ZT: 盖特纳的豪赌

西蒙•约翰逊：盖特纳的豪赌

本文来源于《财经网》　 2011年02月23日

---盖氏依然是全世界政府高官中被大银行的自私观念毒害最深的一个

西蒙•约翰逊曾任IMF首席经济学家，MIT斯隆管理学院教授，彼得森研究所国际经济学高级研究员

 

洛杉矶——

在最近的一次采访中，美国财政部长蒂姆•盖特纳阐述了自己关于世界经济增长性质和美国金融部门角色的观点。盖氏的观点是危险的，相当于在用美国经济的未来进行一场盲注豪赌。从中也可以看出，盖氏依然是全世界政府高官中被大银行的自私观念毒害最深的一个。

盖氏指出，世界将不会经历大型“金融深化”，因为新兴市场对金融产品和服务的需求正在不断增加。当然了，他所考虑的是印度、中国、巴西这样的 “中等收入”国家。他强调，上诉三国均有了极大发展，中产阶级正在崭露头角，这批人希望增加储蓄、获得更便利的融资（以进行生产性投资、购房、教育等）， 而且一般而言都希望消费水平不要出现波动，这无疑是正确的。

但接着盖氏就开始大跃进了。他希望美国银行能够领导这些国家的金融发展。我们有必要看看他原话是怎么说的：

我无意……试图弱化金融体系作为改革试验在我们经济中的相对重要性，因为我们必须考虑到这样一个事实：我们是在更广阔的世界舞台上运作……就像微软等公司一样。我们希望美国企业能够从中获益……如今，风险已经改变了金融企业的面貌，但你可以通过监管克服这一点。

盖氏的观点有三个大问题。首先，全世界范围内已知的所有金融发展模式全部被他忽视了。事实上，几个世纪以来的经验清晰地表明，随着经济增长和储 蓄积累，一国将越来越难以摆脱金融崩溃的宿命。近几十年来的历史再次证明了这一点。盖氏在美国财政部、IMF和纽约联邦储备银行供职多年，有着丰富的国际 危机处理经验，如今竟然会持有如此幼稚的观点，着实令人吃惊。

其次，盖氏认为美国最大企业的风险能够通过监管克服，这与所有人的知识截然相反。就算是多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）改革法案最坚定的 支持者也强调，这一法案只能说是有利于削弱主要金融机构去承担太多风险的激励。除了多德-弗兰克法案外，巴塞尔III协议只是略微提高了资本要求，而以盖氏为首的金融稳定监督委员会更是放出了将采取不插手政策的信号。这三点的联合作用就是，没有任何东西能得到真正的改善。

事实上，如今的美国大银行显然是“太大而不能倒”的，因此它们有更多的激励去提高负债-股本比水平。提高杠杆可以提高好的情形下的回报——高管和交易员的薪资可都是基于“股东回报率”的。而在坏情形下，比如发生了金融危机，损失则会被转嫁给债权人。如果债权人损失太大，牵涉太广，以至于危害到了整个金融体系，政府就会有施手救援的压力。银行家攫取了好处，而坏处全部甩给了纳税人（以及信贷不振时被解雇的那些人）。

20世纪70年代，美国金融部门趋之若鹜地向新兴市场发放高风险贷款，说这是业务新前线。结果这些贷款组合在1982年的债务危机中灰飞烟灭 了。如今，相同的轻率跨境借贷潮卷土重来，金融部门大佬们（比如JP摩根大通的杰米•戴蒙）不但对此大唱赞歌，还说服盖氏来为他们抬轿。

第三，盖氏完全忽视了欧洲的覆辙。他应该花更多的时间与冰岛、爱尔兰和瑞士当局交流交流。在这些国家中，“金融全球化”导致银行业与经济的比例出现了失调。

在冰岛，最大的三家银行的全球资产负债表规模达到了经济规模11~13倍。然后，它们倒闭了。

在爱尔兰，最大的三家银行如失心疯般跳入了商业地产市场——资金是通过大额借款从其他欧元区国家（包括德国）那里融来的。这些银行资产负债表的 价值相当于爱尔兰GDP的两倍，但政客却对此视而不见——一些官员还说可以按时偿付。然后，它们倒闭了，还差点把爱尔兰政府也拖向倒闭。

在瑞士，最大的两家银行瑞银和瑞信，2008年秋的资产负债表规模高达GDP的8 倍，且主要业务都是全球业务。UBS驻伦敦抵押贷款交易部门——其中并没有多少瑞士人——承担了巨量风险，险些把UBS拖垮。瑞士政府竭尽全力才把UBS救活。现在，瑞士央行采取了与盖氏相反的动作——让大银行变小，并更多地使用股权而非债务融资来为经营活动筹钱。

盖氏是一位有智慧、有经验的公务员。他对于金融业未来的观点能左右世界。而这也是为何我们正在奔向麻烦的原因。

西蒙•约翰逊曾任IMF首席经济学家，MIT斯隆管理学院教授，彼得森研究所国际经济学高级研究员。他与郭庾信合著有《13位银行家》

 

Geithner's Gamble

Geithner remains the senior public official worldwide who is most in thrall to the self-serving ideology of big banks.

