| | | |  | Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the
trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for
the parties that deal in them and the economic system.
對於衍生性金融商品以及其他附帶的交易，查理跟我的看法完全一致，我們認為不
論是對參與交易的雙方或者是整個經濟體系而言，它們就像是一顆顆定時炸彈!
Having delivered that thought, which I’ll get back to, let me retreat to
explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because
the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts.
Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some
future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference
items, such as interest rates, stock prices or currency values. If, for
example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are
a party to a very simple derivatives transaction – with your gain or loss
derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying
duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years) and their value is often
tied to several variables.
在丟出這個爆炸性的看法後，請容我稍後我再詳加說明，現在讓我先稍微解釋一下
衍生性金融商品，雖然這類的解釋相當空泛，因為這個名詞代表著相當廣泛的金融
交易，基本上，這類交易工具會使得財富在未來的一段時間內進行易手，其金額決
定於某個或數個關鍵指標，包含利率、股價或匯率等，舉例來說，假設你做多或放
空 S&P500指數期權，那麼你等於已經參與一項非常簡單的衍生性金融商品交易，
你的賺賠取決於指數的變動，衍生性金融商品的期間長短不一而足(有時甚至可能超
過20年以上)，其價值的變化則繫於許多變數。
Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate
value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them.
In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties
record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings
statements without so much as a penny changing hands.
除非衍生性金融商品交易有質押擔保或是附帶保證，否則其最終的價值還必須取決
於交易雙方的履約能力，雖然在交易正式結算之前，交易雙方都會隨時在各自的損
益表上記錄盈虧-且其金額通常都相當龐大-即便實際上還沒有任何一塊錢進行移
轉。
The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man
(or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint
and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future,
were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on
the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem – at a
price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.
只要是人想得到的(或者有時應該說是瘋狂的人)，都可以被列為衍生性金融商品交
易的標的，舉例來說，當初在安隆，就有新聞及寬頻衍生性金融商品，雖然要在許
多年後才會結算，但此類交易還是可以入到公司的帳上；或比如說你想要簽一個契
約，賭內布拉斯加州2020年雙胞胎出生的數目，沒有問題，只要你肯出價，保證
你一定找得到有人肯跟你對賭。
When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a
derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be
dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and
are now terminating it.
當初我們在買下通用再保時，該公司有一家附屬的通用再保證券，這是一家衍生性
金融商品經紀商，查理跟我認為它具有相當的危險性，所以並不想保留這個部門，
於是我們試圖將這個部門出售，但並沒有成功，最後只好將它慢慢清算。
But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a
great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we
reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives
businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost
impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract – which may
require a large payment decades later – you are usually stuck with it. True,
there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most
strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability.
但想要關閉一個衍生性金融商品部門，談何容易，想要擺脫它的糾纏可能要耗費許
多個年頭，(雖然我們正逐日降低所曝露的風險)，事實上，再保險業與衍生性金融
商品交易有點類似，兩者都像是地獄一樣，並沒有多大的進入障礙，但想要退出卻
難如登天，一旦簽了約，你就擺脫不了它，有時甚至要等到幾十年後，才突然冒出
來要你支付一大筆錢，確實也有些法子可以讓你將風險轉嫁給別人，但大多數的做
法還是無法讓你免除連帶的責任。
Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate
reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That’s true because
today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose
inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.
再保險業與衍生性金融商品交易另一個共同特點就是兩者的帳面盈餘通常都有過度
高估的情況，這是由於目前的盈餘大多繫於許多未來的變數，而其正確性卻需要很
多年後才能揭曉。
Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an
optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also
have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who
trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on “earnings” calculated
by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think
about our contract involving twins) and “mark-to-model” is utilized. This
substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts
involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase
the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the
twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use
differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years.
In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call
mark-to-myth.
但錯誤瞞的了人，卻騙不了自己，其所反應的，不過是人們對於他人的承諾，總是
傾向採取樂觀看法的現象，而且交易的雙方有極大的動機在會計帳務上作手腳，因
為這些負責買賣衍生性金融商品的人士，其報酬(全部或部份)往往取決於依市價結
算的帳面盈餘，但現實的狀況是(想想我們剛剛提到的雙胞胎合約)那個市場根本就
不存在，所以取而代之的是"依公式結算"，這種替代性的做法有極大的漏洞，在通
常的狀況下，由於合約牽涉多個變數在加上結算日期的遙遠，使得交易雙方無形中
增加許多引用不實假設的機會，以我們剛剛提到的雙胞胎案例來說，訂立合約的雙
方可能使用截然不同的公式使得交易雙方連續好幾年同時享受鉅額的帳面獲利，在
最誇張的狀況下，所謂的"依公式結算"極可能墮落淪為"依鬼話結算"。
Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but
that’s no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at yearend (after ten
months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding,
involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or
minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of
mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors
could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions.
