美国后面将要面临的另外一个巨大问题（组内讨论稿）
(2011-05-31 23:16:32)
文章来源http://www.niwota.com/submsg/5788837
Alt-A和option ARM或将引发新一轮金融危机
次级抵押贷款危机（简称次贷危机）之后，Alt-A和选择性可调整利率贷款（option ARM）将是另外两颗等待引爆的定时炸弹。
美国住房抵押贷款市场可分为三个档次，优质(Prime)贷款面向信用等级高的客户(信用分数在660分以上)；次级（Subprime）贷款通常指信用分数低于620分，收入证明缺失，负债较重的人；而Alt-A贷款介于两者之间。
对于选择性可调整利率贷款来说，买房者在最初几年只需要每月按揭支付非常低的利息（如1%），人们给这种利率取了个名字“引逗利率”，因为等到2年、3年或者5年之后，重新设定利率时，买房者每月还款会大幅增加，甚至上涨数倍。
Alt-A和选择性可调整利率贷款的利率正开始大规模调整，而现在它们的违约率已经非常惊人。Alt-A和option ARMs贷款的违约率最终将和次级贷款一样高，达到50%，而毒性更大的option ARM可能会高达70%。
整个美国房屋抵押贷款的市场规模是10万亿美元，其中次级贷款1万亿美元，Alt-A贷款1万亿美元，优质贷款8万亿美元。
在2005-2006年，次级贷款“最风光”的时候，对次级贷款承销的标准非常宽松，Alt-A虽然比次级贷款要好一点，但是“放松的尺度可能差不多，因此今后Alt-A会比次级贷款的伤害更厉害，70%的Alt-A借款者都夸大了他们的收入情况，当借款者和贷款经纪人在申请贷款，填写收入和工作一栏时，他们可以任意填写，有时候他们甚至什么都不填，因为没有必要。
次级贷款的人不用担忧未来他们欠的贷款额度会上升15%，但Alt-A却有这一问题。因为Alt-A违约都是在后期发生的，我们将看着这场缓慢的崩溃持续很长时间。
违约率或将在2009年到2011年一直都会呈加速上升的态势，因为这一类的贷款在3年或者5年之后都需要进行利率调整。出现30天以上拖欠债务的违约情况，次级贷款为45%，选择性可调整利率贷款为30%，而Alt-A为20%。
选择性可调整利率贷款的规模约为5000亿-6000亿美元，主要是贷款给优先级的借款人。银行主要依据对房屋的估值以及信用评级公司FICO的信用评分来发放贷款。从2004年到2007年，83%的选择性可调整利率贷款的借款者都是低收入或者没有档案的，因此，此类贷款可以称为“说谎者贷款”。
借款人可以选择三种方式还款：其一，偿还全部本金和利息；其二， 偿还全部利息 ；其三， 只偿还非常低的“引逗利息”（通常是2%-3%，甚至1%）。在第三种情况下，没有支付的利息差额每个月将记入本金中。
典型的选择性可调整利率贷款都是30年或者40年的贷款，一般都是在5年后重新调整利率的。在这场房价下跌中，遭受损失最严重的地方是发行选择性可调整利率贷款最多的地方。
很多选择性可调整利率贷款借款人的情况比次级借款人的情况还要糟糕，因为他们要和这种掠夺性的贷款抗争。他们欠的钱在不断增加，而利率的调整则会产生更大的影响。次级贷款是从2006年底2007年初开始出问题的，而Alt-A和选择性可调整利率贷款实际上在2007年底也开始了，最近是在持续恶化。
选择性可调整利率贷款是抵押贷款中毒性最大的“东西”。例如：如果某人获得了固定利率为5.5%，5万美元的浮动利率抵押贷款，那么每个月还款可以有三种选择。其一，将本金和利息分摊后每月支付2839美元；其二，只支付利息2292美元；其三，每月只支付1%的利息，416美元。
第二种还款方式与第三种还款方式的区别在于，如果按照第三种方式付款，那么每个月1875美元的差额将会记入本金之中。当本金上涨15%至7.5万美元时，也就是第三年，就必须重设利率，要开始同时支付本金和利息了。
贷款标准在2000年开始松动了很多，而到2005年初之后，就变得更加糟糕了，其中最糟糕的贷款就是两年“引逗利率”的贷款。他们目前的违约率高到“前所未有”的程度，特别是当利率调整了之后会更差。这种引逗利率的第一批贷款是在2005年发行的，两年之后，2007年第一季度开始出现大量违约，次贷危机由此爆发。但是在2005年一季度之后，人们发行了一些质量更低的此类贷款。这些贷款在2007年不断重新调整利率，引发了越来越多的违约，于是这场危机持续恶化。从买房人第一个月欠款开始，一般需要平均15个月的时间把房屋清算掉，通常是通过拍卖的方式。
如此算来，2005年第一季度发放的贷款，在2007年第一季度止赎，然后到2008年上半年拍卖出去。
考虑到2005年下半年贷款的标准进一步放松，一直持续到2007年上半年，2009年以及之后的违约、止赎以及拍卖情形会进一步加剧，这些都会进一步拉低房价。
2008年，一共有约4400亿美元的抵押贷款利息进行了重新调整，人们原本预计“引逗利率”的贷款永远都不会重新调整。借款者和贷款者都认为房价会一直上涨，获得信贷也会一直很容易，这样借款人在利率调整之前都可以再贷款。而现在房价不断下跌，抵押贷款市场冻结，很少有人能够重新贷款，这样就导致了违约大量上升，许多情况下，甚至是在利率重新设置之前就违约了。
当Alt-A和选择性可调整利率贷款的利率大规模调整后，大量买房者在未来三年将支付更高的利率。Alt-A和选择性可调整利率贷款的利率调整将在2010年和2011年达到高峰，规模则将大大超过次级抵押贷款。
具体参考下面的图
上一波的高峰是次级贷款Subprime到期重置，形成大量违约，时间点在07-08年。这一波高峰是选择性可调整利率贷款 Option ARM集中到期。时间点是2011下半年到2012年春，预计会形成比次贷更严重的违约。
再看下面这篇最新的新闻
文章来源：http://blog.hsh.com/index.php/2011/05/is-now-the-time-to-dump-your-arm/
May 24th, 2011
Is now the time to dump your ARM?(现在应该回避选择性利率房贷吗?)
