William Reinsch 美国偏执狂 害怕每个人

Paranoia Strikes Deep . . . It Starts When You’re Always Afraid

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch March 13, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

偏执狂袭得很深。 。 。 当你总是害怕的时候它就开始了
William Alan Reinsch 的评论 2023 年 3 月 13 日

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

我以前写过有关 TikTok 的文章，但当前禁止它的提案浪潮说服我再次写下去。 另外，我承认自上次以来我的观点有所改变，本专栏的标题应该能让您了解我的前进方向。

至少三年来，政府一直在试图弄清楚如何处理 TikTok，但未能得出结论，说明问题有多么困难。 一方面，我们有一个流行的应用程序，被数百万美国人使用和享受，其中至少有一些人已经到了投票的年龄，而且如果它消失了，所有人都到了可以向父母苦苦抱怨的年龄。

另一方面，人们对此提出了两个基本的安全担忧：它获得的大量个人数据可能最终落入中国人手中，而中国可以通过提供有偏见的内容或通过审查将其用于虚假信息目的。 内容不讨好中国。

深入研究第一个问题，至少对我来说，尚不清楚中国人可以将这些数据用于什么邪恶目的，这些数据与 Facebook、LinkedIn 和其他应用程序收集的数据基本相同； 唯一的区别似乎在于谁可以访问它。 所以，如果问题是隐私的话，那艘船很久以前就已经航行了。 如果禁令要向前推进，其支持者必须更具体地说明中国可能会如何处理可能构成一定规模安全威胁的数据。

第二个担忧是不言而喻的，尽管禁令支持者必须再次解释为什么他们担心的 TikTok 媒体偏见与我们每天读到的美国应用程序和媒体机构的媒体偏见不同。 所有这些都涉及谎言胜过真相。 无论是中国的谎言、俄罗斯的谎言还是美国的谎言，并不重要。 这个问题在我们的社会中普遍存在，我希望美国人最终能够变得有足够的洞察力，能够自己区分事实与虚构。

这场辩论受到一系列“可能”的阻碍。 如果我们不禁止它，中国“可能”将其用于各种不受欢迎的目的，包括旨在影响美国政策和/或美国选民的虚假信息。 问题是，虽然这种情况发生的可能性很小，但也不为零，所以反对禁令的人不可能说人们担心的事情不可能发生。

我在商务部管理现在的工业和安全局 (BIS) 的经历告诉我，零风险是不可能实现的。 更合理的方法是风险管理，它需要仔细分析风险以及它们对我们的安全造成的威胁程度，并根据试图消除风险的成本来衡量。

就 TikTok 而言，我的结论是，它在美国面临的安全风险清单上排名相当靠后，消除它的成本将非常高，无论是从实际实施禁令的角度还是从其禁令的角度来看。 对第一修正案的影响。 任何养育青少年的人都会告诉你，尝试禁止访问应用程序是徒劳的，并且尝试在国家层面上做到这一点并不比尝试在家庭层面上做到这一点更容易。 从宪法上讲，我们相信言论自由，这种自由只有在有人说出不受欢迎或具有颠覆性的言论时才会受到考验。 我们应该仔细考虑禁止某个平台，因为我们害怕它所说的内容。 这正是我们不应该禁止的时候。 前总统特朗普在法庭上的失败具有启发性。

这里还有一个政治角度——不是一直都有吗？ 如果国会想要禁止 TikTok，勇敢的事情就是站出来去做。 相反，一些悬而未决的法案将这一责任推给了总统。 这是一个对他没有好处的政治陷阱。 如果他禁止 TikTok，就会有数百万不满的青少年对他大喊大叫，如果他不禁止，他就会给他的政治对手提供又一个论点，让他们可以用来说他对中国态度软弱。 此外，如果他禁止这项权利，在最高法院对同性婚姻和堕胎做出裁决之后，他会被提醒，确认一项权利比剥夺一项权利更容易。 此时，更好的途径是让政府继续尝试寻找解决方案，使应用程序能够以最小化安全威胁的方式运行。

最后，我担心我们正在陷入大规模歇斯底里的时期，尤其是在国会，几乎每天都会有攻击中国的新提案出现。 公众对中国的看法变得越来越负面，这是有充分理由的，很大程度上是由于中国采取的行动。