當然，不論是內部的稽核人員或者是外部的會計師，也都看過這些數字，但要弄懂
可不是一件容易的事，舉例來說，通用再保證券截至2002年年底(在決定徹底關閉
它的10個月後)仍有14,384件有效合約流落在外，交易對象遍佈全世界672個對
手，每一項合約的價值都會隨著一個或好幾個變數的變化而隨時上下變動，其中有
一些變數光是看了就令人覺得頭發昏，想要對於這些交易組合進行評價，就算是專
業的會計師，也往往會有不同的意見與看法。
The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years, some huge-
scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In
the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used
derivatives and trading activities to report great “earnings” – until the roof
fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related
receivables on their balance sheets into cash. “Mark-to-market” then
turned out to be truly “mark-to-myth.”
評價難度本身早已超越學術性論證，近幾年來，有好幾件大規模的舞弊案及疑似舞
弊案都是緣自於衍生性金融商品交易，以公用能源事業來說，許多公司利用衍生性
金融商品交易來創造帳面鉅額的獲利，直到東窗事發之際，他們還試圖將衍生性金
融商品交易相關的應收款項，轉換成為現金科目，至此"依市價結算"真正淪為"依鬼
話結算"。
I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have
not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the
trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted
to report impressive “earnings” (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the
CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that
the reported earnings were a sham.
我可以向各位保證，在衍生性金融商品交易所發生的錯誤，絕對無法讓交易雙方的
帳對得平，幾乎不例外的，他們都會偏坦有機會得到百萬獎金的營業員或特別希望
帳面擁有亮麗的報表數字的一方(或甚至是雙方)，而最後往往要等到獎金支付給營
業員，而CEO因為認股權大發利市後，股東們才會發現所謂亮麗的財報數字根本就
是一場騙局。
Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that
a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on
effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company
suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to
counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of
general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their
requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash
collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw
the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still
more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate
meltdown.
衍生性金融商品交易的另一項問題是它可能因為一些毫不相關的原因，讓一家公司
的問題更為加重，這種滾雪球效應之所以會發生主要在於許多衍生性金融商品交易
的合約都要求對方一旦其信用評等遭到調降時，必須立刻提供質押擔保給交易對
方，大家可以想像到當一家公司面臨困境而被調降信用評等的同時，衍生性金融交
易卻又立即登門要求提供事先完全沒有設想到且金額龐大的現金時的情景，此舉可
能讓公司進一步陷入流動性的危機，而通常這又會讓公司的信用評等再度向下調
降，惡性循環的結果可能導致一家原本好好的公司因此垮台。
Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by
insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In
both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up
over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables,
though we’ve been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant
may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be
diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances,
though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to
go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches
us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed
of in more tranquil times.
衍生性金融商品交易也有可能造成骨牌效應的風險，這是因為許多保險業及再保業
者習慣將風險分散給其他保險公司，在這類的情況下，鉅額的應收款項將隨著交易
對象的日趨複雜而持續累積，(以通用再保證券來說，雖然已經經過將近一年的清算
期，目前仍有高達65億美元的應收款項流通在外)，交易的一方或許對於自己相當
有信心，認為其鉅額的信用風險已經經過適度的分散，因此不會發生任何危險，只
有等到某種特殊狀況下，一個外部事件導致A公司的應收帳款發生問題，從而影響B
公司，乃至於一路到Z公司，歷史教訓告訴我們危機的發生往往是我們在太平盛世
時所夢想不到一連串問題串連所導致的。
In banking, the recognition of a “linkage” problem was one of the reasons
for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was
established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and
unanticipated liquidity demands on previously-strong banks, causing
them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of
the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the
dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms
that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the
travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction”
threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind.
That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we
are exiting derivatives.
在金融體系中，早期發現到連鎖反應的問題嚴重性是聯邦準備理事會成立的主要原
因之一，在聯準會成立以前，體質不佳的銀行倒閉有時可能會對一些原本體質還不
錯的銀行造成突然沒有預期到的流動性壓力，導致它們跟著出現問題，聯準會於是
建立一道防火牆將有問題的金融機構隔絕開，但是在保險業或是衍生性金融商品交
易，卻沒有類似中央銀行的控管機制來防止骨牌效應的發生，在這些產業，一家原
本體質不錯的公司很有可能因為其他公司發生問題而受到拖累，當這種連鎖反應的
威脅存在在產業中時，就絕對有必要盡量降低彼此間的牽連，這正是我們目前在再
保業採取的做法，同樣這也是我們選擇退出衍生性金融商品交易的原因之一。
Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that
participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to
stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the
economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants.