by Peter Miller
Despite continuing low mortgage rates, one prominent Detroit bankruptcy attorney says ARMs remain a looming danger and should be avoided. （虽然暂时来说贷款利率还是比较低，但一位破产法资深律师已经警告说应该回避 选择性浮动利率房贷AMR）
“The problem is that a significant part of our housing is still mortgaged with ARMs,” said Michael A. Greiner, a bankruptcy specialist. “Interest rates have been at historic lows for years now. But we are already starting to see upward pressure on interest rates. Once interest rates start to rise again, ARM payments will start to rise again.” （问题的根源是我们很大一部分的房屋都是选择了选择性浮动利率房贷，利率水平已经保持连续几年历史低位，同时我们也观察到了利率上调的压力。一旦利率向上调整，浮动利率房贷AMR的还款额度会开始攀升。）
Greiner explained that “The ARMs are what originally caused this crisis. People were unable to afford their mortgage payments when the rates adjusted…and that is what started the foreclosures. Since then, the foreclosure crisis has been driven by the larger economy, not by the ARMs adjusting. But when interest rates start rising again, we will see another wave of foreclosures due to the ARMs going up again.”（当浮动利率房贷的还款额度大幅攀升，人们就会无力支付，而选择放弃，那时候大量的断供就会出现。）
ARM trends
Greiner, of course, is right that if rates rise, a lot of marginal ARM borrowers–individuals who cannot afford steeper monthly costs–could face foreclosure and bankruptcy. That said, borrowers have been dumping ARMs recently:
Eighty-four percent of borrowers who had a hybrid ARM chose to refinance into a fixed-rate product during the first quarter, continuing a pattern of the past few years of borrowers revealing a strong preference for fixed-rate over variable-pay contracts.
During the first quarter of 2011, the ARM share of applications was 6 percent in Freddie Mac’s monthly ARM survey, which includes purchase-money as well as refinance applications.
The ARM issue may be overblown
Even if ARM rates were to rise, I think the problem they present may be overblown. I do not agree with the idea that “ARMs are what originally caused this crisis.”
Instead, let’s be more specific: what set off the mortgage meltdown was the creation of “affordable” loan products, many of which looked like ARMs but were radically different and more dangerous forms of financing.
Option ARMs: the evil twin
To give an example, since the 1970s, ARMs have generally had two forms of interest rate caps–an annual cap and a lifetime cap. Interest rate increases were typically limited to 2 percent per year, with a 6 percent cap over the original rate of the loan.
However, in 2002 and 2003 we began to see the “option ARM” concept emerge–a product under various names which allowed borrowers to make several payment choices during the loan’s start period. This loan also was distinguished by the fact that it often had three payment caps–a 2 percent annual limit, a 6 percent lifetime limit and a 6 percent limit when the loan was re-cast.
In other words, with this third payment cap, an option ARM rate could increase by as much as 6 percent at one time.
We knew Option ARMs were bad news
This problem was not unknown to the lending industry. Six years ago, John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency and a major bank regulator, explained the dangers:
In the case of a typical $360,000 payment option mortgage that starts at 6 percent interest, monthly payments could increase by 50 percent in the sixth year if interest rates do not change. If rates jump two percentage points, to 8 percent, monthly payments could double. （举例说明，一个资产价值 36万美元的贷款，如果开始是 6%的利率，在第六年的时候（AMR一般是3—5年），在利率不变的情况下，月供会增加到50%。可是如果利率上调2%，到8%，那么月供就翻了一倍了）
“Is this an appropriate product to mass market to customers who may be looking at the less than fully amortizing minimum payment as the only way to afford a larger mortgage–at least for the five years before the onset of payment shock?” Mr. Dugan asked. “And are lenders really prepared to deal with the consequences–including litigation risk–of providing such products in markets where real estate prices soften or decline, or where interest rates substantially increase?”
“Too many consumers have been attracted to products by the seductive prospect of low minimum payments that delay the day of reckoning, but often make ultimate repayment of growing principal far more difficult,” he added. “At the same time, too many lenders have been attracted to the product by the prospect of booking immediate revenue without receiving cash in hand, a process that often masks underlying credit problems that could ultimately produce substantial losses.”
What should you do if you still have an option ARM?
The easy answer is to refinance or get a loan modification. However, if you’re underwater or behind on your monthly payments, getting approved for either is going to be extremely difficult.
What if you just have a plain ARM? If you do, take a look at the potential monthly payment increases to see if you’re able to meet them given your current budget. If not, seek some stability by refinancing into a fixed-rate product. If you’ve had your ARM for at least a few years, you may want to consider a fixed-rate loan with a shorter term, say 20 or 15 years, as opposed to a new 30-year loan.