但我们之前已经在 20 年代的红色恐慌、1950 年代的麦卡锡（乔，不是凯文）时代以及 1980 年代规模较小的日本攻击中看到过这种情况。 这些并没有让我们作为一个社会享有尊严，而且在实践中它们也没有取得什么成就。 我们应该比那更好。 布法罗·斯普林菲尔德说得对——偏执症确实会根深蒂固，而且当你总是感到害怕时，它就会开始。 我们不应该出于恐惧而行动，而应该出于力量而行动，这正是拜登总统“跑得更快”计划的目的——让我们变得更强大，以便我们能够更有效地竞争。

偏执狂袭击：第二部分

威廉·艾伦·赖因施 (William Alan Reinsch) 评论 2023 年 10 月 10 日

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-part-ii

我经常评论国会中越来越多的反华提案以及国会议员之间竞相提出越来越严厉的法案。 其中许多是账单账单。 它们永远不会成为法律，而且它们的作者可能不会特别关心这一点，因为他们更感兴趣的是发表声明而不是实际立法。 然而，最近这些提案不断升级，其获得通过的可能性也有所增加。 最新也是最好的例子是《2023 年中国军事和监视公司制裁法案》，俗称《巴尔法案》，以其作者国会议员安迪·巴尔 (R-KY) 的名字命名。 该法案已获得众议院金融服务委员会的批准，但其支持者似乎并没有试图在众议院全体会议上通过该法案，而是寻求在会议上将其添加到年度国防授权中。

讨论该法案需要一些背景知识。 联邦政府保存着一系列坏人名单，包括决心从事被视为不利于美国各种利益的活动的公司和个人。 这些名单包括中国军工公司名单、中国军工公司名单、实体名单、军事最终用户名单和被拒绝人员名单。 这些清单各自具有不同的法定依据，并且出于不同的原因而制定。 例如，中国军工公司名单是与中国军方开展业务的中国公司的名单。 值得注意的是，名单上的公司不会受到任何处罚。 相比之下，列入商务部实体名单意味着向该实体的所有出口都需要获得许可证，这可能会严重限制贸易。

所有名单之母是财政部的特别指定国民和被封锁人员名单（SDN 名单）。 如果您在该名单上，您的美国资产将被冻结； 美国各方与您进行交易是非法的； 您会发现世界上很少有金融机构愿意与您进行美元计价的交易。 巴尔法案的目的是推动财政部将这些其他名单上的实体添加到其 SDN 名单中（如果它们尚未存在）。 其结果将是对政府尚未确定应得的实体强加经济“核选择”。 此外，采取这样的行动会给试图在中国开展业务的美国公司带来巨大的问题。 例如，中国移动通信集团有限公司、中国联合网络通信集团有限公司（中国联通）和中国电信有限公司这三家在中国运营蜂窝电话网络的中国公司都在一台网络上。 其他列表中的。 如果它们被列入SDN名单，美国人和在华美国公司将被禁止与它们或其中国子公司就在中国的电信服务签订合同。 美国电信公司也无法与他们签订合同，为访问中国的美国人提供漫游服务。 这三家公司还负责测试和批准在中国手机中使用的芯片。 如果美国制造商被列入SDN名单，他们的芯片产品将无法获得认证，不仅美国手机，而且汽车和电器等含有连接物联网芯片的产品也被排除在中国市场之外。 这只是一个例子。

巴尔法案的捍卫者认为，该法案要求财政部考虑将更多实体列入名单，但并不要求财政部这样做，而且财政部将负责任地使用其权力。 如果我们有一个像现任政府那样负责任的政府，这可能是真的，但在另一位总统的领导下，情况就很难确定了。 它还引出了一个问题：如果你只想财政部负责任地行事，为什么还要鼓励它不负责任地行事？

可悲的是，这并不是偏执的唯一例子。 德克萨斯州立法机构已提出法案，禁止中国学生（以及伊朗人、俄罗斯人和朝鲜人）就读德克萨斯州公立学院和大学以及在德克萨斯州购买房产。 我们还看到一波阻止中国人购买农田的法案，尽管政府已经有权出于国家安全原因阻止任何特定投资，例如该地产毗邻军事设施。 诸如此类的措施只会让我们更加疏远。 人们会认为在美国教育中国学生是一件好事。 他们将了解中国宣传之外的民主以及我国的历史和文化。 如果他们最终留在这里，我们就会受益于他们的才华。 如果他们回到中国，他们就会带着我们一起去。 不管怎样我们都会赢。 人们担心的似乎是他们中的一些人是间谍。 其中一些可能是，但禁止所有这些是一个典型的把婴儿和洗澡水一起倒掉的例子。 这也贬低了我们作为一个害怕与可能有不同观点的其他人互动的人。