And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I
sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to
facilitate certain investment strategies.
許多人聲稱衍生性金融商品交易可以有效降低系統風險，透過這類交易讓原本無法
承擔特定風險的人可以將風險移轉到他人身上，這些人相信衍生性金融商品成為穩
定經濟的力量、讓商業交易得以遂行同時降低個別參與者的變數，就個體層面而言，
他們的說法或許確是事實，就像是在Berkshire，我有時也會搭配一些大規模的衍
生性金融商品交易好讓某些投資策略得以遂行。
Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and
getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have
become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers,
who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could
quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge
amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as
I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to
contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as
the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the
value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can
trigger serious systemic problems.
然而查理跟我本人認為，以總體經濟的角度來看，這卻是相當危險，而且風險更有
日益加重的趨勢，大量的風險，尤其是信用風險，目前已逐漸累積在少數幾家衍生
性金融商品交易商身上，而且彼此的交易更是相當頻繁，這使得一家公司在發生問
題後，將很快地傳染給其他公司，到最後這些交易商將積欠非交易商的交易對方鉅
額欠款，而這些交易對方，如我剛剛提到的，由於彼此關係過於緊密，將導致一個
單一事件讓他們同時出現問題，(比如說電信產業的崩潰或者民間電力事業的價值大
幅減損等)，關聯度過高-在問題浮現時，便有可能引發系統性的風險。
Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single
hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve
anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later
Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not
intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM – a firm unknown to the
general public and employing only a few hundred people – could well have
posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words,
the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have
happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled.
And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market
for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario.
就像是1998年大量從事高槓桿操作衍生性金融商品的避險基金-長期資本管理公
司LTCM就搞得大家焦頭爛額，最後使得聯準會不得不火速施出緊急援助，在後來
的國會聽證會中，聯準會官員坦承當初若非他們介入，這家名聲響亮但僅有數百名
員工的神祕公司LTCM，很有可能對於美國資本社會的穩定造成極嚴重的威脅，換
句話說，聯準會之所以甘冒大不諱打破慣例介入干預，完全是因為主事者害怕類似
的事件會發生在其他金融機構的身上進而引發骨牌效應，而這次的事件雖然導致大
部份固定收益市場一度癱瘓達數個星期之久，但個人認為，這還不是最壞的狀況。
One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps,
contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including
stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the
money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any
capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss
that the bank realizes.
在所有衍生性金融商品中，全收益交換是LTCM經常使用的工具之一，這類的合約
使得該公司可以哂?00%的槓桿在各種市場進行套利，也包含股票市場，舉例來
說，合約的一方A，通常是一家銀行，必須投入百分之百的資金買進股票，而在此
同時，合約的另一方B，卻可以不必投入任何資金，B公司就可以約定在未來的某個
日子時，取得或負擔A銀行所實現的利益或損失。
Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements.
Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of
regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk
profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even
experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing
the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives
contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing
the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is
that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.
這類全收益交換合約竟然連保證金都可以不需要，除此之外，其他種類的衍生性金
融商品也嚴重危害到主管機關抑制銀行、保險公司及其他金融單位採取高槓桿及風
險控管的強力鐵腕，同時，即便是經驗老道的投資者及分析師在看到這類佈滿衍生
性金融商品交易公司的財務狀況時，也束手無策，記得當查理跟我自己在看完幾家
大型銀行有關衍生性金融商品交易冗長的財務報表附註時，我們唯一可以確定的是
我們根本就不曉得這些金融機構到底承擔了多少的風險。
The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments
will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event
makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has
already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption
of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically.
Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand
unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective
way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.
衍生性金融商品交易鬼怪現在已從仙朵拉瓶子中竄出，而這類交易還會繼續以各種
不同形式自我複製，直至這個禍害所造成的危害為眾人所知時為止，它們的危險程
度從近年來瀰漫在電力能源產業的幾件個案可以略窺一二，在事件發生之後，衍生
性金融商品交易急速減少，然而在其他產業，衍生性金融商品交易卻照樣毫無節制
的急速擴張中，中央銀行及美國政府到目前為止依然找不到有效克制的辦法，甚至
連監控這些合約所構成風險的機制都沒有。
Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength –
for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try
to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make
us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term
derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized
receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives
are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while
now latent, are potentially lethal.
查理跟我相信Berkshire依然是所有股東、債權人、保戶及員工最堅強的財務堡壘，
我們對於任何可能的潛在重大意外都戒慎恐懼，或許對於長期性衍生性金融商品的
大量交易及鉅額膨脹的無擔保應收款項的保留態度，讓我們看起有點過慮了，但我
們還是認為衍生性金融商品是財務金融的毀滅性武器，其所帶來的危險，雖然是潛
在不可知，但絕對是致命的可能。 |
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