegates respectively um John
Mayor Kanes wanted a multilateral system
and actually interestingly the
multilateral system probably would have
ended up including the Soviet Union but
it wasn't um Britain wanted a
multilateral system as well because they
were in debt heavily in debt because of
the war. The Americans wanted a dollar
backed system and that's what we ended
up with. Um Canes warned them at the
time that it was a mistake and once the
American economy stopped running trade
surpluses, it would um wish that they
hadn't uh taken on the the dollar as the
reserve currency. Turned out to be right
by the 70s they had to go off the gold
standard. And um we've been in a strange
period of fiat fiat currency since which
has led to the de-industrialization of
the United States and the hollowing out
of its economy. Um basically this is
what Steven Moran actually said in the
speech that was so controversial. Um so
that's the that's the history of those
institutions. The the IMF and the World
Bank were actually designed on Keynes's
plan. Um but then at the last minute
they kind of switched out the
multilateral arrangement for a US dollar
arrangement. So in theory those
institutions can be reformed um around
the uh around some sort of multilateral
system. Now Kanes also notes I read the
papers from 44 and Kanees also notes
that it would be absolutely fine if
there wanted to be regional uh partners
as well like bricks. he actually
envvisaged something like that for the
Europeans I think at the time and that
they might even have their own bank
institution that's tied at the you know
under the IMF or as a partner with the
IMF or something like that. So there's a
million different relationships um you
can you can come to the but the two
questions here are institutional and
political at the moment. So the
institutional question I think you kind
of raised it are these institutions
actually trustworthy anymore? Is the IMF
trustworthy anymore? or is the World
Bank trustworthy anymore? They've lost
an awful lot of trust in the world. Um,
I think the IMF in the past few years
has actually not been so bad. I think
it's been calling bulls and strikes
pretty uh pretty objectively actually.
I'm not usually a defender of IMF
policies, but I think actually in the
past couple of years with all the
economic chaos, it's it's been fairly
clearheaded and it hasn't tried to
manipulate data or anything like that.
It could have around some of the
tensions that we've had. So I would say
that there's some um I think I think
that reflects the fact that the the
institutions had to eat crow as they say
in America a little bit. Um but it's
ultimately can they can they get a
sufficient trust if they wanted to do it
or in the IMF. You could just set up a
completely alternative institution. But
I I I wouldn't I'd say try and use the
IMF first of all anyway. the the the
proposal the bank or the multilateral
proposal effectively uses kind of a a a
mechanism like special drawing rights
that the um IMF already has. So it
wouldn't be that hard to build it build
it into the architecture. So personally
I think reuse the institutions but if if
they've lost a sufficient amount of
trust in the developing world then that
would have to be negotiated. But the
political question is the real one and
that's that um in order to make this
decision I think the decision will
actually have to be made on a bilateral
basis between the Chinese and the
Americans effectively because they're
the ones that run the big trade
imbalances and they're the two economies
that that are going to have to do the
main adjustment. Everyone else can kind
of go along for the ride. So that's the
big political question. Can you sell the
Trump administration or a future
administration? And can you sell the
Chinese on this idea? Because those are
the economies that'll have to adjust.
And uh 

Moderator
so what's their what is envisioned by you as a possible new
system with the reformed institutions?
Philip Pilkington

So I'm just rehashing Keynes old idea of
the bankore um multilateral currency
system and that's effectively it goes
back to the original Breton Woods that
everybody experienced from 1945 up until
1971. Uh fixed exchange rate system uh
which the Chinese like actually um I
floated it a little bit to the Chinese.
They like that idea. fixed exchange rate
system, managed managed fixed. So, um,
currencies are effectively forced to
adjust if there's trade imbalances. This
was the case up until 1971. We've lived
through this before. It's pretty
functional. Um, and basically, it would
have a lot of supplements around that
though. You wouldn't be relying on the
dollar anymore. So, there'd be um
there'd be kind of negotiated processes
between uh countries. So just to take
one example, America and China at the
moment. Massive trade deficit America is
running with China. Um there's two ways
to allow well there's a couple of ways
to eliminate that but the most obvious
one is to allow the uh or to talk the US
dollar down. It's already happening. The
US dollar is falling. So the market is
adjusting anyway. But the bank the
bankor system would supplement that with
inward for example foreign direct
investment into America. So it has all
these it's a kind of carrot and sticks
approach. the the bankor system both
encourages investment in the deficit
country and it also kind of imposes
adjustments but the idea is basically to
eliminate trade imbalances of any
significant size. John what do you take
of this idea do you think it as ASEAN
members Malaysia uh how far it would go?
I think um you know most of the rest of
the world and especially developing u
countries uh are agnostic about you know
the the solution so long as there is
one. So what's clear is that the
existing one is not sustainable. It's
collapsing under its own weight.
um if nothing is done uh we will we're
going to effectively let the collapse
determine what what happens and it could
get really ugly. Um even on the best
sort of case scenario people I think
some people see a kind of multicurrency
system um coming to be but certainly a
kind of uh international currency union
where we could agree on this I think
would be very strongly um supported.
It's just that you know pragmatically
one would need to see a lot things would
have to get a lot worse for the US
before the political will is is is
mustered uh to come to this and it could
get you know reality could supply us
with with that with that circumstance.
Thank you so much and we were with you
for this session of reimagining Bretton
Woods with uh Philip Pilington and John
Pang and let's hope that it will not
collapse and it would not be too late
before we can come with their new ideas
and let's listen to our experts more.
Thank you so much.