巴尔法案和其他提案让人想起布法罗·斯普林菲尔德（Buffalo Springfield）的《For What It’s Worth》中的台词——这是我们这一代人的歌曲。 “偏执狂袭得很深/。 。 。 /当你总是害怕的时候，一切就开始了。” 过去，美国人不惧怕任何人。 现在我们似乎害怕每个人。

Paranoia Strikes Deep . . . It Starts When You’re Always Afraid

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch March 13, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

I’ve written about TikTok before, but the current wave of proposals to ban it persuade me to write again. Plus, I confess my views have changed somewhat since the last time, and the title of this column should give you some idea where I’m heading.

The government has been trying to figure out what to do about TikTok for at least three years, and its inability to come to a conclusion illustrates how difficult the problem is. On the one hand, we have a popular app used and enjoyed by millions of Americans, at least some of whom are old enough to vote, and all of whom are old enough to complain bitterly to their parents if it goes away.

On the other hand, two basic security concerns have been raised about it: the massive amounts of personal data it obtains could end up in the hands of the Chinese, and China could use it for disinformation purposes, either by providing biased content or by censoring content that is not flattering to China.

Drilling down a bit on the first one, it is not clear, at least to me, for what nefarious purposes the Chinese could use the data, which is essentially the same as Facebook, LinkedIn and other apps gather; the only difference appears to be who might have access to it. So, if the issue is privacy, that ship sailed a long time ago. If a ban is to move forward, it is important for its proponents to be more specific about exactly what China might do with the data that would constitute a security threat at some scale.

The second concern is self-explanatory, although here again, ban proponents must explain why the media bias they are concerned about with TikTok is different from the media bias from U.S. apps and media outlets we read about every day. All involve the purveyance of lies over truth. Whether they Chinese lies, Russian lies, or American lies, is not critical. This problem is pervasive in our society, and I hope eventually Americans will become discerning enough to distinguish fact from fiction on their own.

This debate is encumbered by a parade of “coulds.” If we don’t ban it, the Chinese “could” use it for a variety of unwelcome purposes, including disinformation designed to influence American policy and/or American voters. The problem is that while the likelihood of that happening is very small, it is not zero, so it is impossible for opponents of a ban to say that the things people are worried about could not possibly happen.

My time at the Commerce Department running what is now the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), taught me that zero risk is unattainable. The sounder approach is risk management, which requires a close analysis of the risks and the degree of threat they pose to our security measured against the costs of trying to eliminate them.

In the case of TikTok, my conclusion is that it is fairly far down on the list of security risks the United States faces and that the cost of eliminating it would be very high, both in terms of actually implementing a ban and in terms of its impact on the First Amendment. Anyone raising teenagers can tell you the futility of trying to ban access to an app, and trying to do it on a national level would not be easier than trying to do it on a family level. Constitutionally, we believe in freedom of speech, a freedom that is only tested when someone is saying something unpopular or subversive. We should think carefully about banning a platform because we are afraid of what it says. That is precisely the time when we should not ban it. Former president Trump’s failure to succeed in the courts is instructive.

There is also a political angle here—isn’t there always? If Congress wants to ban TikTok, the courageous thing is to stand up and do it. Instead, some of the pending bills dump that duty on the president. That is a political trap that does him no favors. If he bans TikTok, he’ll have millions of unhappy teenagers yelling at him, and if he doesn’t, he gives his political opponents one more argument they can use to say he is soft on China. In addition, if he bans it, he will be reminded, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions on same sex marriage and abortion, that it is easier to affirm a right than it is to take one away. At this point, the better route would be to let the government continue to try to find a solution that would allow the app to operate in a way that minimizes the security threat.