By Simon Johnson

LOS ANGELES – In a recent interview, United States Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner laid out his view of the nature of world economic growth and the role of the US financial sector. It is a deeply disturbing vision, one that amounts to a huge, uninformed gamble with the future of the American economy – and that suggests that Geithner remains the senior public official worldwide who is most in thrall to the self-serving ideology of big banks.

Geithner argues that the world will now experience a major “financial deepening,” owing to growing demand in emerging markets for financial products and services. He is thinking, of course, of “middle-income” countries like India, China, and Brazil. And he is right to emphasize that all have made terrific progress and now offer great opportunities for the rising middle class, which wants to accumulate savings, borrow more easily (for productive investment, home purchases, education, etc), and, more generally, smooth out consumption.

But then Geithner takes a leap. He wants US banks to take the lead in these countries’ financial development. His words are worth quoting at length:

I don’t have any enthusiasm for…trying to shrink the relative importance of the financial system in our economy as a test of reform, because we have to think about the fact that we operate in the broader world…It’s the same thing for Microsoft or anything else. We want US firms to benefit from that…Now, financial firms are different because of the risk, but you can contain that through regulation.

There are three serious problems with this view. First, Geithner ignores everything that we know about the pattern of financial development around the world. It is very rare for financial systems to develop without major crises. In fact, experience in recent decades confirms what should have been obvious from previous centuries: as countries grow and accumulate savings, they become increasingly prone to financial collapse. Given Geithner’s extensive international crisis-fighting experience at the US Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and the New York Federal Reserve, his current naïveté on this point is simply stunning.

Second, Geithner assumes that risks at the largest US firms can be contained through regulation, when all our knowledge points directly to the contrary. Even the strongest supporters of the Dodd-Frank reform legislation emphasize that it only went part way towards reducing the incentives for major financial institutions to take big risks. Looking at the combined effect of the new law, plus the weak additional capital requirements agreed under Basel III and the hands-off approach already signaled by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (which Mr. Geithner chairs), it is hard to believe that anything has really improved.

In fact, given that our largest banks are now undoubtedly too big to fail, they have even more incentive to increase their debt levels relative to their equity. Higher leverage increases their payoffs when times are good – as executives and traders are paid based on their “return on equity.” And when times are bad, for example in a crisis episode, losses are transferred to creditors. If those creditor losses are large and spread so as to undermine the broader financial system, pressure for a government bailout will mount. Bankers get the upside and taxpayers (and people laid off as credit is disrupted) get the downside.

The US financial sector went mad for high-risk loans to emerging markets during 1970s – arguing that this was the new frontier. This loan portfolio blew up in the debt crisis of 1982. A version of same thoughtless cross-border lending is again underway, extolled by leading financial sector executives (e.g., Jamie Dimon from JP Morgan Chase) – who have apparently persuaded Mr. Geithner to tag along intellectually.

And third, Geithner completely overlooks what has brought significant parts of Europe to its economic knees. He should spend more time with the authorities in Iceland or Ireland or Switzerland, countries where “financial globalization” allowed banks to become big relative to the economy.

In Iceland, the three largest banks built global balance sheets that were between 11 and 13 times the size of the economy. And then they collapsed.

In Ireland, the three largest banks went crazy for commercial real estate – financed by large-scale borrowing from other eurozone countries (including Germany). The politicians looked the other way – or were paid off, some claim – while these banks built balance sheets valued at two times Irish GDP. And then they collapsed, causing enormous damage to the government’s own solvency.

In Switzerland, the two largest banks (UBS and Credit Suisse) had a combined balance sheet in fall 2008 of around 8 times Swiss GDP – mostly based on their global activities. Mortgage traders in London – not many of whom were Swiss – took on enormous risks that almost brought down UBS. The Swiss government could afford the bailout, just. And now the Swiss National Bank is moving in the exact opposite direction to Geithner – they are pushing these big banks to become smaller and to finance more of their activities with equity, rather than debt.

Geithner is a very smart and experienced public servant. His views concerning the future of finance will help shape what happens. And that is why we are headed for trouble.

Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the IMF, is co-founder of a leading economics blog, http://BaselineScenario.com, a professor at MIT Sloan, and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. His book, 13 Bankers, co-authored with James Kwak, is now available in paperback.