Finally, I fear we are moving headlong into a period of mass hysteria, particularly in Congress, where new proposals for attacking China arrive virtually every day. The public’s view on China has become ever more negative, and there is good reason for that, largely due to actions China has taken. But we’ve seen this before in the Red Scare of the 1920s, the McCarthy (Joe, not Kevin) era in the 1950s, and on a lesser scale Japan bashing in the 1980s. Those did not dignify us as a society, and in practical terms they accomplished very little. We should be better than that. Buffalo Springfield got it right—paranoia does strike deep, and it does start when you’re always afraid. Instead of acting out of fear, we should be acting out of strength, which is exactly what President Biden’s “running faster” programs are designed to do—to make us stronger so we can compete more effectively.

Paranoia Strikes: Part II

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch Oct 10, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-part-ii

I have frequently commented on the growing number of anti-China proposals in the Congress and the competition among members of Congress to produce ever-more stringent bills. Many of these are statement bills. They will never become law, and their authors may not particularly care about that, since they are more interested in making a statement than in actually legislating. Lately, however, the proposals have escalated, and their chances of enactment have also increased. The latest and best example is the Chinese Military and Surveillance Company Sanctions Act of 2023, popularly known as the Barr bill, named after its author Congressman Andy Barr (R-KY). The bill has been approved by the House Financial Services Committee, but rather than attempting to pass it in the full House, it appears its proponents may seek to add it in conference to the annual defense authorization.

Discussing the bill requires a bit of context. The federal government maintains a number of lists of bad guys—companies and individuals determined to have engaged in activities deemed inimical to a variety of U.S. interests. The lists include the Chinese Military Companies list, the Chinese Military-Industrial Companies list, the Entity List, the Military End User List, and the Denied Persons List. These lists each have a different statutory basis and were developed for different reasons. The Chinese Military Companies list, for example, is a list of Chinese companies doing business with China’s military. It is cautionary—there is no penalty imposed on companies on the list. Placement on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, in contrast, means a license is required for all exports to that entity, potentially significantly restricting trade.

The mother of all lists is the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, or SDN list. If you are on that list, your U.S. assets are frozen; it is illegal for U.S. parties to engage in transactions with you; and you will find very few financial institutions anywhere in the world willing to engage in dollar-denominated transactions with you. The intention of the Barr bill is to push the Treasury Department to add the entities on these other lists to its SDN list if they are not already there. The effect of that would be to impose an economic “nuclear option” on entities the government has not determined deserve it. In addition, taking such an action would create enormous problems for U.S. companies trying to do business in China. For example, the three China companies that operate cellular telephone networks in China, China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd., China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (China Unicom), and China Telecom Corporation Limited, are all on one of the other lists. If they are put on the SDN list, Americans and U.S. companies in China would be prohibited from contracting with them or their Chinese subsidiaries for telecommunications services in China. U.S. telecom companies would also be unable to contract with them to provide roaming services for Americans visiting China. The three companies also are responsible for testing and approving chips being incorporated into cell phones in China. If they were on the SDN list, U.S. manufacturers would not be able to get their chip-containing products certified, excluding from the Chinese market not only U.S. phones but products like autos and appliances that contain chips to connect to the internet of things. And this is only one example.

Defenders of the Barr bill argue that it requires the Treasury Department to consider putting additional entities on their list but does not require it to do so, and the Treasury Department will use its authority responsibly. That may be true if we have a responsible administration, like the current one, but that would be far from certain under a different president. It also begs the question: if you only want the Treasury Department to act responsibly, why encourage it to act irresponsibly?

Sadly, this is not the only example of paranoia. Bills have been introduced in the Texas legislature to bar Chinese students (and Iranians, Russians, and North Koreans) from attending Texas public colleges and universities and from buying property in Texas. We are also seeing a wave of bills preventing Chinese from buying farmland, even though the government already has authority to block any specific investment for national security reasons such as the property being adjacent to a military facility. Measures like these only serve to drive us further apart. One would think that educating Chinese students in the United States would be a good thing. They would learn about democracy and the history and culture of our country outside the reach of Chinese propaganda. If they end up staying here, we get the benefit of their talent. If they go back to China, they take part of us with them. We win either way. The fear seems to be that some of them are spies. Some of them probably are, but banning all of them is a classic case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It also demeans us as a people afraid to interact with others that might have different points of view.

The Barr bill and these other proposals bring to mind lines from “For What It’s Worth” by Buffalo Springfield—a song of my generation. “Paranoia strikes deep / . . . / It starts when you’re always afraid.” In the past, Americans weren’t afraid of anybody. Now we seem to be afraid of everybody.